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<title>user/sven/linux.git/include/linux/cpu.h, branch v5.3.2</title>
<subtitle>Linux Kernel
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/atom?h=v5.3.2</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/atom?h=v5.3.2'/>
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<updated>2019-06-03T10:02:03Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>x86/power: Fix 'nosmt' vs hibernation triple fault during resume</title>
<updated>2019-06-03T10:02:03Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Jiri Kosina</name>
<email>jkosina@suse.cz</email>
</author>
<published>2019-05-29T22:09:39Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=ec527c318036a65a083ef68d8ba95789d2212246'/>
<id>urn:sha1:ec527c318036a65a083ef68d8ba95789d2212246</id>
<content type='text'>
As explained in

	0cc3cd21657b ("cpu/hotplug: Boot HT siblings at least once")

we always, no matter what, have to bring up x86 HT siblings during boot at
least once in order to avoid first MCE bringing the system to its knees.

That means that whenever 'nosmt' is supplied on the kernel command-line,
all the HT siblings are as a result sitting in mwait or cpudile after
going through the online-offline cycle at least once.

This causes a serious issue though when a kernel, which saw 'nosmt' on its
commandline, is going to perform resume from hibernation: if the resume
from the hibernated image is successful, cr3 is flipped in order to point
to the address space of the kernel that is being resumed, which in turn
means that all the HT siblings are all of a sudden mwaiting on address
which is no longer valid.

That results in triple fault shortly after cr3 is switched, and machine
reboots.

Fix this by always waking up all the SMT siblings before initiating the
'restore from hibernation' process; this guarantees that all the HT
siblings will be properly carried over to the resumed kernel waiting in
resume_play_dead(), and acted upon accordingly afterwards, based on the
target kernel configuration.

Symmetricaly, the resumed kernel has to push the SMT siblings to mwait
again in case it has SMT disabled; this means it has to online all
the siblings when resuming (so that they come out of hlt) and offline
them again to let them reach mwait.

Cc: 4.19+ &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt; # v4.19+
Debugged-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Fixes: 0cc3cd21657b ("cpu/hotplug: Boot HT siblings at least once")
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina &lt;jkosina@suse.cz&gt;
Acked-by: Pavel Machek &lt;pavel@ucw.cz&gt;
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki &lt;rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'x86-mds-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip</title>
<updated>2019-05-14T14:57:29Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-05-14T14:57:29Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=fa4bff165070dc40a3de35b78e4f8da8e8d85ec5'/>
<id>urn:sha1:fa4bff165070dc40a3de35b78e4f8da8e8d85ec5</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull x86 MDS mitigations from Thomas Gleixner:
 "Microarchitectural Data Sampling (MDS) is a hardware vulnerability
  which allows unprivileged speculative access to data which is
  available in various CPU internal buffers. This new set of misfeatures
  has the following CVEs assigned:

     CVE-2018-12126  MSBDS  Microarchitectural Store Buffer Data Sampling
     CVE-2018-12130  MFBDS  Microarchitectural Fill Buffer Data Sampling
     CVE-2018-12127  MLPDS  Microarchitectural Load Port Data Sampling
     CVE-2019-11091  MDSUM  Microarchitectural Data Sampling Uncacheable Memory

  MDS attacks target microarchitectural buffers which speculatively
  forward data under certain conditions. Disclosure gadgets can expose
  this data via cache side channels.

  Contrary to other speculation based vulnerabilities the MDS
  vulnerability does not allow the attacker to control the memory target
  address. As a consequence the attacks are purely sampling based, but
  as demonstrated with the TLBleed attack samples can be postprocessed
  successfully.

  The mitigation is to flush the microarchitectural buffers on return to
  user space and before entering a VM. It's bolted on the VERW
  instruction and requires a microcode update. As some of the attacks
  exploit data structures shared between hyperthreads, full protection
  requires to disable hyperthreading. The kernel does not do that by
  default to avoid breaking unattended updates.

  The mitigation set comes with documentation for administrators and a
  deeper technical view"

* 'x86-mds-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (23 commits)
  x86/speculation/mds: Fix documentation typo
  Documentation: Correct the possible MDS sysfs values
  x86/mds: Add MDSUM variant to the MDS documentation
  x86/speculation/mds: Add 'mitigations=' support for MDS
  x86/speculation/mds: Print SMT vulnerable on MSBDS with mitigations off
  x86/speculation/mds: Fix comment
  x86/speculation/mds: Add SMT warning message
  x86/speculation: Move arch_smt_update() call to after mitigation decisions
  x86/speculation/mds: Add mds=full,nosmt cmdline option
  Documentation: Add MDS vulnerability documentation
  Documentation: Move L1TF to separate directory
  x86/speculation/mds: Add mitigation mode VMWERV
  x86/speculation/mds: Add sysfs reporting for MDS
  x86/speculation/mds: Add mitigation control for MDS
  x86/speculation/mds: Conditionally clear CPU buffers on idle entry
  x86/kvm/vmx: Add MDS protection when L1D Flush is not active
  x86/speculation/mds: Clear CPU buffers on exit to user
  x86/speculation/mds: Add mds_clear_cpu_buffers()
  x86/kvm: Expose X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR to guests
  x86/speculation/mds: Add BUG_MSBDS_ONLY
  ...
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'smp-hotplug-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip</title>
<updated>2019-05-06T21:44:49Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-05-06T21:44:49Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=5a2bf1abbf96fca02b9785c252e569ef8e004851'/>
<id>urn:sha1:5a2bf1abbf96fca02b9785c252e569ef8e004851</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull CPU hotplug updates from Ingo Molnar:
 "Two changes in this cycle:

   - Make the /sys/devices/system/cpu/smt/* files available on all
     arches, so user space has a consistent way to detect whether SMT is
     enabled.

   - Sparse annotation fix"

* 'smp-hotplug-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  smpboot: Place the __percpu annotation correctly
  cpu/hotplug: Create SMT sysfs interface for all arches
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'sched-core-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip</title>
<updated>2019-05-06T21:31:50Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-05-06T21:31:50Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=e00d4135751bfe786a9e26b5560b185ce3f9f963'/>
<id>urn:sha1:e00d4135751bfe786a9e26b5560b185ce3f9f963</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull scheduler updates from Ingo Molnar:
 "The main changes in this cycle were:

   - Make nohz housekeeping processing more permissive and less
     intrusive to isolated CPUs

   - Decouple CPU-bound workqueue acconting from the scheduler and move
     it into the workqueue code.

   - Optimize topology building

   - Better handle quota and period overflows

   - Add more RCU annotations

   - Comment updates, misc cleanups"

* 'sched-core-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (25 commits)
  nohz_full: Allow the boot CPU to be nohz_full
  sched/isolation: Require a present CPU in housekeeping mask
  kernel/cpu: Allow non-zero CPU to be primary for suspend / kexec freeze
  power/suspend: Add function to disable secondaries for suspend
  sched/core: Allow the remote scheduler tick to be started on CPU0
  sched/nohz: Run NOHZ idle load balancer on HK_FLAG_MISC CPUs
  sched/debug: Fix spelling mistake "logaritmic" -&gt; "logarithmic"
  sched/topology: Update init_sched_domains() comment
  cgroup/cpuset: Update stale generate_sched_domains() comments
  sched/core: Check quota and period overflow at usec to nsec conversion
  sched/core: Handle overflow in cpu_shares_write_u64
  sched/rt: Check integer overflow at usec to nsec conversion
  sched/core: Fix typo in comment
  sched/core: Make some functions static
  sched/core: Unify p-&gt;on_rq updates
  sched/core: Remove ttwu_activate()
  sched/core, workqueues: Distangle worker accounting from rq lock
  sched/fair: Remove unneeded prototype of capacity_of()
  sched/topology: Skip duplicate group rewrites in build_sched_groups()
  sched/topology: Fix build_sched_groups() comment
  ...
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>kernel/cpu: Allow non-zero CPU to be primary for suspend / kexec freeze</title>
<updated>2019-05-03T17:42:58Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Nicholas Piggin</name>
<email>npiggin@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-04-11T03:34:46Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=9ca12ac04bb7d7cfb28aa549dcd3d15761f15543'/>
<id>urn:sha1:9ca12ac04bb7d7cfb28aa549dcd3d15761f15543</id>
<content type='text'>
This patch provides an arch option, ARCH_SUSPEND_NONZERO_CPU, to
opt-in to allowing suspend to occur on one of the housekeeping CPUs
rather than hardcoded CPU0.

This will allow CPU0 to be a nohz_full CPU with a later change.

It may be possible for platforms with hardware/firmware restrictions
on suspend/wake effectively support this by handing off the final
stage to CPU0 when kernel housekeeping is no longer required. Another
option is to make housekeeping / nohz_full mask dynamic at runtime,
but the complexity could not be justified at this time.

Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin &lt;npiggin@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker &lt;fweisbec@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Rafael J . Wysocki &lt;rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190411033448.20842-4-npiggin@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>power/suspend: Add function to disable secondaries for suspend</title>
<updated>2019-05-03T17:42:41Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Nicholas Piggin</name>
<email>npiggin@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-04-11T03:34:45Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=2f1a6fbbef7781382850c3104ecb658f21b5d460'/>
<id>urn:sha1:2f1a6fbbef7781382850c3104ecb658f21b5d460</id>
<content type='text'>
This adds a function to disable secondary CPUs for suspend that are
not necessarily non-zero / non-boot CPUs. Platforms will be able to
use this to suspend using non-zero CPUs.

Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin &lt;npiggin@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker &lt;fweisbec@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Rafael J . Wysocki &lt;rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190411033448.20842-3-npiggin@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'core/speculation' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip.git</title>
<updated>2019-04-17T19:55:31Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Thomas Gleixner</name>
<email>tglx@linutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2019-04-17T19:38:16Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=e9fee6fe08eef51cd9a7455d18b9011f1e463f22'/>
<id>urn:sha1:e9fee6fe08eef51cd9a7455d18b9011f1e463f22</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull in the command line updates from the tip tree so the MDS parts can be
added.
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>cpu/speculation: Add 'mitigations=' cmdline option</title>
<updated>2019-04-17T19:37:28Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Josh Poimboeuf</name>
<email>jpoimboe@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-04-12T20:39:28Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=98af8452945c55652de68536afdde3b520fec429'/>
<id>urn:sha1:98af8452945c55652de68536afdde3b520fec429</id>
<content type='text'>
Keeping track of the number of mitigations for all the CPU speculation
bugs has become overwhelming for many users.  It's getting more and more
complicated to decide which mitigations are needed for a given
architecture.  Complicating matters is the fact that each arch tends to
have its own custom way to mitigate the same vulnerability.

Most users fall into a few basic categories:

a) they want all mitigations off;

b) they want all reasonable mitigations on, with SMT enabled even if
   it's vulnerable; or

c) they want all reasonable mitigations on, with SMT disabled if
   vulnerable.

Define a set of curated, arch-independent options, each of which is an
aggregation of existing options:

- mitigations=off: Disable all mitigations.

- mitigations=auto: [default] Enable all the default mitigations, but
  leave SMT enabled, even if it's vulnerable.

- mitigations=auto,nosmt: Enable all the default mitigations, disabling
  SMT if needed by a mitigation.

Currently, these options are placeholders which don't actually do
anything.  They will be fleshed out in upcoming patches.

Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Tested-by: Jiri Kosina &lt;jkosina@suse.cz&gt; (on x86)
Reviewed-by: Jiri Kosina &lt;jkosina@suse.cz&gt;
Cc: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" &lt;hpa@zytor.com&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Jiri Kosina &lt;jikos@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Waiman Long &lt;longman@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli &lt;aarcange@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Jon Masters &lt;jcm@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt &lt;benh@kernel.crashing.org&gt;
Cc: Paul Mackerras &lt;paulus@samba.org&gt;
Cc: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
Cc: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky &lt;schwidefsky@de.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Heiko Carstens &lt;heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: linux-s390@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Cc: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@canonical.com&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Randy Dunlap &lt;rdunlap@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Steven Price &lt;steven.price@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Phil Auld &lt;pauld@redhat.com&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/b07a8ef9b7c5055c3a4637c87d07c296d5016fe0.1555085500.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>cpu/hotplug: Create SMT sysfs interface for all arches</title>
<updated>2019-04-02T10:36:56Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Josh Poimboeuf</name>
<email>jpoimboe@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-03-27T12:00:29Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=de7b77e5bb9451417ca57f1b6501da654587c048'/>
<id>urn:sha1:de7b77e5bb9451417ca57f1b6501da654587c048</id>
<content type='text'>
Make the /sys/devices/system/cpu/smt/* files available on all arches, so
user space has a consistent way to detect whether SMT is enabled.

The 'control' file now shows 'notimplemented' for architectures which
don't yet have CONFIG_HOTPLUG_SMT.

[ tglx: Make notimplemented a real state ]

Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli &lt;aarcange@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Waiman Long &lt;longman@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Jiri Kosina &lt;jikos@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/469c2b98055f2c41e75748e06447d592a64080c9.1553635520.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/speculation/mds: Add sysfs reporting for MDS</title>
<updated>2019-03-06T20:52:14Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Thomas Gleixner</name>
<email>tglx@linutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2019-02-18T21:51:43Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=8a4b06d391b0a42a373808979b5028f5c84d9c6a'/>
<id>urn:sha1:8a4b06d391b0a42a373808979b5028f5c84d9c6a</id>
<content type='text'>
Add the sysfs reporting file for MDS. It exposes the vulnerability and
mitigation state similar to the existing files for the other speculative
hardware vulnerabilities.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jon Masters &lt;jcm@redhat.com&gt;
Tested-by: Jon Masters &lt;jcm@redhat.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
