user/sven/linux.git/include/linux/cpu.h, branch v5.6.10

cpu/hotplug: Ignore pm_wakeup_pending() for disable_nonboot_cpus()

2020-04-17T14:13:30Z

commit e98eac6ff1b45e4e73f2e6031b37c256ccb5d36b upstream. A recent change to freeze_secondary_cpus() which added an early abort if a wakeup is pending missed the fact that the function is also invoked for shutdown, reboot and kexec via disable_nonboot_cpus(). In case of disable_nonboot_cpus() the wakeup event needs to be ignored as the purpose is to terminate the currently running kernel. Add a 'suspend' argument which is only set when the freeze is in context of a suspend operation. If not set then an eventually pending wakeup event is ignored. Fixes: a66d955e910a ("cpu/hotplug: Abort disabling secondary CPUs if wakeup is pending") Reported-by: Boqun Feng Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Pavankumar Kondeti Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/874kuaxdiz.fsf@nanos.tec.linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

Merge branch 'pm-cpuidle'

2019-11-26T09:26:26Z

* pm-cpuidle: cpuidle: Pass exit latency limit to cpuidle_use_deepest_state() cpuidle: Allow idle injection to apply exit latency limit cpuidle: Introduce cpuidle_driver_state_disabled() for driver quirks cpuidle: teo: Avoid code duplication in conditionals cpuidle: teo: Avoid using "early hits" incorrectly cpuidle: teo: Exclude cpuidle overhead from computations cpuidle: Use nanoseconds as the unit of time cpuidle: Consolidate disabled state checks ACPI: processor_idle: Skip dummy wait if kernel is in guest cpuidle: Do not unset the driver if it is there already cpuidle: teo: Fix "early hits" handling for disabled idle states cpuidle: teo: Consider hits and misses metrics of disabled states cpuidle: teo: Rename local variable in teo_select() cpuidle: teo: Ignore disabled idle states that are too deep

cpuidle: Allow idle injection to apply exit latency limit

2019-11-20T10:32:55Z

In some cases it may be useful to specify an exit latency limit for the idle state to be used during CPU idle time injection. Instead of duplicating the information in struct cpuidle_device or propagating the latency limit in the call stack, replace the use_deepest_state field with forced_latency_limit_ns to represent that limit, so that the deepest idle state with exit latency within that limit is forced (i.e. no governors) when it is set. A zero exit latency limit for forced idle means to use governors in the usual way (analogous to use_deepest_state equal to "false" before this change). Additionally, add play_idle_precise() taking two arguments, the duration of forced idle and the idle state exit latency limit, both in nanoseconds, and redefine play_idle() as a wrapper around that new function. This change is preparatory, no functional impact is expected. Suggested-by: Rafael J. Wysocki Signed-off-by: Daniel Lezcano [ rjw: Subject, changelog, cpuidle_use_deepest_state() kerneldoc, whitespace ] Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki

cpu/speculation: Uninline and export CPU mitigations helpers

2019-11-04T11:22:02Z

A kernel module may need to check the value of the "mitigations=" kernel command line parameter as part of its setup when the module needs to perform software mitigations for a CPU flaw. Uninline and export the helper functions surrounding the cpu_mitigations enum to allow for their usage from a module. Lastly, privatize the enum and cpu_mitigations variable since the value of cpu_mitigations can be checked with the exported helper functions. Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner

x86/bugs: Add ITLB_MULTIHIT bug infrastructure

2019-11-04T11:22:01Z

Some processors may incur a machine check error possibly resulting in an unrecoverable CPU lockup when an instruction fetch encounters a TLB multi-hit in the instruction TLB. This can occur when the page size is changed along with either the physical address or cache type. The relevant erratum can be found here: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=205195 There are other processors affected for which the erratum does not fully disclose the impact. This issue affects both bare-metal x86 page tables and EPT. It can be mitigated by either eliminating the use of large pages or by using careful TLB invalidations when changing the page size in the page tables. Just like Spectre, Meltdown, L1TF and MDS, a new bit has been allocated in MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES (PSCHANGE_MC_NO) and will be set on CPUs which are mitigated against this issue. Signed-off-by: Vineela Tummalapalli Co-developed-by: Pawan Gupta Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner

x86/speculation/taa: Add sysfs reporting for TSX Async Abort

2019-10-28T07:36:59Z

Add the sysfs reporting file for TSX Async Abort. It exposes the vulnerability and the mitigation state similar to the existing files for the other hardware vulnerabilities. Sysfs file path is: /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/tsx_async_abort Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Tested-by: Neelima Krishnan Reviewed-by: Mark Gross Reviewed-by: Tony Luck Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf

cpu/SMT: create and export cpu_smt_possible()

2019-09-24T11:37:28Z

KVM needs to know if SMT is theoretically possible, this means it is supported and not forcefully disabled ('nosmt=force'). Create and export cpu_smt_possible() answering this question. Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini

cpuidle: play_idle: Increase the resolution to usec

2019-09-03T09:33:29Z

The play_idle resolution is 1ms. The intel_powerclamp bases the idle duration on jiffies. The idle injection API is also using msec based duration but has no user yet. Unfortunately, msec based time does not fit well when we want to inject idle cycle precisely with shallow idle state. In order to set the scene for the incoming idle injection user, move the precision up to usec when calling play_idle. Signed-off-by: Daniel Lezcano Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki

x86/power: Fix 'nosmt' vs hibernation triple fault during resume

2019-06-03T10:02:03Z

As explained in 0cc3cd21657b ("cpu/hotplug: Boot HT siblings at least once") we always, no matter what, have to bring up x86 HT siblings during boot at least once in order to avoid first MCE bringing the system to its knees. That means that whenever 'nosmt' is supplied on the kernel command-line, all the HT siblings are as a result sitting in mwait or cpudile after going through the online-offline cycle at least once. This causes a serious issue though when a kernel, which saw 'nosmt' on its commandline, is going to perform resume from hibernation: if the resume from the hibernated image is successful, cr3 is flipped in order to point to the address space of the kernel that is being resumed, which in turn means that all the HT siblings are all of a sudden mwaiting on address which is no longer valid. That results in triple fault shortly after cr3 is switched, and machine reboots. Fix this by always waking up all the SMT siblings before initiating the 'restore from hibernation' process; this guarantees that all the HT siblings will be properly carried over to the resumed kernel waiting in resume_play_dead(), and acted upon accordingly afterwards, based on the target kernel configuration. Symmetricaly, the resumed kernel has to push the SMT siblings to mwait again in case it has SMT disabled; this means it has to online all the siblings when resuming (so that they come out of hlt) and offline them again to let them reach mwait. Cc: 4.19+ # v4.19+ Debugged-by: Thomas Gleixner Fixes: 0cc3cd21657b ("cpu/hotplug: Boot HT siblings at least once") Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina Acked-by: Pavel Machek Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki

Merge branch 'x86-mds-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip

2019-05-14T14:57:29Z

Pull x86 MDS mitigations from Thomas Gleixner: "Microarchitectural Data Sampling (MDS) is a hardware vulnerability which allows unprivileged speculative access to data which is available in various CPU internal buffers. This new set of misfeatures has the following CVEs assigned: CVE-2018-12126 MSBDS Microarchitectural Store Buffer Data Sampling CVE-2018-12130 MFBDS Microarchitectural Fill Buffer Data Sampling CVE-2018-12127 MLPDS Microarchitectural Load Port Data Sampling CVE-2019-11091 MDSUM Microarchitectural Data Sampling Uncacheable Memory MDS attacks target microarchitectural buffers which speculatively forward data under certain conditions. Disclosure gadgets can expose this data via cache side channels. Contrary to other speculation based vulnerabilities the MDS vulnerability does not allow the attacker to control the memory target address. As a consequence the attacks are purely sampling based, but as demonstrated with the TLBleed attack samples can be postprocessed successfully. The mitigation is to flush the microarchitectural buffers on return to user space and before entering a VM. It's bolted on the VERW instruction and requires a microcode update. As some of the attacks exploit data structures shared between hyperthreads, full protection requires to disable hyperthreading. The kernel does not do that by default to avoid breaking unattended updates. The mitigation set comes with documentation for administrators and a deeper technical view" * 'x86-mds-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (23 commits) x86/speculation/mds: Fix documentation typo Documentation: Correct the possible MDS sysfs values x86/mds: Add MDSUM variant to the MDS documentation x86/speculation/mds: Add 'mitigations=' support for MDS x86/speculation/mds: Print SMT vulnerable on MSBDS with mitigations off x86/speculation/mds: Fix comment x86/speculation/mds: Add SMT warning message x86/speculation: Move arch_smt_update() call to after mitigation decisions x86/speculation/mds: Add mds=full,nosmt cmdline option Documentation: Add MDS vulnerability documentation Documentation: Move L1TF to separate directory x86/speculation/mds: Add mitigation mode VMWERV x86/speculation/mds: Add sysfs reporting for MDS x86/speculation/mds: Add mitigation control for MDS x86/speculation/mds: Conditionally clear CPU buffers on idle entry x86/kvm/vmx: Add MDS protection when L1D Flush is not active x86/speculation/mds: Clear CPU buffers on exit to user x86/speculation/mds: Add mds_clear_cpu_buffers() x86/kvm: Expose X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR to guests x86/speculation/mds: Add BUG_MSBDS_ONLY ...