<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>user/sven/linux.git/include/linux/fortify-string.h, branch v6.1.13</title>
<subtitle>Linux Kernel
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/atom?h=v6.1.13</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/atom?h=v6.1.13'/>
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<updated>2022-12-31T12:32:31Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>fortify: Do not cast to "unsigned char"</title>
<updated>2022-12-31T12:32:31Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>keescook@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2022-10-25T23:05:18Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=ed88147bfb4e7cd009cb33c7395a45d52f296bcc'/>
<id>urn:sha1:ed88147bfb4e7cd009cb33c7395a45d52f296bcc</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit e9a40e1585d792751d3a122392695e5a53032809 ]

Do not cast to "unsigned char", as this needlessly creates type problems
when attempting builds without -Wno-pointer-sign[1]. The intent of the
cast is to drop possible "const" types.

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHk-=wgz3Uba8w7kdXhsqR1qvfemYL+OFQdefJnkeqXG8qZ_pA@mail.gmail.com/

Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Fixes: 3009f891bb9f ("fortify: Allow strlen() and strnlen() to pass compile-time known lengths")
Cc: linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'hardening-v6.1-rc4' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux</title>
<updated>2022-11-04T21:46:45Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2022-11-04T21:46:45Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=bd745027438a854e2d7c124032e9ad4aa389e153'/>
<id>urn:sha1:bd745027438a854e2d7c124032e9ad4aa389e153</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull hardening fix from Kees Cook:

 - Correctly report struct member size on memcpy overflow (Kees Cook)

* tag 'hardening-v6.1-rc4' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux:
  fortify: Capture __bos() results in const temp vars
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fortify: Capture __bos() results in const temp vars</title>
<updated>2022-10-28T23:07:01Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>keescook@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2022-10-28T22:32:07Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=6f7630b1b5bc672b54c1285ee6aba752b446672c'/>
<id>urn:sha1:6f7630b1b5bc672b54c1285ee6aba752b446672c</id>
<content type='text'>
In two recent run-time memcpy() bound checking bug reports (NFS[1] and
JFS[2]), the _detection_ was working correctly (in the sense that the
requested copy size was larger than the destination field size), but
the _warning text_ was showing the destination field size as SIZE_MAX
("unknown size"). This should be impossible, since the detection function
will explicitly give up if the destination field size is unknown. For
example, the JFS warning was:

  memcpy: detected field-spanning write (size 132) of single field "ip-&gt;i_link" at fs/jfs/namei.c:950 (size 18446744073709551615)

Other cases of this warning (e.g.[3]) have reported correctly,
and the reproducer only happens under GCC (at least 10.2 and 12.1),
so this currently appears to be a GCC bug. Explicitly capturing the
__builtin_object_size() results in const temporary variables fixes the
report. For example, the JFS reproducer now correctly reports the field
size (128):

  memcpy: detected field-spanning write (size 132) of single field "ip-&gt;i_link" at fs/jfs/namei.c:950 (size 128)

Examination of the .text delta (which is otherwise identical), shows
the literal value used in the report changing:

-     mov    $0xffffffffffffffff,%rcx
+     mov    $0x80,%ecx

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/Y0zEzZwhOxTDcBTB@codemonkey.org.uk/
[2] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=23d613df5259b977dac1696bec77f61a85890e3d
[3] https://lore.kernel.org/all/202210110948.26b43120-yujie.liu@intel.com/

Cc: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" &lt;linux@treblig.org&gt;
Cc: llvm@lists.linux.dev
Cc: linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86: fortify: kmsan: fix KMSAN fortify builds</title>
<updated>2022-10-28T20:37:23Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Alexander Potapenko</name>
<email>glider@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-10-24T21:21:44Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=78a498c3a227f2ac773a8234b2ce092a4403f2c3'/>
<id>urn:sha1:78a498c3a227f2ac773a8234b2ce092a4403f2c3</id>
<content type='text'>
Ensure that KMSAN builds replace memset/memcpy/memmove calls with the
respective __msan_XXX functions, and that none of the macros are redefined
twice.  This should allow building kernel with both CONFIG_KMSAN and
CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20221024212144.2852069-5-glider@google.com
Link: https://github.com/google/kmsan/issues/89
Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko &lt;glider@google.com&gt;
Reported-by: Tamas K Lengyel &lt;tamas.lengyel@zentific.com&gt;
Cc: Nathan Chancellor &lt;nathan@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Nick Desaulniers &lt;ndesaulniers@google.com&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'mm-stable-2022-10-08' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm</title>
<updated>2022-10-11T00:53:04Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2022-10-11T00:53:04Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=27bc50fc90647bbf7b734c3fc306a5e61350da53'/>
<id>urn:sha1:27bc50fc90647bbf7b734c3fc306a5e61350da53</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull MM updates from Andrew Morton:

 - Yu Zhao's Multi-Gen LRU patches are here. They've been under test in
   linux-next for a couple of months without, to my knowledge, any
   negative reports (or any positive ones, come to that).

 - Also the Maple Tree from Liam Howlett. An overlapping range-based
   tree for vmas. It it apparently slightly more efficient in its own
   right, but is mainly targeted at enabling work to reduce mmap_lock
   contention.

   Liam has identified a number of other tree users in the kernel which
   could be beneficially onverted to mapletrees.

   Yu Zhao has identified a hard-to-hit but "easy to fix" lockdep splat
   at [1]. This has yet to be addressed due to Liam's unfortunately
   timed vacation. He is now back and we'll get this fixed up.

 - Dmitry Vyukov introduces KMSAN: the Kernel Memory Sanitizer. It uses
   clang-generated instrumentation to detect used-unintialized bugs down
   to the single bit level.

   KMSAN keeps finding bugs. New ones, as well as the legacy ones.

 - Yang Shi adds a userspace mechanism (madvise) to induce a collapse of
   memory into THPs.

 - Zach O'Keefe has expanded Yang Shi's madvise(MADV_COLLAPSE) to
   support file/shmem-backed pages.

 - userfaultfd updates from Axel Rasmussen

 - zsmalloc cleanups from Alexey Romanov

 - cleanups from Miaohe Lin: vmscan, hugetlb_cgroup, hugetlb and
   memory-failure

 - Huang Ying adds enhancements to NUMA balancing memory tiering mode's
   page promotion, with a new way of detecting hot pages.

 - memcg updates from Shakeel Butt: charging optimizations and reduced
   memory consumption.

 - memcg cleanups from Kairui Song.

 - memcg fixes and cleanups from Johannes Weiner.

 - Vishal Moola provides more folio conversions

 - Zhang Yi removed ll_rw_block() :(

 - migration enhancements from Peter Xu

 - migration error-path bugfixes from Huang Ying

 - Aneesh Kumar added ability for a device driver to alter the memory
   tiering promotion paths. For optimizations by PMEM drivers, DRM
   drivers, etc.

 - vma merging improvements from Jakub Matěn.

 - NUMA hinting cleanups from David Hildenbrand.

 - xu xin added aditional userspace visibility into KSM merging
   activity.

 - THP &amp; KSM code consolidation from Qi Zheng.

 - more folio work from Matthew Wilcox.

 - KASAN updates from Andrey Konovalov.

 - DAMON cleanups from Kaixu Xia.

 - DAMON work from SeongJae Park: fixes, cleanups.

 - hugetlb sysfs cleanups from Muchun Song.

 - Mike Kravetz fixes locking issues in hugetlbfs and in hugetlb core.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CAOUHufZabH85CeUN-MEMgL8gJGzJEWUrkiM58JkTbBhh-jew0Q@mail.gmail.com [1]

* tag 'mm-stable-2022-10-08' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm: (555 commits)
  hugetlb: allocate vma lock for all sharable vmas
  hugetlb: take hugetlb vma_lock when clearing vma_lock-&gt;vma pointer
  hugetlb: fix vma lock handling during split vma and range unmapping
  mglru: mm/vmscan.c: fix imprecise comments
  mm/mglru: don't sync disk for each aging cycle
  mm: memcontrol: drop dead CONFIG_MEMCG_SWAP config symbol
  mm: memcontrol: use do_memsw_account() in a few more places
  mm: memcontrol: deprecate swapaccounting=0 mode
  mm: memcontrol: don't allocate cgroup swap arrays when memcg is disabled
  mm/secretmem: remove reduntant return value
  mm/hugetlb: add available_huge_pages() func
  mm: remove unused inline functions from include/linux/mm_inline.h
  selftests/vm: add selftest for MADV_COLLAPSE of uffd-minor memory
  selftests/vm: add file/shmem MADV_COLLAPSE selftest for cleared pmd
  selftests/vm: add thp collapse shmem testing
  selftests/vm: add thp collapse file and tmpfs testing
  selftests/vm: modularize thp collapse memory operations
  selftests/vm: dedup THP helpers
  mm/khugepaged: add tracepoint to hpage_collapse_scan_file()
  mm/madvise: add file and shmem support to MADV_COLLAPSE
  ...
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86: kmsan: use __msan_ string functions where possible.</title>
<updated>2022-10-03T21:03:24Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Alexander Potapenko</name>
<email>glider@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-09-15T15:04:09Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=ff901d80fff6d65ada6f2a60a1f7d180ee2e0416'/>
<id>urn:sha1:ff901d80fff6d65ada6f2a60a1f7d180ee2e0416</id>
<content type='text'>
Unless stated otherwise (by explicitly calling __memcpy(), __memset() or
__memmove()) we want all string functions to call their __msan_ versions
(e.g.  __msan_memcpy() instead of memcpy()), so that shadow and origin
values are updated accordingly.

Bootloader must still use the default string functions to avoid crashes.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220915150417.722975-36-glider@google.com
Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko &lt;glider@google.com&gt;
Cc: Alexander Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Andrey Konovalov &lt;andreyknvl@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Andrey Konovalov &lt;andreyknvl@google.com&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Cc: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Cc: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Cc: Christoph Lameter &lt;cl@linux.com&gt;
Cc: David Rientjes &lt;rientjes@google.com&gt;
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Cc: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Cc: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Cc: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Cc: Ilya Leoshkevich &lt;iii@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@kernel.dk&gt;
Cc: Joonsoo Kim &lt;iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Marco Elver &lt;elver@google.com&gt;
Cc: Mark Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Matthew Wilcox &lt;willy@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin &lt;mst@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Pekka Enberg &lt;penberg@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Petr Mladek &lt;pmladek@suse.com&gt;
Cc: Stephen Rothwell &lt;sfr@canb.auug.org.au&gt;
Cc: Steven Rostedt &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Vasily Gorbik &lt;gor@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Vegard Nossum &lt;vegard.nossum@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Vlastimil Babka &lt;vbabka@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fortify: Convert to struct vs member helpers</title>
<updated>2022-09-26T18:01:32Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>keescook@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2022-09-20T02:50:32Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=9f7d69c5cd23904a29178a7ecc4eee9c1cfba04b'/>
<id>urn:sha1:9f7d69c5cd23904a29178a7ecc4eee9c1cfba04b</id>
<content type='text'>
In preparation for adding support for __builtin_dynamic_object_size(),
wrap each instance of __builtin_object_size(p, N) with either the new
__struct_size(p) as __bos(p, 0), or __member_size(p) as __bos(p, 1).
This will allow us to replace the definitions with __bdos() next.
There are no binary differences from this change.

Cc: Nathan Chancellor &lt;nathan@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Nick Desaulniers &lt;ndesaulniers@google.com&gt;
Cc: Tom Rix &lt;trix@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org
Cc: llvm@lists.linux.dev
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20220920192202.190793-4-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fortify: Explicitly check bounds are compile-time constants</title>
<updated>2022-09-26T18:01:32Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>keescook@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2022-09-19T23:33:33Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=fa35198f39571bbdae53c5b321020021eaad6bd2'/>
<id>urn:sha1:fa35198f39571bbdae53c5b321020021eaad6bd2</id>
<content type='text'>
In preparation for replacing __builtin_object_size() with
__builtin_dynamic_object_size(), all the compile-time size checks
need to check that the bounds comparisons are, in fact, known at
compile-time. Enforce what was guaranteed with __bos(). In other words,
since all uses of __bos() were constant expressions, it was not required
to test for this. When these change to __bdos(), they _may_ be constant
expressions, and the checks are only valid when the prior condition
holds. This results in no binary differences.

Cc: linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20220920192202.190793-3-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fortify: Add run-time WARN for cross-field memcpy()</title>
<updated>2022-09-07T23:37:26Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>keescook@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2021-06-24T22:39:26Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=54d9469bc515dc5fcbc20eecbe19cea868b70d68'/>
<id>urn:sha1:54d9469bc515dc5fcbc20eecbe19cea868b70d68</id>
<content type='text'>
Enable run-time checking of dynamic memcpy() and memmove() lengths,
issuing a WARN when a write would exceed the size of the target struct
member, when built with CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE=y. This would have
caught all of the memcpy()-based buffer overflows in the last 3 years,
specifically covering all the cases where the destination buffer size
is known at compile time.

This change ONLY adds a run-time warning. As false positives are currently
still expected, this will not block the overflow. The new warnings will
look like this:

  memcpy: detected field-spanning write (size N) of single field "var-&gt;dest" (size M)
  WARNING: CPU: n PID: pppp at source/file/path.c:nr function+0xXX/0xXX [module]

There may be false positives in the kernel where intentional
field-spanning writes are happening. These need to be addressed
similarly to how the compile-time cases were addressed: add a
struct_group(), split the memcpy(), or some other refactoring.

In order to make counting/investigating instances of added runtime checks
easier, each instance includes the destination variable name as a WARN
argument, prefixed with 'field "'. Therefore, on an x86_64 defconfig
build, it is trivial to inspect the build artifacts to find instances.
For example on an x86_64 defconfig build, there are 78 new run-time
memcpy() bounds checks added:

  $ for i in vmlinux $(find . -name '*.ko'); do \
      strings "$i" | grep '^field "'; done | wc -l
  78

Simple cases where a destination buffer is known to be a dynamic size
do not generate a WARN. For example:

struct normal_flex_array {
	void *a;
	int b;
	u32 c;
	size_t array_size;
	u8 flex_array[];
};

struct normal_flex_array *instance;
...
/* These will be ignored for run-time bounds checking. */
memcpy(instance, src, len);
memcpy(instance-&gt;flex_array, src, len);

However, one of the dynamic-sized destination cases is irritatingly
unable to be detected by the compiler: when using memcpy() to target
a composite struct member which contains a trailing flexible array
struct. For example:

struct wrapper {
	int foo;
	char bar;
	struct normal_flex_array embedded;
};

struct wrapper *instance;
...
/* This will incorrectly WARN when len &gt; sizeof(instance-&gt;embedded) */
memcpy(&amp;instance-&gt;embedded, src, len);

These cases end up appearing to the compiler to be sized as if the
flexible array had 0 elements. :( For more details see:
https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=101832
https://godbolt.org/z/vW6x8vh4P

These "composite flexible array structure destination" cases will be
need to be flushed out and addressed on a case-by-case basis.

Regardless, for the general case of using memcpy() on flexible array
destinations, future APIs will be created to handle common cases. Those
can be used to migrate away from open-coded memcpy() so that proper
error handling (instead of trapping) can be used.

As mentioned, none of these bounds checks block any overflows
currently. For users that have tested their workloads, do not encounter
any warnings, and wish to make these checks stop any overflows, they
can use a big hammer and set the sysctl panic_on_warn=1.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fortify: Use SIZE_MAX instead of (size_t)-1</title>
<updated>2022-09-07T23:37:26Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>keescook@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2022-09-02T20:23:06Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=311fb40aa0569abacc430b0d66ee41470803111f'/>
<id>urn:sha1:311fb40aa0569abacc430b0d66ee41470803111f</id>
<content type='text'>
Clean up uses of "(size_t)-1" in favor of SIZE_MAX.

Cc: linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org
Suggested-by: Nick Desaulniers &lt;ndesaulniers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
