<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>user/sven/linux.git/include/linux/fs.h, branch v4.14.186</title>
<subtitle>Linux Kernel
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/atom?h=v4.14.186</id>
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<updated>2020-05-20T06:17:09Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>gcc-10 warnings: fix low-hanging fruit</title>
<updated>2020-05-20T06:17:09Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2020-05-04T16:16:37Z</published>
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<content type='text'>
commit 9d82973e032e246ff5663c9805fbb5407ae932e3 upstream.

Due to a bug-report that was compiler-dependent, I updated one of my
machines to gcc-10.  That shows a lot of new warnings.  Happily they
seem to be mostly the valid kind, but it's going to cause a round of
churn for getting rid of them..

This is the really low-hanging fruit of removing a couple of zero-sized
arrays in some core code.  We have had a round of these patches before,
and we'll have many more coming, and there is nothing special about
these except that they were particularly trivial, and triggered more
warnings than most.

Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>futex: Fix inode life-time issue</title>
<updated>2020-04-02T14:34:21Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Peter Zijlstra</name>
<email>peterz@infradead.org</email>
</author>
<published>2020-03-04T10:28:31Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:e52694b56eb6d4b1fe424bda6126b8ce13c246a8</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 8019ad13ef7f64be44d4f892af9c840179009254 upstream.

As reported by Jann, ihold() does not in fact guarantee inode
persistence. And instead of making it so, replace the usage of inode
pointers with a per boot, machine wide, unique inode identifier.

This sequence number is global, but shared (file backed) futexes are
rare enough that this should not become a performance issue.

Reported-by: Jann Horn &lt;jannh@google.com&gt;
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mm: add filemap_fdatawait_range_keep_errors()</title>
<updated>2019-07-31T05:28:47Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Ross Zwisler</name>
<email>zwisler@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-06-20T21:05:37Z</published>
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<content type='text'>
commit aa0bfcd939c30617385ffa28682c062d78050eba upstream.

In the spirit of filemap_fdatawait_range() and
filemap_fdatawait_keep_errors(), introduce
filemap_fdatawait_range_keep_errors() which both takes a range upon
which to wait and does not clear errors from the address space.

Signed-off-by: Ross Zwisler &lt;zwisler@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fs: stream_open - opener for stream-like files so that read and write can run simultaneously without deadlock</title>
<updated>2019-06-11T10:21:51Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Kirill Smelkov</name>
<email>kirr@nexedi.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-03-26T22:20:43Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=b673f99cec0d9767ae7b98ab86ee6f58564efcd7'/>
<id>urn:sha1:b673f99cec0d9767ae7b98ab86ee6f58564efcd7</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 10dce8af34226d90fa56746a934f8da5dcdba3df upstream.

Commit 9c225f2655e3 ("vfs: atomic f_pos accesses as per POSIX") added
locking for file.f_pos access and in particular made concurrent read and
write not possible - now both those functions take f_pos lock for the
whole run, and so if e.g. a read is blocked waiting for data, write will
deadlock waiting for that read to complete.

This caused regression for stream-like files where previously read and
write could run simultaneously, but after that patch could not do so
anymore. See e.g. commit 581d21a2d02a ("xenbus: fix deadlock on writes
to /proc/xen/xenbus") which fixes such regression for particular case of
/proc/xen/xenbus.

The patch that added f_pos lock in 2014 did so to guarantee POSIX thread
safety for read/write/lseek and added the locking to file descriptors of
all regular files. In 2014 that thread-safety problem was not new as it
was already discussed earlier in 2006.

However even though 2006'th version of Linus's patch was adding f_pos
locking "only for files that are marked seekable with FMODE_LSEEK (thus
avoiding the stream-like objects like pipes and sockets)", the 2014
version - the one that actually made it into the tree as 9c225f2655e3 -
is doing so irregardless of whether a file is seekable or not.

See

    https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/53022DB1.4070805@gmail.com/
    https://lwn.net/Articles/180387
    https://lwn.net/Articles/180396

for historic context.

The reason that it did so is, probably, that there are many files that
are marked non-seekable, but e.g. their read implementation actually
depends on knowing current position to correctly handle the read. Some
examples:

	kernel/power/user.c		snapshot_read
	fs/debugfs/file.c		u32_array_read
	fs/fuse/control.c		fuse_conn_waiting_read + ...
	drivers/hwmon/asus_atk0110.c	atk_debugfs_ggrp_read
	arch/s390/hypfs/inode.c		hypfs_read_iter
	...

Despite that, many nonseekable_open users implement read and write with
pure stream semantics - they don't depend on passed ppos at all. And for
those cases where read could wait for something inside, it creates a
situation similar to xenbus - the write could be never made to go until
read is done, and read is waiting for some, potentially external, event,
for potentially unbounded time -&gt; deadlock.

Besides xenbus, there are 14 such places in the kernel that I've found
with semantic patch (see below):

	drivers/xen/evtchn.c:667:8-24: ERROR: evtchn_fops: .read() can deadlock .write()
	drivers/isdn/capi/capi.c:963:8-24: ERROR: capi_fops: .read() can deadlock .write()
	drivers/input/evdev.c:527:1-17: ERROR: evdev_fops: .read() can deadlock .write()
	drivers/char/pcmcia/cm4000_cs.c:1685:7-23: ERROR: cm4000_fops: .read() can deadlock .write()
	net/rfkill/core.c:1146:8-24: ERROR: rfkill_fops: .read() can deadlock .write()
	drivers/s390/char/fs3270.c:488:1-17: ERROR: fs3270_fops: .read() can deadlock .write()
	drivers/usb/misc/ldusb.c:310:1-17: ERROR: ld_usb_fops: .read() can deadlock .write()
	drivers/hid/uhid.c:635:1-17: ERROR: uhid_fops: .read() can deadlock .write()
	net/batman-adv/icmp_socket.c:80:1-17: ERROR: batadv_fops: .read() can deadlock .write()
	drivers/media/rc/lirc_dev.c:198:1-17: ERROR: lirc_fops: .read() can deadlock .write()
	drivers/leds/uleds.c:77:1-17: ERROR: uleds_fops: .read() can deadlock .write()
	drivers/input/misc/uinput.c:400:1-17: ERROR: uinput_fops: .read() can deadlock .write()
	drivers/infiniband/core/user_mad.c:985:7-23: ERROR: umad_fops: .read() can deadlock .write()
	drivers/gnss/core.c:45:1-17: ERROR: gnss_fops: .read() can deadlock .write()

In addition to the cases above another regression caused by f_pos
locking is that now FUSE filesystems that implement open with
FOPEN_NONSEEKABLE flag, can no longer implement bidirectional
stream-like files - for the same reason as above e.g. read can deadlock
write locking on file.f_pos in the kernel.

FUSE's FOPEN_NONSEEKABLE was added in 2008 in a7c1b990f715 ("fuse:
implement nonseekable open") to support OSSPD. OSSPD implements /dev/dsp
in userspace with FOPEN_NONSEEKABLE flag, with corresponding read and
write routines not depending on current position at all, and with both
read and write being potentially blocking operations:

See

    https://github.com/libfuse/osspd
    https://lwn.net/Articles/308445

    https://github.com/libfuse/osspd/blob/14a9cff0/osspd.c#L1406
    https://github.com/libfuse/osspd/blob/14a9cff0/osspd.c#L1438-L1477
    https://github.com/libfuse/osspd/blob/14a9cff0/osspd.c#L1479-L1510

Corresponding libfuse example/test also describes FOPEN_NONSEEKABLE as
"somewhat pipe-like files ..." with read handler not using offset.
However that test implements only read without write and cannot exercise
the deadlock scenario:

    https://github.com/libfuse/libfuse/blob/fuse-3.4.2-3-ga1bff7d/example/poll.c#L124-L131
    https://github.com/libfuse/libfuse/blob/fuse-3.4.2-3-ga1bff7d/example/poll.c#L146-L163
    https://github.com/libfuse/libfuse/blob/fuse-3.4.2-3-ga1bff7d/example/poll.c#L209-L216

I've actually hit the read vs write deadlock for real while implementing
my FUSE filesystem where there is /head/watch file, for which open
creates separate bidirectional socket-like stream in between filesystem
and its user with both read and write being later performed
simultaneously. And there it is semantically not easy to split the
stream into two separate read-only and write-only channels:

    https://lab.nexedi.com/kirr/wendelin.core/blob/f13aa600/wcfs/wcfs.go#L88-169

Let's fix this regression. The plan is:

1. We can't change nonseekable_open to include &amp;~FMODE_ATOMIC_POS -
   doing so would break many in-kernel nonseekable_open users which
   actually use ppos in read/write handlers.

2. Add stream_open() to kernel to open stream-like non-seekable file
   descriptors. Read and write on such file descriptors would never use
   nor change ppos. And with that property on stream-like files read and
   write will be running without taking f_pos lock - i.e. read and write
   could be running simultaneously.

3. With semantic patch search and convert to stream_open all in-kernel
   nonseekable_open users for which read and write actually do not
   depend on ppos and where there is no other methods in file_operations
   which assume @offset access.

4. Add FOPEN_STREAM to fs/fuse/ and open in-kernel file-descriptors via
   steam_open if that bit is present in filesystem open reply.

   It was tempting to change fs/fuse/ open handler to use stream_open
   instead of nonseekable_open on just FOPEN_NONSEEKABLE flags, but
   grepping through Debian codesearch shows users of FOPEN_NONSEEKABLE,
   and in particular GVFS which actually uses offset in its read and
   write handlers

	https://codesearch.debian.net/search?q=-%3Enonseekable+%3D
	https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/gvfs/blob/1.40.0-6-gcbc54396/client/gvfsfusedaemon.c#L1080
	https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/gvfs/blob/1.40.0-6-gcbc54396/client/gvfsfusedaemon.c#L1247-1346
	https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/gvfs/blob/1.40.0-6-gcbc54396/client/gvfsfusedaemon.c#L1399-1481

   so if we would do such a change it will break a real user.

5. Add stream_open and FOPEN_STREAM handling to stable kernels starting
   from v3.14+ (the kernel where 9c225f2655 first appeared).

   This will allow to patch OSSPD and other FUSE filesystems that
   provide stream-like files to return FOPEN_STREAM | FOPEN_NONSEEKABLE
   in their open handler and this way avoid the deadlock on all kernel
   versions. This should work because fs/fuse/ ignores unknown open
   flags returned from a filesystem and so passing FOPEN_STREAM to a
   kernel that is not aware of this flag cannot hurt. In turn the kernel
   that is not aware of FOPEN_STREAM will be &lt; v3.14 where just
   FOPEN_NONSEEKABLE is sufficient to implement streams without read vs
   write deadlock.

This patch adds stream_open, converts /proc/xen/xenbus to it and adds
semantic patch to automatically locate in-kernel places that are either
required to be converted due to read vs write deadlock, or that are just
safe to be converted because read and write do not use ppos and there
are no other funky methods in file_operations.

Regarding semantic patch I've verified each generated change manually -
that it is correct to convert - and each other nonseekable_open instance
left - that it is either not correct to convert there, or that it is not
converted due to current stream_open.cocci limitations.

The script also does not convert files that should be valid to convert,
but that currently have .llseek = noop_llseek or generic_file_llseek for
unknown reason despite file being opened with nonseekable_open (e.g.
drivers/input/mousedev.c)

Cc: Michael Kerrisk &lt;mtk.manpages@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Yongzhi Pan &lt;panyongzhi@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Jonathan Corbet &lt;corbet@lwn.net&gt;
Cc: David Vrabel &lt;david.vrabel@citrix.com&gt;
Cc: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Cc: Miklos Szeredi &lt;miklos@szeredi.hu&gt;
Cc: Tejun Heo &lt;tj@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Kirill Tkhai &lt;ktkhai@virtuozzo.com&gt;
Cc: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Cc: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Cc: Julia Lawall &lt;Julia.Lawall@lip6.fr&gt;
Cc: Nikolaus Rath &lt;Nikolaus@rath.org&gt;
Cc: Han-Wen Nienhuys &lt;hanwen@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kirill Smelkov &lt;kirr@nexedi.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>iomap: report collisions between directio and buffered writes to userspace</title>
<updated>2019-04-27T07:35:41Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Darrick J. Wong</name>
<email>darrick.wong@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-01-08T18:41:39Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=4fa17fc730ba3b7f0cb69937df919a7a226067be'/>
<id>urn:sha1:4fa17fc730ba3b7f0cb69937df919a7a226067be</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 5a9d929d6e13278df62bd9e3d3ceae8c87ad1eea upstream.

If two programs simultaneously try to write to the same part of a file
via direct IO and buffered IO, there's a chance that the post-diowrite
pagecache invalidation will fail on the dirty page.  When this happens,
the dio write succeeded, which means that the page cache is no longer
coherent with the disk!

Programs are not supposed to mix IO types and this is a clear case of
data corruption, so store an EIO which will be reflected to userspace
during the next fsync.  Replace the WARN_ON with a ratelimited pr_crit
so that the developers have /some/ kind of breadcrumb to track down the
offending program(s) and file(s) involved.

Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong &lt;darrick.wong@oracle.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Liu Bo &lt;bo.li.liu@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Cc: Zubin Mithra &lt;zsm@chromium.org&gt;


</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>namei: allow restricted O_CREAT of FIFOs and regular files</title>
<updated>2018-12-01T08:42:59Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Salvatore Mesoraca</name>
<email>s.mesoraca16@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-08-24T00:00:35Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=7bcfd8f985f2c7bf7be6a08333dfaf31ed58ccd4'/>
<id>urn:sha1:7bcfd8f985f2c7bf7be6a08333dfaf31ed58ccd4</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 30aba6656f61ed44cba445a3c0d38b296fa9e8f5 upstream.

Disallows open of FIFOs or regular files not owned by the user in world
writable sticky directories, unless the owner is the same as that of the
directory or the file is opened without the O_CREAT flag.  The purpose
is to make data spoofing attacks harder.  This protection can be turned
on and off separately for FIFOs and regular files via sysctl, just like
the symlinks/hardlinks protection.  This patch is based on Openwall's
"HARDEN_FIFO" feature by Solar Designer.

This is a brief list of old vulnerabilities that could have been prevented
by this feature, some of them even allow for privilege escalation:

CVE-2000-1134
CVE-2007-3852
CVE-2008-0525
CVE-2009-0416
CVE-2011-4834
CVE-2015-1838
CVE-2015-7442
CVE-2016-7489

This list is not meant to be complete.  It's difficult to track down all
vulnerabilities of this kind because they were often reported without any
mention of this particular attack vector.  In fact, before
hardlinks/symlinks restrictions, fifos/regular files weren't the favorite
vehicle to exploit them.

[s.mesoraca16@gmail.com: fix bug reported by Dan Carpenter]
  Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180426081456.GA7060@mwanda
  Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1524829819-11275-1-git-send-email-s.mesoraca16@gmail.com
[keescook@chromium.org: drop pr_warn_ratelimited() in favor of audit changes in the future]
[keescook@chromium.org: adjust commit subjet]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180416175918.GA13494@beast
Signed-off-by: Salvatore Mesoraca &lt;s.mesoraca16@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Suggested-by: Solar Designer &lt;solar@openwall.com&gt;
Suggested-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Dan Carpenter &lt;dan.carpenter@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Loic &lt;hackurx@opensec.fr&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>vfs: swap names of {do,vfs}_clone_file_range()</title>
<updated>2018-11-10T15:48:33Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Amir Goldstein</name>
<email>amir73il@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-10-22T17:56:46Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=8a6cee344cc0236d6171bc24506cb593d84b8214'/>
<id>urn:sha1:8a6cee344cc0236d6171bc24506cb593d84b8214</id>
<content type='text'>
commit a725356b6659469d182d662f22d770d83d3bc7b5 upstream.

Commit 031a072a0b8a ("vfs: call vfs_clone_file_range() under freeze
protection") created a wrapper do_clone_file_range() around
vfs_clone_file_range() moving the freeze protection to former, so
overlayfs could call the latter.

The more common vfs practice is to call do_xxx helpers from vfs_xxx
helpers, where freeze protecction is taken in the vfs_xxx helper, so
this anomality could be a source of confusion.

It seems that commit 8ede205541ff ("ovl: add reflink/copyfile/dedup
support") may have fallen a victim to this confusion -
ovl_clone_file_range() calls the vfs_clone_file_range() helper in the
hope of getting freeze protection on upper fs, but in fact results in
overlayfs allowing to bypass upper fs freeze protection.

Swap the names of the two helpers to conform to common vfs practice
and call the correct helpers from overlayfs and nfsd.

Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein &lt;amir73il@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi &lt;mszeredi@redhat.com&gt;
Fixes: 031a072a0b8a ("vfs: call vfs_clone_file_range() under freeze...")
Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein &lt;amir73il@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fs: Teach path_connected to handle nfs filesystems with multiple roots.</title>
<updated>2018-03-21T11:06:43Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric W. Biederman</name>
<email>ebiederm@xmission.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-03-14T23:20:29Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=0481f001d9c1c8a277908622cedd965575f2915b'/>
<id>urn:sha1:0481f001d9c1c8a277908622cedd965575f2915b</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 95dd77580ccd66a0da96e6d4696945b8cea39431 upstream.

On nfsv2 and nfsv3 the nfs server can export subsets of the same
filesystem and report the same filesystem identifier, so that the nfs
client can know they are the same filesystem.  The subsets can be from
disjoint directory trees.  The nfsv2 and nfsv3 filesystems provides no
way to find the common root of all directory trees exported form the
server with the same filesystem identifier.

The practical result is that in struct super s_root for nfs s_root is
not necessarily the root of the filesystem.  The nfs mount code sets
s_root to the root of the first subset of the nfs filesystem that the
kernel mounts.

This effects the dcache invalidation code in generic_shutdown_super
currently called shrunk_dcache_for_umount and that code for years
has gone through an additional list of dentries that might be dentry
trees that need to be freed to accomodate nfs.

When I wrote path_connected I did not realize nfs was so special, and
it's hueristic for avoiding calling is_subdir can fail.

The practical case where this fails is when there is a move of a
directory from the subtree exposed by one nfs mount to the subtree
exposed by another nfs mount.  This move can happen either locally or
remotely.  With the remote case requiring that the move directory be cached
before the move and that after the move someone walks the path
to where the move directory now exists and in so doing causes the
already cached directory to be moved in the dcache through the magic
of d_splice_alias.

If someone whose working directory is in the move directory or a
subdirectory and now starts calling .. from the initial mount of nfs
(where s_root == mnt_root), then path_connected as a heuristic will
not bother with the is_subdir check.  As s_root really is not the root
of the nfs filesystem this heuristic is wrong, and the path may
actually not be connected and path_connected can fail.

The is_subdir function might be cheap enough that we can call it
unconditionally.  Verifying that will take some benchmarking and
the result may not be the same on all kernels this fix needs
to be backported to.  So I am avoiding that for now.

Filesystems with snapshots such as nilfs and btrfs do something
similar.  But as the directory tree of the snapshots are disjoint
from one another and from the main directory tree rename won't move
things between them and this problem will not occur.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk&gt;
Fixes: 397d425dc26d ("vfs: Test for and handle paths that are unreachable from their mnt_root")
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>dax: fix vma_is_fsdax() helper</title>
<updated>2018-03-09T06:41:06Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Dan Williams</name>
<email>dan.j.williams@intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-02-22T01:08:01Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=0ba6c33b3287e469622c0ccb2658052661bac579'/>
<id>urn:sha1:0ba6c33b3287e469622c0ccb2658052661bac579</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 230f5a8969d8345fc9bbe3683f068246cf1be4b8 upstream.

Gerd reports that -&gt;i_mode may contain other bits besides S_IFCHR. Use
S_ISCHR() instead. Otherwise, get_user_pages_longterm() may fail on
device-dax instances when those are meant to be explicitly allowed.

Fixes: 2bb6d2837083 ("mm: introduce get_user_pages_longterm")
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Reported-by: Gerd Rausch &lt;gerd.rausch@oracle.com&gt;
Acked-by: Jane Chu &lt;jane.chu@oracle.com&gt;
Reported-by: Haozhong Zhang &lt;haozhong.zhang@intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams &lt;dan.j.williams@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>autofs: revert "autofs: fix AT_NO_AUTOMOUNT not being honored"</title>
<updated>2017-12-05T10:26:29Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Ian Kent</name>
<email>raven@themaw.net</email>
</author>
<published>2017-11-30T00:11:26Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=f354f4ffe6a371a4ae27a682cea56a7e4e1d74d9'/>
<id>urn:sha1:f354f4ffe6a371a4ae27a682cea56a7e4e1d74d9</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 5d38f049cee1e1c4a7ac55aa79d37d01ddcc3860 upstream.

Commit 42f461482178 ("autofs: fix AT_NO_AUTOMOUNT not being honored")
allowed the fstatat(2) system call to properly honor the AT_NO_AUTOMOUNT
flag but introduced a semantic change.

In order to honor AT_NO_AUTOMOUNT a semantic change was made to the
negative dentry case for stat family system calls in follow_automount().

This changed the unconditional triggering of an automount in this case
to no longer be done and an error returned instead.

This has caused more problems than I expected so reverting the change is
needed.

In a discussion with Neil Brown it was concluded that the automount(8)
daemon can implement this change without kernel modifications.  So that
will be done instead and the autofs module documentation updated with a
description of the problem and what needs to be done by module users for
this specific case.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/151174730120.6162.3848002191530283984.stgit@pluto.themaw.net
Fixes: 42f4614821 ("autofs: fix AT_NO_AUTOMOUNT not being honored")
Signed-off-by: Ian Kent &lt;raven@themaw.net&gt;
Cc: Neil Brown &lt;neilb@suse.com&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Colin Walters &lt;walters@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Ondrej Holy &lt;oholy@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
</feed>
