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<title>user/sven/linux.git/include/linux/fscrypt_supp.h, branch v4.19.285</title>
<subtitle>Linux Kernel
</subtitle>
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<updated>2021-09-22T09:47:56Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>fscrypt: add fscrypt_symlink_getattr() for computing st_size</title>
<updated>2021-09-22T09:47:56Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
<email>ebiggers@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-09-08T21:50:30Z</published>
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commit d18760560593e5af921f51a8c9b64b6109d634c2 upstream.

Add a helper function fscrypt_symlink_getattr() which will be called
from the various filesystems' -&gt;getattr() methods to read and decrypt
the target of encrypted symlinks in order to report the correct st_size.

Detailed explanation:

As required by POSIX and as documented in various man pages, st_size for
a symlink is supposed to be the length of the symlink target.
Unfortunately, st_size has always been wrong for encrypted symlinks
because st_size is populated from i_size from disk, which intentionally
contains the length of the encrypted symlink target.  That's slightly
greater than the length of the decrypted symlink target (which is the
symlink target that userspace usually sees), and usually won't match the
length of the no-key encoded symlink target either.

This hadn't been fixed yet because reporting the correct st_size would
require reading the symlink target from disk and decrypting or encoding
it, which historically has been considered too heavyweight to do in
-&gt;getattr().  Also historically, the wrong st_size had only broken a
test (LTP lstat03) and there were no known complaints from real users.
(This is probably because the st_size of symlinks isn't used too often,
and when it is, typically it's for a hint for what buffer size to pass
to readlink() -- which a slightly-too-large size still works for.)

However, a couple things have changed now.  First, there have recently
been complaints about the current behavior from real users:

- Breakage in rpmbuild:
  https://github.com/rpm-software-management/rpm/issues/1682
  https://github.com/google/fscrypt/issues/305

- Breakage in toybox cpio:
  https://www.mail-archive.com/toybox@lists.landley.net/msg07193.html

- Breakage in libgit2: https://issuetracker.google.com/issues/189629152
  (on Android public issue tracker, requires login)

Second, we now cache decrypted symlink targets in -&gt;i_link.  Therefore,
taking the performance hit of reading and decrypting the symlink target
in -&gt;getattr() wouldn't be as big a deal as it used to be, since usually
it will just save having to do the same thing later.

Also note that eCryptfs ended up having to read and decrypt symlink
targets in -&gt;getattr() as well, to fix this same issue; see
commit 3a60a1686f0d ("eCryptfs: Decrypt symlink target for stat size").

So, let's just bite the bullet, and read and decrypt the symlink target
in -&gt;getattr() in order to report the correct st_size.  Add a function
fscrypt_symlink_getattr() which the filesystems will call to do this.

(Alternatively, we could store the decrypted size of symlinks on-disk.
But there isn't a great place to do so, and encryption is meant to hide
the original size to some extent; that property would be lost.)

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210702065350.209646-2-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fscrypt: add fscrypt_is_nokey_name()</title>
<updated>2021-01-06T13:44:58Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
<email>ebiggers@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-12-28T19:12:08Z</published>
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<content type='text'>
commit 159e1de201b6fca10bfec50405a3b53a561096a8 upstream.

It's possible to create a duplicate filename in an encrypted directory
by creating a file concurrently with adding the encryption key.

Specifically, sys_open(O_CREAT) (or sys_mkdir(), sys_mknod(), or
sys_symlink()) can lookup the target filename while the directory's
encryption key hasn't been added yet, resulting in a negative no-key
dentry.  The VFS then calls -&gt;create() (or -&gt;mkdir(), -&gt;mknod(), or
-&gt;symlink()) because the dentry is negative.  Normally, -&gt;create() would
return -ENOKEY due to the directory's key being unavailable.  However,
if the key was added between the dentry lookup and -&gt;create(), then the
filesystem will go ahead and try to create the file.

If the target filename happens to already exist as a normal name (not a
no-key name), a duplicate filename may be added to the directory.

In order to fix this, we need to fix the filesystems to prevent
-&gt;create(), -&gt;mkdir(), -&gt;mknod(), and -&gt;symlink() on no-key names.
(-&gt;rename() and -&gt;link() need it too, but those are already handled
correctly by fscrypt_prepare_rename() and fscrypt_prepare_link().)

In preparation for this, add a helper function fscrypt_is_nokey_name()
that filesystems can use to do this check.  Use this helper function for
the existing checks that fs/crypto/ does for rename and link.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201118075609.120337-2-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fscrypt: fix race where -&gt;lookup() marks plaintext dentry as ciphertext</title>
<updated>2020-11-05T10:08:35Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
<email>ebiggers@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-10-31T22:05:53Z</published>
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<content type='text'>
commit b01531db6cec2aa330dbc91bfbfaaef4a0d387a4 upstream.

-&gt;lookup() in an encrypted directory begins as follows:

1. fscrypt_prepare_lookup():
    a. Try to load the directory's encryption key.
    b. If the key is unavailable, mark the dentry as a ciphertext name
       via d_flags.
2. fscrypt_setup_filename():
    a. Try to load the directory's encryption key.
    b. If the key is available, encrypt the name (treated as a plaintext
       name) to get the on-disk name.  Otherwise decode the name
       (treated as a ciphertext name) to get the on-disk name.

But if the key is concurrently added, it may be found at (2a) but not at
(1a).  In this case, the dentry will be wrongly marked as a ciphertext
name even though it was actually treated as plaintext.

This will cause the dentry to be wrongly invalidated on the next lookup,
potentially causing problems.  For example, if the racy -&gt;lookup() was
part of sys_mount(), then the new mount will be detached when anything
tries to access it.  This is despite the mountpoint having a plaintext
path, which should remain valid now that the key was added.

Of course, this is only possible if there's a userspace race.  Still,
the additional kernel-side race is confusing and unexpected.

Close the kernel-side race by changing fscrypt_prepare_lookup() to also
set the on-disk filename (step 2b), consistent with the d_flags update.

Fixes: 28b4c263961c ("ext4 crypto: revalidate dentry after adding or removing the key")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fscrypt: fix race allowing rename() and link() of ciphertext dentries</title>
<updated>2020-11-05T10:08:35Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
<email>ebiggers@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-10-31T22:05:50Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:000d849574fa636f1764919be459827df0114185</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 968dd6d0c6d6b6a989c6ddb9e2584a031b83e7b5 upstream.

Close some race conditions where fscrypt allowed rename() and link() on
ciphertext dentries that had been looked up just prior to the key being
concurrently added.  It's better to return -ENOKEY in this case.

This avoids doing the nonsensical thing of encrypting the names a second
time when searching for the actual on-disk dir entries.  It also
guarantees that DCACHE_ENCRYPTED_NAME dentries are never rename()d, so
the dcache won't have support all possible combinations of moving
DCACHE_ENCRYPTED_NAME around during __d_move().

Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'f2fs-for-4.18' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jaegeuk/f2fs</title>
<updated>2018-06-11T17:16:13Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2018-06-11T17:16:13Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:d54d35c501bcbd57b9722a6b371c0608b5d34199</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull f2fs updates from Jaegeuk Kim:
 "In this round, we've mainly focused on discard, aka unmap, control
  along with fstrim for Android-specific usage model. In addition, we've
  fixed writepage flow which returned EAGAIN previously resulting in EIO
  of fsync(2) due to mapping's error state. In order to avoid old MM bug
  [1], we decided not to use __GFP_ZERO for the mapping for node and
  meta page caches. As always, we've cleaned up many places for future
  fsverity and symbol conflicts.

  Enhancements:
   - do discard/fstrim in lower priority considering fs utilization
   - split large discard commands into smaller ones for better responsiveness
   - add more sanity checks to address syzbot reports
   - add a mount option, fsync_mode=nobarrier, which can reduce # of cache flushes
   - clean up symbol namespace with modified function names
   - be strict on block allocation and IO control in corner cases

  Bug fixes:
   - don't use __GFP_ZERO for mappings
   - fix error reports in writepage to avoid fsync() failure
   - avoid selinux denial on CAP_RESOURCE on resgid/resuid
   - fix some subtle race conditions in GC/atomic writes/shutdown
   - fix overflow bugs in sanity_check_raw_super
   - fix missing bits on get_flags

  Clean-ups:
   - prepare the generic flow for future fsverity integration
   - fix some broken coding standard"

[1] https://lkml.org/lkml/2018/4/8/661

* tag 'f2fs-for-4.18' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jaegeuk/f2fs: (79 commits)
  f2fs: fix to clear FI_VOLATILE_FILE correctly
  f2fs: let sync node IO interrupt async one
  f2fs: don't change wbc-&gt;sync_mode
  f2fs: fix to update mtime correctly
  fs: f2fs: insert space around that ':' and ', '
  fs: f2fs: add missing blank lines after declarations
  fs: f2fs: changed variable type of offset "unsigned" to "loff_t"
  f2fs: clean up symbol namespace
  f2fs: make set_de_type() static
  f2fs: make __f2fs_write_data_pages() static
  f2fs: fix to avoid accessing cross the boundary
  f2fs: fix to let caller retry allocating block address
  disable loading f2fs module on PAGE_SIZE &gt; 4KB
  f2fs: fix error path of move_data_page
  f2fs: don't drop dentry pages after fs shutdown
  f2fs: fix to avoid race during access gc_thread pointer
  f2fs: clean up with clear_radix_tree_dirty_tag
  f2fs: fix to don't trigger writeback during recovery
  f2fs: clear discard_wake earlier
  f2fs: let discard thread wait a little longer if dev is busy
  ...
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fscrypt: make fscrypt_operations.max_namelen an integer</title>
<updated>2018-05-20T20:21:03Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
<email>ebiggers@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-04-30T22:51:44Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:e12ee6836a3fd3c6ebc9b2dc8a7974af592340d0</id>
<content type='text'>
Now -&gt;max_namelen() is only called to limit the filename length when
adding NUL padding, and only for real filenames -- not symlink targets.
It also didn't give the correct length for symlink targets anyway since
it forgot to subtract 'sizeof(struct fscrypt_symlink_data)'.

Thus, change -&gt;max_namelen from a function to a simple 'unsigned int'
that gives the filesystem's maximum filename length.

Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fscrypt: clean up after fscrypt_prepare_lookup() conversions</title>
<updated>2018-05-20T20:20:59Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
<email>ebiggers@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-04-30T22:51:36Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:54222025f2fe8055fa88c39b5d9f68cbd76b1be0</id>
<content type='text'>
Now that all filesystems have been converted to use
fscrypt_prepare_lookup(), we can remove the fscrypt_set_d_op() and
fscrypt_set_encrypted_dentry() functions as well as un-export
fscrypt_d_ops.

Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fscrypt: allow synchronous bio decryption</title>
<updated>2018-05-02T21:30:57Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
<email>ebiggers@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-04-18T18:09:47Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:0cb8dae4a0df2a977847c2dc6766a7783ce50f9d</id>
<content type='text'>
Currently, fscrypt provides fscrypt_decrypt_bio_pages() which decrypts a
bio's pages asynchronously, then unlocks them afterwards.  But, this
assumes that decryption is the last "postprocessing step" for the bio,
so it's incompatible with additional postprocessing steps such as
authenticity verification after decryption.

Therefore, rename the existing fscrypt_decrypt_bio_pages() to
fscrypt_enqueue_decrypt_bio().  Then, add fscrypt_decrypt_bio() which
decrypts the pages in the bio synchronously without unlocking the pages,
nor setting them Uptodate; and add fscrypt_enqueue_decrypt_work(), which
enqueues work on the fscrypt_read_workqueue.  The new functions will be
used by filesystems that support both fscrypt and fs-verity.

Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim &lt;jaegeuk@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fscrypt: remove 'ci' parameter from fscrypt_put_encryption_info()</title>
<updated>2018-01-12T04:30:13Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
<email>ebiggers@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-01-12T04:30:13Z</published>
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<content type='text'>
fscrypt_put_encryption_info() is only called when evicting an inode, so
the 'struct fscrypt_info *ci' parameter is always NULL, and there cannot
be races with other threads.  This was cruft left over from the broken
key revocation code.  Remove the unused parameter and the cmpxchg().

Also remove the #ifdefs around the fscrypt_put_encryption_info() calls,
since fscrypt_notsupp.h defines a no-op stub for it.

Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fscrypt: fix up fscrypt_fname_encrypted_size() for internal use</title>
<updated>2018-01-12T04:30:08Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
<email>ebiggers@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-01-12T04:30:08Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:b9db0b4a68d373897119d1e0a3beebe1c1a23936</id>
<content type='text'>
Filesystems don't need fscrypt_fname_encrypted_size() anymore, so
unexport it and move it to fscrypt_private.h.

We also never calculate the encrypted size of a filename without having
the fscrypt_info present since it is needed to know the amount of
NUL-padding which is determined by the encryption policy, and also we
will always truncate the NUL-padding to the maximum filename length.
Therefore, also make fscrypt_fname_encrypted_size() assume that the
fscrypt_info is present, and make it truncate the returned length to the
specified max_len.

Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
</content>
</entry>
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