user/sven/linux.git/include/linux/libnvdimm.h, branch stable/5.2.y

treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 295

2019-06-05T15:36:38Z

Based on 1 normalized pattern(s): this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify it under the terms of version 2 of the gnu general public license as published by the free software foundation this program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful but without any warranty without even the implied warranty of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose see the gnu general public license for more details extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier GPL-2.0-only has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 64 file(s). Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Reviewed-by: Alexios Zavras Reviewed-by: Allison Randal Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190529141901.894819585@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

Merge tag 'devdax-for-5.1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/nvdimm/nvdimm

2019-03-16T20:05:32Z

Pull device-dax updates from Dan Williams: "New device-dax infrastructure to allow persistent memory and other "reserved" / performance differentiated memories, to be assigned to the core-mm as "System RAM". Some users want to use persistent memory as additional volatile memory. They are willing to cope with potential performance differences, for example between DRAM and 3D Xpoint, and want to use typical Linux memory management apis rather than a userspace memory allocator layered over an mmap() of a dax file. The administration model is to decide how much Persistent Memory (pmem) to use as System RAM, create a device-dax-mode namespace of that size, and then assign it to the core-mm. The rationale for device-dax is that it is a generic memory-mapping driver that can be layered over any "special purpose" memory, not just pmem. On subsequent boots udev rules can be used to restore the memory assignment. One implication of using pmem as RAM is that mlock() no longer keeps data off persistent media. For this reason it is recommended to enable NVDIMM Security (previously merged for 5.0) to encrypt pmem contents at rest. We considered making this recommendation an actively enforced requirement, but in the end decided to leave it as a distribution / administrator policy to allow for emulation and test environments that lack security capable NVDIMMs. Summary: - Replace the /sys/class/dax device model with /sys/bus/dax, and include a compat driver so distributions can opt-in to the new ABI. - Allow for an alternative driver for the device-dax address-range - Introduce the 'kmem' driver to hotplug / assign a device-dax address-range to the core-mm. - Arrange for the device-dax target-node to be onlined so that the newly added memory range can be uniquely referenced by numa apis" NOTE! I'm not entirely happy with the whole "PMEM as RAM" model because we currently have special - and very annoying rules in the kernel about accessing PMEM only with the "MC safe" accessors, because machine checks inside the regular repeat string copy functions can be fatal in some (not described) circumstances. And apparently the PMEM modules can cause that a lot more than regular RAM. The argument is that this happens because PMEM doesn't necessarily get scrubbed at boot like RAM does, but that is planned to be added for the user space tooling. Quoting Dan from another email: "The exposure can be reduced in the volatile-RAM case by scanning for and clearing errors before it is onlined as RAM. The userspace tooling for that can be in place before v5.1-final. There's also runtime notifications of errors via acpi_nfit_uc_error_notify() from background scrubbers on the DIMM devices. With that mechanism the kernel could proactively clear newly discovered poison in the volatile case, but that would be additional development more suitable for v5.2. I understand the concern, and the need to highlight this issue by tapping the brakes on feature development, but I don't see PMEM as RAM making the situation worse when the exposure is also there via DAX in the PMEM case. Volatile-RAM is arguably a safer use case since it's possible to repair pages where the persistent case needs active application coordination" * tag 'devdax-for-5.1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/nvdimm/nvdimm: device-dax: "Hotplug" persistent memory for use like normal RAM mm/resource: Let walk_system_ram_range() search child resources mm/memory-hotplug: Allow memory resources to be children mm/resource: Move HMM pr_debug() deeper into resource code mm/resource: Return real error codes from walk failures device-dax: Add a 'modalias' attribute to DAX 'bus' devices device-dax: Add a 'target_node' attribute device-dax: Auto-bind device after successful new_id acpi/nfit, device-dax: Identify differentiated memory with a unique numa-node device-dax: Add /sys/class/dax backwards compatibility device-dax: Add support for a dax override driver device-dax: Move resource pinning+mapping into the common driver device-dax: Introduce bus + driver model device-dax: Start defining a dax bus model device-dax: Remove multi-resource infrastructure device-dax: Kill dax_region base device-dax: Kill dax_region ida

Merge branch 'for-5.1/libnvdimm' into libnvdimm-for-next

2019-03-11T19:13:42Z

Merge miscellaneous libnvdimm sub-system updates for v5.1. Highlights include: * Support for the Hyper-V family of device-specific-methods (DSMs) * Several fixes and workarounds for Hyper-V compatibility. * Fix for the support to cache the dirty-shutdown-count at init.

libnvdimm/dimm: Add a no-BLK quirk based on NVDIMM family

2019-02-03T00:35:26Z

As Dexuan reports the NVDIMM_FAMILY_HYPERV platform is incompatible with the existing Linux namespace implementation because it uses NSLABEL_FLAG_LOCAL for x1-width PMEM interleave sets. Quirk it as an platform / DIMM that does not provide BLK-aperture access. Allow the libnvdimm core to assume no potential for aliasing. In case other implementations make the same mistake, provide a "noblk" module parameter to force-enable the quirk. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/PU1P153MB0169977604493B82B662A01CBF920@PU1P153MB0169.APCP153.PROD.OUTLOOK.COM Reported-by: Dexuan Cui Tested-by: Dexuan Cui Signed-off-by: Dan Williams

libnvdimm/security: Require nvdimm_security_setup_events() to succeed

2019-01-21T17:57:43Z

The following warning: ACPI0012:00: security event setup failed: -19 ...is meant to capture exceptional failures of sysfs_get_dirent(), however it will also fail in the common case when security support is disabled. A few issues: 1/ A dev_warn() report for a common case is too chatty 2/ The setup of this notifier is generic, no need for it to be driven from the nfit driver, it can exist completely in the core. 3/ If it fails for any reason besides security support being disabled, that's fatal and should abort DIMM activation. Userspace may hang if it never gets overwrite notifications. 4/ The dirent needs to be released. Move the call to the core 'dimm' driver, make it conditional on security support being active, make it fatal for the exceptional case, add the missing sysfs_put() at device disable time. Fixes: 7d988097c546 ("...Add security DSM overwrite support") Reviewed-by: Dave Jiang Signed-off-by: Dan Williams

libnvdimm/dimm: Fix security capability detection for non-Intel NVDIMMs

2019-01-09T06:06:09Z

Kees reports a crash with the following signature... RIP: 0010:nvdimm_visible+0x79/0x80 [..] Call Trace: internal_create_group+0xf4/0x380 sysfs_create_groups+0x46/0xb0 device_add+0x331/0x680 nd_async_device_register+0x15/0x60 async_run_entry_fn+0x38/0x100 ...when starting a QEMU environment with "label-less" DIMM. Without labels QEMU does not publish any DSM methods. Without defined methods the NVDIMM_FAMILY type is not established and the nfit driver will skip registering security operations. In that case the security state should be initialized to a negative value in __nvdimm_create() and nvdimm_visible() should skip interrogating the specific ops. However, since 'enum nvdimm_security_state' was only defined to contain positive values the "if (nvdimm->sec.state < 0)" check always fails. Define a negative error state to allow negative state values to be handled as expected. Fixes: f2989396553a ("acpi/nfit, libnvdimm: Introduce nvdimm_security_ops") Reviewed-by: Dave Jiang Reported-by: Kees Cook Tested-by: Kees Cook Signed-off-by: Dan Williams

acpi/nfit, device-dax: Identify differentiated memory with a unique numa-node

2019-01-07T05:41:57Z

Persistent memory, as described by the ACPI NFIT (NVDIMM Firmware Interface Table), is the first known instance of a memory range described by a unique "target" proximity domain. Where "initiator" and "target" proximity domains is an approach that the ACPI HMAT (Heterogeneous Memory Attributes Table) uses to described the unique performance properties of a memory range relative to a given initiator (e.g. CPU or DMA device). Currently the numa-node for a /dev/pmemX block-device or /dev/daxX.Y char-device follows the traditional notion of 'numa-node' where the attribute conveys the closest online numa-node. That numa-node attribute is useful for cpu-binding and memory-binding processes *near* the device. However, when the memory range backing a 'pmem', or 'dax' device is onlined (memory hot-add) the memory-only-numa-node representing that address needs to be differentiated from the set of online nodes. In other words, the numa-node association of the device depends on whether you can bind processes *near* the cpu-numa-node in the offline device-case, or bind process *on* the memory-range directly after the backing address range is onlined. Allow for the case that platform firmware describes persistent memory with a unique proximity domain, i.e. when it is distinct from the proximity of DRAM and CPUs that are on the same socket. Plumb the Linux numa-node translation of that proximity through the libnvdimm region device to namespaces that are in device-dax mode. With this in place the proposed kmem driver [1] can optionally discover a unique numa-node number for the address range as it transitions the memory from an offline state managed by a device-driver to an online memory range managed by the core-mm. [1]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20181022201317.8558C1D8@viggo.jf.intel.com Reported-by: Fan Du Cc: Michael Ellerman Cc: "Oliver O'Halloran" Cc: Dave Hansen Cc: Jérôme Glisse Reviewed-by: Yang Shi Signed-off-by: Dan Williams

acpi/nfit, libnvdimm/security: add Intel DSM 1.8 master passphrase support

2018-12-21T20:44:41Z

With Intel DSM 1.8 [1] two new security DSMs are introduced. Enable/update master passphrase and master secure erase. The master passphrase allows a secure erase to be performed without the user passphrase that is set on the NVDIMM. The commands of master_update and master_erase are added to the sysfs knob in order to initiate the DSMs. They are similar in opeartion mechanism compare to update and erase. [1]: http://pmem.io/documents/NVDIMM_DSM_Interface-V1.8.pdf Signed-off-by: Dave Jiang Signed-off-by: Dan Williams

acpi/nfit, libnvdimm/security: Add security DSM overwrite support

2018-12-21T20:44:41Z

Add support for the NVDIMM_FAMILY_INTEL "ovewrite" capability as described by the Intel DSM spec v1.7. This will allow triggering of overwrite on Intel NVDIMMs. The overwrite operation can take tens of minutes. When the overwrite DSM is issued successfully, the NVDIMMs will be unaccessible. The kernel will do backoff polling to detect when the overwrite process is completed. According to the DSM spec v1.7, the 128G NVDIMMs can take up to 15mins to perform overwrite and larger DIMMs will take longer. Given that overwrite puts the DIMM in an indeterminate state until it completes introduce the NDD_SECURITY_OVERWRITE flag to prevent other operations from executing when overwrite is happening. The NDD_WORK_PENDING flag is added to denote that there is a device reference on the nvdimm device for an async workqueue thread context. Signed-off-by: Dave Jiang Signed-off-by: Dan Williams

acpi/nfit, libnvdimm: Add support for issue secure erase DSM to Intel nvdimm

2018-12-21T20:44:41Z

Add support to issue a secure erase DSM to the Intel nvdimm. The required passphrase is acquired from an encrypted key in the kernel user keyring. To trigger the action, "erase " is written to the "security" sysfs attribute. Signed-off-by: Dave Jiang Signed-off-by: Dan Williams