<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>user/sven/linux.git/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h, branch v6.9.3</title>
<subtitle>Linux Kernel
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/atom?h=v6.9.3</id>
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<updated>2024-03-14T15:31:26Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>lsm: use 32-bit compatible data types in LSM syscalls</title>
<updated>2024-03-14T15:31:26Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Casey Schaufler</name>
<email>casey@schaufler-ca.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-03-14T15:31:26Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=a5a858f622a0aff5cdb5e271442cd01b2a01467f'/>
<id>urn:sha1:a5a858f622a0aff5cdb5e271442cd01b2a01467f</id>
<content type='text'>
Change the size parameters in lsm_list_modules(), lsm_set_self_attr()
and lsm_get_self_attr() from size_t to u32. This avoids the need to
have different interfaces for 32 and 64 bit systems.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: a04a1198088a ("LSM: syscalls for current process attributes")
Fixes: ad4aff9ec25f ("LSM: Create lsm_list_modules system call")
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
Reported-and-reviewed-by: Dmitry V. Levin &lt;ldv@strace.io&gt;
[PM: subject and metadata tweaks, syscall.h fixes]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'lsm-pr-20240312' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm</title>
<updated>2024-03-13T03:03:34Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2024-03-13T03:03:34Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:cc4a875cf3b3bc07d523ea85b8ca45da1ca4f4e6</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull lsm updates from Paul Moore:

 - Promote IMA/EVM to a proper LSM

   This is the bulk of the diffstat, and the source of all the changes
   in the VFS code. Prior to the start of the LSM stacking work it was
   important that IMA/EVM were separate from the rest of the LSMs,
   complete with their own hooks, infrastructure, etc. as it was the
   only way to enable IMA/EVM at the same time as a LSM.

   However, now that the bulk of the LSM infrastructure supports
   multiple simultaneous LSMs, we can simplify things greatly by
   bringing IMA/EVM into the LSM infrastructure as proper LSMs. This is
   something I've wanted to see happen for quite some time and Roberto
   was kind enough to put in the work to make it happen.

 - Use the LSM hook default values to simplify the call_int_hook() macro

   Previously the call_int_hook() macro required callers to supply a
   default return value, despite a default value being specified when
   the LSM hook was defined.

   This simplifies the macro by using the defined default return value
   which makes life easier for callers and should also reduce the number
   of return value bugs in the future (we've had a few pop up recently,
   hence this work).

 - Use the KMEM_CACHE() macro instead of kmem_cache_create()

   The guidance appears to be to use the KMEM_CACHE() macro when
   possible and there is no reason why we can't use the macro, so let's
   use it.

 - Fix a number of comment typos in the LSM hook comment blocks

   Not much to say here, we fixed some questionable grammar decisions in
   the LSM hook comment blocks.

* tag 'lsm-pr-20240312' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm: (28 commits)
  cred: Use KMEM_CACHE() instead of kmem_cache_create()
  lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook()
  lsm: fix typos in security/security.c comment headers
  integrity: Remove LSM
  ima: Make it independent from 'integrity' LSM
  evm: Make it independent from 'integrity' LSM
  evm: Move to LSM infrastructure
  ima: Move IMA-Appraisal to LSM infrastructure
  ima: Move to LSM infrastructure
  integrity: Move integrity_kernel_module_request() to IMA
  security: Introduce key_post_create_or_update hook
  security: Introduce inode_post_remove_acl hook
  security: Introduce inode_post_set_acl hook
  security: Introduce inode_post_create_tmpfile hook
  security: Introduce path_post_mknod hook
  security: Introduce file_release hook
  security: Introduce file_post_open hook
  security: Introduce inode_post_removexattr hook
  security: Introduce inode_post_setattr hook
  security: Align inode_setattr hook definition with EVM
  ...
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>security: Introduce key_post_create_or_update hook</title>
<updated>2024-02-16T04:43:45Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Roberto Sassu</name>
<email>roberto.sassu@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-02-15T10:31:06Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=b8d997032a46fcf47d5bda011c0d1e87b20c08ba'/>
<id>urn:sha1:b8d997032a46fcf47d5bda011c0d1e87b20c08ba</id>
<content type='text'>
In preparation for moving IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure, introduce
the key_post_create_or_update hook.

Depending on policy, IMA measures the key content after creation or update,
so that remote verifiers are aware of the operation.

Other LSMs could similarly take some action after successful key creation
or update.

The new hook cannot return an error and cannot cause the operation to be
reverted.

Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu &lt;roberto.sassu@huawei.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger &lt;stefanb@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>security: Introduce inode_post_remove_acl hook</title>
<updated>2024-02-16T04:43:44Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Roberto Sassu</name>
<email>roberto.sassu@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-02-15T10:31:05Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=2d705d8024143c272a764320c880ccd3230bb699'/>
<id>urn:sha1:2d705d8024143c272a764320c880ccd3230bb699</id>
<content type='text'>
In preparation for moving IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure, introduce
the inode_post_remove_acl hook.

At inode_remove_acl hook, EVM verifies the file's existing HMAC value. At
inode_post_remove_acl, EVM re-calculates the file's HMAC with the passed
POSIX ACL removed and other file metadata.

Other LSMs could similarly take some action after successful POSIX ACL
removal.

The new hook cannot return an error and cannot cause the operation to be
reverted.

Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu &lt;roberto.sassu@huawei.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger &lt;stefanb@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Acked-by: Christian Brauner &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>security: Introduce inode_post_set_acl hook</title>
<updated>2024-02-16T04:43:44Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Roberto Sassu</name>
<email>roberto.sassu@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-02-15T10:31:04Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=8b9d0b825c6573d654c8b8039ea79920926305c2'/>
<id>urn:sha1:8b9d0b825c6573d654c8b8039ea79920926305c2</id>
<content type='text'>
In preparation for moving IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure, introduce
the inode_post_set_acl hook.

At inode_set_acl hook, EVM verifies the file's existing HMAC value. At
inode_post_set_acl, EVM re-calculates the file's HMAC based on the modified
POSIX ACL and other file metadata.

Other LSMs could similarly take some action after successful POSIX ACL
change.

The new hook cannot return an error and cannot cause the operation to be
reverted.

Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu &lt;roberto.sassu@huawei.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger &lt;stefanb@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Acked-by: Christian Brauner &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>security: Introduce inode_post_create_tmpfile hook</title>
<updated>2024-02-16T04:43:44Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Roberto Sassu</name>
<email>roberto.sassu@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-02-15T10:31:03Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=a7811e34d100acf24870eb949c5ae3e49dde18b9'/>
<id>urn:sha1:a7811e34d100acf24870eb949c5ae3e49dde18b9</id>
<content type='text'>
In preparation for moving IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure, introduce
the inode_post_create_tmpfile hook.

As temp files can be made persistent, treat new temp files like other new
files, so that the file hash is calculated and stored in the security
xattr.

LSMs could also take some action after temp files have been created.

The new hook cannot return an error and cannot cause the operation to be
canceled.

Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu &lt;roberto.sassu@huawei.com&gt;
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Acked-by: Christian Brauner &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger &lt;stefanb@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>security: Introduce path_post_mknod hook</title>
<updated>2024-02-16T04:43:43Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Roberto Sassu</name>
<email>roberto.sassu@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-02-15T10:31:02Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=08abce60d63fb55f440c393f4508e99064f2fd91'/>
<id>urn:sha1:08abce60d63fb55f440c393f4508e99064f2fd91</id>
<content type='text'>
In preparation for moving IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure, introduce
the path_post_mknod hook.

IMA-appraisal requires all existing files in policy to have a file
hash/signature stored in security.ima. An exception is made for empty files
created by mknod, by tagging them as new files.

LSMs could also take some action after files are created.

The new hook cannot return an error and cannot cause the operation to be
reverted.

Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu &lt;roberto.sassu@huawei.com&gt;
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Acked-by: Christian Brauner &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger &lt;stefanb@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>security: Introduce file_release hook</title>
<updated>2024-02-16T04:43:43Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Roberto Sassu</name>
<email>roberto.sassu@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-02-15T10:31:01Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=f09068b5a114ed28d2df2e82a7d30dde0145dc69'/>
<id>urn:sha1:f09068b5a114ed28d2df2e82a7d30dde0145dc69</id>
<content type='text'>
In preparation for moving IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure, introduce
the file_release hook.

IMA calculates at file close the new digest of the file content and writes
it to security.ima, so that appraisal at next file access succeeds.

The new hook cannot return an error and cannot cause the operation to be
reverted.

Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu &lt;roberto.sassu@huawei.com&gt;
Acked-by: Christian Brauner &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger &lt;stefanb@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>security: Introduce file_post_open hook</title>
<updated>2024-02-16T04:43:42Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Roberto Sassu</name>
<email>roberto.sassu@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-02-15T10:31:00Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=8f46ff5767b0b18329140d80d6bcabd818f42c4c'/>
<id>urn:sha1:8f46ff5767b0b18329140d80d6bcabd818f42c4c</id>
<content type='text'>
In preparation to move IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure, introduce the
file_post_open hook. Also, export security_file_post_open() for NFS.

Based on policy, IMA calculates the digest of the file content and
extends the TPM with the digest, verifies the file's integrity based on
the digest, and/or includes the file digest in the audit log.

LSMs could similarly take action depending on the file content and the
access mask requested with open().

The new hook returns a value and can cause the open to be aborted.

Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu &lt;roberto.sassu@huawei.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger &lt;stefanb@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Acked-by: Christian Brauner &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>security: Introduce inode_post_removexattr hook</title>
<updated>2024-02-16T04:43:42Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Roberto Sassu</name>
<email>roberto.sassu@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-02-15T10:30:59Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:dae52cbf5887ac51c3574648124cfe475a9b3246</id>
<content type='text'>
In preparation for moving IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure, introduce
the inode_post_removexattr hook.

At inode_removexattr hook, EVM verifies the file's existing HMAC value. At
inode_post_removexattr, EVM re-calculates the file's HMAC with the passed
xattr removed and other file metadata.

Other LSMs could similarly take some action after successful xattr removal.

The new hook cannot return an error and cannot cause the operation to be
reverted.

Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu &lt;roberto.sassu@huawei.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger &lt;stefanb@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
Acked-by: Christian Brauner &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
