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<title>user/sven/linux.git/include/linux/mount.h, branch v5.13.13</title>
<subtitle>Linux Kernel
</subtitle>
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<updated>2021-02-27T16:07:12Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'work.misc' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs</title>
<updated>2021-02-27T16:07:12Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2021-02-27T16:07:12Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:5ceabb6078b80a8544ba86d6ee523ad755ae6d5e</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull misc vfs updates from Al Viro:
 "Assorted stuff pile - no common topic here"

* 'work.misc' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
  whack-a-mole: don't open-code iminor/imajor
  9p: fix misuse of sscanf() in v9fs_stat2inode()
  audit_alloc_mark(): don't open-code ERR_CAST()
  fs/inode.c: make inode_init_always() initialize i_ino to 0
  vfs: don't unnecessarily clone write access for writable fds
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fs: introduce MOUNT_ATTR_IDMAP</title>
<updated>2021-01-24T13:43:45Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Christian Brauner</name>
<email>christian.brauner@ubuntu.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-01-21T13:19:54Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:9caccd41541a6f7d6279928d9f971f6642c361af</id>
<content type='text'>
Introduce a new mount bind mount property to allow idmapping mounts. The
MOUNT_ATTR_IDMAP flag can be set via the new mount_setattr() syscall
together with a file descriptor referring to a user namespace.

The user namespace referenced by the namespace file descriptor will be
attached to the bind mount. All interactions with the filesystem going
through that mount will be mapped according to the mapping specified in
the user namespace attached to it.

Using user namespaces to mark mounts means we can reuse all the existing
infrastructure in the kernel that already exists to handle idmappings
and can also use this for permission checking to allow unprivileged user
to create idmapped mounts in the future.

Idmapping a mount is decoupled from the caller's user and mount
namespace. This means idmapped mounts can be created in the initial
user namespace which is an important use-case for systemd-homed,
portable usb-sticks between systems, sharing data between the initial
user namespace and unprivileged containers, and other use-cases that
have been brought up. For example, assume a home directory where all
files are owned by uid and gid 1000 and the home directory is brought to
a new laptop where the user has id 12345. The system administrator can
simply create a mount of this home directory with a mapping of
1000:12345:1 and other mappings to indicate the ids should be kept.
(With this it is e.g. also possible to create idmapped mounts on the
host with an identity mapping 1:1:100000 where the root user is not
mapped. A user with root access that e.g. has been pivot rooted into
such a mount on the host will be not be able to execute, read, write, or
create files as root.)

Given that mapping a mount is decoupled from the caller's user namespace
a sufficiently privileged process such as a container manager can set up
an idmapped mount for the container and the container can simply pivot
root to it. There's no need for the container to do anything. The mount
will appear correctly mapped independent of the user namespace the
container uses. This means we don't need to mark a mount as idmappable.

In order to create an idmapped mount the caller must currently be
privileged in the user namespace of the superblock the mount belongs to.
Once a mount has been idmapped we don't allow it to change its mapping.
This keeps permission checking and life-cycle management simple. Users
wanting to change the idmapped can always create a new detached mount
with a different idmapping.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-36-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Cc: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Cc: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Mauricio Vásquez Bernal &lt;mauricio@kinvolk.io&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner &lt;christian.brauner@ubuntu.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mount: attach mappings to mounts</title>
<updated>2021-01-24T13:27:15Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Christian Brauner</name>
<email>christian.brauner@ubuntu.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-01-21T13:19:20Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:a6435940b62f81a1718bf2bd46a051379fc89b9d</id>
<content type='text'>
In order to support per-mount idmappings vfsmounts are marked with user
namespaces. The idmapping of the user namespace will be used to map the
ids of vfs objects when they are accessed through that mount. By default
all vfsmounts are marked with the initial user namespace. The initial
user namespace is used to indicate that a mount is not idmapped. All
operations behave as before.

Based on prior discussions we want to attach the whole user namespace
and not just a dedicated idmapping struct. This allows us to reuse all
the helpers that already exist for dealing with idmappings instead of
introducing a whole new range of helpers. In addition, if we decide in
the future that we are confident enough to enable unprivileged users to
setup idmapped mounts the permission checking can take into account
whether the caller is privileged in the user namespace the mount is
currently marked with.
Later patches enforce that once a mount has been idmapped it can't be
remapped. This keeps permission checking and life-cycle management
simple. Users wanting to change the idmapped can always create a new
detached mount with a different idmapping.

Add a new mnt_userns member to vfsmount and two simple helpers to
retrieve the mnt_userns from vfsmounts and files.

The idea to attach user namespaces to vfsmounts has been floated around
in various forms at Linux Plumbers in ~2018 with the original idea
tracing back to a discussion in 2017 at a conference in St. Petersburg
between Christoph, Tycho, and myself.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-2-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Cc: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Cc: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner &lt;christian.brauner@ubuntu.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>vfs: don't unnecessarily clone write access for writable fds</title>
<updated>2021-01-04T19:02:08Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
<email>ebiggers@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-09-22T16:44:18Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:14e43bf435612639cab01541fce7cc41bf7e370b</id>
<content type='text'>
There's no need for mnt_want_write_file() to increment mnt_writers when
the file is already open for writing, provided that
mnt_drop_write_file() is changed to conditionally decrement it.

We seem to have ended up in the current situation because
mnt_want_write_file() used to be paired with mnt_drop_write(), due to
mnt_drop_write_file() not having been added yet.  So originally
mnt_want_write_file() had to always increment mnt_writers.

But later mnt_drop_write_file() was added, and all callers of
mnt_want_write_file() were paired with it.  This makes the compatibility
between mnt_want_write_file() and mnt_drop_write() no longer necessary.

Therefore, make __mnt_want_write_file() and __mnt_drop_write_file() skip
incrementing mnt_writers on files already open for writing.  This
removes the only caller of mnt_clone_write(), so remove that too.

Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Add a "nosymfollow" mount option.</title>
<updated>2020-08-27T20:06:47Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Mattias Nissler</name>
<email>mnissler@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2020-08-27T17:09:46Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:dab741e0e02bd3c4f5e2e97be74b39df2523fc6e</id>
<content type='text'>
For mounts that have the new "nosymfollow" option, don't follow symlinks
when resolving paths. The new option is similar in spirit to the
existing "nodev", "noexec", and "nosuid" options, as well as to the
LOOKUP_NO_SYMLINKS resolve flag in the openat2(2) syscall. Various BSD
variants have been supporting the "nosymfollow" mount option for a long
time with equivalent implementations.

Note that symlinks may still be created on file systems mounted with
the "nosymfollow" option present. readlink() remains functional, so
user space code that is aware of symlinks can still choose to follow
them explicitly.

Setting the "nosymfollow" mount option helps prevent privileged
writers from modifying files unintentionally in case there is an
unexpected link along the accessed path. The "nosymfollow" option is
thus useful as a defensive measure for systems that need to deal with
untrusted file systems in privileged contexts.

More information on the history and motivation for this patch can be
found here:

https://sites.google.com/a/chromium.org/dev/chromium-os/chromiumos-design-docs/hardening-against-malicious-stateful-data#TOC-Restricting-symlink-traversal

Signed-off-by: Mattias Nissler &lt;mnissler@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ross Zwisler &lt;zwisler@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Aleksa Sarai &lt;cyphar@cyphar.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'ovl-update-5.8' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mszeredi/vfs</title>
<updated>2020-06-09T22:40:50Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2020-06-09T22:40:50Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:52435c86bf0f5c892804912481af7f1a5b95ff2d</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull overlayfs updates from Miklos Szeredi:
 "Fixes:

   - Resolve mount option conflicts consistently

   - Sync before remount R/O

   - Fix file handle encoding corner cases

   - Fix metacopy related issues

   - Fix an unintialized return value

   - Add missing permission checks for underlying layers

  Optimizations:

   - Allow multipe whiteouts to share an inode

   - Optimize small writes by inheriting SB_NOSEC from upper layer

   - Do not call -&gt;syncfs() multiple times for sync(2)

   - Do not cache negative lookups on upper layer

   - Make private internal mounts longterm"

* tag 'ovl-update-5.8' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mszeredi/vfs: (27 commits)
  ovl: remove unnecessary lock check
  ovl: make oip-&gt;index bool
  ovl: only pass -&gt;ki_flags to ovl_iocb_to_rwf()
  ovl: make private mounts longterm
  ovl: get rid of redundant members in struct ovl_fs
  ovl: add accessor for ofs-&gt;upper_mnt
  ovl: initialize error in ovl_copy_xattr
  ovl: drop negative dentry in upper layer
  ovl: check permission to open real file
  ovl: call secutiry hook in ovl_real_ioctl()
  ovl: verify permissions in ovl_path_open()
  ovl: switch to mounter creds in readdir
  ovl: pass correct flags for opening real directory
  ovl: fix redirect traversal on metacopy dentries
  ovl: initialize OVL_UPPERDATA in ovl_lookup()
  ovl: use only uppermetacopy state in ovl_lookup()
  ovl: simplify setting of origin for index lookup
  ovl: fix out of bounds access warning in ovl_check_fb_len()
  ovl: return required buffer size for file handles
  ovl: sync dirty data when remounting to ro mode
  ...
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ovl: make private mounts longterm</title>
<updated>2020-06-04T08:48:19Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Miklos Szeredi</name>
<email>mszeredi@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-06-04T08:48:19Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:df820f8de4e481222b17f9bcee7b909ae8167529</id>
<content type='text'>
Overlayfs is using clone_private_mount() to create internal mounts for
underlying layers.  These are used for operations requiring a path, such as
dentry_open().

Since these private mounts are not in any namespace they are treated as
short term, "detached" mounts and mntput() involves taking the global
mount_lock, which can result in serious cacheline pingpong.

Make these private mounts longterm instead, which trade the penalty on
mntput() for a slightly longer shutdown time due to an added RCU grace
period when putting these mounts.

Introduce a new helper kern_unmount_many() that can take care of multiple
longterm mounts with a single RCU grace period.

Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi &lt;mszeredi@redhat.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>proc/mounts: add cursor</title>
<updated>2020-05-14T14:44:24Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Miklos Szeredi</name>
<email>mszeredi@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-05-14T14:44:24Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:9f6c61f96f2d97cbb5f7fa85607bc398f843ff0f</id>
<content type='text'>
If mounts are deleted after a read(2) call on /proc/self/mounts (or its
kin), the subsequent read(2) could miss a mount that comes after the
deleted one in the list.  This is because the file position is interpreted
as the number mount entries from the start of the list.

E.g. first read gets entries #0 to #9; the seq file index will be 10.  Then
entry #5 is deleted, resulting in #10 becoming #9 and #11 becoming #10,
etc...  The next read will continue from entry #10, and #9 is missed.

Solve this by adding a cursor entry for each open instance.  Taking the
global namespace_sem for write seems excessive, since we are only dealing
with a per-namespace list.  Instead add a per-namespace spinlock and use
that together with namespace_sem taken for read to protect against
concurrent modification of the mount list.  This may reduce parallelism of
is_local_mountpoint(), but it's hardly a big contention point.  We could
also use RCU freeing of cursors to make traversal not need additional
locks, if that turns out to be neceesary.

Only move the cursor once for each read (cursor is not added on open) to
minimize cacheline invalidation.  When EOF is reached, the cursor is taken
off the list, in order to prevent an excessive number of cursors due to
inactive open file descriptors.

Reported-by: Karel Zak &lt;kzak@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi &lt;mszeredi@redhat.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>acct_on(): don't mess with freeze protection</title>
<updated>2019-04-05T01:04:13Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Al Viro</name>
<email>viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2019-04-05T01:04:13Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:9419a3191dcb27f24478d288abaab697228d28e6</id>
<content type='text'>
What happens there is that we are replacing file-&gt;path.mnt of
a file we'd just opened with a clone and we need the write
count contribution to be transferred from original mount to
new one.  That's it.  We do *NOT* want any kind of freeze
protection for the duration of switchover.

IOW, we should just use __mnt_{want,drop}_write() for that
switchover; no need to bother with mnt_{want,drop}_write()
there.

Tested-by: Amir Goldstein &lt;amir73il@gmail.com&gt;
Reported-by: syzbot+2a73a6ea9507b7112141@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>new helpers: vfs_create_mount(), fc_mount()</title>
<updated>2019-01-30T22:44:24Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Al Viro</name>
<email>viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2018-11-04T11:48:34Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:8f2918898eb5fe25845dde7f4a77bda0e2966e05</id>
<content type='text'>
Create a new helper, vfs_create_mount(), that creates a detached vfsmount
object from an fs_context that has a superblock attached to it.

Almost all uses will be paired with immediately preceding vfs_get_tree();
add a helper for such combination.

Switch vfs_kern_mount() to use this.

NOTE: mild behaviour change; passing NULL as 'device name' to
something like procfs will change /proc/*/mountstats - "device none"
instead on "no device".  That is consistent with /proc/mounts et.al.

[do'h - EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL slipped in by mistake; removed]
[AV -- remove confused comment from vfs_create_mount()]
[AV -- removed the second argument]

Reviewed-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
</entry>
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