<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>user/sven/linux.git/include/linux/random.h, branch v4.4.265</title>
<subtitle>Linux Kernel
</subtitle>
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<updated>2020-08-21T08:52:55Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>random32: move the pseudo-random 32-bit definitions to prandom.h</title>
<updated>2020-08-21T08:52:55Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2020-07-31T05:51:14Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:87fe1537594bba8c023c18807790bdce73eda593</id>
<content type='text'>
commit c0842fbc1b18c7a044e6ff3e8fa78bfa822c7d1a upstream.

The addition of percpu.h to the list of includes in random.h revealed
some circular dependencies on arm64 and possibly other platforms.  This
include was added solely for the pseudo-random definitions, which have
nothing to do with the rest of the definitions in this file but are
still there for legacy reasons.

This patch moves the pseudo-random parts to linux/prandom.h and the
percpu.h include with it, which is now guarded by _LINUX_PRANDOM_H and
protected against recursive inclusion.

A further cleanup step would be to remove this from &lt;linux/random.h&gt;
entirely, and make people who use the prandom infrastructure include
just the new header file.  That's a bit of a churn patch, but grepping
for "prandom_" and "next_pseudo_random32" "struct rnd_state" should
catch most users.

But it turns out that that nice cleanup step is fairly painful, because
a _lot_ of code currently seems to depend on the implicit include of
&lt;linux/random.h&gt;, which can currently come in a lot of ways, including
such fairly core headfers as &lt;linux/net.h&gt;.

So the "nice cleanup" part may or may never happen.

Fixes: 1c9df907da83 ("random: fix circular include dependency on arm64 after addition of percpu.h")
Tested-by: Guenter Roeck &lt;linux@roeck-us.net&gt;
Acked-by: Willy Tarreau &lt;w@1wt.eu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>random32: remove net_rand_state from the latent entropy gcc plugin</title>
<updated>2020-08-21T08:52:55Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2020-07-30T02:11:00Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:d4f1538011dbc161daef137a88e10724c105dd40</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 83bdc7275e6206f560d247be856bceba3e1ed8f2 upstream.

It turns out that the plugin right now ends up being really unhappy
about the change from 'static' to 'extern' storage that happened in
commit f227e3ec3b5c ("random32: update the net random state on interrupt
and activity").

This is probably a trivial fix for the latent_entropy plugin, but for
now, just remove net_rand_state from the list of things the plugin
worries about.

Reported-by: Stephen Rothwell &lt;sfr@canb.auug.org.au&gt;
Cc: Emese Revfy &lt;re.emese@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Willy Tarreau &lt;w@1wt.eu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>random: fix circular include dependency on arm64 after addition of percpu.h</title>
<updated>2020-08-21T08:52:55Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Willy Tarreau</name>
<email>w@1wt.eu</email>
</author>
<published>2020-07-30T05:59:24Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:33d283db8f2f85ef8173d1315c1153ac2f28cf98</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 1c9df907da83812e4f33b59d3d142c864d9da57f upstream.

Daniel Díaz and Kees Cook independently reported that commit
f227e3ec3b5c ("random32: update the net random state on interrupt and
activity") broke arm64 due to a circular dependency on include files
since the addition of percpu.h in random.h.

The correct fix would definitely be to move all the prandom32 stuff out
of random.h but for backporting, a smaller solution is preferred.

This one replaces linux/percpu.h with asm/percpu.h, and this fixes the
problem on x86_64, arm64, arm, and mips.  Note that moving percpu.h
around didn't change anything and that removing it entirely broke
differently.  When backporting, such options might still be considered
if this patch fails to help.

[ It turns out that an alternate fix seems to be to just remove the
  troublesome &lt;asm/pointer_auth.h&gt; remove from the arm64 &lt;asm/smp.h&gt;
  that causes the circular dependency.

  But we might as well do the whole belt-and-suspenders thing, and
  minimize inclusion in &lt;linux/random.h&gt; too. Either will fix the
  problem, and both are good changes.   - Linus ]

Reported-by: Daniel Díaz &lt;daniel.diaz@linaro.org&gt;
Reported-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Tested-by: Marc Zyngier &lt;maz@kernel.org&gt;
Fixes: f227e3ec3b5c
Cc: Stephen Rothwell &lt;sfr@canb.auug.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau &lt;w@1wt.eu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>random32: update the net random state on interrupt and activity</title>
<updated>2020-08-21T08:52:54Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Willy Tarreau</name>
<email>w@1wt.eu</email>
</author>
<published>2020-07-10T13:23:19Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:40713057d1d11fc86f0ed02383373281d87841a3</id>
<content type='text'>
commit f227e3ec3b5cad859ad15666874405e8c1bbc1d4 upstream.

This modifies the first 32 bits out of the 128 bits of a random CPU's
net_rand_state on interrupt or CPU activity to complicate remote
observations that could lead to guessing the network RNG's internal
state.

Note that depending on some network devices' interrupt rate moderation
or binding, this re-seeding might happen on every packet or even almost
never.

In addition, with NOHZ some CPUs might not even get timer interrupts,
leaving their local state rarely updated, while they are running
networked processes making use of the random state.  For this reason, we
also perform this update in update_process_times() in order to at least
update the state when there is user or system activity, since it's the
only case we care about.

Reported-by: Amit Klein &lt;aksecurity@gmail.com&gt;
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" &lt;Jason@zx2c4.com&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau &lt;w@1wt.eu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>drivers: char: random: add get_random_long()</title>
<updated>2017-06-14T11:16:23Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Daniel Cashman</name>
<email>dcashman@android.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-02-26T23:19:34Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:baae8c3c2e2a41aff63cd85767c89c6166d8b58c</id>
<content type='text'>
commit ec9ee4acd97c0039a61c0ae4f12705767ae62153 upstream.

Commit d07e22597d1d ("mm: mmap: add new /proc tunable for mmap_base
ASLR") added the ability to choose from a range of values to use for
entropy count in generating the random offset to the mmap_base address.

The maximum value on this range was set to 32 bits for 64-bit x86
systems, but this value could be increased further, requiring more than
the 32 bits of randomness provided by get_random_int(), as is already
possible for arm64.  Add a new function: get_random_long() which more
naturally fits with the mmap usage of get_random_int() but operates
exactly the same as get_random_int().

Also, fix the shifting constant in mmap_rnd() to be an unsigned long so
that values greater than 31 bits generate an appropriate mask without
overflow.  This is especially important on x86, as its shift instruction
uses a 5-bit mask for the shift operand, which meant that any value for
mmap_rnd_bits over 31 acts as a no-op and effectively disables mmap_base
randomization.

Finally, replace calls to get_random_int() with get_random_long() where
appropriate.

This patch (of 2):

Add get_random_long().

Signed-off-by: Daniel Cashman &lt;dcashman@android.com&gt;
Acked-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Cc: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Cc: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Ralf Baechle &lt;ralf@linux-mips.org&gt;
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt &lt;benh@kernel.crashing.org&gt;
Cc: Paul Mackerras &lt;paulus@samba.org&gt;
Cc: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
Cc: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: H. Peter Anvin &lt;hpa@zytor.com&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Nick Kralevich &lt;nnk@google.com&gt;
Cc: Jeff Vander Stoep &lt;jeffv@google.com&gt;
Cc: Mark Salyzyn &lt;salyzyn@android.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>random32: add prandom_init_once helper for own rngs</title>
<updated>2015-10-08T12:26:38Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Daniel Borkmann</name>
<email>daniel@iogearbox.net</email>
</author>
<published>2015-10-07T23:20:38Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:897ece56e714a2cc64e6914cb89a362d7021b36e</id>
<content type='text'>
Add a prandom_init_once() facility that works on the rnd_state, so that
users that are keeping their own state independent from prandom_u32() can
initialize their taus113 per cpu states.

The motivation here is similar to net_get_random_once(): initialize the
state as late as possible in the hope that enough entropy has been
collected for the seeding. prandom_init_once() makes use of the recently
introduced prandom_seed_full_state() helper and is generic enough so that
it could also be used on fast-paths due to the DO_ONCE().

Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa &lt;hannes@stressinduktion.org&gt;
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>random: Remove kernel blocking API</title>
<updated>2015-06-10T11:14:04Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Herbert Xu</name>
<email>herbert@gondor.apana.org.au</email>
</author>
<published>2015-06-09T10:19:42Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:c2719503f5e1e6213d716bb078bdad01e28ebcbf</id>
<content type='text'>
This patch removes the kernel blocking API as it has been completely
replaced by the callback API.

Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>random: Add callback API for random pool readiness</title>
<updated>2015-06-10T11:13:56Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Herbert Xu</name>
<email>herbert@gondor.apana.org.au</email>
</author>
<published>2015-06-09T10:19:39Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=205a525c334295e3cd4cc7755fd2c0398e3a787f'/>
<id>urn:sha1:205a525c334295e3cd4cc7755fd2c0398e3a787f</id>
<content type='text'>
The get_blocking_random_bytes API is broken because the wait can
be arbitrarily long (potentially forever) so there is no safe way
of calling it from within the kernel.

This patch replaces it with a callback API instead.  The callback
is invoked potentially from interrupt context so the user needs
to schedule their own work thread if necessary.

In addition to adding callbacks, they can also be removed as
otherwise this opens up a way for user-space to allocate kernel
memory with no bound (by opening algif_rng descriptors and then
closing them).

Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>random: Blocking API for accessing nonblocking_pool</title>
<updated>2015-05-27T09:51:53Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Stephan Mueller</name>
<email>smueller@chronox.de</email>
</author>
<published>2015-05-25T13:08:47Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:16b369a91d0dd80be214b7f7801fbc51875454cc</id>
<content type='text'>
The added API calls provide a synchronous function call
get_blocking_random_bytes where the caller is blocked until
the nonblocking_pool is initialized.

CC: Andreas Steffen &lt;andreas.steffen@strongswan.org&gt;
CC: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
CC: Sandy Harris &lt;sandyinchina@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller &lt;smueller@chronox.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>random32: improvements to prandom_bytes</title>
<updated>2014-08-25T01:36:01Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Daniel Borkmann</name>
<email>dborkman@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-08-23T15:03:28Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:a98406e22c12e514bac28fec0a49dc793edaf3a8</id>
<content type='text'>
This patch addresses a couple of minor items, mostly addesssing
prandom_bytes(): 1) prandom_bytes{,_state}() should use size_t
for length arguments, 2) We can use put_unaligned() when filling
the array instead of open coding it [ perhaps some archs will
further benefit from their own arch specific implementation when
GCC cannot make up for it ], 3) Fix a typo, 4) Better use unsigned
int as type for getting the arch seed, 5) Make use of
prandom_u32_max() for timer slack.

Regarding the change to put_unaligned(), callers of prandom_bytes()
which internally invoke prandom_bytes_state(), don't bother as
they expect the array to be filled randomly and don't have any
control of the internal state what-so-ever (that's also why we
have periodic reseeding there, etc), so they really don't care.

Now for the direct callers of prandom_bytes_state(), which
are solely located in test cases for MTD devices, that is,
drivers/mtd/tests/{oobtest.c,pagetest.c,subpagetest.c}:

These tests basically fill a test write-vector through
prandom_bytes_state() with an a-priori defined seed each time
and write that to a MTD device. Later on, they set up a read-vector
and read back that blocks from the device. So in the verification
phase, the write-vector is being re-setup [ so same seed and
prandom_bytes_state() called ], and then memcmp()'ed against the
read-vector to check if the data is the same.

Akinobu, Lothar and I also tested this patch and it runs through
the 3 relevant MTD test cases w/o any errors on the nandsim device
(simulator for MTD devs) for x86_64, ppc64, ARM (i.MX28, i.MX53
and i.MX6):

  # modprobe nandsim first_id_byte=0x20 second_id_byte=0xac \
                     third_id_byte=0x00 fourth_id_byte=0x15
  # modprobe mtd_oobtest dev=0
  # modprobe mtd_pagetest dev=0
  # modprobe mtd_subpagetest dev=0

We also don't have any users depending directly on a particular
result of the PRNG (except the PRNG self-test itself), and that's
just fine as it e.g. allowed us easily to do things like upgrading
from taus88 to taus113.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;dborkman@redhat.com&gt;
Tested-by: Akinobu Mita &lt;akinobu.mita@gmail.com&gt;
Tested-by: Lothar Waßmann &lt;LW@KARO-electronics.de&gt;
Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa &lt;hannes@stressinduktion.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
</entry>
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