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<title>user/sven/linux.git/include/linux/security.h, branch v3.5-rc2</title>
<subtitle>Linux Kernel
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/atom?h=v3.5-rc2</id>
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<updated>2012-06-01T14:37:01Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>take security_mmap_file() outside of -&gt;mmap_sem</title>
<updated>2012-06-01T14:37:01Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Al Viro</name>
<email>viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2012-05-30T21:11:23Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:8b3ec6814c83d76b85bd13badc48552836c24839</id>
<content type='text'>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>split -&gt;file_mmap() into -&gt;mmap_addr()/-&gt;mmap_file()</title>
<updated>2012-05-31T17:11:54Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Al Viro</name>
<email>viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2012-05-30T17:30:51Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:e5467859f7f79b69fc49004403009dfdba3bec53</id>
<content type='text'>
... i.e. file-dependent and address-dependent checks.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>split cap_mmap_addr() out of cap_file_mmap()</title>
<updated>2012-05-31T17:10:54Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Al Viro</name>
<email>viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2012-05-30T17:11:37Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:d007794a182bc072a7b7479909dbd0d67ba341be</id>
<content type='text'>
... switch callers.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'master' of git://git.infradead.org/users/eparis/selinux into next</title>
<updated>2012-05-22T01:21:06Z</updated>
<author>
<name>James Morris</name>
<email>james.l.morris@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-05-22T01:21:06Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:ff2bb047c4bce9742e94911eeb44b4d6ff4734ab</id>
<content type='text'>
Per pull request, for 3.5.
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Add PR_{GET,SET}_NO_NEW_PRIVS to prevent execve from granting privs</title>
<updated>2012-04-14T01:13:18Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Andy Lutomirski</name>
<email>luto@amacapital.net</email>
</author>
<published>2012-04-12T21:47:50Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:259e5e6c75a910f3b5e656151dc602f53f9d7548</id>
<content type='text'>
With this change, calling
  prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0)
disables privilege granting operations at execve-time.  For example, a
process will not be able to execute a setuid binary to change their uid
or gid if this bit is set.  The same is true for file capabilities.

Additionally, LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS is defined to ensure that
LSMs respect the requested behavior.

To determine if the NO_NEW_PRIVS bit is set, a task may call
  prctl(PR_GET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 0, 0, 0, 0);
It returns 1 if set and 0 if it is not set. If any of the arguments are
non-zero, it will return -1 and set errno to -EINVAL.
(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS behaves similarly.)

This functionality is desired for the proposed seccomp filter patch
series.  By using PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, it allows a task to modify the
system call behavior for itself and its child tasks without being
able to impact the behavior of a more privileged task.

Another potential use is making certain privileged operations
unprivileged.  For example, chroot may be considered "safe" if it cannot
affect privileged tasks.

Note, this patch causes execve to fail when PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS is
set and AppArmor is in use.  It is fixed in a subsequent patch.

Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@amacapital.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Will Drewry &lt;wad@chromium.org&gt;
Acked-by: Eric Paris &lt;eparis@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;

v18: updated change desc
v17: using new define values as per 3.4
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;james.l.morris@oracle.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>SELinux: rename dentry_open to file_open</title>
<updated>2012-04-09T16:22:50Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Paris</name>
<email>eparis@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-04-04T17:45:40Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:83d498569e9a7a4b92c4c5d3566f2d6a604f28c9</id>
<content type='text'>
dentry_open takes a file, rename it to file_open

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris &lt;eparis@redhat.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security</title>
<updated>2012-03-21T20:25:04Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2012-03-21T20:25:04Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:3556485f1595e3964ba539e39ea682acbb835cee</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull security subsystem updates for 3.4 from James Morris:
 "The main addition here is the new Yama security module from Kees Cook,
  which was discussed at the Linux Security Summit last year.  Its
  purpose is to collect miscellaneous DAC security enhancements in one
  place.  This also marks a departure in policy for LSM modules, which
  were previously limited to being standalone access control systems.
  Chromium OS is using Yama, and I believe there are plans for Ubuntu,
  at least.

  This patchset also includes maintenance updates for AppArmor, TOMOYO
  and others."

Fix trivial conflict in &lt;net/sock.h&gt; due to the jumo_label-&gt;static_key
rename.

* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (38 commits)
  AppArmor: Fix location of const qualifier on generated string tables
  TOMOYO: Return error if fails to delete a domain
  AppArmor: add const qualifiers to string arrays
  AppArmor: Add ability to load extended policy
  TOMOYO: Return appropriate value to poll().
  AppArmor: Move path failure information into aa_get_name and rename
  AppArmor: Update dfa matching routines.
  AppArmor: Minor cleanup of d_namespace_path to consolidate error handling
  AppArmor: Retrieve the dentry_path for error reporting when path lookup fails
  AppArmor: Add const qualifiers to generated string tables
  AppArmor: Fix oops in policy unpack auditing
  AppArmor: Fix error returned when a path lookup is disconnected
  KEYS: testing wrong bit for KEY_FLAG_REVOKED
  TOMOYO: Fix mount flags checking order.
  security: fix ima kconfig warning
  AppArmor: Fix the error case for chroot relative path name lookup
  AppArmor: fix mapping of META_READ to audit and quiet flags
  AppArmor: Fix underflow in xindex calculation
  AppArmor: Fix dropping of allowed operations that are force audited
  AppArmor: Add mising end of structure test to caps unpacking
  ...
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>security: struct security_operations kerneldoc fix</title>
<updated>2012-02-28T15:01:55Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Javier Martinez Canillas</name>
<email>javier@dowhile0.org</email>
</author>
<published>2012-02-15T10:58:54Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:fbe74e361c6586cdd996bc2805033999dd469e99</id>
<content type='text'>
unix_may_send hook has the prototype:

int (*unix_may_send) (struct socket *sock, struct socket *other)

so the documentation is wrongly referring to the second argument as @sock.

Signed-off-by: Javier Martinez Canillas &lt;javier@dowhile0.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina &lt;jkosina@suse.cz&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>security: trim security.h</title>
<updated>2012-02-13T23:45:42Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Al Viro</name>
<email>viro@ftp.linux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2012-02-13T03:58:52Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:4040153087478993cbf0809f444400a3c808074c</id>
<content type='text'>
Trim security.h

Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mm: collapse security_vm_enough_memory() variants into a single function</title>
<updated>2012-02-13T23:45:39Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Al Viro</name>
<email>viro@ftp.linux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2012-02-13T03:58:52Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:191c542442fdf53cc3c496c00be13367fd9cd42d</id>
<content type='text'>
Collapse security_vm_enough_memory() variants into a single function.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
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