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<title>user/sven/linux.git/include/linux/security.h, branch v3.9.8</title>
<subtitle>Linux Kernel
</subtitle>
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<updated>2013-04-10T19:40:39Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>lsm: add the missing documentation for the security_skb_owned_by() hook</title>
<updated>2013-04-10T19:40:39Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Paul Moore</name>
<email>pmoore@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2013-04-10T19:34:14Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:6b07a24fc38476e04f591cc17594bc1835b9efdd</id>
<content type='text'>
Unfortunately we didn't catch the missing comments earlier when the
patch was merged.

Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;pmoore@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selinux: add a skb_owned_by() hook</title>
<updated>2013-04-09T17:23:11Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2013-04-08T17:58:11Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:ca10b9e9a8ca7342ee07065289cbe74ac128c169</id>
<content type='text'>
Commit 90ba9b1986b5ac (tcp: tcp_make_synack() can use alloc_skb())
broke certain SELinux/NetLabel configurations by no longer correctly
assigning the sock to the outgoing SYNACK packet.

Cost of atomic operations on the LISTEN socket is quite big,
and we would like it to happen only if really needed.

This patch introduces a new security_ops-&gt;skb_owned_by() method,
that is a void operation unless selinux is active.

Reported-by: Miroslav Vadkerti &lt;mvadkert@redhat.com&gt;
Diagnosed-by: Paul Moore &lt;pmoore@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Cc: "David S. Miller" &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: James Morris &lt;james.l.morris@oracle.com&gt;
Tested-by: Paul Moore &lt;pmoore@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Paul Moore &lt;pmoore@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tun: fix LSM/SELinux labeling of tun/tap devices</title>
<updated>2013-01-14T23:16:59Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Paul Moore</name>
<email>pmoore@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2013-01-14T07:12:19Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:5dbbaf2de89613d19a9286d4db0a535ca2735d26</id>
<content type='text'>
This patch corrects some problems with LSM/SELinux that were introduced
with the multiqueue patchset.  The problem stems from the fact that the
multiqueue work changed the relationship between the tun device and its
associated socket; before the socket persisted for the life of the
device, however after the multiqueue changes the socket only persisted
for the life of the userspace connection (fd open).  For non-persistent
devices this is not an issue, but for persistent devices this can cause
the tun device to lose its SELinux label.

We correct this problem by adding an opaque LSM security blob to the
tun device struct which allows us to have the LSM security state, e.g.
SELinux labeling information, persist for the lifetime of the tun
device.  In the process we tweak the LSM hooks to work with this new
approach to TUN device/socket labeling and introduce a new LSM hook,
security_tun_dev_attach_queue(), to approve requests to attach to a
TUN queue via TUNSETQUEUE.

The SELinux code has been adjusted to match the new LSM hooks, the
other LSMs do not make use of the LSM TUN controls.  This patch makes
use of the recently added "tun_socket:attach_queue" permission to
restrict access to the TUNSETQUEUE operation.  On older SELinux
policies which do not define the "tun_socket:attach_queue" permission
the access control decision for TUNSETQUEUE will be handled according
to the SELinux policy's unknown permission setting.

Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;pmoore@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Eric Paris &lt;eparis@parisplace.org&gt;
Tested-by: Jason Wang &lt;jasowang@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>security: introduce kernel_module_from_file hook</title>
<updated>2012-12-14T02:35:24Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>keescook@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2012-10-15T21:02:07Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:2e72d51b4ac32989496870cd8171b3682fea1839</id>
<content type='text'>
Now that kernel module origins can be reasoned about, provide a hook to
the LSMs to make policy decisions about the module file. This will let
Chrome OS enforce that loadable kernel modules can only come from its
read-only hash-verified root filesystem. Other LSMs can, for example,
read extended attributes for signatures, etc.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn &lt;serge.hallyn@canonical.com&gt;
Acked-by: Eric Paris &lt;eparis@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@us.ibm.com&gt;
Acked-by: James Morris &lt;james.l.morris@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell &lt;rusty@rustcorp.com.au&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>consitify do_mount() arguments</title>
<updated>2012-10-12T00:02:04Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Al Viro</name>
<email>viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2012-10-11T15:42:01Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:808d4e3cfdcc52b19276175464f6dbca4df13b09</id>
<content type='text'>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security</title>
<updated>2012-10-03T04:38:48Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2012-10-03T04:38:48Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:88265322c14cce39f7afbc416726ef4fac413298</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
 "Highlights:

   - Integrity: add local fs integrity verification to detect offline
     attacks
   - Integrity: add digital signature verification
   - Simple stacking of Yama with other LSMs (per LSS discussions)
   - IBM vTPM support on ppc64
   - Add new driver for Infineon I2C TIS TPM
   - Smack: add rule revocation for subject labels"

Fixed conflicts with the user namespace support in kernel/auditsc.c and
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c.

* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (39 commits)
  Documentation: Update git repository URL for Smack userland tools
  ima: change flags container data type
  Smack: setprocattr memory leak fix
  Smack: implement revoking all rules for a subject label
  Smack: remove task_wait() hook.
  ima: audit log hashes
  ima: generic IMA action flag handling
  ima: rename ima_must_appraise_or_measure
  audit: export audit_log_task_info
  tpm: fix tpm_acpi sparse warning on different address spaces
  samples/seccomp: fix 31 bit build on s390
  ima: digital signature verification support
  ima: add support for different security.ima data types
  ima: add ima_inode_setxattr/removexattr function and calls
  ima: add inode_post_setattr call
  ima: replace iint spinblock with rwlock/read_lock
  ima: allocating iint improvements
  ima: add appraise action keywords and default rules
  ima: integrity appraisal extension
  vfs: move ima_file_free before releasing the file
  ...
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace</title>
<updated>2012-10-02T18:11:09Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2012-10-02T18:11:09Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:437589a74b6a590d175f86cf9f7b2efcee7765e7</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull user namespace changes from Eric Biederman:
 "This is a mostly modest set of changes to enable basic user namespace
  support.  This allows the code to code to compile with user namespaces
  enabled and removes the assumption there is only the initial user
  namespace.  Everything is converted except for the most complex of the
  filesystems: autofs4, 9p, afs, ceph, cifs, coda, fuse, gfs2, ncpfs,
  nfs, ocfs2 and xfs as those patches need a bit more review.

  The strategy is to push kuid_t and kgid_t values are far down into
  subsystems and filesystems as reasonable.  Leaving the make_kuid and
  from_kuid operations to happen at the edge of userspace, as the values
  come off the disk, and as the values come in from the network.
  Letting compile type incompatible compile errors (present when user
  namespaces are enabled) guide me to find the issues.

  The most tricky areas have been the places where we had an implicit
  union of uid and gid values and were storing them in an unsigned int.
  Those places were converted into explicit unions.  I made certain to
  handle those places with simple trivial patches.

  Out of that work I discovered we have generic interfaces for storing
  quota by projid.  I had never heard of the project identifiers before.
  Adding full user namespace support for project identifiers accounts
  for most of the code size growth in my git tree.

  Ultimately there will be work to relax privlige checks from
  "capable(FOO)" to "ns_capable(user_ns, FOO)" where it is safe allowing
  root in a user names to do those things that today we only forbid to
  non-root users because it will confuse suid root applications.

  While I was pushing kuid_t and kgid_t changes deep into the audit code
  I made a few other cleanups.  I capitalized on the fact we process
  netlink messages in the context of the message sender.  I removed
  usage of NETLINK_CRED, and started directly using current-&gt;tty.

  Some of these patches have also made it into maintainer trees, with no
  problems from identical code from different trees showing up in
  linux-next.

  After reading through all of this code I feel like I might be able to
  win a game of kernel trivial pursuit."

Fix up some fairly trivial conflicts in netfilter uid/git logging code.

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace: (107 commits)
  userns: Convert the ufs filesystem to use kuid/kgid where appropriate
  userns: Convert the udf filesystem to use kuid/kgid where appropriate
  userns: Convert ubifs to use kuid/kgid
  userns: Convert squashfs to use kuid/kgid where appropriate
  userns: Convert reiserfs to use kuid and kgid where appropriate
  userns: Convert jfs to use kuid/kgid where appropriate
  userns: Convert jffs2 to use kuid and kgid where appropriate
  userns: Convert hpfs to use kuid and kgid where appropriate
  userns: Convert btrfs to use kuid/kgid where appropriate
  userns: Convert bfs to use kuid/kgid where appropriate
  userns: Convert affs to use kuid/kgid wherwe appropriate
  userns: On alpha modify linux_to_osf_stat to use convert from kuids and kgids
  userns: On ia64 deal with current_uid and current_gid being kuid and kgid
  userns: On ppc convert current_uid from a kuid before printing.
  userns: Convert s390 getting uid and gid system calls to use kuid and kgid
  userns: Convert s390 hypfs to use kuid and kgid where appropriate
  userns: Convert binder ipc to use kuids
  userns: Teach security_path_chown to take kuids and kgids
  userns: Add user namespace support to IMA
  userns: Convert EVM to deal with kuids and kgids in it's hmac computation
  ...
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>c/r: prctl: fix build error for no-MMU case</title>
<updated>2012-09-25T15:59:21Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Mark Salter</name>
<email>msalter@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-09-25T00:17:38Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:be8cfc4af15cf611dfeb66a1fb5df43d5f1e280a</id>
<content type='text'>
Commit 1ad75b9e1628 ("c/r: prctl: add minimal address test to
PR_SET_MM") added some address checking to prctl_set_mm() used by
checkpoint-restore.  This causes a build error for no-MMU systems:

   kernel/sys.c: In function 'prctl_set_mm':
   kernel/sys.c:1868:34: error: 'mmap_min_addr' undeclared (first use in this function)

The test for mmap_min_addr doesn't make a lot of sense for no-MMU code
as noted in commit 6e1415467614 ("NOMMU: Optimise away the
{dac_,}mmap_min_addr tests").

This patch defines mmap_min_addr as 0UL in the no-MMU case so that the
compiler will optimize away tests for "addr &lt; mmap_min_addr".

Signed-off-by: Mark Salter &lt;msalter@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Cyrill Gorcunov &lt;gorcunov@openvz.org&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;	[3.6.x]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>userns: Teach security_path_chown to take kuids and kgids</title>
<updated>2012-09-21T10:13:25Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric W. Biederman</name>
<email>ebiederm@xmission.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-06-01T22:14:19Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:d2b31ca644fdc8704de3367a6a56a5c958c77f53</id>
<content type='text'>
Don't make the security modules deal with raw user space uid and
gids instead pass in a kuid_t and a kgid_t so that security modules
only have to deal with internal kernel uids and gids.

Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: James Morris &lt;james.l.morris@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
Cc: Kentaro Takeda &lt;takedakn@nttdata.co.jp&gt;
Cc: Tetsuo Handa &lt;penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp&gt;
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn &lt;serge.hallyn@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>security: allow Yama to be unconditionally stacked</title>
<updated>2012-09-05T21:12:31Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>keescook@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2012-09-04T20:32:13Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:c6993e4ac002c92bc75379212e9179c36d4bf7ee</id>
<content type='text'>
Unconditionally call Yama when CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA_STACKED is selected,
no matter what LSM module is primary.

Ubuntu and Chrome OS already carry patches to do this, and Fedora
has voiced interest in doing this as well. Instead of having multiple
distributions (or LSM authors) carrying these patches, just allow Yama
to be called unconditionally when selected by the new CONFIG.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn &lt;serge.hallyn@canonical.com&gt;
Acked-by: Eric Paris &lt;eparis@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;james.l.morris@oracle.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
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