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<title>user/sven/linux.git/include/linux/security.h, branch v4.19.102</title>
<subtitle>Linux Kernel
</subtitle>
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<updated>2020-01-23T07:21:29Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>LSM: generalize flag passing to security_capable</title>
<updated>2020-01-23T07:21:29Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Micah Morton</name>
<email>mortonm@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-01-08T00:10:53Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:87ca9aaf0c0042f526452e3baa95317f9049613f</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit c1a85a00ea66cb6f0bd0f14e47c28c2b0999799f ]

This patch provides a general mechanism for passing flags to the
security_capable LSM hook. It replaces the specific 'audit' flag that is
used to tell security_capable whether it should log an audit message for
the given capability check. The reason for generalizing this flag
passing is so we can add an additional flag that signifies whether
security_capable is being called by a setid syscall (which is needed by
the proposed SafeSetID LSM).

Signed-off-by: Micah Morton &lt;mortonm@chromium.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;james.morris@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'next-general' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security</title>
<updated>2018-08-15T17:25:26Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2018-08-15T17:25:26Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:92d4a03674b8c399c2f547580fa509db78226170</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:

 - kstrdup() return value fix from Eric Biggers

 - Add new security_load_data hook to differentiate security checking of
   kernel-loaded binaries in the case of there being no associated file
   descriptor, from Mimi Zohar.

 - Add ability to IMA to specify a policy at build-time, rather than
   just via command line params or by loading a custom policy, from
   Mimi.

 - Allow IMA and LSMs to prevent sysfs firmware load fallback (e.g. if
   using signed firmware), from Mimi.

 - Allow IMA to deny loading of kexec kernel images, as they cannot be
   measured by IMA, from Mimi.

* 'next-general' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
  security: check for kstrdup() failure in lsm_append()
  security: export security_kernel_load_data function
  ima: based on policy warn about loading firmware (pre-allocated buffer)
  module: replace the existing LSM hook in init_module
  ima: add build time policy
  ima: based on policy require signed firmware (sysfs fallback)
  firmware: add call to LSM hook before firmware sysfs fallback
  ima: based on policy require signed kexec kernel images
  kexec: add call to LSM hook in original kexec_load syscall
  security: define new LSM hook named security_kernel_load_data
  MAINTAINERS: remove the outdated "LINUX SECURITY MODULE (LSM) FRAMEWORK" entry
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>security: define new LSM hook named security_kernel_load_data</title>
<updated>2018-07-16T19:31:57Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Mimi Zohar</name>
<email>zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-07-13T18:05:56Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:377179cd28cd417dcfb4396edb824533431e607e</id>
<content type='text'>
Differentiate between the kernel reading a file specified by userspace
from the kernel loading a buffer containing data provided by userspace.
This patch defines a new LSM hook named security_kernel_load_data().

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Eric Biederman &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Cc: Luis R. Rodriguez &lt;mcgrof@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn &lt;serge@hallyn.com&gt;
Acked-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;james.morris@microsoft.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>security_file_open(): lose cred argument</title>
<updated>2018-07-12T14:04:15Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Al Viro</name>
<email>viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2018-07-10T17:25:29Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:e3f20ae21079ecac282df65d83865c5771f4bca0</id>
<content type='text'>
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>security: add hook for socketpair()</title>
<updated>2018-05-04T19:48:54Z</updated>
<author>
<name>David Herrmann</name>
<email>dh.herrmann@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-05-04T14:28:19Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:aae7cfcbb733cf16f3bc9cbb650673b94d5df75f</id>
<content type='text'>
Right now the LSM labels for socketpairs are always uninitialized,
since there is no security hook for the socketpair() syscall. This
patch adds the required hooks so LSMs can properly label socketpairs.
This allows SO_PEERSEC to return useful information on those sockets.

Note that the behavior of socketpair() can be emulated by creating a
listener socket, connecting to it, and then discarding the initial
listener socket. With this workaround, SO_PEERSEC would return the
caller's security context. However, with socketpair(), the uninitialized
context is returned unconditionally. This is unexpected and makes
socketpair() less useful in situations where the security context is
crucial to the application.

With the new socketpair-hook this disparity can be solved by making
socketpair() return the expected security context.

Acked-by: Serge Hallyn &lt;serge@hallyn.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Tom Gundersen &lt;teg@jklm.no&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Herrmann &lt;dh.herrmann@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;james.morris@microsoft.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'v4.17-rc2' into next-general</title>
<updated>2018-04-23T17:57:26Z</updated>
<author>
<name>James Morris</name>
<email>james.morris@microsoft.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-04-23T17:57:26Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:b393a707c84bb56a7800c93849fd8b492f76ba42</id>
<content type='text'>
Sync to Linux 4.17-rc2 for developers.
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>security: remove security_settime</title>
<updated>2018-04-17T05:18:48Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Sargun Dhillon</name>
<email>sargun@sargun.me</email>
</author>
<published>2018-04-01T08:42:08Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:e59644b720aed4b9ec9d3818b483f97376fb31ed</id>
<content type='text'>
security_settime was a wrapper around security_settime64. There are no more
users of it. Therefore it can be removed. It was removed in:
commit 4eb1bca17933 ("time: Use do_settimeofday64() internally")

Signed-off-by: Sargun Dhillon &lt;sargun@sargun.me&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;james.morris@microsoft.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security</title>
<updated>2018-04-07T23:53:59Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2018-04-07T23:53:59Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:f8cf2f16a7c95acce497bfafa90e7c6d8397d653</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull integrity updates from James Morris:
 "A mixture of bug fixes, code cleanup, and continues to close
  IMA-measurement, IMA-appraisal, and IMA-audit gaps.

  Also note the addition of a new cred_getsecid LSM hook by Matthew
  Garrett:

     For IMA purposes, we want to be able to obtain the prepared secid
     in the bprm structure before the credentials are committed. Add a
     cred_getsecid hook that makes this possible.

  which is used by a new CREDS_CHECK target in IMA:

     In ima_bprm_check(), check with both the existing process
     credentials and the credentials that will be committed when the new
     process is started. This will not change behaviour unless the
     system policy is extended to include CREDS_CHECK targets -
     BPRM_CHECK will continue to check the same credentials that it did
     previously"

* 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
  ima: Fallback to the builtin hash algorithm
  ima: Add smackfs to the default appraise/measure list
  evm: check for remount ro in progress before writing
  ima: Improvements in ima_appraise_measurement()
  ima: Simplify ima_eventsig_init()
  integrity: Remove unused macro IMA_ACTION_RULE_FLAGS
  ima: drop vla in ima_audit_measurement()
  ima: Fix Kconfig to select TPM 2.0 CRB interface
  evm: Constify *integrity_status_msg[]
  evm: Move evm_hmac and evm_hash from evm_main.c to evm_crypto.c
  fuse: define the filesystem as untrusted
  ima: fail signature verification based on policy
  ima: clear IMA_HASH
  ima: re-evaluate files on privileged mounted filesystems
  ima: fail file signature verification on non-init mounted filesystems
  IMA: Support using new creds in appraisal policy
  security: Add a cred_getsecid hook
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'next-general' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security</title>
<updated>2018-04-07T18:11:41Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2018-04-07T18:11:41Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:3612605a5a5bc3d3ae0ec861328be8a2990f2c7a</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull general security layer updates from James Morris:

 - Convert security hooks from list to hlist, a nice cleanup, saving
   about 50% of space, from Sargun Dhillon.

 - Only pass the cred, not the secid, to kill_pid_info_as_cred and
   security_task_kill (as the secid can be determined from the cred),
   from Stephen Smalley.

 - Close a potential race in kernel_read_file(), by making the file
   unwritable before calling the LSM check (vs after), from Kees Cook.

* 'next-general' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
  security: convert security hooks to use hlist
  exec: Set file unwritable before LSM check
  usb, signal, security: only pass the cred, not the secid, to kill_pid_info_as_cred and security_task_kill
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20180403' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux</title>
<updated>2018-04-06T22:39:26Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2018-04-06T22:39:26Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:9eda2d2dca830f0f8923b1f377d0fb70f576af1d</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull SELinux updates from Paul Moore:
 "A bigger than usual pull request for SELinux, 13 patches (lucky!)
  along with a scary looking diffstat.

  Although if you look a bit closer, excluding the usual minor
  tweaks/fixes, there are really only two significant changes in this
  pull request: the addition of proper SELinux access controls for SCTP
  and the encapsulation of a lot of internal SELinux state.

  The SCTP changes are the result of a multi-month effort (maybe even a
  year or longer?) between the SELinux folks and the SCTP folks to add
  proper SELinux controls. A special thanks go to Richard for seeing
  this through and keeping the effort moving forward.

  The state encapsulation work is a bit of janitorial work that came out
  of some early work on SELinux namespacing. The question of namespacing
  is still an open one, but I believe there is some real value in the
  encapsulation work so we've split that out and are now sending that up
  to you"

* tag 'selinux-pr-20180403' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
  selinux: wrap AVC state
  selinux: wrap selinuxfs state
  selinux: fix handling of uninitialized selinux state in get_bools/classes
  selinux: Update SELinux SCTP documentation
  selinux: Fix ltp test connect-syscall failure
  selinux: rename the {is,set}_enforcing() functions
  selinux: wrap global selinux state
  selinux: fix typo in selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone declaration
  selinux: Add SCTP support
  sctp: Add LSM hooks
  sctp: Add ip option support
  security: Add support for SCTP security hooks
  netlabel: If PF_INET6, check sk_buff ip header version
</content>
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