user/sven/linux.git/include/linux/security.h, branch v5.17.3

security: add sctp_assoc_established hook

2022-04-08T11:57:34Z

[ Upstream commit 5e50f5d4ff31e95599d695df1f0a4e7d2d6fef99 ] security_sctp_assoc_established() is added to replace security_inet_conn_established() called in sctp_sf_do_5_1E_ca(), so that asoc can be accessed in security subsystem and save the peer secid to asoc->peer_secid. Fixes: 72e89f50084c ("security: Add support for SCTP security hooks") Reported-by: Prashanth Prahlad Based-on-patch-by: Xin Long Reviewed-by: Xin Long Tested-by: Richard Haines Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek Signed-off-by: Paul Moore Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

security,selinux: remove security_add_mnt_opt()

2021-12-06T18:46:24Z

Its last user has been removed in commit f2aedb713c28 ("NFS: Add fs_context support."). Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler Signed-off-by: Paul Moore

lsm: security_task_getsecid_subj() -> security_current_getsecid_subj()

2021-11-22T22:52:47Z

The security_task_getsecid_subj() LSM hook invites misuse by allowing callers to specify a task even though the hook is only safe when the current task is referenced. Fix this by removing the task_struct argument to the hook, requiring LSM implementations to use the current task. While we are changing the hook declaration we also rename the function to security_current_getsecid_subj() in an effort to reinforce that the hook captures the subjective credentials of the current task and not an arbitrary task on the system. Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler Signed-off-by: Paul Moore

net,lsm,selinux: revert the security_sctp_assoc_established() hook

2021-11-12T17:07:02Z

This patch reverts two prior patches, e7310c94024c ("security: implement sctp_assoc_established hook in selinux") and 7c2ef0240e6a ("security: add sctp_assoc_established hook"), which create the security_sctp_assoc_established() LSM hook and provide a SELinux implementation. Unfortunately these two patches were merged without proper review (the Reviewed-by and Tested-by tags from Richard Haines were for previous revisions of these patches that were significantly different) and there are outstanding objections from the SELinux maintainers regarding these patches. Work is currently ongoing to correct the problems identified in the reverted patches, as well as others that have come up during review, but it is unclear at this point in time when that work will be ready for inclusion in the mainline kernel. In the interest of not keeping objectionable code in the kernel for multiple weeks, and potentially a kernel release, we are reverting the two problematic patches. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore

security: add sctp_assoc_established hook

2021-11-03T11:09:20Z

security_sctp_assoc_established() is added to replace security_inet_conn_established() called in sctp_sf_do_5_1E_ca(), so that asoc can be accessed in security subsystem and save the peer secid to asoc->peer_secid. v1->v2: - fix the return value of security_sctp_assoc_established() in security.h, found by kernel test robot and Ondrej. Fixes: 72e89f50084c ("security: Add support for SCTP security hooks") Reported-by: Prashanth Prahlad Reviewed-by: Richard Haines Tested-by: Richard Haines Signed-off-by: Xin Long Signed-off-by: David S. Miller

security: pass asoc to sctp_assoc_request and sctp_sk_clone

2021-11-03T11:09:20Z

This patch is to move secid and peer_secid from endpoint to association, and pass asoc to sctp_assoc_request and sctp_sk_clone instead of ep. As ep is the local endpoint and asoc represents a connection, and in SCTP one sk/ep could have multiple asoc/connection, saving secid/peer_secid for new asoc will overwrite the old asoc's. Note that since asoc can be passed as NULL, security_sctp_assoc_request() is moved to the place right after the new_asoc is created in sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init() and sctp_sf_do_unexpected_init(). v1->v2: - fix the description of selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(), as Jakub noticed. - fix the annotation in selinux_sctp_assoc_request(), as Richard Noticed. Fixes: 72e89f50084c ("security: Add support for SCTP security hooks") Reported-by: Prashanth Prahlad Reviewed-by: Richard Haines Tested-by: Richard Haines Signed-off-by: Xin Long Signed-off-by: David S. Miller

security: Return xattr name from security_dentry_init_security()

2021-10-20T12:17:08Z

Right now security_dentry_init_security() only supports single security label and is used by SELinux only. There are two users of this hook, namely ceph and nfs. NFS does not care about xattr name. Ceph hardcodes the xattr name to security.selinux (XATTR_NAME_SELINUX). I am making changes to fuse/virtiofs to send security label to virtiofsd and I need to send xattr name as well. I also hardcoded the name of xattr to security.selinux. Stephen Smalley suggested that it probably is a good idea to modify security_dentry_init_security() to also return name of xattr so that we can avoid this hardcoding in the callers. This patch adds a new parameter "const char **xattr_name" to security_dentry_init_security() and LSM puts the name of xattr too if caller asked for it (xattr_name != NULL). Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner Acked-by: James Morris [PM: fixed typos in the commit description] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore

binder: use cred instead of task for getsecid

2021-10-15T00:48:43Z

Use the 'struct cred' saved at binder_open() to lookup the security ID via security_cred_getsecid(). This ensures that the security context that opened binder is the one used to generate the secctx. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.4+ Fixes: ec74136ded79 ("binder: create node flag to request sender's security context") Signed-off-by: Todd Kjos Suggested-by: Stephen Smalley Reported-by: kernel test robot Acked-by: Casey Schaufler Signed-off-by: Paul Moore

binder: use cred instead of task for selinux checks

2021-10-15T00:48:04Z

Since binder was integrated with selinux, it has passed 'struct task_struct' associated with the binder_proc to represent the source and target of transactions. The conversion of task to SID was then done in the hook implementations. It turns out that there are race conditions which can result in an incorrect security context being used. Fix by using the 'struct cred' saved during binder_open and pass it to the selinux subsystem. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.14 (need backport for earlier stables) Fixes: 79af73079d75 ("Add security hooks to binder and implement the hooks for SELinux.") Suggested-by: Jann Horn Signed-off-by: Todd Kjos Acked-by: Casey Schaufler Signed-off-by: Paul Moore

lsm,io_uring: add LSM hooks to io_uring

2021-09-20T02:37:21Z

A full expalantion of io_uring is beyond the scope of this commit description, but in summary it is an asynchronous I/O mechanism which allows for I/O requests and the resulting data to be queued in memory mapped "rings" which are shared between the kernel and userspace. Optionally, io_uring offers the ability for applications to spawn kernel threads to dequeue I/O requests from the ring and submit the requests in the kernel, helping to minimize the syscall overhead. Rings are accessed in userspace by memory mapping a file descriptor provided by the io_uring_setup(2), and can be shared between applications as one might do with any open file descriptor. Finally, process credentials can be registered with a given ring and any process with access to that ring can submit I/O requests using any of the registered credentials. While the io_uring functionality is widely recognized as offering a vastly improved, and high performing asynchronous I/O mechanism, its ability to allow processes to submit I/O requests with credentials other than its own presents a challenge to LSMs. When a process creates a new io_uring ring the ring's credentials are inhertied from the calling process; if this ring is shared with another process operating with different credentials there is the potential to bypass the LSMs security policy. Similarly, registering credentials with a given ring allows any process with access to that ring to submit I/O requests with those credentials. In an effort to allow LSMs to apply security policy to io_uring I/O operations, this patch adds two new LSM hooks. These hooks, in conjunction with the LSM anonymous inode support previously submitted, allow an LSM to apply access control policy to the sharing of io_uring rings as well as any io_uring credential changes requested by a process. The new LSM hooks are described below: * int security_uring_override_creds(cred) Controls if the current task, executing an io_uring operation, is allowed to override it's credentials with @cred. In cases where the current task is a user application, the current credentials will be those of the user application. In cases where the current task is a kernel thread servicing io_uring requests the current credentials will be those of the io_uring ring (inherited from the process that created the ring). * int security_uring_sqpoll(void) Controls if the current task is allowed to create an io_uring polling thread (IORING_SETUP_SQPOLL). Without a SQPOLL thread in the kernel processes must submit I/O requests via io_uring_enter(2) which allows us to compare any requested credential changes against the application making the request. With a SQPOLL thread, we can no longer compare requested credential changes against the application making the request, the comparison is made against the ring's credentials. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore