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<title>user/sven/linux.git/include/linux/security.h, branch v5.18.6</title>
<subtitle>Linux Kernel
</subtitle>
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<updated>2022-05-30T07:24:03Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>lockdown: also lock down previous kgdb use</title>
<updated>2022-05-30T07:24:03Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Daniel Thompson</name>
<email>daniel.thompson@linaro.org</email>
</author>
<published>2022-05-23T18:11:02Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:eca56bf0066ef2f1e7be0e3fa7564b85a309872c</id>
<content type='text'>
commit eadb2f47a3ced5c64b23b90fd2a3463f63726066 upstream.

KGDB and KDB allow read and write access to kernel memory, and thus
should be restricted during lockdown.  An attacker with access to a
serial port (for example, via a hypervisor console, which some cloud
vendors provide over the network) could trigger the debugger so it is
important that the debugger respect the lockdown mode when/if it is
triggered.

Fix this by integrating lockdown into kdb's existing permissions
mechanism.  Unfortunately kgdb does not have any permissions mechanism
(although it certainly could be added later) so, for now, kgdb is simply
and brutally disabled by immediately exiting the gdb stub without taking
any action.

For lockdowns established early in the boot (e.g. the normal case) then
this should be fine but on systems where kgdb has set breakpoints before
the lockdown is enacted than "bad things" will happen.

CVE: CVE-2022-21499
Co-developed-by: Stephen Brennan &lt;stephen.s.brennan@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Stephen Brennan &lt;stephen.s.brennan@oracle.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Douglas Anderson &lt;dianders@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Thompson &lt;daniel.thompson@linaro.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>security: add sctp_assoc_established hook</title>
<updated>2022-02-15T20:03:38Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Ondrej Mosnacek</name>
<email>omosnace@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-02-12T17:59:21Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:5e50f5d4ff31e95599d695df1f0a4e7d2d6fef99</id>
<content type='text'>
security_sctp_assoc_established() is added to replace
security_inet_conn_established() called in
sctp_sf_do_5_1E_ca(), so that asoc can be accessed in security
subsystem and save the peer secid to asoc-&gt;peer_secid.

Fixes: 72e89f50084c ("security: Add support for SCTP security hooks")
Reported-by: Prashanth Prahlad &lt;pprahlad@redhat.com&gt;
Based-on-patch-by: Xin Long &lt;lucien.xin@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Xin Long &lt;lucien.xin@gmail.com&gt;
Tested-by: Richard Haines &lt;richard_c_haines@btinternet.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek &lt;omosnace@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>security,selinux: remove security_add_mnt_opt()</title>
<updated>2021-12-06T18:46:24Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Ondrej Mosnacek</name>
<email>omosnace@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-12-06T13:24:06Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:52f982f00b220d097a71a23c149a1d18efc08e63</id>
<content type='text'>
Its last user has been removed in commit f2aedb713c28 ("NFS: Add
fs_context support.").

Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek &lt;omosnace@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>lsm: security_task_getsecid_subj() -&gt; security_current_getsecid_subj()</title>
<updated>2021-11-22T22:52:47Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Paul Moore</name>
<email>paul@paul-moore.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-09-29T15:01:21Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:6326948f940dc3f77066d5cdc44ba6afe67830c0</id>
<content type='text'>
The security_task_getsecid_subj() LSM hook invites misuse by allowing
callers to specify a task even though the hook is only safe when the
current task is referenced.  Fix this by removing the task_struct
argument to the hook, requiring LSM implementations to use the
current task.  While we are changing the hook declaration we also
rename the function to security_current_getsecid_subj() in an effort
to reinforce that the hook captures the subjective credentials of the
current task and not an arbitrary task on the system.

Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn &lt;serge@hallyn.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net,lsm,selinux: revert the security_sctp_assoc_established() hook</title>
<updated>2021-11-12T17:07:02Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Paul Moore</name>
<email>paul@paul-moore.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-11-12T17:07:02Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:32a370abf12f82c8383e430c21365f5355d8b288</id>
<content type='text'>
This patch reverts two prior patches, e7310c94024c
("security: implement sctp_assoc_established hook in selinux") and
7c2ef0240e6a ("security: add sctp_assoc_established hook"), which
create the security_sctp_assoc_established() LSM hook and provide a
SELinux implementation.  Unfortunately these two patches were merged
without proper review (the Reviewed-by and Tested-by tags from
Richard Haines were for previous revisions of these patches that
were significantly different) and there are outstanding objections
from the SELinux maintainers regarding these patches.

Work is currently ongoing to correct the problems identified in the
reverted patches, as well as others that have come up during review,
but it is unclear at this point in time when that work will be ready
for inclusion in the mainline kernel.  In the interest of not keeping
objectionable code in the kernel for multiple weeks, and potentially
a kernel release, we are reverting the two problematic patches.

Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>security: add sctp_assoc_established hook</title>
<updated>2021-11-03T11:09:20Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Xin Long</name>
<email>lucien.xin@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-11-02T12:02:49Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:7c2ef0240e6abfd3cc59511339517358350a8910</id>
<content type='text'>
security_sctp_assoc_established() is added to replace
security_inet_conn_established() called in
sctp_sf_do_5_1E_ca(), so that asoc can be accessed in security
subsystem and save the peer secid to asoc-&gt;peer_secid.

v1-&gt;v2:
  - fix the return value of security_sctp_assoc_established() in
    security.h, found by kernel test robot and Ondrej.

Fixes: 72e89f50084c ("security: Add support for SCTP security hooks")
Reported-by: Prashanth Prahlad &lt;pprahlad@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Richard Haines &lt;richard_c_haines@btinternet.com&gt;
Tested-by: Richard Haines &lt;richard_c_haines@btinternet.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Xin Long &lt;lucien.xin@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>security: pass asoc to sctp_assoc_request and sctp_sk_clone</title>
<updated>2021-11-03T11:09:20Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Xin Long</name>
<email>lucien.xin@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-11-02T12:02:47Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:c081d53f97a1a90a38e4296dd3d6fda5e38dca2c</id>
<content type='text'>
This patch is to move secid and peer_secid from endpoint to association,
and pass asoc to sctp_assoc_request and sctp_sk_clone instead of ep. As
ep is the local endpoint and asoc represents a connection, and in SCTP
one sk/ep could have multiple asoc/connection, saving secid/peer_secid
for new asoc will overwrite the old asoc's.

Note that since asoc can be passed as NULL, security_sctp_assoc_request()
is moved to the place right after the new_asoc is created in
sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init() and sctp_sf_do_unexpected_init().

v1-&gt;v2:
  - fix the description of selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(), as Jakub noticed.
  - fix the annotation in selinux_sctp_assoc_request(), as Richard Noticed.

Fixes: 72e89f50084c ("security: Add support for SCTP security hooks")
Reported-by: Prashanth Prahlad &lt;pprahlad@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Richard Haines &lt;richard_c_haines@btinternet.com&gt;
Tested-by: Richard Haines &lt;richard_c_haines@btinternet.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Xin Long &lt;lucien.xin@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>security: Return xattr name from security_dentry_init_security()</title>
<updated>2021-10-20T12:17:08Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Vivek Goyal</name>
<email>vgoyal@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-10-12T13:23:07Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:15bf32398ad488c0df1cbaf16431422c87e4feea</id>
<content type='text'>
Right now security_dentry_init_security() only supports single security
label and is used by SELinux only. There are two users of this hook,
namely ceph and nfs.

NFS does not care about xattr name. Ceph hardcodes the xattr name to
security.selinux (XATTR_NAME_SELINUX).

I am making changes to fuse/virtiofs to send security label to virtiofsd
and I need to send xattr name as well. I also hardcoded the name of
xattr to security.selinux.

Stephen Smalley suggested that it probably is a good idea to modify
security_dentry_init_security() to also return name of xattr so that
we can avoid this hardcoding in the callers.

This patch adds a new parameter "const char **xattr_name" to
security_dentry_init_security() and LSM puts the name of xattr
too if caller asked for it (xattr_name != NULL).

Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal &lt;vgoyal@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton &lt;jlayton@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner &lt;christian.brauner@ubuntu.com&gt;
Acked-by: James Morris &lt;jamorris@linux.microsoft.com&gt;
[PM: fixed typos in the commit description]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>binder: use cred instead of task for getsecid</title>
<updated>2021-10-15T00:48:43Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Todd Kjos</name>
<email>tkjos@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-10-12T16:56:14Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:4d5b5539742d2554591751b4248b0204d20dcc9d</id>
<content type='text'>
Use the 'struct cred' saved at binder_open() to lookup
the security ID via security_cred_getsecid(). This
ensures that the security context that opened binder
is the one used to generate the secctx.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.4+
Fixes: ec74136ded79 ("binder: create node flag to request sender's security context")
Signed-off-by: Todd Kjos &lt;tkjos@google.com&gt;
Suggested-by: Stephen Smalley &lt;stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com&gt;
Reported-by: kernel test robot &lt;lkp@intel.com&gt;
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>binder: use cred instead of task for selinux checks</title>
<updated>2021-10-15T00:48:04Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Todd Kjos</name>
<email>tkjos@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-10-12T16:56:13Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:52f88693378a58094c538662ba652aff0253c4fe</id>
<content type='text'>
Since binder was integrated with selinux, it has passed
'struct task_struct' associated with the binder_proc
to represent the source and target of transactions.
The conversion of task to SID was then done in the hook
implementations. It turns out that there are race conditions
which can result in an incorrect security context being used.

Fix by using the 'struct cred' saved during binder_open and pass
it to the selinux subsystem.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.14 (need backport for earlier stables)
Fixes: 79af73079d75 ("Add security hooks to binder and implement the hooks for SELinux.")
Suggested-by: Jann Horn &lt;jannh@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Todd Kjos &lt;tkjos@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
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