user/sven/linux.git/include/linux/security.h, branch v6.2.7

Merge tag 'lsm-pr-20221212' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm

2022-12-13T17:47:48Z

Pull lsm updates from Paul Moore: - Improve the error handling in the device cgroup such that memory allocation failures when updating the access policy do not potentially alter the policy. - Some minor fixes to reiserfs to ensure that it properly releases LSM-related xattr values. - Update the security_socket_getpeersec_stream() LSM hook to take sockptr_t values. Previously the net/BPF folks updated the getsockopt code in the network stack to leverage the sockptr_t type to make it easier to pass both kernel and __user pointers, but unfortunately when they did so they didn't convert the LSM hook. While there was/is no immediate risk by not converting the LSM hook, it seems like this is a mistake waiting to happen so this patch proactively does the LSM hook conversion. - Convert vfs_getxattr_alloc() to return an int instead of a ssize_t and cleanup the callers. Internally the function was never going to return anything larger than an int and the callers were doing some very odd things casting the return value; this patch fixes all that and helps bring a bit of sanity to vfs_getxattr_alloc() and its callers. - More verbose, and helpful, LSM debug output when the system is booted with "lsm.debug" on the command line. There are examples in the commit description, but the quick summary is that this patch provides better information about which LSMs are enabled and the ordering in which they are processed. - General comment and kernel-doc fixes and cleanups. * tag 'lsm-pr-20221212' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm: lsm: Fix description of fs_context_parse_param lsm: Add/fix return values in lsm_hooks.h and fix formatting lsm: Clarify documentation of vm_enough_memory hook reiserfs: Add missing calls to reiserfs_security_free() lsm,fs: fix vfs_getxattr_alloc() return type and caller error paths device_cgroup: Roll back to original exceptions after copy failure LSM: Better reporting of actual LSMs at boot lsm: make security_socket_getpeersec_stream() sockptr_t safe audit: Fix some kernel-doc warnings lsm: remove obsoleted comments for security hooks fs: edit a comment made in bad taste

Merge tag 'landlock-6.2-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mic/linux

2022-12-13T17:14:50Z

Pull landlock updates from Mickaël Salaün: "This adds file truncation support to Landlock, contributed by Günther Noack. As described by Günther [1], the goal of these patches is to work towards a more complete coverage of file system operations that are restrictable with Landlock. The known set of currently unsupported file system operations in Landlock is described at [2]. Out of the operations listed there, truncate is the only one that modifies file contents, so these patches should make it possible to prevent the direct modification of file contents with Landlock. The new LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE access right covers both the truncate(2) and ftruncate(2) families of syscalls, as well as open(2) with the O_TRUNC flag. This includes usages of creat() in the case where existing regular files are overwritten. Additionally, this introduces a new Landlock security blob associated with opened files, to track the available Landlock access rights at the time of opening the file. This is in line with Unix's general approach of checking the read and write permissions during open(), and associating this previously checked authorization with the opened file. An ongoing patch documents this use case [3]. In order to treat truncate(2) and ftruncate(2) calls differently in an LSM hook, we split apart the existing security_path_truncate hook into security_path_truncate (for truncation by path) and security_file_truncate (for truncation of previously opened files)" Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221018182216.301684-1-gnoack3000@gmail.com [1] Link: https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/v6.1/userspace-api/landlock.html#filesystem-flags [2] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221209193813.972012-1-mic@digikod.net [3] * tag 'landlock-6.2-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mic/linux: samples/landlock: Document best-effort approach for LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER landlock: Document Landlock's file truncation support samples/landlock: Extend sample tool to support LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE selftests/landlock: Test ftruncate on FDs created by memfd_create(2) selftests/landlock: Test FD passing from restricted to unrestricted processes selftests/landlock: Locally define __maybe_unused selftests/landlock: Test open() and ftruncate() in multiple scenarios selftests/landlock: Test file truncation support landlock: Support file truncation landlock: Document init_layer_masks() helper landlock: Refactor check_access_path_dual() into is_access_to_paths_allowed() security: Create file_truncate hook from path_truncate hook

lsm: make security_socket_getpeersec_stream() sockptr_t safe

2022-11-05T03:25:30Z

Commit 4ff09db1b79b ("bpf: net: Change sk_getsockopt() to take the sockptr_t argument") made it possible to call sk_getsockopt() with both user and kernel address space buffers through the use of the sockptr_t type. Unfortunately at the time of conversion the security_socket_getpeersec_stream() LSM hook was written to only accept userspace buffers, and in a desire to avoid having to change the LSM hook the commit author simply passed the sockptr_t's userspace buffer pointer. Since the only sk_getsockopt() callers at the time of conversion which used kernel sockptr_t buffers did not allow SO_PEERSEC, and hence the security_socket_getpeersec_stream() hook, this was acceptable but also very fragile as future changes presented the possibility of silently passing kernel space pointers to the LSM hook. There are several ways to protect against this, including careful code review of future commits, but since relying on code review to catch bugs is a recipe for disaster and the upstream eBPF maintainer is "strongly against defensive programming", this patch updates the LSM hook, and all of the implementations to support sockptr_t and safely handle both user and kernel space buffers. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler Acked-by: John Johansen Signed-off-by: Paul Moore

security: add get, remove and set acl hook

2022-10-20T08:13:28Z

The current way of setting and getting posix acls through the generic xattr interface is error prone and type unsafe. The vfs needs to interpret and fixup posix acls before storing or reporting it to userspace. Various hacks exist to make this work. The code is hard to understand and difficult to maintain in it's current form. Instead of making this work by hacking posix acls through xattr handlers we are building a dedicated posix acl api around the get and set inode operations. This removes a lot of hackiness and makes the codepaths easier to maintain. A lot of background can be found in [1]. So far posix acls were passed as a void blob to the security and integrity modules. Some of them like evm then proceed to interpret the void pointer and convert it into the kernel internal struct posix acl representation to perform their integrity checking magic. This is obviously pretty problematic as that requires knowledge that only the vfs is guaranteed to have and has lead to various bugs. Add a proper security hook for setting posix acls and pass down the posix acls in their appropriate vfs format instead of hacking it through a void pointer stored in the uapi format. In the next patches we implement the hooks for the few security modules that do actually have restrictions on posix acls. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220801145520.1532837-1-brauner@kernel.org [1] Acked-by: Paul Moore Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft)

security: Create file_truncate hook from path_truncate hook

2022-10-19T07:01:40Z

Like path_truncate, the file_truncate hook also restricts file truncation, but is called in the cases where truncation is attempted on an already-opened file. This is required in a subsequent commit to handle ftruncate() operations differently to truncate() operations. Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa Acked-by: John Johansen Acked-by: Paul Moore Signed-off-by: Günther Noack Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221018182216.301684-2-gnoack3000@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün

Merge tag 'powerpc-6.1-1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/powerpc/linux

2022-10-09T21:05:15Z

Pull powerpc updates from Michael Ellerman: - Remove our now never-true definitions for pgd_huge() and p4d_leaf(). - Add pte_needs_flush() and huge_pmd_needs_flush() for 64-bit. - Add support for syscall wrappers. - Add support for KFENCE on 64-bit. - Update 64-bit HV KVM to use the new guest state entry/exit accounting API. - Support execute-only memory when using the Radix MMU (P9 or later). - Implement CONFIG_PARAVIRT_TIME_ACCOUNTING for pseries guests. - Updates to our linker script to move more data into read-only sections. - Allow the VDSO to be randomised on 32-bit. - Many other small features and fixes. Thanks to Andrew Donnellan, Aneesh Kumar K.V, Arnd Bergmann, Athira Rajeev, Christophe Leroy, David Hildenbrand, Disha Goel, Fabiano Rosas, Gaosheng Cui, Gustavo A. R. Silva, Haren Myneni, Hari Bathini, Jilin Yuan, Joel Stanley, Kajol Jain, Kees Cook, Krzysztof Kozlowski, Laurent Dufour, Liang He, Li Huafei, Lukas Bulwahn, Madhavan Srinivasan, Nathan Chancellor, Nathan Lynch, Nicholas Miehlbradt, Nicholas Piggin, Pali Rohár, Rohan McLure, Russell Currey, Sachin Sant, Segher Boessenkool, Shrikanth Hegde, Tyrel Datwyler, Wolfram Sang, ye xingchen, and Zheng Yongjun. * tag 'powerpc-6.1-1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/powerpc/linux: (214 commits) KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Fix stack frame regs marker powerpc: Don't add __powerpc_ prefix to syscall entry points powerpc/64s/interrupt: Fix stack frame regs marker powerpc/64: Fix msr_check_and_set/clear MSR[EE] race powerpc/64s/interrupt: Change must-hard-mask interrupt check from BUG to WARN powerpc/pseries: Add firmware details to the hardware description powerpc/powernv: Add opal details to the hardware description powerpc: Add device-tree model to the hardware description powerpc/64: Add logical PVR to the hardware description powerpc: Add PVR & CPU name to hardware description powerpc: Add hardware description string powerpc/configs: Enable PPC_UV in powernv_defconfig powerpc/configs: Update config files for removed/renamed symbols powerpc/mm: Fix UBSAN warning reported on hugetlb powerpc/mm: Always update max/min_low_pfn in mem_topology_setup() powerpc/mm/book3s/hash: Rename flush_tlb_pmd_range powerpc: Drops STABS_DEBUG from linker scripts powerpc/64s: Remove lost/old comment powerpc/64s: Remove old STAB comment powerpc: remove orphan systbl_chk.sh ...

Merge tag 'pull-path' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs

2022-10-07T00:31:02Z

Pull vfs constification updates from Al Viro: "whack-a-mole: constifying struct path *" * tag 'pull-path' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: ecryptfs: constify path spufs: constify path nd_jump_link(): constify path audit_init_parent(): constify path __io_setxattr(): constify path do_proc_readlink(): constify path overlayfs: constify path fs/notify: constify path may_linkat(): constify path do_sys_name_to_handle(): constify path ->getprocattr(): attribute name is const char *, TYVM...

Merge tag 'lsm-pr-20221003' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm

2022-10-04T00:51:52Z

Pull LSM updates from Paul Moore: "Seven patches for the LSM layer and we've got a mix of trivial and significant patches. Highlights below, starting with the smaller bits first so they don't get lost in the discussion of the larger items: - Remove some redundant NULL pointer checks in the common LSM audit code. - Ratelimit the lockdown LSM's access denial messages. With this change there is a chance that the last visible lockdown message on the console is outdated/old, but it does help preserve the initial series of lockdown denials that started the denial message flood and my gut feeling is that these might be the more valuable messages. - Open userfaultfds as readonly instead of read/write. While this code obviously lives outside the LSM, it does have a noticeable impact on the LSMs with Ondrej explaining the situation in the commit description. It is worth noting that this patch languished on the VFS list for over a year without any comments (objections or otherwise) so I took the liberty of pulling it into the LSM tree after giving fair notice. It has been in linux-next since the end of August without any noticeable problems. - Add a LSM hook for user namespace creation, with implementations for both the BPF LSM and SELinux. Even though the changes are fairly small, this is the bulk of the diffstat as we are also including BPF LSM selftests for the new hook. It's also the most contentious of the changes in this pull request with Eric Biederman NACK'ing the LSM hook multiple times during its development and discussion upstream. While I've never taken NACK's lightly, I'm sending these patches to you because it is my belief that they are of good quality, satisfy a long-standing need of users and distros, and are in keeping with the existing nature of the LSM layer and the Linux Kernel as a whole. The patches in implement a LSM hook for user namespace creation that allows for a granular approach, configurable at runtime, which enables both monitoring and control of user namespaces. The general consensus has been that this is far preferable to the other solutions that have been adopted downstream including outright removal from the kernel, disabling via system wide sysctls, or various other out-of-tree mechanisms that users have been forced to adopt since we haven't been able to provide them an upstream solution for their requests. Eric has been steadfast in his objections to this LSM hook, explaining that any restrictions on the user namespace could have significant impact on userspace. While there is the possibility of impacting userspace, it is important to note that this solution only impacts userspace when it is requested based on the runtime configuration supplied by the distro/admin/user. Frederick (the pathset author), the LSM/security community, and myself have tried to work with Eric during development of this patchset to find a mutually acceptable solution, but Eric's approach and unwillingness to engage in a meaningful way have made this impossible. I have CC'd Eric directly on this pull request so he has a chance to provide his side of the story; there have been no objections outside of Eric's" * tag 'lsm-pr-20221003' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm: lockdown: ratelimit denial messages userfaultfd: open userfaultfds with O_RDONLY selinux: Implement userns_create hook selftests/bpf: Add tests verifying bpf lsm userns_create hook bpf-lsm: Make bpf_lsm_userns_create() sleepable security, lsm: Introduce security_create_user_ns() lsm: clean up redundant NULL pointer check

powerpc/rtas: block error injection when locked down

2022-09-28T09:22:14Z

The error injection facility on pseries VMs allows corruption of arbitrary guest memory, potentially enabling a sufficiently privileged user to disable lockdown or perform other modifications of the running kernel via the rtas syscall. Block the PAPR error injection facility from being opened or called when locked down. Signed-off-by: Nathan Lynch Acked-by: Paul Moore (LSM) Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220926131643.146502-3-nathanl@linux.ibm.com

powerpc/pseries: block untrusted device tree changes when locked down

2022-09-28T09:22:14Z

The /proc/powerpc/ofdt interface allows the root user to freely alter the in-kernel device tree, enabling arbitrary physical address writes via drivers that could bind to malicious device nodes, thus making it possible to disable lockdown. Historically this interface has been used on the pseries platform to facilitate the runtime addition and removal of processor, memory, and device resources (aka Dynamic Logical Partitioning or DLPAR). Years ago, the processor and memory use cases were migrated to designs that happen to be lockdown-friendly: device tree updates are communicated directly to the kernel from firmware without passing through untrusted user space. I/O device DLPAR via the "drmgr" command in powerpc-utils remains the sole legitimate user of /proc/powerpc/ofdt, but it is already broken in lockdown since it uses /dev/mem to allocate argument buffers for the rtas syscall. So only illegitimate uses of the interface should see a behavior change when running on a locked down kernel. Signed-off-by: Nathan Lynch Acked-by: Paul Moore (LSM) Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220926131643.146502-2-nathanl@linux.ibm.com