user/sven/linux.git/include/linux/skbuff.h, branch v4.14.219

net: skbuff: disambiguate argument and member for skb_list_walk_safe helper

2021-01-23T14:48:47Z

commit 5eee7bd7e245914e4e050c413dfe864e31805207 upstream. This worked before, because we made all callers name their next pointer "next". But in trying to be more "drop-in" ready, the silliness here is revealed. This commit fixes the problem by making the macro argument and the member use different names. Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

net: introduce skb_list_walk_safe for skb segment walking

2021-01-23T14:48:47Z

commit dcfea72e79b0aa7a057c8f6024169d86a1bbc84b upstream. As part of the continual effort to remove direct usage of skb->next and skb->prev, this patch adds a helper for iterating through the singly-linked variant of skb lists, which are used for lists of GSO packet. The name "skb_list_..." has been chosen to match the existing function, "kfree_skb_list, which also operates on these singly-linked lists, and the "..._walk_safe" part is the same idiom as elsewhere in the kernel. This patch removes the helper from wireguard and puts it into linux/skbuff.h, while making it a bit more robust for general usage. In particular, parenthesis are added around the macro argument usage, and it now accounts for trying to iterate through an already-null skb pointer, which will simply run the iteration zero times. This latter enhancement means it can be used to replace both do { ... } while and while (...) open-coded idioms. This should take care of these three possible usages, which match all current methods of iterations. skb_list_walk_safe(segs, skb, next) { ... } skb_list_walk_safe(skb, skb, next) { ... } skb_list_walk_safe(segs, skb, segs) { ... } Gcc appears to generate efficient code for each of these. Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: David S. Miller [ Just the skbuff.h changes for backporting - gregkh] Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

net: use skb_list_del_init() to remove from RX sublists

2021-01-23T14:48:47Z

[ Upstream commit 22f6bbb7bcfcef0b373b0502a7ff390275c575dd ] list_del() leaves the skb->next pointer poisoned, which can then lead to a crash in e.g. OVS forwarding. For example, setting up an OVS VXLAN forwarding bridge on sfc as per: ======== $ ovs-vsctl show 5dfd9c47-f04b-4aaa-aa96-4fbb0a522a30 Bridge "br0" Port "br0" Interface "br0" type: internal Port "enp6s0f0" Interface "enp6s0f0" Port "vxlan0" Interface "vxlan0" type: vxlan options: {key="1", local_ip="10.0.0.5", remote_ip="10.0.0.4"} ovs_version: "2.5.0" ======== (where 10.0.0.5 is an address on enp6s0f1) and sending traffic across it will lead to the following panic: ======== general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI CPU: 5 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/5 Not tainted 4.20.0-rc3-ehc+ #701 Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R710/0M233H, BIOS 6.4.0 07/23/2013 RIP: 0010:dev_hard_start_xmit+0x38/0x200 Code: 53 48 89 fb 48 83 ec 20 48 85 ff 48 89 54 24 08 48 89 4c 24 18 0f 84 ab 01 00 00 48 8d 86 90 00 00 00 48 89 f5 48 89 44 24 10 <4c> 8b 33 48 c7 03 00 00 00 00 48 8b 05 c7 d1 b3 00 4d 85 f6 0f 95 RSP: 0018:ffff888627b437e0 EFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: dead000000000100 RCX: ffff88862279c000 RDX: ffff888614a342c0 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: ffff888618a88000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 00000000000003e8 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff888614a34140 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000062 R14: dead000000000100 R15: ffff888616430000 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff888627b40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f6d2bc6d000 CR3: 000000000200a000 CR4: 00000000000006e0 Call Trace: __dev_queue_xmit+0x623/0x870 ? masked_flow_lookup+0xf7/0x220 [openvswitch] ? ep_poll_callback+0x101/0x310 do_execute_actions+0xaba/0xaf0 [openvswitch] ? __wake_up_common+0x8a/0x150 ? __wake_up_common_lock+0x87/0xc0 ? queue_userspace_packet+0x31c/0x5b0 [openvswitch] ovs_execute_actions+0x47/0x120 [openvswitch] ovs_dp_process_packet+0x7d/0x110 [openvswitch] ovs_vport_receive+0x6e/0xd0 [openvswitch] ? dst_alloc+0x64/0x90 ? rt_dst_alloc+0x50/0xd0 ? ip_route_input_slow+0x19a/0x9a0 ? __udp_enqueue_schedule_skb+0x198/0x1b0 ? __udp4_lib_rcv+0x856/0xa30 ? __udp4_lib_rcv+0x856/0xa30 ? cpumask_next_and+0x19/0x20 ? find_busiest_group+0x12d/0xcd0 netdev_frame_hook+0xce/0x150 [openvswitch] __netif_receive_skb_core+0x205/0xae0 __netif_receive_skb_list_core+0x11e/0x220 netif_receive_skb_list+0x203/0x460 ? __efx_rx_packet+0x335/0x5e0 [sfc] efx_poll+0x182/0x320 [sfc] net_rx_action+0x294/0x3c0 __do_softirq+0xca/0x297 irq_exit+0xa6/0xb0 do_IRQ+0x54/0xd0 common_interrupt+0xf/0xf ======== So, in all listified-receive handling, instead pull skbs off the lists with skb_list_del_init(). Fixes: 9af86f933894 ("net: core: fix use-after-free in __netif_receive_skb_list_core") Fixes: 7da517a3bc52 ("net: core: Another step of skb receive list processing") Fixes: a4ca8b7df73c ("net: ipv4: fix drop handling in ip_list_rcv() and ip_list_rcv_finish()") Fixes: d8269e2cbf90 ("net: ipv6: listify ipv6_rcv() and ip6_rcv_finish()") Signed-off-by: Edward Cree Signed-off-by: David S. Miller [ for 4.14.y and older, just take the skbuff.h change - gregkh ] Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

skbuff: fix a data race in skb_queue_len()

2020-10-01T11:12:33Z

[ Upstream commit 86b18aaa2b5b5bb48e609cd591b3d2d0fdbe0442 ] sk_buff.qlen can be accessed concurrently as noticed by KCSAN, BUG: KCSAN: data-race in __skb_try_recv_from_queue / unix_dgram_sendmsg read to 0xffff8a1b1d8a81c0 of 4 bytes by task 5371 on cpu 96: unix_dgram_sendmsg+0x9a9/0xb70 include/linux/skbuff.h:1821 net/unix/af_unix.c:1761 ____sys_sendmsg+0x33e/0x370 ___sys_sendmsg+0xa6/0xf0 __sys_sendmsg+0x69/0xf0 __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x51/0x70 do_syscall_64+0x91/0xb47 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe write to 0xffff8a1b1d8a81c0 of 4 bytes by task 1 on cpu 99: __skb_try_recv_from_queue+0x327/0x410 include/linux/skbuff.h:2029 __skb_try_recv_datagram+0xbe/0x220 unix_dgram_recvmsg+0xee/0x850 ____sys_recvmsg+0x1fb/0x210 ___sys_recvmsg+0xa2/0xf0 __sys_recvmsg+0x66/0xf0 __x64_sys_recvmsg+0x51/0x70 do_syscall_64+0x91/0xb47 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe Since only the read is operating as lockless, it could introduce a logic bug in unix_recvq_full() due to the load tearing. Fix it by adding a lockless variant of skb_queue_len() and unix_recvq_full() where READ_ONCE() is on the read while WRITE_ONCE() is on the write similar to the commit d7d16a89350a ("net: add skb_queue_empty_lockless()"). Signed-off-by: Qian Cai Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

net: add __must_check to skb_put_padto()

2020-10-01T11:12:25Z

[ Upstream commit 4a009cb04aeca0de60b73f37b102573354214b52 ] skb_put_padto() and __skb_put_padto() callers must check return values or risk use-after-free. Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

net: add a READ_ONCE() in skb_peek_tail()

2020-01-04T13:00:08Z

commit f8cc62ca3e660ae3fdaee533b1d554297cd2ae82 upstream. skb_peek_tail() can be used without protection of a lock, as spotted by KCSAN [1] In order to avoid load-stearing, add a READ_ONCE() Note that the corresponding WRITE_ONCE() are already there. [1] BUG: KCSAN: data-race in sk_wait_data / skb_queue_tail read to 0xffff8880b36a4118 of 8 bytes by task 20426 on cpu 1: skb_peek_tail include/linux/skbuff.h:1784 [inline] sk_wait_data+0x15b/0x250 net/core/sock.c:2477 kcm_wait_data+0x112/0x1f0 net/kcm/kcmsock.c:1103 kcm_recvmsg+0xac/0x320 net/kcm/kcmsock.c:1130 sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:871 [inline] sock_recvmsg net/socket.c:889 [inline] sock_recvmsg+0x92/0xb0 net/socket.c:885 ___sys_recvmsg+0x1a0/0x3e0 net/socket.c:2480 do_recvmmsg+0x19a/0x5c0 net/socket.c:2601 __sys_recvmmsg+0x1ef/0x200 net/socket.c:2680 __do_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2703 [inline] __se_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2696 [inline] __x64_sys_recvmmsg+0x89/0xb0 net/socket.c:2696 do_syscall_64+0xcc/0x370 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 write to 0xffff8880b36a4118 of 8 bytes by task 451 on cpu 0: __skb_insert include/linux/skbuff.h:1852 [inline] __skb_queue_before include/linux/skbuff.h:1958 [inline] __skb_queue_tail include/linux/skbuff.h:1991 [inline] skb_queue_tail+0x7e/0xc0 net/core/skbuff.c:3145 kcm_queue_rcv_skb+0x202/0x310 net/kcm/kcmsock.c:206 kcm_rcv_strparser+0x74/0x4b0 net/kcm/kcmsock.c:370 __strp_recv+0x348/0xf50 net/strparser/strparser.c:309 strp_recv+0x84/0xa0 net/strparser/strparser.c:343 tcp_read_sock+0x174/0x5c0 net/ipv4/tcp.c:1639 strp_read_sock+0xd4/0x140 net/strparser/strparser.c:366 do_strp_work net/strparser/strparser.c:414 [inline] strp_work+0x9a/0xe0 net/strparser/strparser.c:423 process_one_work+0x3d4/0x890 kernel/workqueue.c:2269 worker_thread+0xa0/0x800 kernel/workqueue.c:2415 kthread+0x1d4/0x200 drivers/block/aoe/aoecmd.c:1253 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:352 Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on: CPU: 0 PID: 451 Comm: kworker/u4:3 Not tainted 5.4.0-rc3+ #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Workqueue: kstrp strp_work Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Reported-by: syzbot Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

net/flow_dissector: switch to siphash

2019-11-10T10:25:37Z

commit 55667441c84fa5e0911a0aac44fb059c15ba6da2 upstream. UDP IPv6 packets auto flowlabels are using a 32bit secret (static u32 hashrnd in net/core/flow_dissector.c) and apply jhash() over fields known by the receivers. Attackers can easily infer the 32bit secret and use this information to identify a device and/or user, since this 32bit secret is only set at boot time. Really, using jhash() to generate cookies sent on the wire is a serious security concern. Trying to change the rol32(hash, 16) in ip6_make_flowlabel() would be a dead end. Trying to periodically change the secret (like in sch_sfq.c) could change paths taken in the network for long lived flows. Let's switch to siphash, as we did in commit df453700e8d8 ("inet: switch IP ID generator to siphash") Using a cryptographically strong pseudo random function will solve this privacy issue and more generally remove other weak points in the stack. Packet schedulers using skb_get_hash_perturb() benefit from this change. Fixes: b56774163f99 ("ipv6: Enable auto flow labels by default") Fixes: 42240901f7c4 ("ipv6: Implement different admin modes for automatic flow labels") Fixes: 67800f9b1f4e ("ipv6: Call skb_get_hash_flowi6 to get skb->hash in ip6_make_flowlabel") Fixes: cb1ce2ef387b ("ipv6: Implement automatic flow label generation on transmit") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Reported-by: Jonathan Berger Reported-by: Amit Klein Reported-by: Benny Pinkas Cc: Tom Herbert Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

net: add skb_queue_empty_lockless()

2019-11-10T10:25:33Z

[ Upstream commit d7d16a89350ab263484c0aa2b523dd3a234e4a80 ] Some paths call skb_queue_empty() without holding the queue lock. We must use a barrier in order to not let the compiler do strange things, and avoid KCSAN splats. Adding a barrier in skb_queue_empty() might be overkill, I prefer adding a new helper to clearly identify points where the callers might be lockless. This might help us finding real bugs. The corresponding WRITE_ONCE() should add zero cost for current compilers. Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

net: test nouarg before dereferencing zerocopy pointers

2019-05-25T16:25:16Z

[ Upstream commit 185ce5c38ea76f29b6bd9c7c8c7a5e5408834920 ] Zerocopy skbs without completion notification were added for packet sockets with PACKET_TX_RING user buffers. Those signal completion through the TP_STATUS_USER bit in the ring. Zerocopy annotation was added only to avoid premature notification after clone or orphan, by triggering a copy on these paths for these packets. The mechanism had to define a special "no-uarg" mode because packet sockets already use skb_uarg(skb) == skb_shinfo(skb)->destructor_arg for a different pointer. Before deferencing skb_uarg(skb), verify that it is a real pointer. Fixes: 5cd8d46ea1562 ("packet: copy user buffers before orphan or clone") Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

net: validate untrusted gso packets without csum offload

2019-02-27T09:08:08Z

commit d5be7f632bad0f489879eed0ff4b99bd7fe0b74c upstream. Syzkaller again found a path to a kernel crash through bad gso input. By building an excessively large packet to cause an skb field to wrap. If VIRTIO_NET_HDR_F_NEEDS_CSUM was set this would have been dropped in skb_partial_csum_set. GSO packets that do not set checksum offload are suspicious and rare. Most callers of virtio_net_hdr_to_skb already pass them to skb_probe_transport_header. Move that test forward, change it to detect parse failure and drop packets on failure as those cleary are not one of the legitimate VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO types. Fixes: bfd5f4a3d605 ("packet: Add GSO/csum offload support.") Fixes: f43798c27684 ("tun: Allow GSO using virtio_net_hdr") Reported-by: syzbot Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman