user/sven/linux.git/include/linux/string.h, branch v5.15.73

string: uninline memcpy_and_pad

2021-11-21T12:44:12Z

commit 5c4e0a21fae877a7ef89be6dcc6263ec672372b8 upstream. When building m68k:allmodconfig, recent versions of gcc generate the following error if the length of UTS_RELEASE is less than 8 bytes. In function 'memcpy_and_pad', inlined from 'nvmet_execute_disc_identify' at drivers/nvme/target/discovery.c:268:2: arch/m68k/include/asm/string.h:72:25: error: '__builtin_memcpy' reading 8 bytes from a region of size 7 Discussions around the problem suggest that this only happens if an architecture does not provide strlen(), if -ffreestanding is provided as compiler option, and if CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE=n. All of this is the case for m68k. The exact reasons are unknown, but seem to be related to the ability of the compiler to evaluate the return value of strlen() and the resulting execution flow in memcpy_and_pad(). It would be possible to work around the problem by using sizeof(UTS_RELEASE) instead of strlen(UTS_RELEASE), but that would only postpone the problem until the function is called in a similar way. Uninline memcpy_and_pad() instead to solve the problem for good. Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds Reviewed-by: Geert Uytterhoeven Acked-by: Andy Shevchenko Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

isystem: ship and use stdarg.h

2021-08-19T00:02:55Z

Ship minimal stdarg.h (1 type, 4 macros) as . stdarg.h is the only userspace header commonly used in the kernel. GPL 2 version of can be extracted from http://archive.debian.org/debian/pool/main/g/gcc-4.2/gcc-4.2_4.2.4.orig.tar.gz Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan Acked-by: Rafael J. Wysocki Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada

kernel.h: split out kstrtox() and simple_strtox() to a separate header

2021-07-01T18:06:05Z

kernel.h is being used as a dump for all kinds of stuff for a long time. Here is the attempt to start cleaning it up by splitting out kstrtox() and simple_strtox() helpers. At the same time convert users in header and lib folders to use new header. Though for time being include new header back to kernel.h to avoid twisted indirected includes for existing users. [andy.shevchenko@gmail.com: fix documentation references] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210615220003.377901-1-andy.shevchenko@gmail.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210611185815.44103-1-andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko Acked-by: Jonathan Cameron Cc: Francis Laniel Cc: Randy Dunlap Cc: Kars Mulder Cc: Trond Myklebust Cc: Anna Schumaker Cc: "J. Bruce Fields" Cc: Chuck Lever Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

string.h: move fortified functions definitions in a dedicated header.

2021-02-26T17:41:04Z

This patch adds fortify-string.h to contain fortified functions definitions. Thus, the code is more separated and compile time is approximately 1% faster for people who do not set CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210111092141.22946-1-laniel_francis@privacyrequired.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210111092141.22946-2-laniel_francis@privacyrequired.com Signed-off-by: Francis Laniel Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

kasan, arm64: expand CONFIG_KASAN checks

2020-12-22T20:55:08Z

Some #ifdef CONFIG_KASAN checks are only relevant for software KASAN modes (either related to shadow memory or compiler instrumentation). Expand those into CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC || CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/e6971e432dbd72bb897ff14134ebb7e169bdcf0c.1606161801.git.andreyknvl@google.com Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov Signed-off-by: Vincenzo Frascino Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko Tested-by: Vincenzo Frascino Cc: Andrey Ryabinin Cc: Branislav Rankov Cc: Dmitry Vyukov Cc: Evgenii Stepanov Cc: Kevin Brodsky Cc: Marco Elver Cc: Vasily Gorbik Cc: Will Deacon Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

string.h: add FORTIFY coverage for strscpy()

2020-12-16T06:46:16Z

The fortified version of strscpy ensures the following before vanilla strscpy is called: 1. There is no read overflow because we either size is smaller than src length or we shrink size to src length by calling fortified strnlen. 2. There is no write overflow because we either failed during compilation or at runtime by checking that size is smaller than dest size. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201122162451.27551-4-laniel_francis@privacyrequired.com Signed-off-by: Francis Laniel Acked-by: Kees Cook Cc: Daniel Axtens Cc: Daniel Micay Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

lib: string.h: detect intra-object overflow in fortified string functions

2020-12-16T06:46:16Z

Patch series "Fortify strscpy()", v7. This patch implements a fortified version of strscpy() enabled by setting CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE=y. The new version ensures the following before calling vanilla strscpy(): 1. There is no read overflow because either size is smaller than src length or we shrink size to src length by calling fortified strnlen(). 2. There is no write overflow because we either failed during compilation or at runtime by checking that size is smaller than dest size. Note that, if src and dst size cannot be got, the patch defaults to call vanilla strscpy(). The patches adds the following: 1. Implement the fortified version of strscpy(). 2. Add a new LKDTM test to ensures the fortified version still returns the same value as the vanilla one while panic'ing when there is a write overflow. 3. Correct some typos in LKDTM related file. I based my modifications on top of two patches from Daniel Axtens which modify calls to __builtin_object_size, in fortified string functions, to ensure the true size of char * are returned and not the surrounding structure size. About performance, I measured the slow down of fortified strscpy(), using the vanilla one as baseline. The hardware I used is an Intel i3 2130 CPU clocked at 3.4 GHz. I ran "Linux 5.10.0-rc4+ SMP PREEMPT" inside qemu 3.10 with 4 CPU cores. The following code, called through LKDTM, was used as a benchmark: #define TIMES 10000 char *src; char dst[7]; int i; ktime_t begin; src = kstrdup("foobar", GFP_KERNEL); if (src == NULL) return; begin = ktime_get(); for (i = 0; i < TIMES; i++) strscpy(dst, src, strlen(src)); pr_info("%d fortified strscpy() tooks %lld", TIMES, ktime_get() - begin); begin = ktime_get(); for (i = 0; i < TIMES; i++) __real_strscpy(dst, src, strlen(src)); pr_info("%d vanilla strscpy() tooks %lld", TIMES, ktime_get() - begin); kfree(src); I called the above code 30 times to compute stats for each version (in ns, round to int): | version | mean | std | median | 95th | | --------- | ------- | ------ | ------- | ------- | | fortified | 245_069 | 54_657 | 216_230 | 331_122 | | vanilla | 172_501 | 70_281 | 143_539 | 219_553 | On average, fortified strscpy() is approximately 1.42 times slower than vanilla strscpy(). For the 95th percentile, the fortified version is about 1.50 times slower. So, clearly the stats are not in favor of fortified strscpy(). But, the fortified version loops the string twice (one in strnlen() and another in vanilla strscpy()) while the vanilla one only loops once. This can explain why fortified strscpy() is slower than the vanilla one. This patch (of 5): When the fortify feature was first introduced in commit 6974f0c4555e ("include/linux/string.h: add the option of fortified string.h functions"), Daniel Micay observed: * It should be possible to optionally use __builtin_object_size(x, 1) for some functions (C strings) to detect intra-object overflows (like glibc's _FORTIFY_SOURCE=2), but for now this takes the conservative approach to avoid likely compatibility issues. This is a case that often cannot be caught by KASAN. Consider: struct foo { char a[10]; char b[10]; } void test() { char *msg; struct foo foo; msg = kmalloc(16, GFP_KERNEL); strcpy(msg, "Hello world!!"); // this copy overwrites foo.b strcpy(foo.a, msg); } The questionable copy overflows foo.a and writes to foo.b as well. It cannot be detected by KASAN. Currently it is also not detected by fortify, because strcpy considers __builtin_object_size(x, 0), which considers the size of the surrounding object (here, struct foo). However, if we switch the string functions over to use __builtin_object_size(x, 1), the compiler will measure the size of the closest surrounding subobject (here, foo.a), rather than the size of the surrounding object as a whole. See https://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/gcc/Object-Size-Checking.html for more info. Only do this for string functions: we cannot use it on things like memcpy, memmove, memcmp and memchr_inv due to code like this which purposefully operates on multiple structure members: (arch/x86/kernel/traps.c) /* * regs->sp points to the failing IRET frame on the * ESPFIX64 stack. Copy it to the entry stack. This fills * in gpregs->ss through gpregs->ip. * */ memmove(&gpregs->ip, (void *)regs->sp, 5*8); This change passes an allyesconfig on powerpc and x86, and an x86 kernel built with it survives running with syz-stress from syzkaller, so it seems safe so far. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201122162451.27551-1-laniel_francis@privacyrequired.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201122162451.27551-2-laniel_francis@privacyrequired.com Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens Signed-off-by: Francis Laniel Reviewed-by: Kees Cook Cc: Daniel Micay Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

x86, powerpc: Rename memcpy_mcsafe() to copy_mc_to_{user, kernel}()

2020-10-06T09:18:04Z

In reaction to a proposal to introduce a memcpy_mcsafe_fast() implementation Linus points out that memcpy_mcsafe() is poorly named relative to communicating the scope of the interface. Specifically what addresses are valid to pass as source, destination, and what faults / exceptions are handled. Of particular concern is that even though x86 might be able to handle the semantics of copy_mc_to_user() with its common copy_user_generic() implementation other archs likely need / want an explicit path for this case: On Fri, May 1, 2020 at 11:28 AM Linus Torvalds wrote: > > On Thu, Apr 30, 2020 at 6:21 PM Dan Williams wrote: > > > > However now I see that copy_user_generic() works for the wrong reason. > > It works because the exception on the source address due to poison > > looks no different than a write fault on the user address to the > > caller, it's still just a short copy. So it makes copy_to_user() work > > for the wrong reason relative to the name. > > Right. > > And it won't work that way on other architectures. On x86, we have a > generic function that can take faults on either side, and we use it > for both cases (and for the "in_user" case too), but that's an > artifact of the architecture oddity. > > In fact, it's probably wrong even on x86 - because it can hide bugs - > but writing those things is painful enough that everybody prefers > having just one function. Replace a single top-level memcpy_mcsafe() with either copy_mc_to_user(), or copy_mc_to_kernel(). Introduce an x86 copy_mc_fragile() name as the rename for the low-level x86 implementation formerly named memcpy_mcsafe(). It is used as the slow / careful backend that is supplanted by a fast copy_mc_generic() in a follow-on patch. One side-effect of this reorganization is that separating copy_mc_64.S to its own file means that perf no longer needs to track dependencies for its memcpy_64.S benchmarks. [ bp: Massage a bit. ] Signed-off-by: Dan Williams Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Reviewed-by: Tony Luck Acked-by: Michael Ellerman Cc: Link: http://lore.kernel.org/r/CAHk-=wjSqtXAqfUJxFtWNwmguFASTgB0dz1dT3V-78Quiezqbg@mail.gmail.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/160195561680.2163339.11574962055305783722.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com

string.h: fix incompatibility between FORTIFY_SOURCE and KASAN

2020-06-04T03:09:42Z

The memcmp KASAN self-test fails on a kernel with both KASAN and FORTIFY_SOURCE. When FORTIFY_SOURCE is on, a number of functions are replaced with fortified versions, which attempt to check the sizes of the operands. However, these functions often directly invoke __builtin_foo() once they have performed the fortify check. Using __builtins may bypass KASAN checks if the compiler decides to inline it's own implementation as sequence of instructions, rather than emit a function call that goes out to a KASAN-instrumented implementation. Why is only memcmp affected? ============================ Of the string and string-like functions that kasan_test tests, only memcmp is replaced by an inline sequence of instructions in my testing on x86 with gcc version 9.2.1 20191008 (Ubuntu 9.2.1-9ubuntu2). I believe this is due to compiler heuristics. For example, if I annotate kmalloc calls with the alloc_size annotation (and disable some fortify compile-time checking!), the compiler will replace every memset except the one in kmalloc_uaf_memset with inline instructions. (I have some WIP patches to add this annotation.) Does this affect other functions in string.h? ============================================= Yes. Anything that uses __builtin_* rather than __real_* could be affected. This looks like: - strncpy - strcat - strlen - strlcpy maybe, under some circumstances? - strncat under some circumstances - memset - memcpy - memmove - memcmp (as noted) - memchr - strcpy Whether a function call is emitted always depends on the compiler. Most bugs should get caught by FORTIFY_SOURCE, but the missed memcmp test shows that this is not always the case. Isn't FORTIFY_SOURCE disabled with KASAN? ========================================- The string headers on all arches supporting KASAN disable fortify with kasan, but only when address sanitisation is _also_ disabled. For example from x86: #if defined(CONFIG_KASAN) && !defined(__SANITIZE_ADDRESS__) /* * For files that are not instrumented (e.g. mm/slub.c) we * should use not instrumented version of mem* functions. */ #define memcpy(dst, src, len) __memcpy(dst, src, len) #define memmove(dst, src, len) __memmove(dst, src, len) #define memset(s, c, n) __memset(s, c, n) #ifndef __NO_FORTIFY #define __NO_FORTIFY /* FORTIFY_SOURCE uses __builtin_memcpy, etc. */ #endif #endif This comes from commit 6974f0c4555e ("include/linux/string.h: add the option of fortified string.h functions"), and doesn't work when KASAN is enabled and the file is supposed to be sanitised - as with test_kasan.c I'm pretty sure this is not wrong, but not as expansive it should be: * we shouldn't use __builtin_memcpy etc in files where we don't have instrumentation - it could devolve into a function call to memcpy, which will be instrumented. Rather, we should use __memcpy which by convention is not instrumented. * we also shouldn't be using __builtin_memcpy when we have a KASAN instrumented file, because it could be replaced with inline asm that will not be instrumented. What is correct behaviour? ========================== Firstly, there is some overlap between fortification and KASAN: both provide some level of _runtime_ checking. Only fortify provides compile-time checking. KASAN and fortify can pick up different things at runtime: - Some fortify functions, notably the string functions, could easily be modified to consider sub-object sizes (e.g. members within a struct), and I have some WIP patches to do this. KASAN cannot detect these because it cannot insert poision between members of a struct. - KASAN can detect many over-reads/over-writes when the sizes of both operands are unknown, which fortify cannot. So there are a couple of options: 1) Flip the test: disable fortify in santised files and enable it in unsanitised files. This at least stops us missing KASAN checking, but we lose the fortify checking. 2) Make the fortify code always call out to real versions. Do this only for KASAN, for fear of losing the inlining opportunities we get from __builtin_*. (We can't use kasan_check_{read,write}: because the fortify functions are _extern inline_, you can't include _static_ inline functions without a compiler warning. kasan_check_{read,write} are static inline so we can't use them even when they would otherwise be suitable.) Take approach 2 and call out to real versions when KASAN is enabled. Use __underlying_foo to distinguish from __real_foo: __real_foo always refers to the kernel's implementation of foo, __underlying_foo could be either the kernel implementation or the __builtin_foo implementation. This is sometimes enough to make the memcmp test succeed with FORTIFY_SOURCE enabled. It is at least enough to get the function call into the module. One more fix is needed to make it reliable: see the next patch. Fixes: 6974f0c4555e ("include/linux/string.h: add the option of fortified string.h functions") Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Tested-by: David Gow Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov Cc: Daniel Micay Cc: Andrey Ryabinin Cc: Alexander Potapenko Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200423154503.5103-3-dja@axtens.net Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

lib/string: add strnchrnul()

2020-02-04T03:05:26Z

Patch series "lib: rework bitmap_parse", v5. Similarl to the recently revisited bitmap_parselist(), bitmap_parse() is ineffective and overcomplicated. This series reworks it, aligns its interface with bitmap_parselist() and makes it simpler to use. The series also adds a test for the function and fixes usage of it in cpumask_parse() according to the new design - drops the calculating of length of an input string. bitmap_parse() takes the array of numbers to be put into the map in the BE order which is reversed to the natural LE order for bitmaps. For example, to construct bitmap containing a bit on the position 42, we have to put a line '400,0'. Current implementation reads chunk one by one from the beginning ('400' before '0') and makes bitmap shift after each successful parse. It makes the complexity of the whole process as O(n^2). We can do it in reverse direction ('0' before '400') and avoid shifting, but it requires reverse parsing helpers. This patch (of 7): New function works like strchrnul() with a length limited string. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200102043031.30357-2-yury.norov@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Yury Norov Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko Cc: Rasmus Villemoes Cc: Amritha Nambiar Cc: Willem de Bruijn Cc: Kees Cook Cc: Matthew Wilcox Cc: "Tobin C . Harding" Cc: Will Deacon Cc: Miklos Szeredi Cc: Vineet Gupta Cc: Chris Wilson Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo Cc: Steffen Klassert Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds