user/sven/linux.git/include/linux/string.h, branch v6.0.15

fortify: Provide a memcpy trap door for sharp corners

2022-05-12T08:49:23Z

As we continue to narrow the scope of what the FORTIFY memcpy() will accept and build alternative APIs that give the compiler appropriate visibility into more complex memcpy scenarios, there is a need for "unfortified" memcpy use in rare cases where combinations of compiler behaviors, source code layout, etc, result in cases where the stricter memcpy checks need to be bypassed until appropriate solutions can be developed (i.e. fix compiler bugs, code refactoring, new API, etc). The intention is for this to be used only if there's no other reasonable solution, for its use to include a justification that can be used to assess future solutions, and for it to be temporary. Example usage included, based on analysis and discussion from: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/CANn89iLS_2cshtuXPyNUGDPaic=sJiYfvTb_wNLgWrZRyBxZ_g@mail.gmail.com Cc: Jakub Kicinski Cc: Eric Dumazet Cc: "David S. Miller" Cc: Paolo Abeni Cc: Coco Li Cc: Tariq Toukan Cc: Saeed Mahameed Cc: Leon Romanovsky Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220511025301.3636666-1-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni

string: uninline memcpy_and_pad

2021-11-03T18:41:25Z

When building m68k:allmodconfig, recent versions of gcc generate the following error if the length of UTS_RELEASE is less than 8 bytes. In function 'memcpy_and_pad', inlined from 'nvmet_execute_disc_identify' at drivers/nvme/target/discovery.c:268:2: arch/m68k/include/asm/string.h:72:25: error: '__builtin_memcpy' reading 8 bytes from a region of size 7 Discussions around the problem suggest that this only happens if an architecture does not provide strlen(), if -ffreestanding is provided as compiler option, and if CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE=n. All of this is the case for m68k. The exact reasons are unknown, but seem to be related to the ability of the compiler to evaluate the return value of strlen() and the resulting execution flow in memcpy_and_pad(). It would be possible to work around the problem by using sizeof(UTS_RELEASE) instead of strlen(UTS_RELEASE), but that would only postpone the problem until the function is called in a similar way. Uninline memcpy_and_pad() instead to solve the problem for good. Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds Reviewed-by: Geert Uytterhoeven Acked-by: Andy Shevchenko Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

string.h: Introduce memset_startat() for wiping trailing members and padding

2021-10-18T19:28:52Z

A common idiom in kernel code is to wipe the contents of a structure starting from a given member. These open-coded cases are usually difficult to read and very sensitive to struct layout changes. Like memset_after(), introduce a new helper, memset_startat() that takes the target struct instance, the byte to write, and the member name where zeroing should start. Note that this doesn't zero padding preceding the target member. For those cases, memset_after() should be used on the preceding member. Cc: Steffen Klassert Cc: Herbert Xu Cc: "David S. Miller" Cc: Jakub Kicinski Cc: Andrew Morton Cc: Francis Laniel Cc: Vincenzo Frascino Cc: Daniel Axtens Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook

string.h: Introduce memset_after() for wiping trailing members/padding

2021-10-18T19:28:52Z

A common idiom in kernel code is to wipe the contents of a structure after a given member. This is especially useful in places where there is trailing padding. These open-coded cases are usually difficult to read and very sensitive to struct layout changes. Introduce a new helper, memset_after() that takes the target struct instance, the byte to write, and the member name after which the zeroing should start. Cc: Steffen Klassert Cc: Herbert Xu Cc: "David S. Miller" Cc: Jakub Kicinski Cc: Andrew Morton Cc: Francis Laniel Cc: Vincenzo Frascino Cc: Daniel Axtens Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook

fortify: Move remaining fortify helpers into fortify-string.h

2021-09-25T15:20:49Z

When commit a28a6e860c6c ("string.h: move fortified functions definitions in a dedicated header.") moved the fortify-specific code, some helpers were left behind. Move the remaining fortify-specific helpers into fortify-string.h so they're together where they're used. This requires that any FORTIFY helper function prototypes be conditionally built to avoid "no prototype" warnings. Additionally removes unused helpers. Cc: Andrew Morton Cc: Daniel Axtens Cc: Vincenzo Frascino Cc: Andrey Konovalov Cc: Dan Williams Acked-by: Francis Laniel Reviewed-by: Nick Desaulniers Signed-off-by: Kees Cook

isystem: ship and use stdarg.h

2021-08-19T00:02:55Z

Ship minimal stdarg.h (1 type, 4 macros) as . stdarg.h is the only userspace header commonly used in the kernel. GPL 2 version of can be extracted from http://archive.debian.org/debian/pool/main/g/gcc-4.2/gcc-4.2_4.2.4.orig.tar.gz Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan Acked-by: Rafael J. Wysocki Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada

kernel.h: split out kstrtox() and simple_strtox() to a separate header

2021-07-01T18:06:05Z

kernel.h is being used as a dump for all kinds of stuff for a long time. Here is the attempt to start cleaning it up by splitting out kstrtox() and simple_strtox() helpers. At the same time convert users in header and lib folders to use new header. Though for time being include new header back to kernel.h to avoid twisted indirected includes for existing users. [andy.shevchenko@gmail.com: fix documentation references] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210615220003.377901-1-andy.shevchenko@gmail.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210611185815.44103-1-andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko Acked-by: Jonathan Cameron Cc: Francis Laniel Cc: Randy Dunlap Cc: Kars Mulder Cc: Trond Myklebust Cc: Anna Schumaker Cc: "J. Bruce Fields" Cc: Chuck Lever Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

string.h: move fortified functions definitions in a dedicated header.

2021-02-26T17:41:04Z

This patch adds fortify-string.h to contain fortified functions definitions. Thus, the code is more separated and compile time is approximately 1% faster for people who do not set CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210111092141.22946-1-laniel_francis@privacyrequired.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210111092141.22946-2-laniel_francis@privacyrequired.com Signed-off-by: Francis Laniel Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

kasan, arm64: expand CONFIG_KASAN checks

2020-12-22T20:55:08Z

Some #ifdef CONFIG_KASAN checks are only relevant for software KASAN modes (either related to shadow memory or compiler instrumentation). Expand those into CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC || CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/e6971e432dbd72bb897ff14134ebb7e169bdcf0c.1606161801.git.andreyknvl@google.com Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov Signed-off-by: Vincenzo Frascino Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko Tested-by: Vincenzo Frascino Cc: Andrey Ryabinin Cc: Branislav Rankov Cc: Dmitry Vyukov Cc: Evgenii Stepanov Cc: Kevin Brodsky Cc: Marco Elver Cc: Vasily Gorbik Cc: Will Deacon Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

string.h: add FORTIFY coverage for strscpy()

2020-12-16T06:46:16Z

The fortified version of strscpy ensures the following before vanilla strscpy is called: 1. There is no read overflow because we either size is smaller than src length or we shrink size to src length by calling fortified strnlen. 2. There is no write overflow because we either failed during compilation or at runtime by checking that size is smaller than dest size. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201122162451.27551-4-laniel_francis@privacyrequired.com Signed-off-by: Francis Laniel Acked-by: Kees Cook Cc: Daniel Axtens Cc: Daniel Micay Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds