user/sven/linux.git/include/linux/sunrpc/auth.h, branch v4.9.5

sunrpc: add hash_cred() function to rpc_authops struct

2016-09-30T19:28:46Z

Currently, a single hash algorithm is used to hash the auth_cred for the credcache for all rpc_auth types. Add a hash_cred() function to the rpc_authops struct to allow a hash function specific to each auth flavor. Signed-off-by: Frank Sorenson Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker

Merge branch 'nfs-rdma'

2016-07-24T21:09:02Z

sunrpc: move NO_CRKEY_TIMEOUT to the auth->au_flags

2016-07-19T20:23:24Z

A generic_cred can be used to look up a unx_cred or a gss_cred, so it's not really safe to use the the generic_cred->acred->ac_flags to store the NO_CRKEY_TIMEOUT flag. A lookup for a unx_cred triggered while the KEY_EXPIRE_SOON flag is already set will cause both NO_CRKEY_TIMEOUT and KEY_EXPIRE_SOON to be set in the ac_flags, leaving the user associated with the auth_cred to be in a state where they're perpetually doing 4K NFS_FILE_SYNC writes. This can be reproduced as follows: 1. Mount two NFS filesystems, one with sec=krb5 and one with sec=sys. They do not need to be the same export, nor do they even need to be from the same NFS server. Also, v3 is fine. $ sudo mount -o v3,sec=krb5 server1:/export /mnt/krb5 $ sudo mount -o v3,sec=sys server2:/export /mnt/sys 2. As the normal user, before accessing the kerberized mount, kinit with a short lifetime (but not so short that renewing the ticket would leave you within the 4-minute window again by the time the original ticket expires), e.g. $ kinit -l 10m -r 60m 3. Do some I/O to the kerberized mount and verify that the writes are wsize, UNSTABLE: $ dd if=/dev/zero of=/mnt/krb5/file bs=1M count=1 4. Wait until you're within 4 minutes of key expiry, then do some more I/O to the kerberized mount to ensure that RPC_CRED_KEY_EXPIRE_SOON gets set. Verify that the writes are 4K, FILE_SYNC: $ dd if=/dev/zero of=/mnt/krb5/file bs=1M count=1 5. Now do some I/O to the sec=sys mount. This will cause RPC_CRED_NO_CRKEY_TIMEOUT to be set: $ dd if=/dev/zero of=/mnt/sys/file bs=1M count=1 6. Writes for that user will now be permanently 4K, FILE_SYNC for that user, regardless of which mount is being written to, until you reboot the client. Renewing the kerberos ticket (assuming it hasn't already expired) will have no effect. Grabbing a new kerberos ticket at this point will have no effect either. Move the flag to the auth->au_flags field (which is currently unused) and rename it slightly to reflect that it's no longer associated with the auth_cred->ac_flags. Add the rpc_auth to the arg list of rpcauth_cred_key_to_expire and check the au_flags there too. Finally, add the inode to the arg list of nfs_ctx_key_to_expire so we can determine the rpc_auth to pass to rpcauth_cred_key_to_expire. Signed-off-by: Scott Mayhew Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust

xprtrdma: No direct data placement with krb5i and krb5p

2016-07-11T19:50:43Z

Direct data placement is not allowed when using flavors that guarantee integrity or privacy. When such security flavors are in effect, don't allow the use of Read and Write chunks for moving individual data items. All messages larger than the inline threshold are sent via Long Call or Long Reply. On my systems (CX-3 Pro on FDR), for small I/O operations, the use of Long messages adds only around 5 usecs of latency in each direction. Note that when integrity or encryption is used, the host CPU touches every byte in these messages. Even if it could be used, data movement offload doesn't buy much in this case. Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever Tested-by: Steve Wise Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker

SUNRPC: Ensure get_rpccred() and put_rpccred() can take NULL arguments

2016-05-17T19:48:06Z

Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker

sunrpc: add a get_rpccred_rcu inline

2016-05-09T13:05:40Z

Sometimes we might have a RCU managed credential pointer and don't want to use locking to handle it. Add a function that will take a reference to the cred iff the refcount is not already zero. Callers can dereference the pointer under the rcu_read_lock and use that function to take a reference only if the cred is not on its way to destruction. Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker

sunrpc: add rpc_lookup_generic_cred

2016-05-09T13:05:40Z

Add function rpc_lookup_generic_cred, which allows lookups of a generic credential that's not current_cred(). [jlayton: add gfp_t parm] Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker

sunrpc: plumb gfp_t parm into crcreate operation

2016-05-09T13:05:40Z

We need to be able to call the generic_cred creator from different contexts. Add a gfp_t parm to the crcreate operation and to rpcauth_lookup_credcache. For now, we just push the gfp_t parms up one level to the *_lookup_cred functions. Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker

nfsd: Lower NFSv4.1 callback message size limit

2016-03-01T21:06:35Z

The maximum size of a backchannel message on RPC-over-RDMA depends on the connection's inline threshold. Today that threshold is typically 1024 bytes, making the maximum message size 996 bytes. The Linux server's CREATE_SESSION operation checks that the size of callback Calls can be as large as 1044 bytes, to accommodate RPCSEC_GSS. Thus CREATE_SESSION fails if a client advertises the true message size maximum of 996 bytes. But the server's backchannel currently does not support RPCSEC_GSS. The actual maximum size it needs is much smaller. It is safe to reduce the limit to enable NFSv4.1 on RDMA backchannel operation. Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields

sunrpc: increase UNX_MAXNODENAME from 32 to __NEW_UTS_LEN bytes

2015-08-12T18:31:04Z

The current limit of 32 bytes artificially limits the name string that we end up stuffing into NFSv4.x client ID blobs. If you have multiple hosts with long hostnames that only differ near the end, then this can cause NFSv4 client ID collisions. Linux nodenames are actually limited to __NEW_UTS_LEN bytes (64), so use that as the limit instead. Also, use XDR_QUADLEN to specify the slack length, just for clarity and in case someone in the future changes this to something not evenly divisible by 4. Reported-by: Michael Skralivetsky Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust