<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>user/sven/linux.git/include/linux/sysctl.h, branch v4.14.141</title>
<subtitle>Linux Kernel
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/atom?h=v4.14.141</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/atom?h=v4.14.141'/>
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<updated>2017-11-10T01:58:40Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>sysctl: add register_sysctl() dummy helper</title>
<updated>2017-11-10T01:58:40Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Arnd Bergmann</name>
<email>arnd@arndb.de</email>
</author>
<published>2017-11-09T21:38:18Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=e609a6b85182f8a479d265839d3ff9aad2e67b18'/>
<id>urn:sha1:e609a6b85182f8a479d265839d3ff9aad2e67b18</id>
<content type='text'>
register_sysctl() has been around for five years with commit
fea478d4101a ("sysctl: Add register_sysctl for normal sysctl users") but
now that arm64 started using it, I ran into a compile error:

  arch/arm64/kernel/armv8_deprecated.c: In function 'register_insn_emulation_sysctl':
  arch/arm64/kernel/armv8_deprecated.c:257:2: error: implicit declaration of function 'register_sysctl'

This adds a inline function like we already have for
register_sysctl_paths() and register_sysctl_table().

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171106133700.558647-1-arnd@arndb.de
Fixes: 38b9aeb32fa7 ("arm64: Port deprecated instruction emulation to new sysctl interface")
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Dave Martin &lt;Dave.Martin@arm.com&gt;
Acked-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Acked-by: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Cc: "Luis R. Rodriguez" &lt;mcgrof@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Alex Benne &lt;alex.bennee@linaro.org&gt;
Cc: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license</title>
<updated>2017-11-02T10:10:55Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Greg Kroah-Hartman</name>
<email>gregkh@linuxfoundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2017-11-01T14:07:57Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:b24413180f5600bcb3bb70fbed5cf186b60864bd</id>
<content type='text'>
Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.

By default all files without license information are under the default
license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.

Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0'
SPDX license identifier.  The SPDX identifier is a legally binding
shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.

This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
Philippe Ombredanne.

How this work was done:

Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of
the use cases:
 - file had no licensing information it it.
 - file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
 - file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,

Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license
had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.

The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to
a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the
output of two independent scanners (ScanCode &amp; Windriver) producing SPDX
tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne.  Philippe prepared the
base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files.

The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files
assessed.  Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner
results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s)
to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not
immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.

Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
 - Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
 - Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained &gt;5
   lines of source
 - File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if &lt;5
   lines).

All documentation files were explicitly excluded.

The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
identifiers to apply.

 - when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
   considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
   COPYING file license applied.

   For non */uapi/* files that summary was:

   SPDX license identifier                            # files
   ---------------------------------------------------|-------
   GPL-2.0                                              11139

   and resulted in the first patch in this series.

   If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
   Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0".  Results of that was:

   SPDX license identifier                            # files
   ---------------------------------------------------|-------
   GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note                        930

   and resulted in the second patch in this series.

 - if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
   of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
   any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
   it (per prior point).  Results summary:

   SPDX license identifier                            # files
   ---------------------------------------------------|------
   GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note                       270
   GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                      169
   ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause)    21
   ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause)    17
   LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                      15
   GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                       14
   ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause)    5
   LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                       4
   LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note                        3
   ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT)              3
   ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT)             1

   and that resulted in the third patch in this series.

 - when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became
   the concluded license(s).

 - when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a
   license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
   licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.

 - In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
   resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and
   which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).

 - When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
   confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.

 - If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
   the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
   in time.

In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation
by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.

Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights.  The
Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so
they are related.

Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks
in about 15000 files.

In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the
correct identifier.

Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch
version early this week with:
 - a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
   license ids and scores
 - reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
   files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct
 - reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license
   was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied
   SPDX license was correct

This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction.  This
worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
different types of files to be modified.

These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg.  Thomas wrote a script to
parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
format that the file expected.  This script was further refined by Greg
based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
comment types.)  Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
generate the patches.

Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart &lt;kstewart@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne &lt;pombredanne@nexb.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'gcc-plugins-v4.13-rc2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux</title>
<updated>2017-07-19T15:55:18Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2017-07-19T15:55:18Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=e06fdaf40a5c021dd4a2ec797e8b724f07360070'/>
<id>urn:sha1:e06fdaf40a5c021dd4a2ec797e8b724f07360070</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull structure randomization updates from Kees Cook:
 "Now that IPC and other changes have landed, enable manual markings for
  randstruct plugin, including the task_struct.

  This is the rest of what was staged in -next for the gcc-plugins, and
  comes in three patches, largest first:

   - mark "easy" structs with __randomize_layout

   - mark task_struct with an optional anonymous struct to isolate the
     __randomize_layout section

   - mark structs to opt _out_ of automated marking (which will come
     later)

  And, FWIW, this continues to pass allmodconfig (normal and patched to
  enable gcc-plugins) builds of x86_64, i386, arm64, arm, powerpc, and
  s390 for me"

* tag 'gcc-plugins-v4.13-rc2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux:
  randstruct: opt-out externally exposed function pointer structs
  task_struct: Allow randomized layout
  randstruct: Mark various structs for randomization
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'akpm' (patches from Andrew)</title>
<updated>2017-07-13T19:38:49Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2017-07-13T19:38:49Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=ad51271afc21a72479974713abb40ca4b96d1f6b'/>
<id>urn:sha1:ad51271afc21a72479974713abb40ca4b96d1f6b</id>
<content type='text'>
Merge yet more updates from Andrew Morton:

- various misc things

- kexec updates

- sysctl core updates

- scripts/gdb udpates

- checkpoint-restart updates

- ipc updates

- kernel/watchdog updates

- Kees's "rough equivalent to the glibc _FORTIFY_SOURCE=1 feature"

- "stackprotector: ascii armor the stack canary"

- more MM bits

- checkpatch updates

* emailed patches from Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;: (96 commits)
  writeback: rework wb_[dec|inc]_stat family of functions
  ARM: samsung: usb-ohci: move inline before return type
  video: fbdev: omap: move inline before return type
  video: fbdev: intelfb: move inline before return type
  USB: serial: safe_serial: move __inline__ before return type
  drivers: tty: serial: move inline before return type
  drivers: s390: move static and inline before return type
  x86/efi: move asmlinkage before return type
  sh: move inline before return type
  MIPS: SMP: move asmlinkage before return type
  m68k: coldfire: move inline before return type
  ia64: sn: pci: move inline before type
  ia64: move inline before return type
  FRV: tlbflush: move asmlinkage before return type
  CRIS: gpio: move inline before return type
  ARM: HP Jornada 7XX: move inline before return type
  ARM: KVM: move asmlinkage before type
  checkpatch: improve the STORAGE_CLASS test
  mm, migration: do not trigger OOM killer when migrating memory
  drm/i915: use __GFP_RETRY_MAYFAIL
  ...
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sysctl: add unsigned int range support</title>
<updated>2017-07-12T23:26:00Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Luis R. Rodriguez</name>
<email>mcgrof@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2017-07-12T21:33:40Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=61d9b56a89208d8cccd0b4cfec7e6959717e16e3'/>
<id>urn:sha1:61d9b56a89208d8cccd0b4cfec7e6959717e16e3</id>
<content type='text'>
To keep parity with regular int interfaces provide the an unsigned int
proc_douintvec_minmax() which allows you to specify a range of allowed
valid numbers.

Adding proc_douintvec_minmax_sysadmin() is easy but we can wait for an
actual user for that.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170519033554.18592-6-mcgrof@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Luis R. Rodriguez &lt;mcgrof@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Subash Abhinov Kasiviswanathan &lt;subashab@codeaurora.org&gt;
Cc: Heinrich Schuchardt &lt;xypron.glpk@gmx.de&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: "David S. Miller" &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan &lt;adobriyan@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>proc: Fix proc_sys_prune_dcache to hold a sb reference</title>
<updated>2017-07-11T16:01:24Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric W. Biederman</name>
<email>ebiederm@xmission.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-07-06T13:41:06Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=2fd1d2c4ceb2248a727696962cf3370dc9f5a0a4'/>
<id>urn:sha1:2fd1d2c4ceb2248a727696962cf3370dc9f5a0a4</id>
<content type='text'>
Andrei Vagin writes:
FYI: This bug has been reproduced on 4.11.7
&gt; BUG: Dentry ffff895a3dd01240{i=4e7c09a,n=lo}  still in use (1) [unmount of proc proc]
&gt; ------------[ cut here ]------------
&gt; WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 13588 at fs/dcache.c:1445 umount_check+0x6e/0x80
&gt; CPU: 1 PID: 13588 Comm: kworker/1:1 Not tainted 4.11.7-200.fc25.x86_64 #1
&gt; Hardware name: CompuLab sbc-flt1/fitlet, BIOS SBCFLT_0.08.04 06/27/2015
&gt; Workqueue: events proc_cleanup_work
&gt; Call Trace:
&gt;  dump_stack+0x63/0x86
&gt;  __warn+0xcb/0xf0
&gt;  warn_slowpath_null+0x1d/0x20
&gt;  umount_check+0x6e/0x80
&gt;  d_walk+0xc6/0x270
&gt;  ? dentry_free+0x80/0x80
&gt;  do_one_tree+0x26/0x40
&gt;  shrink_dcache_for_umount+0x2d/0x90
&gt;  generic_shutdown_super+0x1f/0xf0
&gt;  kill_anon_super+0x12/0x20
&gt;  proc_kill_sb+0x40/0x50
&gt;  deactivate_locked_super+0x43/0x70
&gt;  deactivate_super+0x5a/0x60
&gt;  cleanup_mnt+0x3f/0x90
&gt;  mntput_no_expire+0x13b/0x190
&gt;  kern_unmount+0x3e/0x50
&gt;  pid_ns_release_proc+0x15/0x20
&gt;  proc_cleanup_work+0x15/0x20
&gt;  process_one_work+0x197/0x450
&gt;  worker_thread+0x4e/0x4a0
&gt;  kthread+0x109/0x140
&gt;  ? process_one_work+0x450/0x450
&gt;  ? kthread_park+0x90/0x90
&gt;  ret_from_fork+0x2c/0x40
&gt; ---[ end trace e1c109611e5d0b41 ]---
&gt; VFS: Busy inodes after unmount of proc. Self-destruct in 5 seconds.  Have a nice day...
&gt; BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at           (null)
&gt; IP: _raw_spin_lock+0xc/0x30
&gt; PGD 0

Fix this by taking a reference to the super block in proc_sys_prune_dcache.

The superblock reference is the core of the fix however the sysctl_inodes
list is converted to a hlist so that hlist_del_init_rcu may be used.  This
allows proc_sys_prune_dache to remove inodes the sysctl_inodes list, while
not causing problems for proc_sys_evict_inode when if it later choses to
remove the inode from the sysctl_inodes list.  Removing inodes from the
sysctl_inodes list allows proc_sys_prune_dcache to have a progress
guarantee, while still being able to drop all locks.  The fact that
head-&gt;unregistering is set in start_unregistering ensures that no more
inodes will be added to the the sysctl_inodes list.

Previously the code did a dance where it delayed calling iput until the
next entry in the list was being considered to ensure the inode remained on
the sysctl_inodes list until the next entry was walked to.  The structure
of the loop in this patch does not need that so is much easier to
understand and maintain.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Andrei Vagin &lt;avagin@gmail.com&gt;
Tested-by: Andrei Vagin &lt;avagin@openvz.org&gt;
Fixes: ace0c791e6c3 ("proc/sysctl: Don't grab i_lock under sysctl_lock.")
Fixes: d6cffbbe9a7e ("proc/sysctl: prune stale dentries during unregistering")
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>randstruct: Mark various structs for randomization</title>
<updated>2017-06-30T19:00:51Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>keescook@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2016-10-28T08:22:25Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=3859a271a003aba01e45b85c9d8b355eb7bf25f9'/>
<id>urn:sha1:3859a271a003aba01e45b85c9d8b355eb7bf25f9</id>
<content type='text'>
This marks many critical kernel structures for randomization. These are
structures that have been targeted in the past in security exploits, or
contain functions pointers, pointers to function pointer tables, lists,
workqueues, ref-counters, credentials, permissions, or are otherwise
sensitive. This initial list was extracted from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's
code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my understanding
of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are mine and
don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code.

Left out of this list is task_struct, which requires special handling
and will be covered in a subsequent patch.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sysctl: Remove dead register_sysctl_root</title>
<updated>2017-04-17T04:42:49Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric W. Biederman</name>
<email>ebiederm@xmission.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-03-24T13:38:20Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=b54807fa52ae21bdf6bad72b0f00fd400af412eb'/>
<id>urn:sha1:b54807fa52ae21bdf6bad72b0f00fd400af412eb</id>
<content type='text'>
The function no longer does anything.  The is only a single caller of
register_sysctl_root when semantically there should be two.  Remove
this function so that if someone decides this functionality is needed
again it will be obvious all of the callers of setup_sysctl_set need
to be audited and modified appropriately.

Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>proc/sysctl: prune stale dentries during unregistering</title>
<updated>2017-02-13T04:00:06Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Konstantin Khlebnikov</name>
<email>khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru</email>
</author>
<published>2017-02-10T07:35:02Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=d6cffbbe9a7e51eb705182965a189457c17ba8a3'/>
<id>urn:sha1:d6cffbbe9a7e51eb705182965a189457c17ba8a3</id>
<content type='text'>
Currently unregistering sysctl table does not prune its dentries.
Stale dentries could slowdown sysctl operations significantly.

For example, command:

 # for i in {1..100000} ; do unshare -n -- sysctl -a &amp;&gt; /dev/null ; done
 creates a millions of stale denties around sysctls of loopback interface:

 # sysctl fs.dentry-state
 fs.dentry-state = 25812579  24724135        45      0       0       0

 All of them have matching names thus lookup have to scan though whole
 hash chain and call d_compare (proc_sys_compare) which checks them
 under system-wide spinlock (sysctl_lock).

 # time sysctl -a &gt; /dev/null
 real    1m12.806s
 user    0m0.016s
 sys     1m12.400s

Currently only memory reclaimer could remove this garbage.
But without significant memory pressure this never happens.

This patch collects sysctl inodes into list on sysctl table header and
prunes all their dentries once that table unregisters.

Konstantin Khlebnikov &lt;khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru&gt; writes:
&gt; On 10.02.2017 10:47, Al Viro wrote:
&gt;&gt; how about &gt;&gt; the matching stats *after* that patch?
&gt;
&gt; dcache size doesn't grow endlessly, so stats are fine
&gt;
&gt; # sysctl fs.dentry-state
&gt; fs.dentry-state = 92712	58376	45	0	0	0
&gt;
&gt; # time sysctl -a &amp;&gt;/dev/null
&gt;
&gt; real	0m0.013s
&gt; user	0m0.004s
&gt; sys	0m0.008s

Signed-off-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov &lt;khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru&gt;
Suggested-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace</title>
<updated>2016-10-06T16:52:23Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2016-10-06T16:52:23Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=14986a34e1289424811443a524cdd9e1688c7913'/>
<id>urn:sha1:14986a34e1289424811443a524cdd9e1688c7913</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull namespace updates from Eric Biederman:
 "This set of changes is a number of smaller things that have been
  overlooked in other development cycles focused on more fundamental
  change. The devpts changes are small things that were a distraction
  until we managed to kill off DEVPTS_MULTPLE_INSTANCES. There is an
  trivial regression fix to autofs for the unprivileged mount changes
  that went in last cycle. A pair of ioctls has been added by Andrey
  Vagin making it is possible to discover the relationships between
  namespaces when referring to them through file descriptors.

  The big user visible change is starting to add simple resource limits
  to catch programs that misbehave. With namespaces in general and user
  namespaces in particular allowing users to use more kinds of
  resources, it has become important to have something to limit errant
  programs. Because the purpose of these limits is to catch errant
  programs the code needs to be inexpensive to use as it always on, and
  the default limits need to be high enough that well behaved programs
  on well behaved systems don't encounter them.

  To this end, after some review I have implemented per user per user
  namespace limits, and use them to limit the number of namespaces. The
  limits being per user mean that one user can not exhause the limits of
  another user. The limits being per user namespace allow contexts where
  the limit is 0 and security conscious folks can remove from their
  threat anlysis the code used to manage namespaces (as they have
  historically done as it root only). At the same time the limits being
  per user namespace allow other parts of the system to use namespaces.

  Namespaces are increasingly being used in application sand boxing
  scenarios so an all or nothing disable for the entire system for the
  security conscious folks makes increasing use of these sandboxes
  impossible.

  There is also added a limit on the maximum number of mounts present in
  a single mount namespace. It is nontrivial to guess what a reasonable
  system wide limit on the number of mount structure in the kernel would
  be, especially as it various based on how a system is using
  containers. A limit on the number of mounts in a mount namespace
  however is much easier to understand and set. In most cases in
  practice only about 1000 mounts are used. Given that some autofs
  scenarious have the potential to be 30,000 to 50,000 mounts I have set
  the default limit for the number of mounts at 100,000 which is well
  above every known set of users but low enough that the mount hash
  tables don't degrade unreaonsably.

  These limits are a start. I expect this estabilishes a pattern that
  other limits for resources that namespaces use will follow. There has
  been interest in making inotify event limits per user per user
  namespace as well as interest expressed in making details about what
  is going on in the kernel more visible"

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace: (28 commits)
  autofs:  Fix automounts by using current_real_cred()-&gt;uid
  mnt: Add a per mount namespace limit on the number of mounts
  netns: move {inc,dec}_net_namespaces into #ifdef
  nsfs: Simplify __ns_get_path
  tools/testing: add a test to check nsfs ioctl-s
  nsfs: add ioctl to get a parent namespace
  nsfs: add ioctl to get an owning user namespace for ns file descriptor
  kernel: add a helper to get an owning user namespace for a namespace
  devpts: Change the owner of /dev/pts/ptmx to the mounter of /dev/pts
  devpts: Remove sync_filesystems
  devpts: Make devpts_kill_sb safe if fsi is NULL
  devpts: Simplify devpts_mount by using mount_nodev
  devpts: Move the creation of /dev/pts/ptmx into fill_super
  devpts: Move parse_mount_options into fill_super
  userns: When the per user per user namespace limit is reached return ENOSPC
  userns; Document per user per user namespace limits.
  mntns: Add a limit on the number of mount namespaces.
  netns: Add a limit on the number of net namespaces
  cgroupns: Add a limit on the number of cgroup namespaces
  ipcns: Add a  limit on the number of ipc namespaces
  ...
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