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<title>user/sven/linux.git/include/linux/user_namespace.h, branch v3.12.25</title>
<subtitle>Linux Kernel
</subtitle>
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<updated>2013-09-07T21:35:32Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace</title>
<updated>2013-09-07T21:35:32Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2013-09-07T21:35:32Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:c7c4591db64dbd1e504bc4e2806d7ef290a3c81b</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull namespace changes from Eric Biederman:
 "This is an assorted mishmash of small cleanups, enhancements and bug
  fixes.

  The major theme is user namespace mount restrictions.  nsown_capable
  is killed as it encourages not thinking about details that need to be
  considered.  A very hard to hit pid namespace exiting bug was finally
  tracked and fixed.  A couple of cleanups to the basic namespace
  infrastructure.

  Finally there is an enhancement that makes per user namespace
  capabilities usable as capabilities, and an enhancement that allows
  the per userns root to nice other processes in the user namespace"

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace:
  userns:  Kill nsown_capable it makes the wrong thing easy
  capabilities: allow nice if we are privileged
  pidns: Don't have unshare(CLONE_NEWPID) imply CLONE_THREAD
  userns: Allow PR_CAPBSET_DROP in a user namespace.
  namespaces: Simplify copy_namespaces so it is clear what is going on.
  pidns: Fix hang in zap_pid_ns_processes by sending a potentially extra wakeup
  sysfs: Restrict mounting sysfs
  userns: Better restrictions on when proc and sysfs can be mounted
  vfs: Don't copy mount bind mounts of /proc/&lt;pid&gt;/ns/mnt between namespaces
  kernel/nsproxy.c: Improving a snippet of code.
  proc: Restrict mounting the proc filesystem
  vfs: Lock in place mounts from more privileged users
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>userns: Better restrictions on when proc and sysfs can be mounted</title>
<updated>2013-08-27T02:17:03Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric W. Biederman</name>
<email>ebiederm@xmission.com</email>
</author>
<published>2013-03-31T02:57:41Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:e51db73532955dc5eaba4235e62b74b460709d5b</id>
<content type='text'>
Rely on the fact that another flavor of the filesystem is already
mounted and do not rely on state in the user namespace.

Verify that the mounted filesystem is not covered in any significant
way.  I would love to verify that the previously mounted filesystem
has no mounts on top but there are at least the directories
/proc/sys/fs/binfmt_misc and /sys/fs/cgroup/ that exist explicitly
for other filesystems to mount on top of.

Refactor the test into a function named fs_fully_visible and call that
function from the mount routines of proc and sysfs.  This makes this
test local to the filesystems involved and the results current of when
the mounts take place, removing a weird threading of the user
namespace, the mount namespace and the filesystems themselves.

Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>userns: limit the maximum depth of user_namespace-&gt;parent chain</title>
<updated>2013-08-08T20:11:39Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Oleg Nesterov</name>
<email>oleg@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2013-08-08T16:55:32Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:8742f229b635bf1c1c84a3dfe5e47c814c20b5c8</id>
<content type='text'>
Ensure that user_namespace-&gt;parent chain can't grow too much.
Currently we use the hardroded 32 as limit.

Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@amacapital.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>userns: Restrict when proc and sysfs can be mounted</title>
<updated>2013-03-27T14:50:08Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric W. Biederman</name>
<email>ebiederm@xmission.com</email>
</author>
<published>2013-03-24T21:28:27Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:87a8ebd637dafc255070f503909a053cf0d98d3f</id>
<content type='text'>
Only allow unprivileged mounts of proc and sysfs if they are already
mounted when the user namespace is created.

proc and sysfs are interesting because they have content that is
per namespace, and so fresh mounts are needed when new namespaces
are created while at the same time proc and sysfs have content that
is shared between every instance.

Respect the policy of who may see the shared content of proc and sysfs
by only allowing new mounts if there was an existing mount at the time
the user namespace was created.

In practice there are only two interesting cases: proc and sysfs are
mounted at their usual places, proc and sysfs are not mounted at all
(some form of mount namespace jail).

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn &lt;serge.hallyn@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>userns: Avoid recursion in put_user_ns</title>
<updated>2013-01-27T06:11:41Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric W. Biederman</name>
<email>ebiederm@xmission.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-12-29T02:58:39Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:c61a2810a2161986353705b44d9503e6bb079f4f</id>
<content type='text'>
When freeing a deeply nested user namespace free_user_ns calls
put_user_ns on it's parent which may in turn call free_user_ns again.
When -fno-optimize-sibling-calls is passed to gcc one stack frame per
user namespace is left on the stack, potentially overflowing the
kernel stack.  CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER forces -fno-optimize-sibling-calls
so we can't count on gcc to optimize this code.

Remove struct kref and use a plain atomic_t.  Making the code more
flexible and easier to comprehend.  Make the loop in free_user_ns
explict to guarantee that the stack does not overflow with
CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER enabled.

I have tested this fix with a simple program that uses unshare to
create a deeply nested user namespace structure and then calls exit.
With 1000 nesteuser namespaces before this change running my test
program causes the kernel to die a horrible death.  With 10,000,000
nested user namespaces after this change my test program runs to
completion and causes no harm.

Acked-by: Serge Hallyn &lt;serge.hallyn@canonical.com&gt;
Pointed-out-by: Vasily Kulikov &lt;segoon@openwall.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>proc: Usable inode numbers for the namespace file descriptors.</title>
<updated>2012-11-20T12:19:49Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric W. Biederman</name>
<email>ebiederm@xmission.com</email>
</author>
<published>2011-06-15T17:21:48Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:98f842e675f96ffac96e6c50315790912b2812be</id>
<content type='text'>
Assign a unique proc inode to each namespace, and use that
inode number to ensure we only allocate at most one proc
inode for every namespace in proc.

A single proc inode per namespace allows userspace to test
to see if two processes are in the same namespace.

This has been a long requested feature and only blocked because
a naive implementation would put the id in a global space and
would ultimately require having a namespace for the names of
namespaces, making migration and certain virtualization tricks
impossible.

We still don't have per superblock inode numbers for proc, which
appears necessary for application unaware checkpoint/restart and
migrations (if the application is using namespace file descriptors)
but that is now allowd by the design if it becomes important.

I have preallocated the ipc and uts initial proc inode numbers so
their structures can be statically initialized.

Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>userns: Implement unshare of the user namespace</title>
<updated>2012-11-20T12:18:14Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric W. Biederman</name>
<email>ebiederm@xmission.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-07-26T12:15:35Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:b2e0d98705e60e45bbb3c0032c48824ad7ae0704</id>
<content type='text'>
- Add CLONE_THREAD to the unshare flags if CLONE_NEWUSER is selected
  As changing user namespaces is only valid if all there is only
  a single thread.
- Restore the code to add CLONE_VM if CLONE_THREAD is selected and
  the code to addCLONE_SIGHAND if CLONE_VM is selected.
  Making the constraints in the code clear.

Acked-by: Serge Hallyn &lt;serge.hallyn@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>userns: Add kprojid_t and associated infrastructure in projid.h</title>
<updated>2012-09-18T08:01:37Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric W. Biederman</name>
<email>ebiederm@xmission.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-08-30T08:24:05Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:f76d207a66c3a53defea67e7d36c3eb1b7d6d61d</id>
<content type='text'>
Implement kprojid_t a cousin of the kuid_t and kgid_t.

The per user namespace mapping of project id values can be set with
/proc/&lt;pid&gt;/projid_map.

A full compliment of helpers is provided: make_kprojid, from_kprojid,
from_kprojid_munged, kporjid_has_mapping, projid_valid, projid_eq,
projid_eq, projid_lt.

Project identifiers are part of the generic disk quota interface,
although it appears only xfs implements project identifiers currently.

The xfs code allows anyone who has permission to set the project
identifier on a file to use any project identifier so when
setting up the user namespace project identifier mappings I do
not require a capability.

Cc: Dave Chinner &lt;david@fromorbit.com&gt;
Cc: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>userns: Replace user_ns_map_uid and user_ns_map_gid with from_kuid and from_kgid</title>
<updated>2012-05-03T10:28:39Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric W. Biederman</name>
<email>ebiederm@xmission.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-03-14T22:24:19Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:76b6db010297d4928ab7b7e7c78dd982f413f0a4</id>
<content type='text'>
These function are no longer needed replace them with their more useful equivalents.

Acked-by: Serge Hallyn &lt;serge.hallyn@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>userns: Store uid and gid values in struct cred with kuid_t and kgid_t types</title>
<updated>2012-05-03T10:28:38Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric W. Biederman</name>
<email>ebiederm@xmission.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-02-08T15:00:08Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:078de5f706ece36afd73bb4b8283314132d2dfdf</id>
<content type='text'>
cred.h and a few trivial users of struct cred are changed.  The rest of the users
of struct cred are left for other patches as there are too many changes to make
in one go and leave the change reviewable.  If the user namespace is disabled and
CONFIG_UIDGID_STRICT_TYPE_CHECKS are disabled the code will contiue to compile
and behave correctly.

Acked-by: Serge Hallyn &lt;serge.hallyn@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
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