<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>user/sven/linux.git/include/linux/virtio_net.h, branch v4.14.231</title>
<subtitle>Linux Kernel
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/atom?h=v4.14.231</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/atom?h=v4.14.231'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/'/>
<updated>2021-04-16T09:57:48Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>net: ensure mac header is set in virtio_net_hdr_to_skb()</title>
<updated>2021-04-16T09:57:48Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-03-30T23:43:43Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=12ba6288b027b816459782fcd8d7b37ed8a16828'/>
<id>urn:sha1:12ba6288b027b816459782fcd8d7b37ed8a16828</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 61431a5907fc36d0738e9a547c7e1556349a03e9 upstream.

Commit 924a9bc362a5 ("net: check if protocol extracted by virtio_net_hdr_set_proto is correct")
added a call to dev_parse_header_protocol() but mac_header is not yet set.

This means that eth_hdr() reads complete garbage, and syzbot complained about it [1]

This patch resets mac_header earlier, to get more coverage about this change.

Audit of virtio_net_hdr_to_skb() callers shows that this change should be safe.

[1]

BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in eth_header_parse_protocol+0xdc/0xe0 net/ethernet/eth.c:282
Read of size 2 at addr ffff888017a6200b by task syz-executor313/8409

CPU: 1 PID: 8409 Comm: syz-executor313 Not tainted 5.12.0-rc2-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:79 [inline]
 dump_stack+0x141/0x1d7 lib/dump_stack.c:120
 print_address_description.constprop.0.cold+0x5b/0x2f8 mm/kasan/report.c:232
 __kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:399 [inline]
 kasan_report.cold+0x7c/0xd8 mm/kasan/report.c:416
 eth_header_parse_protocol+0xdc/0xe0 net/ethernet/eth.c:282
 dev_parse_header_protocol include/linux/netdevice.h:3177 [inline]
 virtio_net_hdr_to_skb.constprop.0+0x99d/0xcd0 include/linux/virtio_net.h:83
 packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:2994 [inline]
 packet_sendmsg+0x2325/0x52b0 net/packet/af_packet.c:3031
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:654 [inline]
 sock_sendmsg+0xcf/0x120 net/socket.c:674
 sock_no_sendpage+0xf3/0x130 net/core/sock.c:2860
 kernel_sendpage.part.0+0x1ab/0x350 net/socket.c:3631
 kernel_sendpage net/socket.c:3628 [inline]
 sock_sendpage+0xe5/0x140 net/socket.c:947
 pipe_to_sendpage+0x2ad/0x380 fs/splice.c:364
 splice_from_pipe_feed fs/splice.c:418 [inline]
 __splice_from_pipe+0x43e/0x8a0 fs/splice.c:562
 splice_from_pipe fs/splice.c:597 [inline]
 generic_splice_sendpage+0xd4/0x140 fs/splice.c:746
 do_splice_from fs/splice.c:767 [inline]
 do_splice+0xb7e/0x1940 fs/splice.c:1079
 __do_splice+0x134/0x250 fs/splice.c:1144
 __do_sys_splice fs/splice.c:1350 [inline]
 __se_sys_splice fs/splice.c:1332 [inline]
 __x64_sys_splice+0x198/0x250 fs/splice.c:1332
 do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46

Fixes: 924a9bc362a5 ("net: check if protocol extracted by virtio_net_hdr_set_proto is correct")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Cc: Balazs Nemeth &lt;bnemeth@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Willem de Bruijn &lt;willemb@google.com&gt;
Reported-by: syzbot &lt;syzkaller@googlegroups.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: check if protocol extracted by virtio_net_hdr_set_proto is correct</title>
<updated>2021-03-17T15:34:28Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Balazs Nemeth</name>
<email>bnemeth@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-03-09T11:31:00Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=ea3fb2ce5fa794d02135f5c079e05cd6fc3f545d'/>
<id>urn:sha1:ea3fb2ce5fa794d02135f5c079e05cd6fc3f545d</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 924a9bc362a5223cd448ca08c3dde21235adc310 upstream.

For gso packets, virtio_net_hdr_set_proto sets the protocol (if it isn't
set) based on the type in the virtio net hdr, but the skb could contain
anything since it could come from packet_snd through a raw socket. If
there is a mismatch between what virtio_net_hdr_set_proto sets and
the actual protocol, then the skb could be handled incorrectly later
on.

An example where this poses an issue is with the subsequent call to
skb_flow_dissect_flow_keys_basic which relies on skb-&gt;protocol being set
correctly. A specially crafted packet could fool
skb_flow_dissect_flow_keys_basic preventing EINVAL to be returned.

Avoid blindly trusting the information provided by the virtio net header
by checking that the protocol in the packet actually matches the
protocol set by virtio_net_hdr_set_proto. Note that since the protocol
is only checked if skb-&gt;dev implements header_ops-&gt;parse_protocol,
packets from devices without the implementation are not checked at this
stage.

Fixes: 9274124f023b ("net: stricter validation of untrusted gso packets")
Signed-off-by: Balazs Nemeth &lt;bnemeth@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Willem de Bruijn &lt;willemb@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: be more gentle about silly gso requests coming from user</title>
<updated>2020-06-30T19:37:57Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-05-28T21:57:47Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=bfbaf151efe491e30697e21c8b7ae1b615480873'/>
<id>urn:sha1:bfbaf151efe491e30697e21c8b7ae1b615480873</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 7c6d2ecbda83150b2036a2b36b21381ad4667762 upstream.

Recent change in virtio_net_hdr_to_skb() broke some packetdrill tests.

When --mss=XXX option is set, packetdrill always provide gso_type &amp; gso_size
for its inbound packets, regardless of packet size.

	if (packet-&gt;tcp &amp;&amp; packet-&gt;mss) {
		if (packet-&gt;ipv4)
			gso.gso_type = VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_TCPV4;
		else
			gso.gso_type = VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_TCPV6;
		gso.gso_size = packet-&gt;mss;
	}

Since many other programs could do the same, relax virtio_net_hdr_to_skb()
to no longer return an error, but instead ignore gso settings.

This keeps Willem intent to make sure no malicious packet could
reach gso stack.

Note that TCP stack has a special logic in tcp_set_skb_tso_segs()
to clear gso_size for small packets.

Fixes: 6dd912f82680 ("net: check untrusted gso_size at kernel entry")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Cc: Willem de Bruijn &lt;willemb@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Willem de Bruijn &lt;willemb@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Cc: Guenter Roeck &lt;linux@roeck-us.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: check untrusted gso_size at kernel entry</title>
<updated>2020-06-11T07:22:59Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Willem de Bruijn</name>
<email>willemb@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-05-25T19:07:40Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=5c336039843d40e949d1d4fe8dcd380229db795f'/>
<id>urn:sha1:5c336039843d40e949d1d4fe8dcd380229db795f</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 6dd912f82680761d8fb6b1bb274a69d4c7010988 ]

Syzkaller again found a path to a kernel crash through bad gso input:
a packet with gso size exceeding len.

These packets are dropped in tcp_gso_segment and udp[46]_ufo_fragment.
But they may affect gso size calculations earlier in the path.

Now that we have thlen as of commit 9274124f023b ("net: stricter
validation of untrusted gso packets"), check gso_size at entry too.

Fixes: bfd5f4a3d605 ("packet: Add GSO/csum offload support.")
Reported-by: syzbot &lt;syzkaller@googlegroups.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn &lt;willemb@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: stricter validation of untrusted gso packets</title>
<updated>2020-05-20T06:16:56Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Willem de Bruijn</name>
<email>willemb@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-05-04T16:48:54Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=a0c23ec2171f98e401504bb6b789410f1646a686'/>
<id>urn:sha1:a0c23ec2171f98e401504bb6b789410f1646a686</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 9274124f023b5c56dc4326637d4f787968b03607 ]

Syzkaller again found a path to a kernel crash through bad gso input:
a packet with transport header extending beyond skb_headlen(skb).

Tighten validation at kernel entry:

- Verify that the transport header lies within the linear section.

    To avoid pulling linux/tcp.h, verify just sizeof tcphdr.
    tcp_gso_segment will call pskb_may_pull (th-&gt;doff * 4) before use.

- Match the gso_type against the ip_proto found by the flow dissector.

Fixes: bfd5f4a3d605 ("packet: Add GSO/csum offload support.")
Reported-by: syzbot &lt;syzkaller@googlegroups.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn &lt;willemb@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: avoid false positives in untrusted gso validation</title>
<updated>2019-02-27T09:08:08Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Willem de Bruijn</name>
<email>willemb@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-02-19T04:37:12Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=d996573ebd5c528c613e90b7e7daa961d58fa16e'/>
<id>urn:sha1:d996573ebd5c528c613e90b7e7daa961d58fa16e</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 9e8db5913264d3967b93c765a6a9e464d9c473db upstream.

GSO packets with vnet_hdr must conform to a small set of gso_types.
The below commit uses flow dissection to drop packets that do not.

But it has false positives when the skb is not fully initialized.
Dissection needs skb-&gt;protocol and skb-&gt;network_header.

Infer skb-&gt;protocol from gso_type as the two must agree.
SKB_GSO_UDP can use both ipv4 and ipv6, so try both.

Exclude callers for which network header offset is not known.

Fixes: d5be7f632bad ("net: validate untrusted gso packets without csum offload")
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn &lt;willemb@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: validate untrusted gso packets without csum offload</title>
<updated>2019-02-27T09:08:08Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Willem de Bruijn</name>
<email>willemb@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-02-15T17:15:47Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=dac7d4432b13d6b58923c1178b786bcda37c9e9e'/>
<id>urn:sha1:dac7d4432b13d6b58923c1178b786bcda37c9e9e</id>
<content type='text'>
commit d5be7f632bad0f489879eed0ff4b99bd7fe0b74c upstream.

Syzkaller again found a path to a kernel crash through bad gso input.
By building an excessively large packet to cause an skb field to wrap.

If VIRTIO_NET_HDR_F_NEEDS_CSUM was set this would have been dropped in
skb_partial_csum_set.

GSO packets that do not set checksum offload are suspicious and rare.
Most callers of virtio_net_hdr_to_skb already pass them to
skb_probe_transport_header.

Move that test forward, change it to detect parse failure and drop
packets on failure as those cleary are not one of the legitimate
VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO types.

Fixes: bfd5f4a3d605 ("packet: Add GSO/csum offload support.")
Fixes: f43798c27684 ("tun: Allow GSO using virtio_net_hdr")
Reported-by: syzbot &lt;syzkaller@googlegroups.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn &lt;willemb@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net/packet: fix packet drop as of virtio gso</title>
<updated>2018-10-18T07:16:19Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Jianfeng Tan</name>
<email>jianfeng.tan@linux.alibaba.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-09-29T15:41:27Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=5150140b4ea7ac8401deaebec03e619988a3804b'/>
<id>urn:sha1:5150140b4ea7ac8401deaebec03e619988a3804b</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 9d2f67e43b73e8af7438be219b66a5de0cfa8bd9 ]

When we use raw socket as the vhost backend, a packet from virito with
gso offloading information, cannot be sent out in later validaton at
xmit path, as we did not set correct skb-&gt;protocol which is further used
for looking up the gso function.

To fix this, we set this field according to virito hdr information.

Fixes: e858fae2b0b8f4 ("virtio_net: use common code for virtio_net_hdr and skb GSO conversion")
Signed-off-by: Jianfeng Tan &lt;jianfeng.tan@linux.alibaba.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: in virtio_net_hdr only add VLAN_HLEN to csum_start if payload holds vlan</title>
<updated>2018-06-26T00:06:28Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Willem de Bruijn</name>
<email>willemb@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-06-06T15:23:01Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=5320e035d7bbdade3755f90dc9b55ee542edc4d3'/>
<id>urn:sha1:5320e035d7bbdade3755f90dc9b55ee542edc4d3</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit fd3a88625844907151737fc3b4201676effa6d27 ]

Tun, tap, virtio, packet and uml vector all use struct virtio_net_hdr
to communicate packet metadata to userspace.

For skbuffs with vlan, the first two return the packet as it may have
existed on the wire, inserting the VLAN tag in the user buffer.  Then
virtio_net_hdr.csum_start needs to be adjusted by VLAN_HLEN bytes.

Commit f09e2249c4f5 ("macvtap: restore vlan header on user read")
added this feature to macvtap. Commit 3ce9b20f1971 ("macvtap: Fix
csum_start when VLAN tags are present") then fixed up csum_start.

Virtio, packet and uml do not insert the vlan header in the user
buffer.

When introducing virtio_net_hdr_from_skb to deduplicate filling in
the virtio_net_hdr, the variant from macvtap which adds VLAN_HLEN was
applied uniformly, breaking csum offset for packets with vlan on
virtio and packet.

Make insertion of VLAN_HLEN optional. Convert the callers to pass it
when needed.

Fixes: e858fae2b0b8f4 ("virtio_net: use common code for virtio_net_hdr and skb GSO conversion")
Fixes: 1276f24eeef2 ("packet: use common code for virtio_net_hdr and skb GSO conversion")
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn &lt;willemb@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: accept UFO datagrams from tuntap and packet</title>
<updated>2017-12-17T14:07:58Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Willem de Bruijn</name>
<email>willemb@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-11-21T15:22:25Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=60335608e2f1ad6e55acaa4f13bd0f3bcd156dbd'/>
<id>urn:sha1:60335608e2f1ad6e55acaa4f13bd0f3bcd156dbd</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 0c19f846d582af919db66a5914a0189f9f92c936 ]

Tuntap and similar devices can inject GSO packets. Accept type
VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_UDP, even though not generating UFO natively.

Processes are expected to use feature negotiation such as TUNSETOFFLOAD
to detect supported offload types and refrain from injecting other
packets. This process breaks down with live migration: guest kernels
do not renegotiate flags, so destination hosts need to expose all
features that the source host does.

Partially revert the UFO removal from 182e0b6b5846~1..d9d30adf5677.
This patch introduces nearly(*) no new code to simplify verification.
It brings back verbatim tuntap UFO negotiation, VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_UDP
insertion and software UFO segmentation.

It does not reinstate protocol stack support, hardware offload
(NETIF_F_UFO), SKB_GSO_UDP tunneling in SKB_GSO_SOFTWARE or reception
of VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_UDP packets in tuntap.

To support SKB_GSO_UDP reappearing in the stack, also reinstate
logic in act_csum and openvswitch. Achieve equivalence with v4.13 HEAD
by squashing in commit 939912216fa8 ("net: skb_needs_check() removes
CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY check for tx.") and reverting commit 8d63bee643f1
("net: avoid skb_warn_bad_offload false positives on UFO").

(*) To avoid having to bring back skb_shinfo(skb)-&gt;ip6_frag_id,
ipv6_proxy_select_ident is changed to return a __be32 and this is
assigned directly to the frag_hdr. Also, SKB_GSO_UDP is inserted
at the end of the enum to minimize code churn.

Tested
  Booted a v4.13 guest kernel with QEMU. On a host kernel before this
  patch `ethtool -k eth0` shows UFO disabled. After the patch, it is
  enabled, same as on a v4.13 host kernel.

  A UFO packet sent from the guest appears on the tap device:
    host:
      nc -l -p -u 8000 &amp;
      tcpdump -n -i tap0

    guest:
      dd if=/dev/zero of=payload.txt bs=1 count=2000
      nc -u 192.16.1.1 8000 &lt; payload.txt

  Direct tap to tap transmission of VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_UDP succeeds,
  packets arriving fragmented:

    ./with_tap_pair.sh ./tap_send_ufo tap0 tap1
    (from https://github.com/wdebruij/kerneltools/tree/master/tests)

Changes
  v1 -&gt; v2
    - simplified set_offload change (review comment)
    - documented test procedure

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/&lt;CAF=yD-LuUeDuL9YWPJD9ykOZ0QCjNeznPDr6whqZ9NGMNF12Mw@mail.gmail.com&gt;
Fixes: fb652fdfe837 ("macvlan/macvtap: Remove NETIF_F_UFO advertisement.")
Reported-by: Michal Kubecek &lt;mkubecek@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn &lt;willemb@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Jason Wang &lt;jasowang@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
