user/sven/linux.git/include/linux, branch v3.14.20

vgaswitcheroo: add vga_switcheroo_fini_domain_pm_ops

2014-10-05T21:52:22Z

commit 766a53d059d1500c9755c8af017bd411bd8f1b20 upstream. Drivers should call this on unload to unregister pmops. Bug: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=84431 Reviewed-by: Ben Skeggs Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher Signed-off-by: Pali Rohár Cc: Ben Skeggs Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

lockdep: Revert lockdep check in raw_seqcount_begin()

2014-10-05T21:52:20Z

commit 22fdcf02f6e80d64a927f702dd9d631a927d87d4 upstream. This commit reverts the addition of lockdep checking to raw_seqcount_begin for the following reasons: 1) It violates the naming convention that raw_* functions should not do lockdep checks (a convention that is also followed by the other raw_*_seqcount_begin functions). 2) raw_seqcount_begin does not spin, so it can only be part of an ABBA deadlock in very special circumstances (for instance if a lock is held across the entire raw_seqcount_begin()+read_seqcount_retry() loop while also being taken inside the write_seqcount protected area). 3) It is causing false positives with some existing callers, and there is no non-lockdep alternative for those callers to use. None of the three existing callers (__d_lookup_rcu, netdev_get_name, and the NFS state code) appear to use the function in a manner that is ABBA deadlock prone. Fixes: 1ca7d67cf5d5: seqcount: Add lockdep functionality to seqcount/seqlock Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra Cc: John Stultz Cc: "David S. Miller" Cc: Al Viro Cc: Waiman Long Cc: Stephen Boyd Cc: Linus Torvalds Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CAHQdGtRR6SvEhXiqWo24hoUh9AU9cL82Z8Z-d8-7u951F_d+5g@mail.gmail.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

workqueue: apply __WQ_ORDERED to create_singlethread_workqueue()

2014-10-05T21:52:19Z

commit e09c2c295468476a239d13324ce9042ec4de05eb upstream. create_singlethread_workqueue() is a compat interface for single threaded workqueue which maps to ordered workqueue w/ rescuer in the current implementation. create_singlethread_workqueue() currently implemented by invoking alloc_workqueue() w/ appropriate parameters. 8719dceae2f9 ("workqueue: reject adjusting max_active or applying attrs to ordered workqueues") introduced __WQ_ORDERED to protect ordered workqueues against dynamic attribute changes which can break ordering guarantees but forgot to apply it to create_singlethread_workqueue(). This in itself is okay as nobody currently uses dynamic attribute change on workqueues created with create_singlethread_workqueue(). However, 4c16bd327c ("workqueue: implement NUMA affinity for unbound workqueues") broke singlethreaded guarantee for ordered workqueues through allocating a separate pool_workqueue on each NUMA node by default. A later change 8a2b75384444 ("workqueue: fix ordered workqueues in NUMA setups") fixed it by allocating only one global pool_workqueue if __WQ_ORDERED is set. Combined, the __WQ_ORDERED omission in create_singlethread_workqueue() became critical breaking its single threadedness and ordering guarantee. Let's make create_singlethread_workqueue() wrap alloc_ordered_workqueue() instead so that it inherits __WQ_ORDERED and can implicitly track future ordered_workqueue changes. v2: I missed that __WQ_ORDERED now protects against pwq splitting across NUMA nodes and incorrectly described the patch as a nice-to-have fix to protect against future dynamic attribute usages. Oleg pointed out that this is actually a critical breakage due to 8a2b75384444 ("workqueue: fix ordered workqueues in NUMA setups"). Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo Reported-by: Mike Anderson Cc: Oleg Nesterov Cc: Gustavo Luiz Duarte Cc: Tomas Henzl Fixes: 4c16bd327c ("workqueue: implement NUMA affinity for unbound workqueues") Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

iio:trigger: modify return value for iio_trigger_get

2014-10-05T21:52:17Z

commit f153566570fb9e32c2f59182883f4f66048788fb upstream. Instead of a void function, return the trigger pointer. Whilst not in of itself a fix, this makes the following set of 7 fixes cleaner than they would otherwise be. Signed-off-by: Srinivas Pandruvada Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

vfs: add d_is_dir()

2014-09-17T16:19:27Z

commit 44b1d53043c482225196e8a9cd9f35163a1b3336 upstream. Add d_is_dir(dentry) helper which is analogous to S_ISDIR(). To avoid confusion, rename d_is_directory() to d_can_lookup(). Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi Reviewed-by: J. Bruce Fields Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

mnt: Correct permission checks in do_remount

2014-09-17T16:19:21Z

commit 9566d6742852c527bf5af38af5cbb878dad75705 upstream. While invesgiating the issue where in "mount --bind -oremount,ro ..." would result in later "mount --bind -oremount,rw" succeeding even if the mount started off locked I realized that there are several additional mount flags that should be locked and are not. In particular MNT_NOSUID, MNT_NODEV, MNT_NOEXEC, and the atime flags in addition to MNT_READONLY should all be locked. These flags are all per superblock, can all be changed with MS_BIND, and should not be changable if set by a more privileged user. The following additions to the current logic are added in this patch. - nosuid may not be clearable by a less privileged user. - nodev may not be clearable by a less privielged user. - noexec may not be clearable by a less privileged user. - atime flags may not be changeable by a less privileged user. The logic with atime is that always setting atime on access is a global policy and backup software and auditing software could break if atime bits are not updated (when they are configured to be updated), and serious performance degradation could result (DOS attack) if atime updates happen when they have been explicitly disabled. Therefore an unprivileged user should not be able to mess with the atime bits set by a more privileged user. The additional restrictions are implemented with the addition of MNT_LOCK_NOSUID, MNT_LOCK_NODEV, MNT_LOCK_NOEXEC, and MNT_LOCK_ATIME mnt flags. Taken together these changes and the fixes for MNT_LOCK_READONLY should make it safe for an unprivileged user to create a user namespace and to call "mount --bind -o remount,... ..." without the danger of mount flags being changed maliciously. Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

mnt: Only change user settable mount flags in remount

2014-09-17T16:19:21Z

commit a6138db815df5ee542d848318e5dae681590fccd upstream. Kenton Varda discovered that by remounting a read-only bind mount read-only in a user namespace the MNT_LOCK_READONLY bit would be cleared, allowing an unprivileged user to the remount a read-only mount read-write. Correct this by replacing the mask of mount flags to preserve with a mask of mount flags that may be changed, and preserve all others. This ensures that any future bugs with this mask and remount will fail in an easy to detect way where new mount flags simply won't change. Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

CAPABILITIES: remove undefined caps from all processes

2014-09-17T16:19:09Z

commit 7d8b6c63751cfbbe5eef81a48c22978b3407a3ad upstream. This is effectively a revert of 7b9a7ec565505699f503b4fcf61500dceb36e744 plus fixing it a different way... We found, when trying to run an application from an application which had dropped privs that the kernel does security checks on undefined capability bits. This was ESPECIALLY difficult to debug as those undefined bits are hidden from /proc/$PID/status. Consider a root application which drops all capabilities from ALL 4 capability sets. We assume, since the application is going to set eff/perm/inh from an array that it will clear not only the defined caps less than CAP_LAST_CAP, but also the higher 28ish bits which are undefined future capabilities. The BSET gets cleared differently. Instead it is cleared one bit at a time. The problem here is that in security/commoncap.c::cap_task_prctl() we actually check the validity of a capability being read. So any task which attempts to 'read all things set in bset' followed by 'unset all things set in bset' will not even attempt to unset the undefined bits higher than CAP_LAST_CAP. So the 'parent' will look something like: CapInh: 0000000000000000 CapPrm: 0000000000000000 CapEff: 0000000000000000 CapBnd: ffffffc000000000 All of this 'should' be fine. Given that these are undefined bits that aren't supposed to have anything to do with permissions. But they do... So lets now consider a task which cleared the eff/perm/inh completely and cleared all of the valid caps in the bset (but not the invalid caps it couldn't read out of the kernel). We know that this is exactly what the libcap-ng library does and what the go capabilities library does. They both leave you in that above situation if you try to clear all of you capapabilities from all 4 sets. If that root task calls execve() the child task will pick up all caps not blocked by the bset. The bset however does not block bits higher than CAP_LAST_CAP. So now the child task has bits in eff which are not in the parent. These are 'meaningless' undefined bits, but still bits which the parent doesn't have. The problem is now in cred_cap_issubset() (or any operation which does a subset test) as the child, while a subset for valid cap bits, is not a subset for invalid cap bits! So now we set durring commit creds that the child is not dumpable. Given it is 'more priv' than its parent. It also means the parent cannot ptrace the child and other stupidity. The solution here: 1) stop hiding capability bits in status This makes debugging easier! 2) stop giving any task undefined capability bits. it's simple, it you don't put those invalid bits in CAP_FULL_SET you won't get them in init and you won't get them in any other task either. This fixes the cap_issubset() tests and resulting fallout (which made the init task in a docker container untraceable among other things) 3) mask out undefined bits when sys_capset() is called as it might use ~0, ~0 to denote 'all capabilities' for backward/forward compatibility. This lets 'capsh --caps="all=eip" -- -c /bin/bash' run. 4) mask out undefined bit when we read a file capability off of disk as again likely all bits are set in the xattr for forward/backward compatibility. This lets 'setcap all+pe /bin/bash; /bin/bash' run Signed-off-by: Eric Paris Reviewed-by: Kees Cook Cc: Andrew Vagin Cc: Andrew G. Morgan Cc: Serge E. Hallyn Cc: Kees Cook Cc: Steve Grubb Cc: Dan Walsh Signed-off-by: James Morris Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

tpm: Provide a generic means to override the chip returned timeouts

2014-09-17T16:19:08Z

commit 8e54caf407b98efa05409e1fee0e5381abd2b088 upstream. Some Atmel TPMs provide completely wrong timeouts from their TPM_CAP_PROP_TIS_TIMEOUT query. This patch detects that and returns new correct values via a DID/VID table in the TIS driver. Tested on ARM using an AT97SC3204T FW version 37.16 [PHuewe: without this fix these 'broken' Atmel TPMs won't function on older kernels] Signed-off-by: "Berg, Christopher" Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Signed-off-by: Peter Huewe

svcrdma: Select NFSv4.1 backchannel transport based on forward channel

2014-09-05T23:34:18Z

commit 3c45ddf823d679a820adddd53b52c6699c9a05ac upstream. The current code always selects XPRT_TRANSPORT_BC_TCP for the back channel, even when the forward channel was not TCP (eg, RDMA). When a 4.1 mount is attempted with RDMA, the server panics in the TCP BC code when trying to send CB_NULL. Instead, construct the transport protocol number from the forward channel transport or'd with XPRT_TRANSPORT_BC. Transports that do not support bi-directional RPC will not have registered a "BC" transport, causing create_backchannel_client() to fail immediately. Fixes: https://bugzilla.linux-nfs.org/show_bug.cgi?id=265 Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman