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<title>user/sven/linux.git/include/linux, branch v3.4.70</title>
<subtitle>Linux Kernel
</subtitle>
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<updated>2013-11-04T12:23:41Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>inet: fix possible memory corruption with UDP_CORK and UFO</title>
<updated>2013-11-04T12:23:41Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Hannes Frederic Sowa</name>
<email>hannes@stressinduktion.org</email>
</author>
<published>2013-10-21T22:07:47Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=478e9a72b5e0cc9ecd8b787db90dec01d283123c'/>
<id>urn:sha1:478e9a72b5e0cc9ecd8b787db90dec01d283123c</id>
<content type='text'>
[ This is a simplified -stable version of a set of upstream commits. ]

This is a replacement patch only for stable which does fix the problems
handled by the following two commits in -net:

"ip_output: do skb ufo init for peeked non ufo skb as well" (e93b7d748be887cd7639b113ba7d7ef792a7efb9)
"ip6_output: do skb ufo init for peeked non ufo skb as well" (c547dbf55d5f8cf615ccc0e7265e98db27d3fb8b)

Three frames are written on a corked udp socket for which the output
netdevice has UFO enabled.  If the first and third frame are smaller than
the mtu and the second one is bigger, we enqueue the second frame with
skb_append_datato_frags without initializing the gso fields. This leads
to the third frame appended regulary and thus constructing an invalid skb.

This fixes the problem by always using skb_append_datato_frags as soon
as the first frag got enqueued to the skb without marking the packet
as SKB_GSO_UDP.

The problem with only two frames for ipv6 was fixed by "ipv6: udp
packets following an UFO enqueued packet need also be handled by UFO"
(2811ebac2521ceac84f2bdae402455baa6a7fb47).

Cc: Jiri Pirko &lt;jiri@resnulli.us&gt;
Cc: Eric Dumazet &lt;eric.dumazet@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: David Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa &lt;hannes@stressinduktion.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tcp: must unclone packets before mangling them</title>
<updated>2013-11-04T12:23:40Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2013-10-15T18:54:30Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:11db1e4cee071defc371d0fc7f1740024fbe5b06</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit c52e2421f7368fd36cbe330d2cf41b10452e39a9 ]

TCP stack should make sure it owns skbs before mangling them.

We had various crashes using bnx2x, and it turned out gso_size
was cleared right before bnx2x driver was populating TC descriptor
of the _previous_ packet send. TCP stack can sometime retransmit
packets that are still in Qdisc.

Of course we could make bnx2x driver more robust (using
ACCESS_ONCE(shinfo-&gt;gso_size) for example), but the bug is TCP stack.

We have identified two points where skb_unclone() was needed.

This patch adds a WARN_ON_ONCE() to warn us if we missed another
fix of this kind.

Kudos to Neal for finding the root cause of this bug. Its visible
using small MSS.

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell &lt;ncardwell@google.com&gt;
Cc: Yuchung Cheng &lt;ycheng@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>random: run random_int_secret_init() run after all late_initcalls</title>
<updated>2013-10-22T08:02:25Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Theodore Ts'o</name>
<email>tytso@mit.edu</email>
</author>
<published>2013-09-10T14:52:35Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:c2f271001295e9d4b1cca3a01502795e4f0d1639</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 47d06e532e95b71c0db3839ebdef3fe8812fca2c upstream.

The some platforms (e.g., ARM) initializes their clocks as
late_initcalls for some unknown reason.  So make sure
random_int_secret_init() is run after all of the late_initcalls are
run.

Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mm, show_mem: suppress page counts in non-blockable contexts</title>
<updated>2013-10-13T22:42:49Z</updated>
<author>
<name>David Rientjes</name>
<email>rientjes@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2013-04-29T22:06:11Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:022a41db8aa1bc0b4ff4c013f889292324a1c465</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 4b59e6c4730978679b414a8da61514a2518da512 upstream.

On large systems with a lot of memory, walking all RAM to determine page
types may take a half second or even more.

In non-blockable contexts, the page allocator will emit a page allocation
failure warning unless __GFP_NOWARN is specified.  In such contexts, irqs
are typically disabled and such a lengthy delay may even result in NMI
watchdog timeouts.

To fix this, suppress the page walk in such contexts when printing the
page allocation failure warning.

Signed-off-by: David Rientjes &lt;rientjes@google.com&gt;
Cc: Mel Gorman &lt;mgorman@suse.de&gt;
Acked-by: Michal Hocko &lt;mhocko@suse.cz&gt;
Cc: Dave Hansen &lt;dave@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Xishi Qiu &lt;qiuxishi@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>perf: Clarify perf_cpu_context::active_pmu usage by renaming it to ::unique_pmu</title>
<updated>2013-10-01T16:10:52Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Peter Zijlstra</name>
<email>a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl</email>
</author>
<published>2012-10-02T13:38:52Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:2cd21fa1b54efaf6b5912ef2833fa474fdcf92b7</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 3f1f33206c16c7b3839d71372bc2ac3f305aa802 upstream.

Stephane thought the perf_cpu_context::active_pmu name confusing and
suggested using 'unique_pmu' instead.

This pointer is a pointer to a 'random' pmu sharing the cpuctx
instance, therefore limiting a for_each_pmu loop to those where
cpuctx-&gt;unique_pmu matches the pmu we get a loop over unique cpuctx
instances.

Suggested-by: Stephane Eranian &lt;eranian@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra &lt;a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-kxyjqpfj2fn9gt7kwu5ag9ks@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Li Zefan &lt;lizefan@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>HID: provide a helper for validating hid reports</title>
<updated>2013-10-01T16:10:51Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>keescook@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2013-09-11T19:56:50Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:0049b62c9efc4ef23492976512d4722b3e63de45</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 331415ff16a12147d57d5c953f3a961b7ede348b upstream.

Many drivers need to validate the characteristics of their HID report
during initialization to avoid misusing the reports. This adds a common
helper to perform validation of the report exisitng, the field existing,
and the expected number of values within the field.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Benjamin Tissoires &lt;benjamin.tissoires@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina &lt;jkosina@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>HID: validate HID report id size</title>
<updated>2013-09-27T00:15:34Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>keescook@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2013-08-28T20:29:55Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:676bb9a417ceec66576daeb24aed2184a82ef544</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 43622021d2e2b82ea03d883926605bdd0525e1d1 upstream.

The "Report ID" field of a HID report is used to build indexes of
reports. The kernel's index of these is limited to 256 entries, so any
malicious device that sets a Report ID greater than 255 will trigger
memory corruption on the host:

[ 1347.156239] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffff88094958a878
[ 1347.156261] IP: [&lt;ffffffff813e4da0&gt;] hid_register_report+0x2a/0x8b

CVE-2013-2888

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina &lt;jkosina@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>rculist: list_first_or_null_rcu() should use list_entry_rcu()</title>
<updated>2013-09-27T00:15:32Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Tejun Heo</name>
<email>tj@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2013-06-28T17:34:48Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:a7179b89a68c7cb6f8623cedcce02b98d9e072a1</id>
<content type='text'>
commit c34ac00caefbe49d40058ae7200bd58725cebb45 upstream.

list_first_or_null() should test whether the list is empty and return
pointer to the first entry if not in a RCU safe manner.  It's broken
in several ways.

* It compares __kernel @__ptr with __rcu @__next triggering the
  following sparse warning.

  net/core/dev.c:4331:17: error: incompatible types in comparison expression (different address spaces)

* It doesn't perform rcu_dereference*() and computes the entry address
  using container_of() directly from the __rcu pointer which is
  inconsitent with other rculist interface.  As a result, all three
  in-kernel users - net/core/dev.c, macvlan, cgroup - are buggy.  They
  dereference the pointer w/o going through read barrier.

* While -&gt;next dereference passes through list_next_rcu(), the
  compiler is still free to fetch -&gt;next more than once and thus
  nullify the "__ptr != __next" condition check.

Fix it by making list_first_or_null_rcu() dereference -&gt;next directly
using ACCESS_ONCE() and then use list_entry_rcu() on it like other
rculist accessors.

v2: Paul pointed out that the compiler may fetch the pointer more than
    once nullifying the condition check.  ACCESS_ONCE() added on
    -&gt;next dereference.

v3: Restored () around macro param which was accidentally removed.
    Spotted by Paul.

Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo &lt;tj@kernel.org&gt;
Reported-by: Fengguang Wu &lt;fengguang.wu@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Dipankar Sarma &lt;dipankar@in.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: "Paul E. McKenney" &lt;paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: "David S. Miller" &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Cc: Li Zefan &lt;lizefan@huawei.com&gt;
Cc: Patrick McHardy &lt;kaber@trash.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney &lt;paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Josh Triplett &lt;josh@joshtriplett.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ICMPv6: treat dest unreachable codes 5 and 6 as EACCES, not EPROTO</title>
<updated>2013-09-14T13:02:10Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Jiri Bohac</name>
<email>jbohac@suse.cz</email>
</author>
<published>2013-08-30T09:18:45Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:8708ea2b682963ce30dfd638771e7e4022094a90</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 61e76b178dbe7145e8d6afa84bb4ccea71918994 ]

RFC 4443 has defined two additional codes for ICMPv6 type 1 (destination
unreachable) messages:
        5 - Source address failed ingress/egress policy
	6 - Reject route to destination

Now they are treated as protocol error and icmpv6_err_convert() converts them
to EPROTO.

RFC 4443 says:
	"Codes 5 and 6 are more informative subsets of code 1."

Treat codes 5 and 6 as code 1 (EACCES)

Btw, connect() returning -EPROTO confuses firefox, so that fallback to
other/IPv4 addresses does not work:
https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=910773

Signed-off-by: Jiri Bohac &lt;jbohac@suse.cz&gt;
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa &lt;hannes@stressinduktion.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ipv6: drop packets with multiple fragmentation headers</title>
<updated>2013-09-14T13:02:10Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Hannes Frederic Sowa</name>
<email>hannes@stressinduktion.org</email>
</author>
<published>2013-08-16T11:30:07Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:055c396300ee15d990777841278ba94d2bc7868a</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit f46078cfcd77fa5165bf849f5e568a7ac5fa569c ]

It is not allowed for an ipv6 packet to contain multiple fragmentation
headers. So discard packets which were already reassembled by
fragmentation logic and send back a parameter problem icmp.

The updates for RFC 6980 will come in later, I have to do a bit more
research here.

Cc: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki &lt;yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa &lt;hannes@stressinduktion.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
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