user/sven/linux.git/include/linux, branch v3.5.2

Input: eeti_ts: pass gpio value instead of IRQ

2012-08-15T14:53:04Z

commit 4eef6cbfcc03b294d9d334368a851b35b496ce53 upstream. The EETI touchscreen asserts its IRQ line as soon as it has data in its internal buffers. The line is automatically deasserted once all data has been read via I2C. Hence, the driver has to monitor the GPIO line and cannot simply rely on the interrupt handler reception. In the current implementation of the driver, irq_to_gpio() is used to determine the GPIO number from the i2c_client's IRQ value. As irq_to_gpio() is not available on all platforms, this patch changes this and makes the driver ignore the passed in IRQ. Instead, a GPIO is added to the platform_data struct and gpio_to_irq is used to derive the IRQ from that GPIO. If this fails, bail out. The driver is only able to work in environments where the touchscreen GPIO can be mapped to an IRQ. Without this patch, building raumfeld_defconfig results in: drivers/input/touchscreen/eeti_ts.c: In function 'eeti_ts_irq_active': drivers/input/touchscreen/eeti_ts.c:65:2: error: implicit declaration of function 'irq_to_gpio' [-Werror=implicit-function-declaration] Signed-off-by: Daniel Mack Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann Cc: Dmitry Torokhov Cc: Sven Neumann Cc: linux-input@vger.kernel.org Cc: Haojian Zhuang Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

Yama: higher restrictions should block PTRACE_TRACEME

2012-08-15T14:53:04Z

commit 9d8dad742ad1c74d7e7210ee05d0b44961d5ea16 upstream. The higher ptrace restriction levels should be blocking even PTRACE_TRACEME requests. The comments in the LSM documentation are misleading about when the checks happen (the parent does not go through security_ptrace_access_check() on a PTRACE_TRACEME call). Signed-off-by: Kees Cook Signed-off-by: James Morris Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

ARM: pxa: remove irq_to_gpio from ezx-pcap driver

2012-08-15T14:53:03Z

commit 59ee93a528b94ef4e81a08db252b0326feff171f upstream. The irq_to_gpio function was removed from the pxa platform in linux-3.2, and this driver has been broken since. There is actually no in-tree user of this driver that adds this platform device, but the driver can and does get enabled on some platforms. Without this patch, building ezx_defconfig results in: drivers/mfd/ezx-pcap.c: In function 'pcap_isr_work': drivers/mfd/ezx-pcap.c:205:2: error: implicit declaration of function 'irq_to_gpio' [-Werror=implicit-function-declaration] Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann Acked-by: Haojian Zhuang Cc: Samuel Ortiz Cc: Daniel Ribeiro Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

random: remove rand_initialize_irq()

2012-08-15T14:52:49Z

commit c5857ccf293968348e5eb4ebedc68074de3dcda6 upstream. With the new interrupt sampling system, we are no longer using the timer_rand_state structure in the irq descriptor, so we can stop initializing it now. [ Merged in fixes from Sedat to find some last missing references to rand_initialize_irq() ] Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" Signed-off-by: Sedat Dilek Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

random: add new get_random_bytes_arch() function

2012-08-15T14:52:48Z

commit c2557a303ab6712bb6e09447df828c557c710ac9 upstream. Create a new function, get_random_bytes_arch() which will use the architecture-specific hardware random number generator if it is present. Change get_random_bytes() to not use the HW RNG, even if it is avaiable. The reason for this is that the hw random number generator is fast (if it is present), but it requires that we trust the hardware manufacturer to have not put in a back door. (For example, an increasing counter encrypted by an AES key known to the NSA.) It's unlikely that Intel (for example) was paid off by the US Government to do this, but it's impossible for them to prove otherwise --- especially since Bull Mountain is documented to use AES as a whitener. Hence, the output of an evil, trojan-horse version of RDRAND is statistically indistinguishable from an RDRAND implemented to the specifications claimed by Intel. Short of using a tunnelling electronic microscope to reverse engineer an Ivy Bridge chip and disassembling and analyzing the CPU microcode, there's no way for us to tell for sure. Since users of get_random_bytes() in the Linux kernel need to be able to support hardware systems where the HW RNG is not present, most time-sensitive users of this interface have already created their own cryptographic RNG interface which uses get_random_bytes() as a seed. So it's much better to use the HW RNG to improve the existing random number generator, by mixing in any entropy returned by the HW RNG into /dev/random's entropy pool, but to always _use_ /dev/random's entropy pool. This way we get almost of the benefits of the HW RNG without any potential liabilities. The only benefits we forgo is the speed/performance enhancements --- and generic kernel code can't depend on depend on get_random_bytes() having the speed of a HW RNG anyway. For those places that really want access to the arch-specific HW RNG, if it is available, we provide get_random_bytes_arch(). Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

random: create add_device_randomness() interface

2012-08-15T14:52:48Z

commit a2080a67abe9e314f9e9c2cc3a4a176e8a8f8793 upstream. Add a new interface, add_device_randomness() for adding data to the random pool that is likely to differ between two devices (or possibly even per boot). This would be things like MAC addresses or serial numbers, or the read-out of the RTC. This does *not* add any actual entropy to the pool, but it initializes the pool to different values for devices that might otherwise be identical and have very little entropy available to them (particularly common in the embedded world). [ Modified by tytso to mix in a timestamp, since there may be some variability caused by the time needed to detect/configure the hardware in question. ] Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

random: make 'add_interrupt_randomness()' do something sane

2012-08-15T14:52:47Z

commit 775f4b297b780601e61787b766f306ed3e1d23eb upstream. We've been moving away from add_interrupt_randomness() for various reasons: it's too expensive to do on every interrupt, and flooding the CPU with interrupts could theoretically cause bogus floods of entropy from a somewhat externally controllable source. This solves both problems by limiting the actual randomness addition to just once a second or after 64 interrupts, whicever comes first. During that time, the interrupt cycle data is buffered up in a per-cpu pool. Also, we make sure the the nonblocking pool used by urandom is initialized before we start feeding the normal input pool. This assures that /dev/urandom is returning unpredictable data as soon as possible. (Based on an original patch by Linus, but significantly modified by tytso.) Tested-by: Eric Wustrow Reported-by: Eric Wustrow Reported-by: Nadia Heninger Reported-by: Zakir Durumeric Reported-by: J. Alex Halderman Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

posix_types.h: Cleanup stale __NFDBITS and related definitions

2012-08-09T15:23:11Z

commit 8ded2bbc1845e19c771eb55209aab166ef011243 upstream. Recently, glibc made a change to suppress sign-conversion warnings in FD_SET (glibc commit ceb9e56b3d1). This uncovered an issue with the kernel's definition of __NFDBITS if applications #include after including . A build failure would be seen when passing the -Werror=sign-compare and -D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2 flags to gcc. It was suggested that the kernel should either match the glibc definition of __NFDBITS or remove that entirely. The current in-kernel uses of __NFDBITS can be replaced with BITS_PER_LONG, and there are no uses of the related __FDELT and __FDMASK defines. Given that, we'll continue the cleanup that was started with commit 8b3d1cda4f5f ("posix_types: Remove fd_set macros") and drop the remaining unused macros. Additionally, linux/time.h has similar macros defined that expand to nothing so we'll remove those at the same time. Reported-by: Jeff Law Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer [ .. and fix up whitespace as per akpm ] Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

workqueue: perform cpu down operations from low priority cpu_notifier()

2012-08-09T15:22:54Z

commit 6575820221f7a4dd6eadecf7bf83cdd154335eda upstream. Currently, all workqueue cpu hotplug operations run off CPU_PRI_WORKQUEUE which is higher than normal notifiers. This is to ensure that workqueue is up and running while bringing up a CPU before other notifiers try to use workqueue on the CPU. Per-cpu workqueues are supposed to remain working and bound to the CPU for normal CPU_DOWN_PREPARE notifiers. This holds mostly true even with workqueue offlining running with higher priority because workqueue CPU_DOWN_PREPARE only creates a bound trustee thread which runs the per-cpu workqueue without concurrency management without explicitly detaching the existing workers. However, if the trustee needs to create new workers, it creates unbound workers which may wander off to other CPUs while CPU_DOWN_PREPARE notifiers are in progress. Furthermore, if the CPU down is cancelled, the per-CPU workqueue may end up with workers which aren't bound to the CPU. While reliably reproducible with a convoluted artificial test-case involving scheduling and flushing CPU burning work items from CPU down notifiers, this isn't very likely to happen in the wild, and, even when it happens, the effects are likely to be hidden by the following successful CPU down. Fix it by using different priorities for up and down notifiers - high priority for up operations and low priority for down operations. Workqueue cpu hotplug operations will soon go through further cleanup. Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo Acked-by: "Rafael J. Wysocki" Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

tun: fix a crash bug and a memory leak

2012-08-09T15:22:51Z

commit b09e786bd1dd66418b69348cb110f3a64764626a upstream. This patch fixes a crash tun_chr_close -> netdev_run_todo -> tun_free_netdev -> sk_release_kernel -> sock_release -> iput(SOCK_INODE(sock)) introduced by commit 1ab5ecb90cb6a3df1476e052f76a6e8f6511cb3d The problem is that this socket is embedded in struct tun_struct, it has no inode, iput is called on invalid inode, which modifies invalid memory and optionally causes a crash. sock_release also decrements sockets_in_use, this causes a bug that "sockets: used" field in /proc/*/net/sockstat keeps on decreasing when creating and closing tun devices. This patch introduces a flag SOCK_EXTERNALLY_ALLOCATED that instructs sock_release to not free the inode and not decrement sockets_in_use, fixing both memory corruption and sockets_in_use underflow. It should be backported to 3.3 an 3.4 stabke. Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman