user/sven/linux.git/include/linux, branch v4.1.29

netfilter: x_tables: introduce and use xt_copy_counters_from_user

2016-07-11T03:07:37Z

[ Upstream commit d7591f0c41ce3e67600a982bab6989ef0f07b3ce ] The three variants use same copy&pasted code, condense this into a helper and use that. Make sure info.name is 0-terminated. Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

netfilter: x_tables: xt_compat_match_from_user doesn't need a retval

2016-07-11T03:07:36Z

[ Upstream commit 0188346f21e6546498c2a0f84888797ad4063fc5 ] Always returned 0. Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

netfilter: x_tables: check for bogus target offset

2016-07-11T03:07:34Z

[ Upstream commit ce683e5f9d045e5d67d1312a42b359cb2ab2a13c ] We're currently asserting that targetoff + targetsize <= nextoff. Extend it to also check that targetoff is >= sizeof(xt_entry). Since this is generic code, add an argument pointing to the start of the match/target, we can then derive the base structure size from the delta. We also need the e->elems pointer in a followup change to validate matches. Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

netfilter: x_tables: add compat version of xt_check_entry_offsets

2016-07-11T03:07:34Z

[ Upstream commit fc1221b3a163d1386d1052184202d5dc50d302d1 ] 32bit rulesets have different layout and alignment requirements, so once more integrity checks get added to xt_check_entry_offsets it will reject well-formed 32bit rulesets. Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

netfilter: x_tables: add and use xt_check_entry_offsets

2016-07-11T03:07:33Z

[ Upstream commit 7d35812c3214afa5b37a675113555259cfd67b98 ] Currently arp/ip and ip6tables each implement a short helper to check that the target offset is large enough to hold one xt_entry_target struct and that t->u.target_size fits within the current rule. Unfortunately these checks are not sufficient. To avoid adding new tests to all of ip/ip6/arptables move the current checks into a helper, then extend this helper in followup patches. Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

pipe: limit the per-user amount of pages allocated in pipes

2016-07-11T03:07:27Z

[ Upstream commit 759c01142a5d0f364a462346168a56de28a80f52 ] On no-so-small systems, it is possible for a single process to cause an OOM condition by filling large pipes with data that are never read. A typical process filling 4000 pipes with 1 MB of data will use 4 GB of memory. On small systems it may be tricky to set the pipe max size to prevent this from happening. This patch makes it possible to enforce a per-user soft limit above which new pipes will be limited to a single page, effectively limiting them to 4 kB each, as well as a hard limit above which no new pipes may be created for this user. This has the effect of protecting the system against memory abuse without hurting other users, and still allowing pipes to work correctly though with less data at once. The limit are controlled by two new sysctls : pipe-user-pages-soft, and pipe-user-pages-hard. Both may be disabled by setting them to zero. The default soft limit allows the default number of FDs per process (1024) to create pipes of the default size (64kB), thus reaching a limit of 64MB before starting to create only smaller pipes. With 256 processes limited to 1024 FDs each, this results in 1024*64kB + (256*1024 - 1024) * 4kB = 1084 MB of memory allocated for a user. The hard limit is disabled by default to avoid breaking existing applications that make intensive use of pipes (eg: for splicing). Reported-by: socketpair@gmail.com Reported-by: Tetsuo Handa Mitigates: CVE-2013-4312 (Linux 2.0+) Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau Signed-off-by: Al Viro Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

net: validate variable length ll headers

2016-07-11T03:07:01Z

[ Upstream commit 2793a23aacbd754dbbb5cb75093deb7e4103bace ] Netdevice parameter hard_header_len is variously interpreted both as an upper and lower bound on link layer header length. The field is used as upper bound when reserving room at allocation, as lower bound when validating user input in PF_PACKET. Clarify the definition to be maximum header length. For validation of untrusted headers, add an optional validate member to header_ops. Allow bypassing of validation by passing CAP_SYS_RAWIO, for instance for deliberate testing of corrupt input. In this case, pad trailing bytes, as some device drivers expect completely initialized headers. See also http://comments.gmane.org/gmane.linux.network/401064 Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

packet: Allow packets with only a header (but no payload)

2016-07-11T03:07:01Z

[ Upstream commit 880621c2605b82eb5af91a2c94223df6f5a3fb64 ] Commit 9c7077622dd91 ("packet: make packet_snd fail on len smaller than l2 header") added validation for the packet size in packet_snd. This change enforces that every packet needs a header (with at least hard_header_len bytes) plus a payload with at least one byte. Before this change the payload was optional. This fixes PPPoE connections which do not have a "Service" or "Host-Uniq" configured (which is violating the spec, but is still widely used in real-world setups). Those are currently failing with the following message: "pppd: packet size is too short (24 <= 24)" Signed-off-by: Martin Blumenstingl Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

mld, igmp: Fix reserved tailroom calculation

2016-07-11T03:07:00Z

[ Upstream commit 1837b2e2bcd23137766555a63867e649c0b637f0 ] The current reserved_tailroom calculation fails to take hlen and tlen into account. skb: [__hlen__|__data____________|__tlen___|__extra__] ^ ^ head skb_end_offset In this representation, hlen + data + tlen is the size passed to alloc_skb. "extra" is the extra space made available in __alloc_skb because of rounding up by kmalloc. We can reorder the representation like so: [__hlen__|__data____________|__extra__|__tlen___] ^ ^ head skb_end_offset The maximum space available for ip headers and payload without fragmentation is min(mtu, data + extra). Therefore, reserved_tailroom = data + extra + tlen - min(mtu, data + extra) = skb_end_offset - hlen - min(mtu, skb_end_offset - hlen - tlen) = skb_tailroom - min(mtu, skb_tailroom - tlen) ; after skb_reserve(hlen) Compare the second line to the current expression: reserved_tailroom = skb_end_offset - min(mtu, skb_end_offset) and we can see that hlen and tlen are not taken into account. The min() in the third line can be expanded into: if mtu < skb_tailroom - tlen: reserved_tailroom = skb_tailroom - mtu else: reserved_tailroom = tlen Depending on hlen, tlen, mtu and the number of multicast address records, the current code may output skbs that have less tailroom than dev->needed_tailroom or it may output more skbs than needed because not all space available is used. Fixes: 4c672e4b ("ipv6: mld: fix add_grhead skb_over_panic for devs with large MTUs") Signed-off-by: Benjamin Poirier Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

dm snapshot: disallow the COW and origin devices from being identical

2016-07-11T03:06:54Z

[ Upstream commit 4df2bf466a9c9c92f40d27c4aa9120f4e8227bfc ] Otherwise loading a "snapshot" table using the same device for the origin and COW devices, e.g.: echo "0 20971520 snapshot 253:3 253:3 P 8" | dmsetup create snap will trigger: BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000098 [ 1958.979934] IP: [] dm_exception_store_set_chunk_size+0x7a/0x110 [dm_snapshot] [ 1958.989655] PGD 0 [ 1958.991903] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP ... [ 1959.059647] CPU: 9 PID: 3556 Comm: dmsetup Tainted: G IO 4.5.0-rc5.snitm+ #150 ... [ 1959.083517] task: ffff8800b9660c80 ti: ffff88032a954000 task.ti: ffff88032a954000 [ 1959.091865] RIP: 0010:[] [] dm_exception_store_set_chunk_size+0x7a/0x110 [dm_snapshot] [ 1959.104295] RSP: 0018:ffff88032a957b30 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 1959.110219] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000008 RCX: 0000000000000001 [ 1959.118180] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffff880329334a00 [ 1959.126141] RBP: ffff88032a957b50 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000001 [ 1959.134102] R10: 000000000000000a R11: f000000000000000 R12: ffff880330884d80 [ 1959.142061] R13: 0000000000000008 R14: ffffc90001c13088 R15: ffff880330884d80 [ 1959.150021] FS: 00007f8926ba3840(0000) GS:ffff880333440000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 1959.159047] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 1959.165456] CR2: 0000000000000098 CR3: 000000032f48b000 CR4: 00000000000006e0 [ 1959.173415] Stack: [ 1959.175656] ffffc90001c13040 ffff880329334a00 ffff880330884ed0 ffff88032a957bdc [ 1959.183946] ffff88032a957bb8 ffffffffa040f225 ffff880329334a30 ffff880300000000 [ 1959.192233] ffffffffa04133e0 ffff880329334b30 0000000830884d58 00000000569c58cf [ 1959.200521] Call Trace: [ 1959.203248] [] dm_exception_store_create+0x1d5/0x240 [dm_snapshot] [ 1959.211986] [] snapshot_ctr+0x140/0x630 [dm_snapshot] [ 1959.219469] [] ? dm_split_args+0x64/0x150 [dm_mod] [ 1959.226656] [] dm_table_add_target+0x177/0x440 [dm_mod] [ 1959.234328] [] table_load+0x143/0x370 [dm_mod] [ 1959.241129] [] ? retrieve_status+0x1b0/0x1b0 [dm_mod] [ 1959.248607] [] ctl_ioctl+0x255/0x4d0 [dm_mod] [ 1959.255307] [] ? memzero_explicit+0x12/0x20 [ 1959.261816] [] dm_ctl_ioctl+0x13/0x20 [dm_mod] [ 1959.268615] [] do_vfs_ioctl+0xa6/0x5c0 [ 1959.274637] [] ? __audit_syscall_entry+0xaf/0x100 [ 1959.281726] [] ? do_audit_syscall_entry+0x66/0x70 [ 1959.288814] [] SyS_ioctl+0x79/0x90 [ 1959.294450] [] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x71 ... [ 1959.323277] RIP [] dm_exception_store_set_chunk_size+0x7a/0x110 [dm_snapshot] [ 1959.333090] RSP [ 1959.336978] CR2: 0000000000000098 [ 1959.344121] ---[ end trace b049991ccad1169e ]--- Fixes: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1195899 Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ding Xiang Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin