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<title>user/sven/linux.git/include/linux, branch v4.14.148</title>
<subtitle>Linux Kernel
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/atom?h=v4.14.148</id>
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<updated>2019-10-05T10:48:12Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>quota: fix wrong condition in is_quota_modification()</title>
<updated>2019-10-05T10:48:12Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Chao Yu</name>
<email>yuchao0@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-09-11T09:36:50Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:94ad384da9237d707d224d47a4b736e87e0f9a05</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 6565c182094f69e4ffdece337d395eb7ec760efc upstream.

Quoted from
commit 3da40c7b0898 ("ext4: only call ext4_truncate when size &lt;= isize")

" At LSF we decided that if we truncate up from isize we shouldn't trim
  fallocated blocks that were fallocated with KEEP_SIZE and are past the
 new i_size.  This patch fixes ext4 to do this. "

And generic/092 of fstest have covered this case for long time, however
is_quota_modification() didn't adjust based on that rule, so that in
below condition, we will lose to quota block change:
- fallocate blocks beyond EOF
- remount
- truncate(file_path, file_size)

Fix it.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190911093650.35329-1-yuchao0@huawei.com
Fixes: 3da40c7b0898 ("ext4: only call ext4_truncate when size &lt;= isize")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu &lt;yuchao0@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>kprobes: Prohibit probing on BUG() and WARN() address</title>
<updated>2019-10-05T10:48:01Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Masami Hiramatsu</name>
<email>mhiramat@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-09-03T11:08:21Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:05fade62bd53af335ee6cae1c8030a0aae40c8ad</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit e336b4027775cb458dc713745e526fa1a1996b2a ]

Since BUG() and WARN() may use a trap (e.g. UD2 on x86) to
get the address where the BUG() has occurred, kprobes can not
do single-step out-of-line that instruction. So prohibit
probing on such address.

Without this fix, if someone put a kprobe on WARN(), the
kernel will crash with invalid opcode error instead of
outputing warning message, because kernel can not find
correct bug address.

Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu &lt;mhiramat@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Acked-by: Naveen N. Rao &lt;naveen.n.rao@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Anil S Keshavamurthy &lt;anil.s.keshavamurthy@intel.com&gt;
Cc: David S . Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Naveen N . Rao &lt;naveen.n.rao@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Steven Rostedt &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/156750890133.19112.3393666300746167111.stgit@devnote2
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>libceph: allow ceph_buffer_put() to receive a NULL ceph_buffer</title>
<updated>2019-09-10T09:32:19Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Luis Henriques</name>
<email>lhenriques@suse.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-07-19T14:32:19Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:2aeaba9025b5a31afd206ccc03e201897b68a70c</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 5c498950f730aa17c5f8a2cdcb903524e4002ed2 ]

Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques &lt;lhenriques@suse.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton &lt;jlayton@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov &lt;idryomov@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>gpio: Fix build error of function redefinition</title>
<updated>2019-09-10T09:32:13Z</updated>
<author>
<name>YueHaibing</name>
<email>yuehaibing@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-07-31T12:38:14Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:c37374d643a8e33a9062f438a902dc90ad30a6c5</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 68e03b85474a51ec1921b4d13204782594ef7223 ]

when do randbuilding, I got this error:

In file included from drivers/hwmon/pmbus/ucd9000.c:19:0:
./include/linux/gpio/driver.h:576:1: error: redefinition of gpiochip_add_pin_range
 gpiochip_add_pin_range(struct gpio_chip *chip, const char *pinctl_name,
 ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
In file included from drivers/hwmon/pmbus/ucd9000.c:18:0:
./include/linux/gpio.h:245:1: note: previous definition of gpiochip_add_pin_range was here
 gpiochip_add_pin_range(struct gpio_chip *chip, const char *pinctl_name,
 ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Reported-by: Hulk Robot &lt;hulkci@huawei.com&gt;
Fixes: 964cb341882f ("gpio: move pincontrol calls to &lt;linux/gpio/driver.h&gt;")
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing &lt;yuehaibing@huawei.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190731123814.46624-1-yuehaibing@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Walleij &lt;linus.walleij@linaro.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>NFS: Pass error information to the pgio error cleanup routine</title>
<updated>2019-09-06T08:21:00Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Trond Myklebust</name>
<email>trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-02-13T15:39:39Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:e4ca24bdcea96cf5143afe197b649060b40d5fd8</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit df3accb849607a86278a37c35e6b313635ccc48b ]

Allow the caller to pass error information when cleaning up a failed
I/O request so that we can conditionally take action to cancel the
request altogether if the error turned out to be fatal.

Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust &lt;trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>NFS: Clean up list moves of struct nfs_page</title>
<updated>2019-09-06T08:21:00Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Trond Myklebust</name>
<email>trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-02-18T16:35:54Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:fc26de15b5d840286dbd8dac7048897d0699f611</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 078b5fd92c4913dd367361db6c28568386077c89 ]

In several places we're just moving the struct nfs_page from one list to
another by first removing from the existing list, then adding to the new
one.

Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust &lt;trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: fix bpf_jit_limit knob for PAGE_SIZE &gt;= 64K</title>
<updated>2019-08-25T08:50:23Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Daniel Borkmann</name>
<email>daniel@iogearbox.net</email>
</author>
<published>2018-12-11T11:14:12Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:2d45c6f193789c6b610d734997a2f4cdebec4e37</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit fdadd04931c2d7cd294dc5b2b342863f94be53a3 ]

Michael and Sandipan report:

  Commit ede95a63b5 introduced a bpf_jit_limit tuneable to limit BPF
  JIT allocations. At compile time it defaults to PAGE_SIZE * 40000,
  and is adjusted again at init time if MODULES_VADDR is defined.

  For ppc64 kernels, MODULES_VADDR isn't defined, so we're stuck with
  the compile-time default at boot-time, which is 0x9c400000 when
  using 64K page size. This overflows the signed 32-bit bpf_jit_limit
  value:

  root@ubuntu:/tmp# cat /proc/sys/net/core/bpf_jit_limit
  -1673527296

  and can cause various unexpected failures throughout the network
  stack. In one case `strace dhclient eth0` reported:

  setsockopt(5, SOL_SOCKET, SO_ATTACH_FILTER, {len=11, filter=0x105dd27f8},
             16) = -1 ENOTSUPP (Unknown error 524)

  and similar failures can be seen with tools like tcpdump. This doesn't
  always reproduce however, and I'm not sure why. The more consistent
  failure I've seen is an Ubuntu 18.04 KVM guest booted on a POWER9
  host would time out on systemd/netplan configuring a virtio-net NIC
  with no noticeable errors in the logs.

Given this and also given that in near future some architectures like
arm64 will have a custom area for BPF JIT image allocations we should
get rid of the BPF_JIT_LIMIT_DEFAULT fallback / default entirely. For
4.21, we have an overridable bpf_jit_alloc_exec(), bpf_jit_free_exec()
so therefore add another overridable bpf_jit_alloc_exec_limit() helper
function which returns the possible size of the memory area for deriving
the default heuristic in bpf_jit_charge_init().

Like bpf_jit_alloc_exec() and bpf_jit_free_exec(), the new
bpf_jit_alloc_exec_limit() assumes that module_alloc() is the default
JIT memory provider, and therefore in case archs implement their custom
module_alloc() we use MODULES_{END,_VADDR} for limits and otherwise for
vmalloc_exec() cases like on ppc64 we use VMALLOC_{END,_START}.

Additionally, for archs supporting large page sizes, we should change
the sysctl to be handled as long to not run into sysctl restrictions
in future.

Fixes: ede95a63b5e8 ("bpf: add bpf_jit_limit knob to restrict unpriv allocations")
Reported-by: Sandipan Das &lt;sandipan@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Reported-by: Michael Roth &lt;mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Tested-by: Michael Roth &lt;mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: add bpf_jit_limit knob to restrict unpriv allocations</title>
<updated>2019-08-25T08:50:03Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Daniel Borkmann</name>
<email>daniel@iogearbox.net</email>
</author>
<published>2019-08-16T22:05:36Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:a1fe647042affe713a17243cd10e9b25f3d83948</id>
<content type='text'>
commit ede95a63b5e84ddeea6b0c473b36ab8bfd8c6ce3 upstream.

Rick reported that the BPF JIT could potentially fill the entire module
space with BPF programs from unprivileged users which would prevent later
attempts to load normal kernel modules or privileged BPF programs, for
example. If JIT was enabled but unsuccessful to generate the image, then
before commit 290af86629b2 ("bpf: introduce BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON config")
we would always fall back to the BPF interpreter. Nowadays in the case
where the CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON could be set, then the load will abort
with a failure since the BPF interpreter was compiled out.

Add a global limit and enforce it for unprivileged users such that in case
of BPF interpreter compiled out we fail once the limit has been reached
or we fall back to BPF interpreter earlier w/o using module mem if latter
was compiled in. In a next step, fair share among unprivileged users can
be resolved in particular for the case where we would fail hard once limit
is reached.

Fixes: 290af86629b2 ("bpf: introduce BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON config")
Fixes: 0a14842f5a3c ("net: filter: Just In Time compiler for x86-64")
Co-Developed-by: Rick Edgecombe &lt;rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Eric Dumazet &lt;eric.dumazet@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Jann Horn &lt;jannh@google.com&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: LKML &lt;linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KVM: Fix leak vCPU's VMCS value into other pCPU</title>
<updated>2019-08-16T08:13:57Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Wanpeng Li</name>
<email>wanpengli@tencent.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-08-05T02:03:19Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:90ad23e8c5838166387684ec1b8d4d8f3b9913a6</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 17e433b54393a6269acbcb792da97791fe1592d8 upstream.

After commit d73eb57b80b (KVM: Boost vCPUs that are delivering interrupts), a
five years old bug is exposed. Running ebizzy benchmark in three 80 vCPUs VMs
on one 80 pCPUs Skylake server, a lot of rcu_sched stall warning splatting
in the VMs after stress testing:

 INFO: rcu_sched detected stalls on CPUs/tasks: { 4 41 57 62 77} (detected by 15, t=60004 jiffies, g=899, c=898, q=15073)
 Call Trace:
   flush_tlb_mm_range+0x68/0x140
   tlb_flush_mmu.part.75+0x37/0xe0
   tlb_finish_mmu+0x55/0x60
   zap_page_range+0x142/0x190
   SyS_madvise+0x3cd/0x9c0
   system_call_fastpath+0x1c/0x21

swait_active() sustains to be true before finish_swait() is called in
kvm_vcpu_block(), voluntarily preempted vCPUs are taken into account
by kvm_vcpu_on_spin() loop greatly increases the probability condition
kvm_arch_vcpu_runnable(vcpu) is checked and can be true, when APICv
is enabled the yield-candidate vCPU's VMCS RVI field leaks(by
vmx_sync_pir_to_irr()) into spinning-on-a-taken-lock vCPU's current
VMCS.

This patch fixes it by checking conservatively a subset of events.

Cc: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Radim Krčmář &lt;rkrcmar@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Christian Borntraeger &lt;borntraeger@de.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Marc Zyngier &lt;Marc.Zyngier@arm.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 98f4a1467 (KVM: add kvm_arch_vcpu_runnable() test to kvm_vcpu_on_spin() loop)
Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li &lt;wanpengli@tencent.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: ccp - Add support for valid authsize values less than 16</title>
<updated>2019-08-16T08:13:47Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Gary R Hook</name>
<email>gary.hook@amd.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-07-30T16:05:24Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:cd31e7c5d5c4b6dae2ee3628129077fab5d39834</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 9f00baf74e4b6f79a3a3dfab44fb7bb2e797b551 upstream.

AES GCM encryption allows for authsize values of 4, 8, and 12-16 bytes.
Validate the requested authsize, and retain it to save in the request
context.

Fixes: 36cf515b9bbe2 ("crypto: ccp - Enable support for AES GCM on v5 CCPs")
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Gary R Hook &lt;gary.hook@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
</feed>
