user/sven/linux.git/include/linux, branch v4.9.150

platform-msi: Free descriptors in platform_msi_domain_free()

2019-01-09T15:16:43Z

commit 81b1e6e6a8590a19257e37a1633bec098d499c57 upstream. Since the addition of platform MSI support, there were two helpers supposed to allocate/free IRQs for a device: platform_msi_domain_alloc_irqs() platform_msi_domain_free_irqs() In these helpers, IRQ descriptors are allocated in the "alloc" routine while they are freed in the "free" one. Later, two other helpers have been added to handle IRQ domains on top of MSI domains: platform_msi_domain_alloc() platform_msi_domain_free() Seen from the outside, the logic is pretty close with the former helpers and people used it with the same logic as before: a platform_msi_domain_alloc() call should be balanced with a platform_msi_domain_free() call. While this is probably what was intended to do, the platform_msi_domain_free() does not remove/free the IRQ descriptor(s) created/inserted in platform_msi_domain_alloc(). One effect of such situation is that removing a module that requested an IRQ will let one orphaned IRQ descriptor (with an allocated MSI entry) in the device descriptors list. Next time the module will be inserted back, one will observe that the allocation will happen twice in the MSI domain, one time for the remaining descriptor, one time for the new one. It also has the side effect to quickly overshoot the maximum number of allocated MSI and then prevent any module requesting an interrupt in the same domain to be inserted anymore. This situation has been met with loops of insertion/removal of the mvpp2.ko module (requesting 15 MSIs each time). Fixes: 552c494a7666 ("platform-msi: Allow creation of a MSI-based stacked irq domain") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Miquel Raynal Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

ptr_ring: wrap back ->producer in __ptr_ring_swap_queue()

2019-01-09T15:16:42Z

[ Upstream commit aff6db454599d62191aabc208930e891748e4322 ] __ptr_ring_swap_queue() tries to move pointers from the old ring to the new one, but it forgets to check if ->producer is beyond the new size at the end of the operation. This leads to an out-of-bound access in __ptr_ring_produce() as reported by syzbot. Reported-by: syzbot+8993c0fa96d57c399735@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: 5d49de532002 ("ptr_ring: resize support") Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" Cc: John Fastabend Cc: Jason Wang Signed-off-by: Cong Wang Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

signal: Introduce COMPAT_SIGMINSTKSZ for use in compat_sys_sigaltstack

2018-12-21T13:11:29Z

commit 22839869f21ab3850fbbac9b425ccc4c0023926f upstream. The sigaltstack(2) system call fails with -ENOMEM if the new alternative signal stack is found to be smaller than SIGMINSTKSZ. On architectures such as arm64, where the native value for SIGMINSTKSZ is larger than the compat value, this can result in an unexpected error being reported to a compat task. See, for example: https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=904385 This patch fixes the problem by extending do_sigaltstack to take the minimum signal stack size as an additional parameter, allowing the native and compat system call entry code to pass in their respective values. COMPAT_SIGMINSTKSZ is just defined as SIGMINSTKSZ if it has not been defined by the architecture. Cc: Arnd Bergmann Cc: Dominik Brodowski Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" Cc: Andrew Morton Cc: Al Viro Cc: Oleg Nesterov Reported-by: Steve McIntyre Tested-by: Steve McIntyre <93sam@debian.org> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas [signal: Fix up cherry-pick conflicts for 22839869f21a] Signed-off-by: Steve McIntyre <93sam@debian.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

USB: check usb_get_extra_descriptor for proper size

2018-12-13T08:20:27Z

commit 704620afc70cf47abb9d6a1a57f3825d2bca49cf upstream. When reading an extra descriptor, we need to properly check the minimum and maximum size allowed, to prevent from invalid data being sent by a device. Reported-by: Hui Peng Reported-by: Mathias Payer Co-developed-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Hui Peng Signed-off-by: Mathias Payer Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Cc: stable Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

bpf: Prevent memory disambiguation attack

2018-12-08T12:05:10Z

commit af86ca4e3088fe5eacf2f7e58c01fa68ca067672 upstream. Detect code patterns where malicious 'speculative store bypass' can be used and sanitize such patterns. 39: (bf) r3 = r10 40: (07) r3 += -216 41: (79) r8 = *(u64 *)(r7 +0) // slow read 42: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -72) = 0 // verifier inserts this instruction 43: (7b) *(u64 *)(r8 +0) = r3 // this store becomes slow due to r8 44: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r6 +0) // cpu speculatively executes this load 45: (71) r2 = *(u8 *)(r1 +0) // speculatively arbitrary 'load byte' // is now sanitized Above code after x86 JIT becomes: e5: mov %rbp,%rdx e8: add $0xffffffffffffff28,%rdx ef: mov 0x0(%r13),%r14 f3: movq $0x0,-0x48(%rbp) fb: mov %rdx,0x0(%r14) ff: mov 0x0(%rbx),%rdi 103: movzbq 0x0(%rdi),%rsi Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner [bwh: Backported to 4.9: - Add bpf_verifier_env parameter to check_stack_write() - Look up stack slot_types with state->stack_slot_type[] rather than state->stack[].slot_type[] - Drop bpf_verifier_env argument to verbose() - Adjust context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

libceph: implement CEPHX_V2 calculation mode

2018-12-08T12:05:10Z

commit cc255c76c70f7a87d97939621eae04b600d9f4a1 upstream. Derive the signature from the entire buffer (both AES cipher blocks) instead of using just the first half of the first block, leaving out data_crc entirely. This addresses CVE-2018-1129. Link: http://tracker.ceph.com/issues/24837 Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov Reviewed-by: Sage Weil [bwh: Backported to 4.9: - Define and test the feature bit in the old way - Don't change any other feature bits in ceph_features.h] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

libceph: add authorizer challenge

2018-12-08T12:05:10Z

commit 6daca13d2e72bedaaacfc08f873114c9307d5aea upstream. When a client authenticates with a service, an authorizer is sent with a nonce to the service (ceph_x_authorize_[ab]) and the service responds with a mutation of that nonce (ceph_x_authorize_reply). This lets the client verify the service is who it says it is but it doesn't protect against a replay: someone can trivially capture the exchange and reuse the same authorizer to authenticate themselves. Allow the service to reject an initial authorizer with a random challenge (ceph_x_authorize_challenge). The client then has to respond with an updated authorizer proving they are able to decrypt the service's challenge and that the new authorizer was produced for this specific connection instance. The accepting side requires this challenge and response unconditionally if the client side advertises they have CEPHX_V2 feature bit. This addresses CVE-2018-1128. Link: http://tracker.ceph.com/issues/24836 Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov Reviewed-by: Sage Weil Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

libceph: store ceph_auth_handshake pointer in ceph_connection

2018-12-08T12:05:09Z

commit 262614c4294d33b1f19e0d18c0091d9c329b544a upstream. We already copy authorizer_reply_buf and authorizer_reply_buf_len into ceph_connection. Factoring out __prepare_write_connect() requires two more: authorizer_buf and authorizer_buf_len. Store the pointer to the handshake in con->auth rather than piling on. Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov Reviewed-by: Sage Weil Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

libceph: drop len argument of *verify_authorizer_reply()

2018-12-08T12:05:09Z

commit 0dde584882ade13dc9708d611fbf69b0ae8a9e48 upstream. The length of the reply is protocol-dependent - for cephx it's ceph_x_authorize_reply. Nothing sensible can be passed from the messenger layer anyway. Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov Reviewed-by: Sage Weil Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

reset: remove remaining WARN_ON() in

2018-12-08T12:05:09Z

commit bb6c7768385b200063a14d6615cc1246c3d00760 upstream. Commit bb475230b8e5 ("reset: make optional functions really optional") gave a new meaning to _get_optional variants. The differentiation by WARN_ON() is not needed any more. We already have inconsistency about this; (devm_)reset_control_get_exclusive() has WARN_ON() check, but of_reset_control_get_exclusive() does not. Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada Signed-off-by: Philipp Zabel Cc: Dinh Nguyen Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman