<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>user/sven/linux.git/include/linux, branch v4.9.235</title>
<subtitle>Linux Kernel
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/atom?h=v4.9.235</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/atom?h=v4.9.235'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/'/>
<updated>2020-09-03T09:21:22Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>overflow.h: Add allocation size calculation helpers</title>
<updated>2020-09-03T09:21:22Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>keescook@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2018-05-07T23:47:02Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=676057c7750dcae319e2f3f37bc2ca4e7b14448e'/>
<id>urn:sha1:676057c7750dcae319e2f3f37bc2ca4e7b14448e</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 610b15c50e86eb1e4b77274fabcaea29ac72d6a8 upstream.

In preparation for replacing unchecked overflows for memory allocations,
this creates helpers for the 3 most common calculations:

array_size(a, b): 2-dimensional array
array3_size(a, b, c): 3-dimensional array
struct_size(ptr, member, n): struct followed by n-many trailing members

Each of these return SIZE_MAX on overflow instead of wrapping around.

(Additionally renames a variable named "array_size" to avoid future
collision.)

Co-developed-by: Matthew Wilcox &lt;mawilcox@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>writeback: Avoid skipping inode writeback</title>
<updated>2020-09-03T09:21:21Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Jan Kara</name>
<email>jack@suse.cz</email>
</author>
<published>2020-05-29T13:05:22Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=9228416d338d1acd498c80c0b9e473269d904b75'/>
<id>urn:sha1:9228416d338d1acd498c80c0b9e473269d904b75</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 5afced3bf28100d81fb2fe7e98918632a08feaf5 upstream.

Inode's i_io_list list head is used to attach inode to several different
lists - wb-&gt;{b_dirty, b_dirty_time, b_io, b_more_io}. When flush worker
prepares a list of inodes to writeback e.g. for sync(2), it moves inodes
to b_io list. Thus it is critical for sync(2) data integrity guarantees
that inode is not requeued to any other writeback list when inode is
queued for processing by flush worker. That's the reason why
writeback_single_inode() does not touch i_io_list (unless the inode is
completely clean) and why __mark_inode_dirty() does not touch i_io_list
if I_SYNC flag is set.

However there are two flaws in the current logic:

1) When inode has only I_DIRTY_TIME set but it is already queued in b_io
list due to sync(2), concurrent __mark_inode_dirty(inode, I_DIRTY_SYNC)
can still move inode back to b_dirty list resulting in skipping
writeback of inode time stamps during sync(2).

2) When inode is on b_dirty_time list and writeback_single_inode() races
with __mark_inode_dirty() like:

writeback_single_inode()		__mark_inode_dirty(inode, I_DIRTY_PAGES)
  inode-&gt;i_state |= I_SYNC
  __writeback_single_inode()
					  inode-&gt;i_state |= I_DIRTY_PAGES;
					  if (inode-&gt;i_state &amp; I_SYNC)
					    bail
  if (!(inode-&gt;i_state &amp; I_DIRTY_ALL))
  - not true so nothing done

We end up with I_DIRTY_PAGES inode on b_dirty_time list and thus
standard background writeback will not writeback this inode leading to
possible dirty throttling stalls etc. (thanks to Martijn Coenen for this
analysis).

Fix these problems by tracking whether inode is queued in b_io or
b_more_io lists in a new I_SYNC_QUEUED flag. When this flag is set, we
know flush worker has queued inode and we should not touch i_io_list.
On the other hand we also know that once flush worker is done with the
inode it will requeue the inode to appropriate dirty list. When
I_SYNC_QUEUED is not set, __mark_inode_dirty() can (and must) move inode
to appropriate dirty list.

Reported-by: Martijn Coenen &lt;maco@android.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Martijn Coenen &lt;maco@android.com&gt;
Tested-by: Martijn Coenen &lt;maco@android.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Fixes: 0ae45f63d4ef ("vfs: add support for a lazytime mount option")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>efi: provide empty efi_enter_virtual_mode implementation</title>
<updated>2020-09-03T09:21:19Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Andrey Konovalov</name>
<email>andreyknvl@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-08-07T06:25:01Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=68604a87fbeb910d777309a4450e124c9a12f00e'/>
<id>urn:sha1:68604a87fbeb910d777309a4450e124c9a12f00e</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 2c547f9da0539ad1f7ef7f08c8c82036d61b011a ]

When CONFIG_EFI is not enabled, we might get an undefined reference to
efi_enter_virtual_mode() error, if this efi_enabled() call isn't inlined
into start_kernel().  This happens in particular, if start_kernel() is
annodated with __no_sanitize_address.

Reported-by: kernel test robot &lt;lkp@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov &lt;andreyknvl@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel &lt;ardb@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Alexander Potapenko &lt;glider@google.com&gt;
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin &lt;aryabinin@virtuozzo.com&gt;
Cc: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Cc: Elena Petrova &lt;lenaptr@google.com&gt;
Cc: Marco Elver &lt;elver@google.com&gt;
Cc: Vincenzo Frascino &lt;vincenzo.frascino@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Walter Wu &lt;walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/6514652d3a32d3ed33d6eb5c91d0af63bf0d1a0c.1596544734.git.andreyknvl@google.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mm: Avoid calling build_all_zonelists_init under hotplug context</title>
<updated>2020-08-21T09:02:11Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Oscar Salvador</name>
<email>osalvador@suse.de</email>
</author>
<published>2020-08-18T11:00:46Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=23feab188cb8c1abbd98d18f181287d899d82b22'/>
<id>urn:sha1:23feab188cb8c1abbd98d18f181287d899d82b22</id>
<content type='text'>
Recently a customer of ours experienced a crash when booting the
system while enabling memory-hotplug.

The problem is that Normal zones on different nodes don't get their private
zone-&gt;pageset allocated, and keep sharing the initial boot_pageset.
The sharing between zones is normally safe as explained by the comment for
boot_pageset - it's a percpu structure, and manipulations are done with
disabled interrupts, and boot_pageset is set up in a way that any page placed
on its pcplist is immediately flushed to shared zone's freelist, because
pcp-&gt;high == 1.
However, the hotplug operation updates pcp-&gt;high to a higher value as it
expects to be operating on a private pageset.

The problem is in build_all_zonelists(), which is called when the first range
of pages is onlined for the Normal zone of node X or Y:

	if (system_state == SYSTEM_BOOTING) {
		build_all_zonelists_init();
	} else {
	#ifdef CONFIG_MEMORY_HOTPLUG
		if (zone)
			setup_zone_pageset(zone);
	#endif
		/* we have to stop all cpus to guarantee there is no user
		of zonelist */
		stop_machine(__build_all_zonelists, pgdat, NULL);
		/* cpuset refresh routine should be here */
	}

When called during hotplug, it should execute the setup_zone_pageset(zone)
which allocates the private pageset.
However, with memhp_default_state=online, this happens early while
system_state == SYSTEM_BOOTING is still true, hence this step is skipped.
(and build_all_zonelists_init() is probably unsafe anyway at this point).

Another hotplug operation on the same zone then leads to zone_pcp_update(zone)
called from online_pages(), which updates the pcp-&gt;high for the shared
boot_pageset to a value higher than 1.
At that point, pages freed from Node X and Y Normal zones can end up on the same
pcplist and from there they can be freed to the wrong zone's freelist,
leading to the corruption and crashes.

Please, note that upstream has fixed that differently (and unintentionally) by
adding another boot state (SYSTEM_SCHEDULING), which is set before smp_init().
That should happen before memory hotplug events even with memhp_default_state=online.
Backporting that would be too intrusive.

Signed-off-by: Oscar Salvador &lt;osalvador@suse.de&gt;
Debugged-by: Vlastimil Babka &lt;vbabka@suse.cz&gt;
Acked-by: Michal Hocko &lt;mhocko@suse.com&gt; # for stable trees
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>iommu/vt-d: Enforce PASID devTLB field mask</title>
<updated>2020-08-21T09:02:10Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Liu Yi L</name>
<email>yi.l.liu@intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-07-24T01:49:14Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=b15fa8563e54e6cb7ed9db8e8f006530510e7dca'/>
<id>urn:sha1:b15fa8563e54e6cb7ed9db8e8f006530510e7dca</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 5f77d6ca5ca74e4b4a5e2e010f7ff50c45dea326 ]

Set proper masks to avoid invalid input spillover to reserved bits.

Signed-off-by: Liu Yi L &lt;yi.l.liu@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jacob Pan &lt;jacob.jun.pan@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Lu Baolu &lt;baolu.lu@linux.intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Eric Auger &lt;eric.auger@redhat.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200724014925.15523-2-baolu.lu@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel &lt;jroedel@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tracepoint: Mark __tracepoint_string's __used</title>
<updated>2020-08-21T09:01:56Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Nick Desaulniers</name>
<email>ndesaulniers@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-07-30T22:45:54Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=1c6da5bc56fc898f15b22de8dc983e77b7cb0e4d'/>
<id>urn:sha1:1c6da5bc56fc898f15b22de8dc983e77b7cb0e4d</id>
<content type='text'>
commit f3751ad0116fb6881f2c3c957d66a9327f69cefb upstream.

__tracepoint_string's have their string data stored in .rodata, and an
address to that data stored in the "__tracepoint_str" section. Functions
that refer to those strings refer to the symbol of the address. Compiler
optimization can replace those address references with references
directly to the string data. If the address doesn't appear to have other
uses, then it appears dead to the compiler and is removed. This can
break the /tracing/printk_formats sysfs node which iterates the
addresses stored in the "__tracepoint_str" section.

Like other strings stored in custom sections in this header, mark these
__used to inform the compiler that there are other non-obvious users of
the address, so they should still be emitted.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200730224555.2142154-2-ndesaulniers@google.com

Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Miguel Ojeda &lt;miguel.ojeda.sandonis@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 102c9323c35a8 ("tracing: Add __tracepoint_string() to export string pointers")
Reported-by: Tim Murray &lt;timmurray@google.com&gt;
Reported-by: Simon MacMullen &lt;simonmacm@google.com&gt;
Suggested-by: Greg Hackmann &lt;ghackmann@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Nick Desaulniers &lt;ndesaulniers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xattr: break delegations in {set,remove}xattr</title>
<updated>2020-08-21T09:01:55Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Frank van der Linden</name>
<email>fllinden@amazon.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-06-23T22:39:18Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=419d10aec453598e5ea51dc4282a64502b718294'/>
<id>urn:sha1:419d10aec453598e5ea51dc4282a64502b718294</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 08b5d5014a27e717826999ad20e394a8811aae92 upstream.

set/removexattr on an exported filesystem should break NFS delegations.
This is true in general, but also for the upcoming support for
RFC 8726 (NFSv4 extended attribute support). Make sure that they do.

Additionally, they need to grow a _locked variant, since callers might
call this with i_rwsem held (like the NFS server code).

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.9+
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Frank van der Linden &lt;fllinden@amazon.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever &lt;chuck.lever@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>random32: move the pseudo-random 32-bit definitions to prandom.h</title>
<updated>2020-08-21T09:01:52Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2020-07-31T05:51:14Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=82461648c647e282cb438cfde19d5ec430686ee0'/>
<id>urn:sha1:82461648c647e282cb438cfde19d5ec430686ee0</id>
<content type='text'>
commit c0842fbc1b18c7a044e6ff3e8fa78bfa822c7d1a upstream.

The addition of percpu.h to the list of includes in random.h revealed
some circular dependencies on arm64 and possibly other platforms.  This
include was added solely for the pseudo-random definitions, which have
nothing to do with the rest of the definitions in this file but are
still there for legacy reasons.

This patch moves the pseudo-random parts to linux/prandom.h and the
percpu.h include with it, which is now guarded by _LINUX_PRANDOM_H and
protected against recursive inclusion.

A further cleanup step would be to remove this from &lt;linux/random.h&gt;
entirely, and make people who use the prandom infrastructure include
just the new header file.  That's a bit of a churn patch, but grepping
for "prandom_" and "next_pseudo_random32" "struct rnd_state" should
catch most users.

But it turns out that that nice cleanup step is fairly painful, because
a _lot_ of code currently seems to depend on the implicit include of
&lt;linux/random.h&gt;, which can currently come in a lot of ways, including
such fairly core headfers as &lt;linux/net.h&gt;.

So the "nice cleanup" part may or may never happen.

Fixes: 1c9df907da83 ("random: fix circular include dependency on arm64 after addition of percpu.h")
Tested-by: Guenter Roeck &lt;linux@roeck-us.net&gt;
Acked-by: Willy Tarreau &lt;w@1wt.eu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>random32: remove net_rand_state from the latent entropy gcc plugin</title>
<updated>2020-08-21T09:01:52Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2020-07-30T02:11:00Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=8ce7dd3f42f45ea2900fe18a6ff78cfc4a69e6a4'/>
<id>urn:sha1:8ce7dd3f42f45ea2900fe18a6ff78cfc4a69e6a4</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 83bdc7275e6206f560d247be856bceba3e1ed8f2 upstream.

It turns out that the plugin right now ends up being really unhappy
about the change from 'static' to 'extern' storage that happened in
commit f227e3ec3b5c ("random32: update the net random state on interrupt
and activity").

This is probably a trivial fix for the latent_entropy plugin, but for
now, just remove net_rand_state from the list of things the plugin
worries about.

Reported-by: Stephen Rothwell &lt;sfr@canb.auug.org.au&gt;
Cc: Emese Revfy &lt;re.emese@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Willy Tarreau &lt;w@1wt.eu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>random: fix circular include dependency on arm64 after addition of percpu.h</title>
<updated>2020-08-21T09:01:52Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Willy Tarreau</name>
<email>w@1wt.eu</email>
</author>
<published>2020-07-30T05:59:24Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=746fe4967584d056457fad08aa8a8871746b9a62'/>
<id>urn:sha1:746fe4967584d056457fad08aa8a8871746b9a62</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 1c9df907da83812e4f33b59d3d142c864d9da57f upstream.

Daniel Díaz and Kees Cook independently reported that commit
f227e3ec3b5c ("random32: update the net random state on interrupt and
activity") broke arm64 due to a circular dependency on include files
since the addition of percpu.h in random.h.

The correct fix would definitely be to move all the prandom32 stuff out
of random.h but for backporting, a smaller solution is preferred.

This one replaces linux/percpu.h with asm/percpu.h, and this fixes the
problem on x86_64, arm64, arm, and mips.  Note that moving percpu.h
around didn't change anything and that removing it entirely broke
differently.  When backporting, such options might still be considered
if this patch fails to help.

[ It turns out that an alternate fix seems to be to just remove the
  troublesome &lt;asm/pointer_auth.h&gt; remove from the arm64 &lt;asm/smp.h&gt;
  that causes the circular dependency.

  But we might as well do the whole belt-and-suspenders thing, and
  minimize inclusion in &lt;linux/random.h&gt; too. Either will fix the
  problem, and both are good changes.   - Linus ]

Reported-by: Daniel Díaz &lt;daniel.diaz@linaro.org&gt;
Reported-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Tested-by: Marc Zyngier &lt;maz@kernel.org&gt;
Fixes: f227e3ec3b5c
Cc: Stephen Rothwell &lt;sfr@canb.auug.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau &lt;w@1wt.eu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
</feed>
