<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>user/sven/linux.git/include/linux, branch v4.9.248</title>
<subtitle>Linux Kernel
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/atom?h=v4.9.248</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/atom?h=v4.9.248'/>
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<updated>2020-12-11T12:38:00Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>spi: Introduce device-managed SPI controller allocation</title>
<updated>2020-12-11T12:38:00Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Lukas Wunner</name>
<email>lukas@wunner.de</email>
</author>
<published>2020-12-06T12:46:00Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:0870525cf94bc27907e94ce99afb6d7239ffd2f5</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 5e844cc37a5cbaa460e68f9a989d321d63088a89 ]

SPI driver probing currently comprises two steps, whereas removal
comprises only one step:

    spi_alloc_master()
    spi_register_master()

    spi_unregister_master()

That's because spi_unregister_master() calls device_unregister()
instead of device_del(), thereby releasing the reference on the
spi_master which was obtained by spi_alloc_master().

An SPI driver's private data is contained in the same memory allocation
as the spi_master struct.  Thus, once spi_unregister_master() has been
called, the private data is inaccessible.  But some drivers need to
access it after spi_unregister_master() to perform further teardown
steps.

Introduce devm_spi_alloc_master(), which releases a reference on the
spi_master struct only after the driver has unbound, thereby keeping the
memory allocation accessible.  Change spi_unregister_master() to not
release a reference if the spi_master was allocated by the new devm
function.

The present commit is small enough to be backportable to stable.
It allows fixing drivers which use the private data in their -&gt;remove()
hook after it's been freed.  It also allows fixing drivers which neglect
to release a reference on the spi_master in the probe error path.

Long-term, most SPI drivers shall be moved over to the devm function
introduced herein.  The few that can't shall be changed in a treewide
commit to explicitly release the last reference on the master.
That commit shall amend spi_unregister_master() to no longer release
a reference, thereby completing the migration.

As a result, the behaviour will be less surprising and more consistent
with subsystems such as IIO, which also includes the private data in the
allocation of the generic iio_dev struct, but calls device_del() in
iio_device_unregister().

Signed-off-by: Lukas Wunner &lt;lukas@wunner.de&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/272bae2ef08abd21388c98e23729886663d19192.1605121038.git.lukas@wunner.de
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown &lt;broonie@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tty: Fix -&gt;session locking</title>
<updated>2020-12-11T12:38:00Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Jann Horn</name>
<email>jannh@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-12-03T01:25:05Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:ac28e357fe00902bbc21655eaee6b56c850f80af</id>
<content type='text'>
commit c8bcd9c5be24fb9e6132e97da5a35e55a83e36b9 upstream.

Currently, locking of -&gt;session is very inconsistent; most places
protect it using the legacy tty mutex, but disassociate_ctty(),
__do_SAK(), tiocspgrp() and tiocgsid() don't.
Two of the writers hold the ctrl_lock (because they already need it for
-&gt;pgrp), but __proc_set_tty() doesn't do that yet.

On a PREEMPT=y system, an unprivileged user can theoretically abuse
this broken locking to read 4 bytes of freed memory via TIOCGSID if
tiocgsid() is preempted long enough at the right point. (Other things
might also go wrong, especially if root-only ioctls are involved; I'm
not sure about that.)

Change the locking on -&gt;session such that:

 - tty_lock() is held by all writers: By making disassociate_ctty()
   hold it. This should be fine because the same lock can already be
   taken through the call to tty_vhangup_session().
   The tricky part is that we need to shorten the area covered by
   siglock to be able to take tty_lock() without ugly retry logic; as
   far as I can tell, this should be fine, since nothing in the
   signal_struct is touched in the `if (tty)` branch.
 - ctrl_lock is held by all writers: By changing __proc_set_tty() to
   hold the lock a little longer.
 - All readers that aren't holding tty_lock() hold ctrl_lock: By
   adding locking to tiocgsid() and __do_SAK(), and expanding the area
   covered by ctrl_lock in tiocspgrp().

Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn &lt;jannh@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jiri Slaby &lt;jirislaby@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>vlan: consolidate VLAN parsing code and limit max parsing depth</title>
<updated>2020-12-11T12:37:58Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Toke Høiland-Jørgensen</name>
<email>toke@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-07-07T11:03:25Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:a890a3d3115da196ff25599fe900f34016a4ef49</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 469aceddfa3ed16e17ee30533fae45e90f62efd8 ]

Toshiaki pointed out that we now have two very similar functions to extract
the L3 protocol number in the presence of VLAN tags. And Daniel pointed out
that the unbounded parsing loop makes it possible for maliciously crafted
packets to loop through potentially hundreds of tags.

Fix both of these issues by consolidating the two parsing functions and
limiting the VLAN tag parsing to a max depth of 8 tags. As part of this,
switch over __vlan_get_protocol() to use skb_header_pointer() instead of
pskb_may_pull(), to avoid the possible side effects of the latter and keep
the skb pointer 'const' through all the parsing functions.

v2:
- Use limit of 8 tags instead of 32 (matching XMIT_RECURSION_LIMIT)

Reported-by: Toshiaki Makita &lt;toshiaki.makita1@gmail.com&gt;
Reported-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Fixes: d7bf2ebebc2b ("sched: consistently handle layer3 header accesses in the presence of VLANs")
Signed-off-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen &lt;toke@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>USB: core: add endpoint-blacklist quirk</title>
<updated>2020-12-02T07:31:29Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Johan Hovold</name>
<email>johan@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2020-02-03T15:38:28Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:c795e16801aa97668f41a1354632903da5ba3c72</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 73f8bda9b5dc1c69df2bc55c0cbb24461a6391a9 upstream

Add a new device quirk that can be used to blacklist endpoints.

Since commit 3e4f8e21c4f2 ("USB: core: fix check for duplicate
endpoints") USB core ignores any duplicate endpoints found during
descriptor parsing.

In order to handle devices where the first interfaces with duplicate
endpoints are the ones that should have their endpoints ignored, we need
to add a blacklist.

Tested-by: edes &lt;edes@gmx.net&gt;
Cc: stable &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold &lt;johan@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200203153830.26394-2-johan@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
[sudip: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Sudip Mukherjee &lt;sudipm.mukherjee@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>perf/core: Fix bad use of igrab()</title>
<updated>2020-11-18T17:26:29Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Song Liu</name>
<email>songliubraving@fb.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-04-18T06:29:07Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:51f0471b12817e576e42ecea027177798a968db4</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 9511bce9fe8e5e6c0f923c09243a713eba560141 upstream

As Miklos reported and suggested:

 "This pattern repeats two times in trace_uprobe.c and in
  kernel/events/core.c as well:

      ret = kern_path(filename, LOOKUP_FOLLOW, &amp;path);
      if (ret)
          goto fail_address_parse;

      inode = igrab(d_inode(path.dentry));
      path_put(&amp;path);

  And it's wrong.  You can only hold a reference to the inode if you
  have an active ref to the superblock as well (which is normally
  through path.mnt) or holding s_umount.

  This way unmounting the containing filesystem while the tracepoint is
  active will give you the "VFS: Busy inodes after unmount..." message
  and a crash when the inode is finally put.

  Solution: store path instead of inode."

This patch fixes the issue in kernel/event/core.c.

Reviewed-and-tested-by: Alexander Shishkin &lt;alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com&gt;
Reported-by: Miklos Szeredi &lt;miklos@szeredi.hu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Song Liu &lt;songliubraving@fb.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: &lt;kernel-team@fb.com&gt;
Cc: Alexander Shishkin &lt;alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo &lt;acme@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Jiri Olsa &lt;jolsa@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Stephane Eranian &lt;eranian@google.com&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Vince Weaver &lt;vincent.weaver@maine.edu&gt;
Fixes: 375637bc5249 ("perf/core: Introduce address range filtering")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180418062907.3210386-2-songliubraving@fb.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
[sudip: Backported to 4.9: use file_inode()]
Signed-off-by: Sudip Mukherjee &lt;sudipm.mukherjee@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>random32: make prandom_u32() output unpredictable</title>
<updated>2020-11-18T17:26:29Z</updated>
<author>
<name>George Spelvin</name>
<email>lkml@sdf.org</email>
</author>
<published>2020-08-09T06:57:44Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=29da3bb1a848abdcadc2cbec68787c4c81671341'/>
<id>urn:sha1:29da3bb1a848abdcadc2cbec68787c4c81671341</id>
<content type='text'>
commit c51f8f88d705e06bd696d7510aff22b33eb8e638 upstream.

Non-cryptographic PRNGs may have great statistical properties, but
are usually trivially predictable to someone who knows the algorithm,
given a small sample of their output.  An LFSR like prandom_u32() is
particularly simple, even if the sample is widely scattered bits.

It turns out the network stack uses prandom_u32() for some things like
random port numbers which it would prefer are *not* trivially predictable.
Predictability led to a practical DNS spoofing attack.  Oops.

This patch replaces the LFSR with a homebrew cryptographic PRNG based
on the SipHash round function, which is in turn seeded with 128 bits
of strong random key.  (The authors of SipHash have *not* been consulted
about this abuse of their algorithm.)  Speed is prioritized over security;
attacks are rare, while performance is always wanted.

Replacing all callers of prandom_u32() is the quick fix.
Whether to reinstate a weaker PRNG for uses which can tolerate it
is an open question.

Commit f227e3ec3b5c ("random32: update the net random state on interrupt
and activity") was an earlier attempt at a solution.  This patch replaces
it.

Reported-by: Amit Klein &lt;aksecurity@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Willy Tarreau &lt;w@1wt.eu&gt;
Cc: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" &lt;Jason@zx2c4.com&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: tytso@mit.edu
Cc: Florian Westphal &lt;fw@strlen.de&gt;
Cc: Marc Plumb &lt;lkml.mplumb@gmail.com&gt;
Fixes: f227e3ec3b5c ("random32: update the net random state on interrupt and activity")
Signed-off-by: George Spelvin &lt;lkml@sdf.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20200808152628.GA27941@SDF.ORG/
[ willy: partial reversal of f227e3ec3b5c; moved SIPROUND definitions
  to prandom.h for later use; merged George's prandom_seed() proposal;
  inlined siprand_u32(); replaced the net_rand_state[] array with 4
  members to fix a build issue; cosmetic cleanups to make checkpatch
  happy; fixed RANDOM32_SELFTEST build ]
[wt: backported to 4.9 -- various context adjustments; timer API change]
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau &lt;w@1wt.eu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>can: can_create_echo_skb(): fix echo skb generation: always use skb_clone()</title>
<updated>2020-11-18T17:26:24Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Oleksij Rempel</name>
<email>o.rempel@pengutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2019-12-18T08:39:02Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=919d9b622c896f8fac21faa125c4bcbceca8ddf2'/>
<id>urn:sha1:919d9b622c896f8fac21faa125c4bcbceca8ddf2</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 286228d382ba6320f04fa2e7c6fc8d4d92e428f4 ]

All user space generated SKBs are owned by a socket (unless injected into the
key via AF_PACKET). If a socket is closed, all associated skbs will be cleaned
up.

This leads to a problem when a CAN driver calls can_put_echo_skb() on a
unshared SKB. If the socket is closed prior to the TX complete handler,
can_get_echo_skb() and the subsequent delivering of the echo SKB to all
registered callbacks, a SKB with a refcount of 0 is delivered.

To avoid the problem, in can_get_echo_skb() the original SKB is now always
cloned, regardless of shared SKB or not. If the process exists it can now
safely discard its SKBs, without disturbing the delivery of the echo SKB.

The problem shows up in the j1939 stack, when it clones the incoming skb, which
detects the already 0 refcount.

We can easily reproduce this with following example:

testj1939 -B -r can0: &amp;
cansend can0 1823ff40#0123

WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 293 at lib/refcount.c:25 refcount_warn_saturate+0x108/0x174
refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free.
Modules linked in: coda_vpu imx_vdoa videobuf2_vmalloc dw_hdmi_ahb_audio vcan
CPU: 0 PID: 293 Comm: cansend Not tainted 5.5.0-rc6-00376-g9e20dcb7040d #1
Hardware name: Freescale i.MX6 Quad/DualLite (Device Tree)
Backtrace:
[&lt;c010f570&gt;] (dump_backtrace) from [&lt;c010f90c&gt;] (show_stack+0x20/0x24)
[&lt;c010f8ec&gt;] (show_stack) from [&lt;c0c3e1a4&gt;] (dump_stack+0x8c/0xa0)
[&lt;c0c3e118&gt;] (dump_stack) from [&lt;c0127fec&gt;] (__warn+0xe0/0x108)
[&lt;c0127f0c&gt;] (__warn) from [&lt;c01283c8&gt;] (warn_slowpath_fmt+0xa8/0xcc)
[&lt;c0128324&gt;] (warn_slowpath_fmt) from [&lt;c0539c0c&gt;] (refcount_warn_saturate+0x108/0x174)
[&lt;c0539b04&gt;] (refcount_warn_saturate) from [&lt;c0ad2cac&gt;] (j1939_can_recv+0x20c/0x210)
[&lt;c0ad2aa0&gt;] (j1939_can_recv) from [&lt;c0ac9dc8&gt;] (can_rcv_filter+0xb4/0x268)
[&lt;c0ac9d14&gt;] (can_rcv_filter) from [&lt;c0aca2cc&gt;] (can_receive+0xb0/0xe4)
[&lt;c0aca21c&gt;] (can_receive) from [&lt;c0aca348&gt;] (can_rcv+0x48/0x98)
[&lt;c0aca300&gt;] (can_rcv) from [&lt;c09b1fdc&gt;] (__netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x64/0x88)
[&lt;c09b1f78&gt;] (__netif_receive_skb_one_core) from [&lt;c09b2070&gt;] (__netif_receive_skb+0x38/0x94)
[&lt;c09b2038&gt;] (__netif_receive_skb) from [&lt;c09b2130&gt;] (netif_receive_skb_internal+0x64/0xf8)
[&lt;c09b20cc&gt;] (netif_receive_skb_internal) from [&lt;c09b21f8&gt;] (netif_receive_skb+0x34/0x19c)
[&lt;c09b21c4&gt;] (netif_receive_skb) from [&lt;c0791278&gt;] (can_rx_offload_napi_poll+0x58/0xb4)

Fixes: 0ae89beb283a ("can: add destructor for self generated skbs")
Signed-off-by: Oleksij Rempel &lt;o.rempel@pengutronix.de&gt;
Link: http://lore.kernel.org/r/20200124132656.22156-1-o.rempel@pengutronix.de
Acked-by: Oliver Hartkopp &lt;socketcan@hartkopp.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde &lt;mkl@pengutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>time: Prevent undefined behaviour in timespec64_to_ns()</title>
<updated>2020-11-18T17:26:23Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Zeng Tao</name>
<email>prime.zeng@hisilicon.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-09-01T09:30:13Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=6e12733ef63c3f5be2a4f378eddfddfd82b622cf'/>
<id>urn:sha1:6e12733ef63c3f5be2a4f378eddfddfd82b622cf</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit cb47755725da7b90fecbb2aa82ac3b24a7adb89b ]

UBSAN reports:

Undefined behaviour in ./include/linux/time64.h:127:27
signed integer overflow:
17179869187 * 1000000000 cannot be represented in type 'long long int'
Call Trace:
 timespec64_to_ns include/linux/time64.h:127 [inline]
 set_cpu_itimer+0x65c/0x880 kernel/time/itimer.c:180
 do_setitimer+0x8e/0x740 kernel/time/itimer.c:245
 __x64_sys_setitimer+0x14c/0x2c0 kernel/time/itimer.c:336
 do_syscall_64+0xa1/0x540 arch/x86/entry/common.c:295

Commit bd40a175769d ("y2038: itimer: change implementation to timespec64")
replaced the original conversion which handled time clamping correctly with
timespec64_to_ns() which has no overflow protection.

Fix it in timespec64_to_ns() as this is not necessarily limited to the
usage in itimers.

[ tglx: Added comment and adjusted the fixes tag ]

Fixes: 361a3bf00582 ("time64: Add time64.h header and define struct timespec64")
Signed-off-by: Zeng Tao &lt;prime.zeng@hisilicon.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1598952616-6416-1-git-send-email-prime.zeng@hisilicon.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>hil/parisc: Disable HIL driver when it gets stuck</title>
<updated>2020-11-10T09:24:00Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Helge Deller</name>
<email>deller@gmx.de</email>
</author>
<published>2020-10-19T14:57:50Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=f7ef2b3c9fd109824e9a6c35fa947f873607dbc9'/>
<id>urn:sha1:f7ef2b3c9fd109824e9a6c35fa947f873607dbc9</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 879bc2d27904354b98ca295b6168718e045c4aa2 upstream.

When starting a HP machine with HIL driver but without an HIL keyboard
or HIL mouse attached, it may happen that data written to the HIL loop
gets stuck (e.g. because the transaction queue is full).  Usually one
will then have to reboot the machine because all you see is and endless
output of:
 Transaction add failed: transaction already queued?

In the higher layers hp_sdc_enqueue_transaction() is called to queued up
a HIL packet. This function returns an error code, and this patch adds
the necessary checks for this return code and disables the HIL driver if
further packets can't be sent.

Tested on a HP 730 and a HP 715/64 machine.

Signed-off-by: Helge Deller &lt;deller@gmx.de&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fscrypto: move ioctl processing more fully into common code</title>
<updated>2020-11-10T09:23:51Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
<email>ebiggers@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-11-27T00:07:49Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=3326d00ca023c346802ab6cda899e53b2ff4b108'/>
<id>urn:sha1:3326d00ca023c346802ab6cda899e53b2ff4b108</id>
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commit db717d8e26c2d1b0dba3e08668a1e6a7f665adde upstream.

Multiple bugs were recently fixed in the "set encryption policy" ioctl.
To make it clear that fscrypt_process_policy() and fscrypt_get_policy()
implement ioctls and therefore their implementations must take standard
security and correctness precautions, rename them to
fscrypt_ioctl_set_policy() and fscrypt_ioctl_get_policy().  Make the
latter take in a struct file * to make it consistent with the former.

Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;


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