<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>user/sven/linux.git/include/linux, branch v5.10.82</title>
<subtitle>Linux Kernel
</subtitle>
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<updated>2021-11-26T09:39:22Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>Revert "perf: Rework perf_event_exit_event()"</title>
<updated>2021-11-26T09:39:22Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Sasha Levin</name>
<email>sashal@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2021-11-25T00:18:11Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:d35250ec5a23771187c85a46e6812d5943b5c13e</id>
<content type='text'>
This reverts commit 94902ee2996a7f71471138093495df452dab87b6 which is
upstream commit ef54c1a476aef7eef26fe13ea10dc090952c00f8.

Reverting for now due to issues that need to get fixed upstream.

Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fs: export an inode_update_time helper</title>
<updated>2021-11-26T09:39:22Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Josef Bacik</name>
<email>josef@toxicpanda.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-10-14T17:11:00Z</published>
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<content type='text'>
commit e60feb445fce9e51c1558a6aa7faf9dd5ded533b upstream.

If you already have an inode and need to update the time on the inode
there is no way to do this properly.  Export this helper to allow file
systems to update time on the inode so the appropriate handler is
called, either -&gt;update_time or generic_update_time.

Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik &lt;josef@toxicpanda.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: virtio_net_hdr_to_skb: count transport header in UFO</title>
<updated>2021-11-26T09:39:16Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Jonathan Davies</name>
<email>jonathan.davies@nutanix.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-11-16T17:42:42Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:8e6bae950da9dc2d2c6c18b1c6b206dc00dc8772</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit cf9acc90c80ecbee00334aa85d92f4e74014bcff ]

virtio_net_hdr_to_skb does not set the skb's gso_size and gso_type
correctly for UFO packets received via virtio-net that are a little over
the GSO size. This can lead to problems elsewhere in the networking
stack, e.g. ovs_vport_send dropping over-sized packets if gso_size is
not set.

This is due to the comparison

  if (skb-&gt;len - p_off &gt; gso_size)

not properly accounting for the transport layer header.

p_off includes the size of the transport layer header (thlen), so
skb-&gt;len - p_off is the size of the TCP/UDP payload.

gso_size is read from the virtio-net header. For UFO, fragmentation
happens at the IP level so does not need to include the UDP header.

Hence the calculation could be comparing a TCP/UDP payload length with
an IP payload length, causing legitimate virtio-net packets to have
lack gso_type/gso_size information.

Example: a UDP packet with payload size 1473 has IP payload size 1481.
If the guest used UFO, it is not fragmented and the virtio-net header's
flags indicate that it is a GSO frame (VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_UDP), with
gso_size = 1480 for an MTU of 1500.  skb-&gt;len will be 1515 and p_off
will be 42, so skb-&gt;len - p_off = 1473.  Hence the comparison fails, and
shinfo-&gt;gso_size and gso_type are not set as they should be.

Instead, add the UDP header length before comparing to gso_size when
using UFO. In this way, it is the size of the IP payload that is
compared to gso_size.

Fixes: 6dd912f82680 ("net: check untrusted gso_size at kernel entry")
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Davies &lt;jonathan.davies@nutanix.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn &lt;willemb@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tracing: Add length protection to histogram string copies</title>
<updated>2021-11-26T09:39:14Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Steven Rostedt (VMware)</name>
<email>rostedt@goodmis.org</email>
</author>
<published>2021-11-14T18:28:34Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:3984876f91a3da423fa27c3f48b568a58f4a65d8</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 938aa33f14657c9ed9deea348b7d6f14b6d69cb7 ]

The string copies to the histogram storage has a max size of 256 bytes
(defined by MAX_FILTER_STR_VAL). Only the string size of the event field
needs to be copied to the event storage, but no more than what is in the
event storage. Although nothing should be bigger than 256 bytes, there's
no protection against overwriting of the storage if one day there is.

Copy no more than the destination size, and enforce it.

Also had to turn MAX_FILTER_STR_VAL into an unsigned int, to keep the
min() comparison of the string sizes of comparable types.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAHk-=wjREUihCGrtRBwfX47y_KrLCGjiq3t6QtoNJpmVrAEb1w@mail.gmail.com/
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211114132834.183429a4@rorschach.local.home

Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Tom Zanussi &lt;zanussi@kernel.org&gt;
Reported-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu &lt;mhiramat@kernel.org&gt;
Fixes: 63f84ae6b82b ("tracing/histogram: Do not copy the fixed-size char array field over the field size")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bus: ti-sysc: Add quirk handling for reinit on context lost</title>
<updated>2021-11-26T09:39:08Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Tony Lindgren</name>
<email>tony@atomide.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-09-21T09:42:25Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:5eca1c8412f40dd798c28549cd4c032217ad2faf</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 9d881361206ebcf6285c2ec2ef275aff80875347 ]

Some interconnect target modules such as otg and gpmc on am335x need a
re-init after resume. As we also have PM runtime cases where the context
may be lost, let's handle these all with cpu_pm.

For the am335x resume path, we already have cpu_pm_resume() call
cpu_pm_cluster_exit().

Signed-off-by: Tony Lindgren &lt;tony@atomide.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>PCI/MSI: Deal with devices lying about their MSI mask capability</title>
<updated>2021-11-21T12:46:36Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Marc Zyngier</name>
<email>maz@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2021-11-04T18:01:29Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:f28c620e1ac1b7312519516217240556193c2618</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 2226667a145db2e1f314d7f57fd644fe69863ab9 upstream.

It appears that some devices are lying about their mask capability,
pretending that they don't have it, while they actually do.
The net result is that now that we don't enable MSIs on such
endpoint.

Add a new per-device flag to deal with this. Further patches will
make use of it, sadly.

Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier &lt;maz@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211104180130.3825416-2-maz@kernel.org
Cc: Bjorn Helgaas &lt;helgaas@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>block: Add a helper to validate the block size</title>
<updated>2021-11-21T12:46:35Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Xie Yongji</name>
<email>xieyongji@bytedance.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-10-26T14:40:12Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:79ff56c613c193744d6be77d4c50a7ae22d6dd01</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 570b1cac477643cbf01a45fa5d018430a1fddbce upstream.

There are some duplicated codes to validate the block
size in block drivers. This limitation actually comes
from block layer, so this patch tries to add a new block
layer helper for that.

Signed-off-by: Xie Yongji &lt;xieyongji@bytedance.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211026144015.188-2-xieyongji@bytedance.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@kernel.dk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Tadeusz Struk &lt;tadeusz.struk@linaro.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>arch/cc: Introduce a function to check for confidential computing features</title>
<updated>2021-11-18T13:04:32Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Tom Lendacky</name>
<email>thomas.lendacky@amd.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-09-08T22:58:33Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:74ba917cfdddbb6b1ad9c2fc4833bf1f810b27f9</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 46b49b12f3fc5e1347dba37d4639e2165f447871 upstream.

In preparation for other confidential computing technologies, introduce
a generic helper function, cc_platform_has(), that can be used to
check for specific active confidential computing attributes, like
memory encryption. This is intended to eliminate having to add multiple
technology-specific checks to the code (e.g. if (sev_active() ||
tdx_active() || ... ).

 [ bp: s/_CC_PLATFORM_H/_LINUX_CC_PLATFORM_H/g ]

Co-developed-by: Andi Kleen &lt;ak@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen &lt;ak@linux.intel.com&gt;
Co-developed-by: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan &lt;sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan &lt;sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky &lt;thomas.lendacky@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210928191009.32551-3-bp@alien8.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>posix-cpu-timers: Clear task::posix_cputimers_work in copy_process()</title>
<updated>2021-11-18T13:04:29Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Michael Pratt</name>
<email>mpratt@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-11-01T21:06:15Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:f67f6eb717ae6277ddd6c1685b0e85ef17420096</id>
<content type='text'>
commit ca7752caeaa70bd31d1714af566c9809688544af upstream.

copy_process currently copies task_struct.posix_cputimers_work as-is. If a
timer interrupt arrives while handling clone and before dup_task_struct
completes then the child task will have:

1. posix_cputimers_work.scheduled = true
2. posix_cputimers_work.work queued.

copy_process clears task_struct.task_works, so (2) will have no effect and
posix_cpu_timers_work will never run (not to mention it doesn't make sense
for two tasks to share a common linked list).

Since posix_cpu_timers_work never runs, posix_cputimers_work.scheduled is
never cleared. Since scheduled is set, future timer interrupts will skip
scheduling work, with the ultimate result that the task will never receive
timer expirations.

Together, the complete flow is:

1. Task 1 calls clone(), enters kernel.
2. Timer interrupt fires, schedules task work on Task 1.
   2a. task_struct.posix_cputimers_work.scheduled = true
   2b. task_struct.posix_cputimers_work.work added to
       task_struct.task_works.
3. dup_task_struct() copies Task 1 to Task 2.
4. copy_process() clears task_struct.task_works for Task 2.
5. Future timer interrupts on Task 2 see
   task_struct.posix_cputimers_work.scheduled = true and skip scheduling
   work.

Fix this by explicitly clearing contents of task_struct.posix_cputimers_work
in copy_process(). This was never meant to be shared or inherited across
tasks in the first place.

Fixes: 1fb497dd0030 ("posix-cpu-timers: Provide mechanisms to defer timer handling to task_work")
Reported-by: Rhys Hiltner &lt;rhys@justin.tv&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michael Pratt &lt;mpratt@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211101210615.716522-1-mpratt@google.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>seq_file: fix passing wrong private data</title>
<updated>2021-11-18T13:04:27Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Muchun Song</name>
<email>songmuchun@bytedance.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-11-09T02:35:19Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:b5703462a42805cb1a9611a7e0b421343e67ffda</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 10a6de19cad6efb9b49883513afb810dc265fca2 ]

DEFINE_PROC_SHOW_ATTRIBUTE() is supposed to be used to define a series
of functions and variables to register proc file easily. And the users
can use proc_create_data() to pass their own private data and get it
via seq-&gt;private in the callback. Unfortunately, the proc file system
use PDE_DATA() to get private data instead of inode-&gt;i_private. So fix
it. Fortunately, there only one user of it which does not pass any
private data, so this bug does not break any in-tree codes.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211029032638.84884-1-songmuchun@bytedance.com
Fixes: 97a32539b956 ("proc: convert everything to "struct proc_ops"")
Signed-off-by: Muchun Song &lt;songmuchun@bytedance.com&gt;
Cc: Andy Shevchenko &lt;andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Stephen Rothwell &lt;sfr@canb.auug.org.au&gt;
Cc: Florent Revest &lt;revest@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan &lt;adobriyan@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Christian Brauner &lt;christian.brauner@ubuntu.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
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