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<title>user/sven/linux.git/include/linux, branch v5.4.90</title>
<subtitle>Linux Kernel
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/atom?h=v5.4.90</id>
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<updated>2021-01-12T19:16:10Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>proc: fix lookup in /proc/net subdirectories after setns(2)</title>
<updated>2021-01-12T19:16:10Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Alexey Dobriyan</name>
<email>adobriyan@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-12-16T04:42:39Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=9ea03f6890ceee39f03655814097c8933a22725d'/>
<id>urn:sha1:9ea03f6890ceee39f03655814097c8933a22725d</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit c6c75deda81344c3a95d1d1f606d5cee109e5d54 ]

Commit 1fde6f21d90f ("proc: fix /proc/net/* after setns(2)") only forced
revalidation of regular files under /proc/net/

However, /proc/net/ is unusual in the sense of /proc/net/foo handlers
take netns pointer from parent directory which is old netns.

Steps to reproduce:

	(void)open("/proc/net/sctp/snmp", O_RDONLY);
	unshare(CLONE_NEWNET);

	int fd = open("/proc/net/sctp/snmp", O_RDONLY);
	read(fd, &amp;c, 1);

Read will read wrong data from original netns.

Patch forces lookup on every directory under /proc/net .

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201205160916.GA109739@localhost.localdomain
Fixes: 1da4d377f943 ("proc: revalidate misc dentries")
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan &lt;adobriyan@gmail.com&gt;
Reported-by: "Rantala, Tommi T. (Nokia - FI/Espoo)" &lt;tommi.t.rantala@nokia.com&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>exec: Transform exec_update_mutex into a rw_semaphore</title>
<updated>2021-01-09T12:44:55Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric W. Biederman</name>
<email>ebiederm@xmission.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-12-03T20:12:00Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:117433236ae296d9770442960ddf57459177e90e</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit f7cfd871ae0c5008d94b6f66834e7845caa93c15 ]

Recently syzbot reported[0] that there is a deadlock amongst the users
of exec_update_mutex.  The problematic lock ordering found by lockdep
was:

   perf_event_open  (exec_update_mutex -&gt; ovl_i_mutex)
   chown            (ovl_i_mutex       -&gt; sb_writes)
   sendfile         (sb_writes         -&gt; p-&gt;lock)
     by reading from a proc file and writing to overlayfs
   proc_pid_syscall (p-&gt;lock           -&gt; exec_update_mutex)

While looking at possible solutions it occured to me that all of the
users and possible users involved only wanted to state of the given
process to remain the same.  They are all readers.  The only writer is
exec.

There is no reason for readers to block on each other.  So fix
this deadlock by transforming exec_update_mutex into a rw_semaphore
named exec_update_lock that only exec takes for writing.

Cc: Jann Horn &lt;jannh@google.com&gt;
Cc: Vasiliy Kulikov &lt;segoon@openwall.com&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Bernd Edlinger &lt;bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de&gt;
Cc: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Christopher Yeoh &lt;cyeoh@au1.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov &lt;gorcunov@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Sargun Dhillon &lt;sargun@sargun.me&gt;
Cc: Christian Brauner &lt;christian.brauner@ubuntu.com&gt;
Cc: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo &lt;acme@kernel.org&gt;
Fixes: eea9673250db ("exec: Add exec_update_mutex to replace cred_guard_mutex")
[0] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/00000000000063640c05ade8e3de@google.com
Reported-by: syzbot+db9cdf3dd1f64252c6ef@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/87ft4mbqen.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>rwsem: Implement down_read_interruptible</title>
<updated>2021-01-09T12:44:55Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric W. Biederman</name>
<email>ebiederm@xmission.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-12-03T20:11:13Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:d390fc97df62dd76770eeab53f78e8ce2a07113d</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 31784cff7ee073b34d6eddabb95e3be2880a425c ]

In preparation for converting exec_update_mutex to a rwsem so that
multiple readers can execute in parallel and not deadlock, add
down_read_interruptible.  This is needed for perf_event_open to be
converted (with no semantic changes) from working on a mutex to
wroking on a rwsem.

Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/87k0tybqfy.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>rwsem: Implement down_read_killable_nested</title>
<updated>2021-01-09T12:44:55Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric W. Biederman</name>
<email>ebiederm@xmission.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-12-03T20:10:32Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:1b75a263fbd95f7e03af23921eb3f32086db66f1</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 0f9368b5bf6db0c04afc5454b1be79022a681615 ]

In preparation for converting exec_update_mutex to a rwsem so that
multiple readers can execute in parallel and not deadlock, add
down_read_killable_nested.  This is needed so that kcmp_lock
can be converted from working on a mutexes to working on rw_semaphores.

Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/87o8jabqh3.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>kdev_t: always inline major/minor helper functions</title>
<updated>2021-01-09T12:44:54Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Josh Poimboeuf</name>
<email>jpoimboe@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-12-29T23:14:55Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:7a736f41013e8fa53629ac04f3528ef897e36e95</id>
<content type='text'>
commit aa8c7db494d0a83ecae583aa193f1134ef25d506 upstream.

Silly GCC doesn't always inline these trivial functions.

Fixes the following warning:

  arch/x86/kernel/sys_ia32.o: warning: objtool: cp_stat64()+0xd8: call to new_encode_dev() with UACCESS enabled

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/984353b44a4484d86ba9f73884b7306232e25e30.1608737428.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@redhat.com&gt;
Reported-by: Randy Dunlap &lt;rdunlap@infradead.org&gt;
Acked-by: Randy Dunlap &lt;rdunlap@infradead.org&gt;	[build-tested]
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>of: fix linker-section match-table corruption</title>
<updated>2021-01-06T13:48:37Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Johan Hovold</name>
<email>johan@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2020-11-23T10:23:12Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=8ddf02859c691d6e37fe2ca878750fb8f293ea16'/>
<id>urn:sha1:8ddf02859c691d6e37fe2ca878750fb8f293ea16</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 5812b32e01c6d86ba7a84110702b46d8a8531fe9 upstream.

Specify type alignment when declaring linker-section match-table entries
to prevent gcc from increasing alignment and corrupting the various
tables with padding (e.g. timers, irqchips, clocks, reserved memory).

This is specifically needed on x86 where gcc (typically) aligns larger
objects like struct of_device_id with static extent on 32-byte
boundaries which at best prevents matching on anything but the first
entry. Specifying alignment when declaring variables suppresses this
optimisation.

Here's a 64-bit example where all entries are corrupt as 16 bytes of
padding has been inserted before the first entry:

	ffffffff8266b4b0 D __clk_of_table
	ffffffff8266b4c0 d __of_table_fixed_factor_clk
	ffffffff8266b5a0 d __of_table_fixed_clk
	ffffffff8266b680 d __clk_of_table_sentinel

And here's a 32-bit example where the 8-byte-aligned table happens to be
placed on a 32-byte boundary so that all but the first entry are corrupt
due to the 28 bytes of padding inserted between entries:

	812b3ec0 D __irqchip_of_table
	812b3ec0 d __of_table_irqchip1
	812b3fa0 d __of_table_irqchip2
	812b4080 d __of_table_irqchip3
	812b4160 d irqchip_of_match_end

Verified on x86 using gcc-9.3 and gcc-4.9 (which uses 64-byte
alignment), and on arm using gcc-7.2.

Note that there are no in-tree users of these tables on x86 currently
(even if they are included in the image).

Fixes: 54196ccbe0ba ("of: consolidate linker section OF match table declarations")
Fixes: f6e916b82022 ("irqchip: add basic infrastructure")
Cc: stable &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;     # 3.9
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold &lt;johan@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201123102319.8090-2-johan@kernel.org
[ johan: adjust context to 5.4 ]
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold &lt;johan@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fscrypt: add fscrypt_is_nokey_name()</title>
<updated>2021-01-06T13:48:35Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
<email>ebiggers@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-12-28T18:54:30Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:34f000524d3327283d3cdf6437f289bc1f172a87</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 159e1de201b6fca10bfec50405a3b53a561096a8 upstream.

It's possible to create a duplicate filename in an encrypted directory
by creating a file concurrently with adding the encryption key.

Specifically, sys_open(O_CREAT) (or sys_mkdir(), sys_mknod(), or
sys_symlink()) can lookup the target filename while the directory's
encryption key hasn't been added yet, resulting in a negative no-key
dentry.  The VFS then calls -&gt;create() (or -&gt;mkdir(), -&gt;mknod(), or
-&gt;symlink()) because the dentry is negative.  Normally, -&gt;create() would
return -ENOKEY due to the directory's key being unavailable.  However,
if the key was added between the dentry lookup and -&gt;create(), then the
filesystem will go ahead and try to create the file.

If the target filename happens to already exist as a normal name (not a
no-key name), a duplicate filename may be added to the directory.

In order to fix this, we need to fix the filesystems to prevent
-&gt;create(), -&gt;mkdir(), -&gt;mknod(), and -&gt;symlink() on no-key names.
(-&gt;rename() and -&gt;link() need it too, but those are already handled
correctly by fscrypt_prepare_rename() and fscrypt_prepare_link().)

In preparation for this, add a helper function fscrypt_is_nokey_name()
that filesystems can use to do this check.  Use this helper function for
the existing checks that fs/crypto/ does for rename and link.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201118075609.120337-2-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fix namespaced fscaps when !CONFIG_SECURITY</title>
<updated>2020-12-30T10:51:30Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Serge Hallyn</name>
<email>shallyn@cisco.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-11-16T03:55:31Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:b8dfee2345813128328d2e47db70497b4b64aa07</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit ed9b25d1970a4787ac6a39c2091e63b127ecbfc1 ]

Namespaced file capabilities were introduced in 8db6c34f1dbc .
When userspace reads an xattr for a namespaced capability, a
virtualized representation of it is returned if the caller is
in a user namespace owned by the capability's owning rootid.
The function which performs this virtualization was not hooked
up if CONFIG_SECURITY=n.  Therefore in that case the original
xattr was shown instead of the virtualized one.

To test this using libcap-bin (*1),

$ v=$(mktemp)
$ unshare -Ur setcap cap_sys_admin-eip $v
$ unshare -Ur setcap -v cap_sys_admin-eip $v
/tmp/tmp.lSiIFRvt8Y: OK

"setcap -v" verifies the values instead of setting them, and
will check whether the rootid value is set.  Therefore, with
this bug un-fixed, and with CONFIG_SECURITY=n, setcap -v will
fail:

$ v=$(mktemp)
$ unshare -Ur setcap cap_sys_admin=eip $v
$ unshare -Ur setcap -v cap_sys_admin=eip $v
nsowner[got=1000, want=0],/tmp/tmp.HHDiOOl9fY differs in []

Fix this bug by calling cap_inode_getsecurity() in
security_inode_getsecurity() instead of returning
-EOPNOTSUPP, when CONFIG_SECURITY=n.

*1 - note, if libcap is too old for getcap to have the '-n'
option, then use verify-caps instead.

Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=209689
Cc: Hervé Guillemet &lt;herve@guillemet.org&gt;
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn &lt;shallyn@cisco.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew G. Morgan &lt;morgan@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;jamorris@linux.microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>seq_buf: Avoid type mismatch for seq_buf_init</title>
<updated>2020-12-30T10:51:21Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Arnd Bergmann</name>
<email>arnd@arndb.de</email>
</author>
<published>2020-10-26T16:10:58Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:0e724f2e80ba23afaada081528c13950bdb4630e</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit d9a9280a0d0ae51dc1d4142138b99242b7ec8ac6 ]

Building with W=2 prints a number of warnings for one function that
has a pointer type mismatch:

linux/seq_buf.h: In function 'seq_buf_init':
linux/seq_buf.h:35:12: warning: pointer targets in assignment from 'unsigned char *' to 'char *' differ in signedness [-Wpointer-sign]

Change the type in the function prototype according to the type in
the structure.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201026161108.3707783-1-arnd@kernel.org

Fixes: 9a7777935c34 ("tracing: Convert seq_buf fields to be like seq_file fields")
Reviewed-by: Cezary Rojewski &lt;cezary.rojewski@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>SUNRPC: xprt_load_transport() needs to support the netid "rdma6"</title>
<updated>2020-12-30T10:51:16Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Trond Myklebust</name>
<email>trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-11-06T21:33:38Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:73892eef6d9ed18aedab7c805b749f361b4e8203</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit d5aa6b22e2258f05317313ecc02efbb988ed6d38 ]

According to RFC5666, the correct netid for an IPv6 addressed RDMA
transport is "rdma6", which we've supported as a mount option since
Linux-4.7. The problem is when we try to load the module "xprtrdma6",
that will fail, since there is no modulealias of that name.

Fixes: 181342c5ebe8 ("xprtrdma: Add rdma6 option to support NFS/RDMA IPv6")
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust &lt;trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
