<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>user/sven/linux.git/include/linux, branch v6.11.5</title>
<subtitle>Linux Kernel
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/atom?h=v6.11.5</id>
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<updated>2024-10-22T13:51:36Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>irqchip/gic-v4: Don't allow a VMOVP on a dying VPE</title>
<updated>2024-10-22T13:51:36Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Marc Zyngier</name>
<email>maz@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2024-10-02T20:49:59Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:d960505a869e66184fff97fb334980a5b797c7c6</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 1442ee0011983f0c5c4b92380e6853afb513841a upstream.

Kunkun Jiang reported that there is a small window of opportunity for
userspace to force a change of affinity for a VPE while the VPE has already
been unmapped, but the corresponding doorbell interrupt still visible in
/proc/irq/.

Plug the race by checking the value of vmapp_count, which tracks whether
the VPE is mapped ot not, and returning an error in this case.

This involves making vmapp_count common to both GICv4.1 and its v4.0
ancestor.

Fixes: 64edfaa9a234 ("irqchip/gic-v4.1: Implement the v4.1 flavour of VMAPP")
Reported-by: Kunkun Jiang &lt;jiangkunkun@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier &lt;maz@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/c182ece6-2ba0-ce4f-3404-dba7a3ab6c52@huawei.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20241002204959.2051709-1-maz@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: enetc: add missing static descriptor and inline keyword</title>
<updated>2024-10-22T13:51:18Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Wei Fang</name>
<email>wei.fang@nxp.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-10-11T03:01:03Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:4ed14e8008e7cb0979b75b461168d7bde6f97cd0</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 1d7b2ce43d2c22a21dadaf689cb36a69570346a6 upstream.

Fix the build warnings when CONFIG_FSL_ENETC_MDIO is not enabled.
The detailed warnings are shown as follows.

include/linux/fsl/enetc_mdio.h:62:18: warning: no previous prototype for function 'enetc_hw_alloc' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
      62 | struct enetc_hw *enetc_hw_alloc(struct device *dev, void __iomem *port_regs)
         |                  ^
include/linux/fsl/enetc_mdio.h:62:1: note: declare 'static' if the function is not intended to be used outside of this translation unit
      62 | struct enetc_hw *enetc_hw_alloc(struct device *dev, void __iomem *port_regs)
         | ^
         | static
8 warnings generated.

Fixes: 6517798dd343 ("enetc: Make MDIO accessors more generic and export to include/linux/fsl")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: kernel test robot &lt;lkp@intel.com&gt;
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202410102136.jQHZOcS4-lkp@intel.com/
Signed-off-by: Wei Fang &lt;wei.fang@nxp.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Claudiu Manoil &lt;claudiu.manoil@nxp.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Vladimir Oltean &lt;vladimir.oltean@nxp.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241011030103.392362-1-wei.fang@nxp.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>PCI: Pass domain number to pci_bus_release_domain_nr() explicitly</title>
<updated>2024-10-17T13:27:02Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Manivannan Sadhasivam</name>
<email>manivannan.sadhasivam@linaro.org</email>
</author>
<published>2024-09-12T05:30:25Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=a61c55fa3a8af128448a3c09574369d203b6a809'/>
<id>urn:sha1:a61c55fa3a8af128448a3c09574369d203b6a809</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 0cca961a026177af69044f10d6ae76d8ce043764 upstream.

The pci_bus_release_domain_nr() API is supposed to free the domain
number allocated by pci_bus_find_domain_nr(). Most of the callers of
pci_bus_find_domain_nr(), store the domain number in pci_bus::domain_nr.

As such, the pci_bus_release_domain_nr() implicitly frees the domain
number by dereferencing 'struct pci_bus'. However, one of the callers
of this API, the PCI endpoint subsystem, doesn't have 'struct pci_bus',
so it only passes NULL. Due to this, the API will end up dereferencing
the NULL pointer.

To fix this issue, pass the domain number to this API explicitly. Since
'struct pci_bus' is not used for anything else other than extracting the
domain number, it makes sense to pass the domain number directly.

Fixes: 0328947c5032 ("PCI: endpoint: Assign PCI domain number for endpoint controllers")
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-pci/c0c40ddb-bf64-4b22-9dd1-8dbb18aa2813@stanley.mountain
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-pci/20240912053025.25314-1-manivannan.sadhasivam@linaro.org
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter &lt;dan.carpenter@linaro.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Manivannan Sadhasivam &lt;manivannan.sadhasivam@linaro.org&gt;
[kwilczynski: commit log]
Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Wilczyński &lt;kwilczynski@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/amd_nb: Add new PCI IDs for AMD family 1Ah model 60h</title>
<updated>2024-10-17T13:26:53Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Shyam Sundar S K</name>
<email>Shyam-sundar.S-k@amd.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-07-22T09:28:01Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=3f0bd341ae191911b9942f0d64d08724e1504309'/>
<id>urn:sha1:3f0bd341ae191911b9942f0d64d08724e1504309</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 59c34008d3bdeef4c8ebc0ed2426109b474334d4 ]

Add new PCI device IDs into the root IDs and miscellaneous IDs lists to
provide support for the latest generation of AMD 1Ah family 60h processor
models.

Signed-off-by: Shyam Sundar S K &lt;Shyam-sundar.S-k@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Yazen Ghannam &lt;yazen.ghannam@amd.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240722092801.3480266-1-Shyam-sundar.S-k@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>NFSv4: Prevent NULL-pointer dereference in nfs42_complete_copies()</title>
<updated>2024-10-17T13:26:43Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Yanjun Zhang</name>
<email>zhangyanjun@cestc.cn</email>
</author>
<published>2024-10-01T08:39:30Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=ef9189bb15dcbe7ed3f3515aaa6fc8bf7483960d'/>
<id>urn:sha1:ef9189bb15dcbe7ed3f3515aaa6fc8bf7483960d</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit a848c29e3486189aaabd5663bc11aea50c5bd144 ]

On the node of an NFS client, some files saved in the mountpoint of the
NFS server were copied to another location of the same NFS server.
Accidentally, the nfs42_complete_copies() got a NULL-pointer dereference
crash with the following syslog:

[232064.838881] NFSv4: state recovery failed for open file nfs/pvc-12b5200d-cd0f-46a3-b9f0-af8f4fe0ef64.qcow2, error = -116
[232064.839360] NFSv4: state recovery failed for open file nfs/pvc-12b5200d-cd0f-46a3-b9f0-af8f4fe0ef64.qcow2, error = -116
[232066.588183] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000058
[232066.588586] Mem abort info:
[232066.588701]   ESR = 0x0000000096000007
[232066.588862]   EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[232066.589084]   SET = 0, FnV = 0
[232066.589216]   EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[232066.589340]   FSC = 0x07: level 3 translation fault
[232066.589559] Data abort info:
[232066.589683]   ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000007
[232066.589842]   CM = 0, WnR = 0
[232066.589967] user pgtable: 64k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=00002000956ff400
[232066.590231] [0000000000000058] pgd=08001100ae100003, p4d=08001100ae100003, pud=08001100ae100003, pmd=08001100b3c00003, pte=0000000000000000
[232066.590757] Internal error: Oops: 96000007 [#1] SMP
[232066.590958] Modules linked in: rpcsec_gss_krb5 auth_rpcgss nfsv4 dns_resolver nfs lockd grace fscache netfs ocfs2_dlmfs ocfs2_stack_o2cb ocfs2_dlm vhost_net vhost vhost_iotlb tap tun ipt_rpfilter xt_multiport ip_set_hash_ip ip_set_hash_net xfrm_interface xfrm6_tunnel tunnel4 tunnel6 esp4 ah4 wireguard libcurve25519_generic veth xt_addrtype xt_set nf_conntrack_netlink ip_set_hash_ipportnet ip_set_hash_ipportip ip_set_bitmap_port ip_set_hash_ipport dummy ip_set ip_vs_sh ip_vs_wrr ip_vs_rr ip_vs iptable_filter sch_ingress nfnetlink_cttimeout vport_gre ip_gre ip_tunnel gre vport_geneve geneve vport_vxlan vxlan ip6_udp_tunnel udp_tunnel openvswitch nf_conncount dm_round_robin dm_service_time dm_multipath xt_nat xt_MASQUERADE nft_chain_nat nf_nat xt_mark xt_conntrack xt_comment nft_compat nft_counter nf_tables nfnetlink ocfs2 ocfs2_nodemanager ocfs2_stackglue iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi ipmi_ssif nbd overlay 8021q garp mrp bonding tls rfkill sunrpc ext4 mbcache jbd2
[232066.591052]  vfat fat cas_cache cas_disk ses enclosure scsi_transport_sas sg acpi_ipmi ipmi_si ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler ip_tables vfio_pci vfio_pci_core vfio_virqfd vfio_iommu_type1 vfio dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 br_netfilter bridge stp llc fuse xfs libcrc32c ast drm_vram_helper qla2xxx drm_kms_helper syscopyarea crct10dif_ce sysfillrect ghash_ce sysimgblt sha2_ce fb_sys_fops cec sha256_arm64 sha1_ce drm_ttm_helper ttm nvme_fc igb sbsa_gwdt nvme_fabrics drm nvme_core i2c_algo_bit i40e scsi_transport_fc megaraid_sas aes_neon_bs
[232066.596953] CPU: 6 PID: 4124696 Comm: 10.253.166.125- Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.15.131-9.cl9_ocfs2.aarch64 #1
[232066.597356] Hardware name: Great Wall .\x93\x8e...RF6260 V5/GWMSSE2GL1T, BIOS T656FBE_V3.0.18 2024-01-06
[232066.597721] pstate: 20400009 (nzCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
[232066.598034] pc : nfs4_reclaim_open_state+0x220/0x800 [nfsv4]
[232066.598327] lr : nfs4_reclaim_open_state+0x12c/0x800 [nfsv4]
[232066.598595] sp : ffff8000f568fc70
[232066.598731] x29: ffff8000f568fc70 x28: 0000000000001000 x27: ffff21003db33000
[232066.599030] x26: ffff800005521ae0 x25: ffff0100f98fa3f0 x24: 0000000000000001
[232066.599319] x23: ffff800009920008 x22: ffff21003db33040 x21: ffff21003db33050
[232066.599628] x20: ffff410172fe9e40 x19: ffff410172fe9e00 x18: 0000000000000000
[232066.599914] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000004 x15: 0000000000000000
[232066.600195] x14: 0000000000000000 x13: ffff800008e685a8 x12: 00000000eac0c6e6
[232066.600498] x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000008 x9 : ffff8000054e5828
[232066.600784] x8 : 00000000ffffffbf x7 : 0000000000000001 x6 : 000000000a9eb14a
[232066.601062] x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : ffff70ff8a14a800 x3 : 0000000000000058
[232066.601348] x2 : 0000000000000001 x1 : 54dce46366daa6c6 x0 : 0000000000000000
[232066.601636] Call trace:
[232066.601749]  nfs4_reclaim_open_state+0x220/0x800 [nfsv4]
[232066.601998]  nfs4_do_reclaim+0x1b8/0x28c [nfsv4]
[232066.602218]  nfs4_state_manager+0x928/0x10f0 [nfsv4]
[232066.602455]  nfs4_run_state_manager+0x78/0x1b0 [nfsv4]
[232066.602690]  kthread+0x110/0x114
[232066.602830]  ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
[232066.602985] Code: 1400000d f9403f20 f9402e61 91016003 (f9402c00)
[232066.603284] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs
[232066.606936] Starting crashdump kernel...
[232066.607146] Bye!

Analysing the vmcore, we know that nfs4_copy_state listed by destination
nfs_server-&gt;ss_copies was added by the field copies in handle_async_copy(),
and we found a waiting copy process with the stack as:
PID: 3511963  TASK: ffff710028b47e00  CPU: 0   COMMAND: "cp"
 #0 [ffff8001116ef740] __switch_to at ffff8000081b92f4
 #1 [ffff8001116ef760] __schedule at ffff800008dd0650
 #2 [ffff8001116ef7c0] schedule at ffff800008dd0a00
 #3 [ffff8001116ef7e0] schedule_timeout at ffff800008dd6aa0
 #4 [ffff8001116ef860] __wait_for_common at ffff800008dd166c
 #5 [ffff8001116ef8e0] wait_for_completion_interruptible at ffff800008dd1898
 #6 [ffff8001116ef8f0] handle_async_copy at ffff8000055142f4 [nfsv4]
 #7 [ffff8001116ef970] _nfs42_proc_copy at ffff8000055147c8 [nfsv4]
 #8 [ffff8001116efa80] nfs42_proc_copy at ffff800005514cf0 [nfsv4]
 #9 [ffff8001116efc50] __nfs4_copy_file_range.constprop.0 at ffff8000054ed694 [nfsv4]

The NULL-pointer dereference was due to nfs42_complete_copies() listed
the nfs_server-&gt;ss_copies by the field ss_copies of nfs4_copy_state.
So the nfs4_copy_state address ffff0100f98fa3f0 was offset by 0x10 and
the data accessed through this pointer was also incorrect. Generally,
the ordered list nfs4_state_owner-&gt;so_states indicate open(O_RDWR) or
open(O_WRITE) states are reclaimed firstly by nfs4_reclaim_open_state().
When destination state reclaim is failed with NFS_STATE_RECOVERY_FAILED
and copies are not deleted in nfs_server-&gt;ss_copies, the source state
may be passed to the nfs42_complete_copies() process earlier, resulting
in this crash scene finally. To solve this issue, we add a list_head
nfs_server-&gt;ss_src_copies for a server-to-server copy specially.

Fixes: 0e65a32c8a56 ("NFS: handle source server reboot")
Signed-off-by: Yanjun Zhang &lt;zhangyanjun@cestc.cn&gt;
Reviewed-by: Trond Myklebust &lt;trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker &lt;anna.schumaker@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>PCI: endpoint: Assign PCI domain number for endpoint controllers</title>
<updated>2024-10-17T13:26:37Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Manivannan Sadhasivam</name>
<email>manivannan.sadhasivam@linaro.org</email>
</author>
<published>2024-08-28T15:46:15Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=a4934cd7a18d35fc57025f23773f6f19e2b2dbb1'/>
<id>urn:sha1:a4934cd7a18d35fc57025f23773f6f19e2b2dbb1</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 0328947c50324cf4b2d8b181bf948edb8101f59f ]

Right now, PCI endpoint subsystem doesn't assign PCI domain number for the
PCI endpoint controllers. But this domain number could be useful to the EPC
drivers to uniquely identify each controller based on the hardware instance
when there are multiple ones present in an SoC (even multiple RC/EP).

So let's make use of the existing pci_bus_find_domain_nr() API to allocate
domain numbers based on either devicetree (linux,pci-domain) property or
dynamic domain number allocation scheme.

It should be noted that the domain number allocated by this API will be
based on both RC and EP controllers in a SoC. If the 'linux,pci-domain' DT
property is present, then the domain number represents the actual hardware
instance of the PCI endpoint controller. If not, then the domain number
will be allocated based on the PCI EP/RC controller probe order.

If the architecture doesn't support CONFIG_PCI_DOMAINS_GENERIC (rare), then
currently a warning is thrown to indicate that the architecture specific
implementation is needed.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-pci/20240828-pci-qcom-hotplug-v4-5-263a385fbbcb@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Manivannan Sadhasivam &lt;manivannan.sadhasivam@linaro.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Wilczyński &lt;kwilczynski@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Frank Li &lt;Frank.Li@nxp.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>PCI: Add function 0 DMA alias quirk for Glenfly Arise chip</title>
<updated>2024-10-17T13:26:35Z</updated>
<author>
<name>WangYuli</name>
<email>wangyuli@uniontech.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-08-23T09:57:08Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=efe07dfad8d49838b1ad0c25fcde0bfdb09c4954'/>
<id>urn:sha1:efe07dfad8d49838b1ad0c25fcde0bfdb09c4954</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 9246b487ab3c3b5993aae7552b7a4c541cc14a49 ]

Add DMA support for audio function of Glenfly Arise chip, which uses
Requester ID of function 0.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/CA2BBD087345B6D1+20240823095708.3237375-1-wangyuli@uniontech.com
Signed-off-by: SiyuLi &lt;siyuli@glenfly.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: WangYuli &lt;wangyuli@uniontech.com&gt;
[bhelgaas: lower-case hex to match local code, drop unused Device IDs]
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas &lt;bhelgaas@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Takashi Iwai &lt;tiwai@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: Prevent tail call between progs attached to different hooks</title>
<updated>2024-10-17T13:26:34Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Xu Kuohai</name>
<email>xukuohai@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-07-19T11:00:53Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=88c2a10e6c176c2860cd0659f4c0e9d20b3f64d1'/>
<id>urn:sha1:88c2a10e6c176c2860cd0659f4c0e9d20b3f64d1</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 28ead3eaabc16ecc907cfb71876da028080f6356 ]

bpf progs can be attached to kernel functions, and the attached functions
can take different parameters or return different return values. If
prog attached to one kernel function tail calls prog attached to another
kernel function, the ctx access or return value verification could be
bypassed.

For example, if prog1 is attached to func1 which takes only 1 parameter
and prog2 is attached to func2 which takes two parameters. Since verifier
assumes the bpf ctx passed to prog2 is constructed based on func2's
prototype, verifier allows prog2 to access the second parameter from
the bpf ctx passed to it. The problem is that verifier does not prevent
prog1 from passing its bpf ctx to prog2 via tail call. In this case,
the bpf ctx passed to prog2 is constructed from func1 instead of func2,
that is, the assumption for ctx access verification is bypassed.

Another example, if BPF LSM prog1 is attached to hook file_alloc_security,
and BPF LSM prog2 is attached to hook bpf_lsm_audit_rule_known. Verifier
knows the return value rules for these two hooks, e.g. it is legal for
bpf_lsm_audit_rule_known to return positive number 1, and it is illegal
for file_alloc_security to return positive number. So verifier allows
prog2 to return positive number 1, but does not allow prog1 to return
positive number. The problem is that verifier does not prevent prog1
from calling prog2 via tail call. In this case, prog2's return value 1
will be used as the return value for prog1's hook file_alloc_security.
That is, the return value rule is bypassed.

This patch adds restriction for tail call to prevent such bypasses.

Signed-off-by: Xu Kuohai &lt;xukuohai@huawei.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240719110059.797546-4-xukuohai@huaweicloud.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko &lt;andrii@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sunrpc: change sp_nrthreads from atomic_t to unsigned int.</title>
<updated>2024-10-10T10:04:14Z</updated>
<author>
<name>NeilBrown</name>
<email>neilb@suse.de</email>
</author>
<published>2024-07-15T07:14:18Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=a7378b63a220b28b55ce761cb408a321e498f135'/>
<id>urn:sha1:a7378b63a220b28b55ce761cb408a321e498f135</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 60749cbe3d8ae572a6c7dda675de3e8b25797a18 ]

sp_nrthreads is only ever accessed under the service mutex
  nlmsvc_mutex nfs_callback_mutex nfsd_mutex
so these is no need for it to be an atomic_t.

The fact that all code using it is single-threaded means that we can
simplify svc_pool_victim and remove the temporary elevation of
sp_nrthreads.

Signed-off-by: NeilBrown &lt;neilb@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever &lt;chuck.lever@oracle.com&gt;
Stable-dep-of: aadc3bbea163 ("NFSD: Limit the number of concurrent async COPY operations")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
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<entry>
<title>close_range(): fix the logics in descriptor table trimming</title>
<updated>2024-10-10T10:04:11Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Al Viro</name>
<email>viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2024-08-16T19:17:00Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=19497297ecb4945a8aa61adb8e438975f49c807b'/>
<id>urn:sha1:19497297ecb4945a8aa61adb8e438975f49c807b</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 678379e1d4f7443b170939525d3312cfc37bf86b upstream.

Cloning a descriptor table picks the size that would cover all currently
opened files.  That's fine for clone() and unshare(), but for close_range()
there's an additional twist - we clone before we close, and it would be
a shame to have
	close_range(3, ~0U, CLOSE_RANGE_UNSHARE)
leave us with a huge descriptor table when we are not going to keep
anything past stderr, just because some large file descriptor used to
be open before our call has taken it out.

Unfortunately, it had been dealt with in an inherently racy way -
sane_fdtable_size() gets a "don't copy anything past that" argument
(passed via unshare_fd() and dup_fd()), close_range() decides how much
should be trimmed and passes that to unshare_fd().

The problem is, a range that used to extend to the end of descriptor
table back when close_range() had looked at it might very well have stuff
grown after it by the time dup_fd() has allocated a new files_struct
and started to figure out the capacity of fdtable to be attached to that.

That leads to interesting pathological cases; at the very least it's a
QoI issue, since unshare(CLONE_FILES) is atomic in a sense that it takes
a snapshot of descriptor table one might have observed at some point.
Since CLOSE_RANGE_UNSHARE close_range() is supposed to be a combination
of unshare(CLONE_FILES) with plain close_range(), ending up with a
weird state that would never occur with unshare(2) is confusing, to put
it mildly.

It's not hard to get rid of - all it takes is passing both ends of the
range down to sane_fdtable_size().  There we are under -&gt;files_lock,
so the race is trivially avoided.

So we do the following:
	* switch close_files() from calling unshare_fd() to calling
dup_fd().
	* undo the calling convention change done to unshare_fd() in
60997c3d45d9 "close_range: add CLOSE_RANGE_UNSHARE"
	* introduce struct fd_range, pass a pointer to that to dup_fd()
and sane_fdtable_size() instead of "trim everything past that point"
they are currently getting.  NULL means "we are not going to be punching
any holes"; NR_OPEN_MAX is gone.
	* make sane_fdtable_size() use find_last_bit() instead of
open-coding it; it's easier to follow that way.
	* while we are at it, have dup_fd() report errors by returning
ERR_PTR(), no need to use a separate int *errorp argument.

Fixes: 60997c3d45d9 "close_range: add CLOSE_RANGE_UNSHARE"
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
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</entry>
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