user/sven/linux.git/include/linux, branch v6.12.47

x86/vmscape: Enable the mitigation

2025-09-11T15:21:46Z

Commit 556c1ad666ad90c50ec8fccb930dd5046cfbecfb upstream. Enable the previously added mitigation for VMscape. Add the cmdline vmscape={off|ibpb|force} and sysfs reporting. Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

block: add a queue_limits_commit_update_frozen helper

2025-09-09T16:58:24Z

[ Upstream commit aa427d7b73b196f657d6d2cf0e94eff6b883fdef ] Add a helper that freezes the queue, updates the queue limits and unfreezes the queue and convert all open coded versions of that to the new helper. Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig Reviewed-by: John Garry Reviewed-by: Ming Lei Reviewed-by: Damien Le Moal Reviewed-by: Martin K. Petersen Reviewed-by: Nilay Shroff Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250110054726.1499538-3-hch@lst.de Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe Stable-dep-of: 708e2371f77a ("scsi: sr: Reinstate rotational media flag") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

mm: move page table sync declarations to linux/pgtable.h

2025-09-09T16:58:15Z

commit 7cc183f2e67d19b03ee5c13a6664b8c6cc37ff9d upstream. During our internal testing, we started observing intermittent boot failures when the machine uses 4-level paging and has a large amount of persistent memory: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffe70000000034 #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP NOPTI RIP: 0010:__init_single_page+0x9/0x6d Call Trace: __init_zone_device_page+0x17/0x5d memmap_init_zone_device+0x154/0x1bb pagemap_range+0x2e0/0x40f memremap_pages+0x10b/0x2f0 devm_memremap_pages+0x1e/0x60 dev_dax_probe+0xce/0x2ec [device_dax] dax_bus_probe+0x6d/0xc9 [... snip ...] It turns out that the kernel panics while initializing vmemmap (struct page array) when the vmemmap region spans two PGD entries, because the new PGD entry is only installed in init_mm.pgd, but not in the page tables of other tasks. And looking at __populate_section_memmap(): if (vmemmap_can_optimize(altmap, pgmap)) // does not sync top level page tables r = vmemmap_populate_compound_pages(pfn, start, end, nid, pgmap); else // sync top level page tables in x86 r = vmemmap_populate(start, end, nid, altmap); In the normal path, vmemmap_populate() in arch/x86/mm/init_64.c synchronizes the top level page table (See commit 9b861528a801 ("x86-64, mem: Update all PGDs for direct mapping and vmemmap mapping changes")) so that all tasks in the system can see the new vmemmap area. However, when vmemmap_can_optimize() returns true, the optimized path skips synchronization of top-level page tables. This is because vmemmap_populate_compound_pages() is implemented in core MM code, which does not handle synchronization of the top-level page tables. Instead, the core MM has historically relied on each architecture to perform this synchronization manually. We're not the first party to encounter a crash caused by not-sync'd top level page tables: earlier this year, Gwan-gyeong Mun attempted to address the issue [1] [2] after hitting a kernel panic when x86 code accessed the vmemmap area before the corresponding top-level entries were synced. At that time, the issue was believed to be triggered only when struct page was enlarged for debugging purposes, and the patch did not get further updates. It turns out that current approach of relying on each arch to handle the page table sync manually is fragile because 1) it's easy to forget to sync the top level page table, and 2) it's also easy to overlook that the kernel should not access the vmemmap and direct mapping areas before the sync. # The solution: Make page table sync more code robust and harder to miss To address this, Dave Hansen suggested [3] [4] introducing {pgd,p4d}_populate_kernel() for updating kernel portion of the page tables and allow each architecture to explicitly perform synchronization when installing top-level entries. With this approach, we no longer need to worry about missing the sync step, reducing the risk of future regressions. The new interface reuses existing ARCH_PAGE_TABLE_SYNC_MASK, PGTBL_P*D_MODIFIED and arch_sync_kernel_mappings() facility used by vmalloc and ioremap to synchronize page tables. pgd_populate_kernel() looks like this: static inline void pgd_populate_kernel(unsigned long addr, pgd_t *pgd, p4d_t *p4d) { pgd_populate(&init_mm, pgd, p4d); if (ARCH_PAGE_TABLE_SYNC_MASK & PGTBL_PGD_MODIFIED) arch_sync_kernel_mappings(addr, addr); } It is worth noting that vmalloc() and apply_to_range() carefully synchronizes page tables by calling p*d_alloc_track() and arch_sync_kernel_mappings(), and thus they are not affected by this patch series. This series was hugely inspired by Dave Hansen's suggestion and hence added Suggested-by: Dave Hansen. Cc stable because lack of this series opens the door to intermittent boot failures. This patch (of 3): Move ARCH_PAGE_TABLE_SYNC_MASK and arch_sync_kernel_mappings() to linux/pgtable.h so that they can be used outside of vmalloc and ioremap. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250818020206.4517-1-harry.yoo@oracle.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250818020206.4517-2-harry.yoo@oracle.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20250220064105.808339-1-gwan-gyeong.mun@intel.com [1] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20250311114420.240341-1-gwan-gyeong.mun@intel.com [2] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/d1da214c-53d3-45ac-a8b6-51821c5416e4@intel.com [3] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/4d800744-7b88-41aa-9979-b245e8bf794b@intel.com [4] Fixes: 8d400913c231 ("x86/vmemmap: handle unpopulated sub-pmd ranges") Signed-off-by: Harry Yoo Acked-by: Kiryl Shutsemau Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport (Microsoft) Reviewed-by: "Uladzislau Rezki (Sony)" Reviewed-by: Lorenzo Stoakes Acked-by: David Hildenbrand Cc: Alexander Potapenko Cc: Alistair Popple Cc: Andrey Konovalov Cc: Andrey Ryabinin Cc: Andy Lutomirski Cc: "Aneesh Kumar K.V" Cc: Anshuman Khandual Cc: Ard Biesheuvel Cc: Arnd Bergmann Cc: bibo mao Cc: Borislav Betkov Cc: Christoph Lameter (Ampere) Cc: Dennis Zhou Cc: Dev Jain Cc: Dmitriy Vyukov Cc: Gwan-gyeong Mun Cc: Ingo Molnar Cc: Jane Chu Cc: Joao Martins Cc: Joerg Roedel Cc: John Hubbard Cc: Kevin Brodsky Cc: Liam Howlett Cc: Michal Hocko Cc: Oscar Salvador Cc: Peter Xu Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Qi Zheng Cc: Ryan Roberts Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan Cc: Tejun Heo Cc: Thomas Gleinxer Cc: Thomas Huth Cc: Vincenzo Frascino Cc: Vlastimil Babka Cc: Dave Hansen Cc: Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

io_uring/msg_ring: ensure io_kiocb freeing is deferred for RCU

2025-09-09T16:58:15Z

Commit fc582cd26e888b0652bc1494f252329453fd3b23 upstream. syzbot reports that defer/local task_work adding via msg_ring can hit a request that has been freed: CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 19356 Comm: iou-wrk-19354 Not tainted 6.16.0-rc4-syzkaller-00108-g17bbde2e1716 #0 PREEMPT(full) Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 05/07/2025 Call Trace: dump_stack_lvl+0x189/0x250 lib/dump_stack.c:120 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:408 [inline] print_report+0xd2/0x2b0 mm/kasan/report.c:521 kasan_report+0x118/0x150 mm/kasan/report.c:634 io_req_local_work_add io_uring/io_uring.c:1184 [inline] __io_req_task_work_add+0x589/0x950 io_uring/io_uring.c:1252 io_msg_remote_post io_uring/msg_ring.c:103 [inline] io_msg_data_remote io_uring/msg_ring.c:133 [inline] __io_msg_ring_data+0x820/0xaa0 io_uring/msg_ring.c:151 io_msg_ring_data io_uring/msg_ring.c:173 [inline] io_msg_ring+0x134/0xa00 io_uring/msg_ring.c:314 __io_issue_sqe+0x17e/0x4b0 io_uring/io_uring.c:1739 io_issue_sqe+0x165/0xfd0 io_uring/io_uring.c:1762 io_wq_submit_work+0x6e9/0xb90 io_uring/io_uring.c:1874 io_worker_handle_work+0x7cd/0x1180 io_uring/io-wq.c:642 io_wq_worker+0x42f/0xeb0 io_uring/io-wq.c:696 ret_from_fork+0x3fc/0x770 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:148 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245 which is supposed to be safe with how requests are allocated. But msg ring requests alloc and free on their own, and hence must defer freeing to a sane time. Add an rcu_head and use kfree_rcu() in both spots where requests are freed. Only the one in io_msg_tw_complete() is strictly required as it has been visible on the other ring, but use it consistently in the other spot as well. This should not cause any other issues outside of KASAN rightfully complaining about it. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/io-uring/686cd2ea.a00a0220.338033.0007.GAE@google.com/ Reported-by: syzbot+54cbbfb4db9145d26fc2@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 0617bb500bfa ("io_uring/msg_ring: improve handling of target CQE posting") Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe (cherry picked from commit fc582cd26e888b0652bc1494f252329453fd3b23) Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

net: skb: add pskb_network_may_pull_reason() helper

2025-09-09T16:58:10Z

[ Upstream commit 454bbde8f0d465e93e5a3a4003ac6c7e62fa4473 ] Introduce the function pskb_network_may_pull_reason() and make pskb_network_may_pull() a simple inline call to it. The drop reasons of it just come from pskb_may_pull_reason. Signed-off-by: Menglong Dong Reviewed-by: Simon Horman Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Stable-dep-of: 6ead38147ebb ("vxlan: Fix NPD when refreshing an FDB entry with a nexthop object") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

HID: stop exporting hid_snto32()

2025-09-09T16:58:04Z

[ Upstream commit c653ffc283404a6c1c0e65143a833180c7ff799b ] The only user of hid_snto32() is Logitech HID++ driver, which always calls hid_snto32() with valid size (constant, either 12 or 8) and therefore can simply use sign_extend32(). Make the switch and remove hid_snto32(). Move snto32() and s32ton() to avoid introducing forward declaration. Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241003144656.3786064-2-dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com [bentiss: fix checkpatch warning] Signed-off-by: Benjamin Tissoires Stable-dep-of: a6b87bfc2ab5 ("HID: core: Harden s32ton() against conversion to 0 bits") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

bpf: Fix oob access in cgroup local storage

2025-09-09T16:58:01Z

[ Upstream commit abad3d0bad72a52137e0c350c59542d75ae4f513 ] Lonial reported that an out-of-bounds access in cgroup local storage can be crafted via tail calls. Given two programs each utilizing a cgroup local storage with a different value size, and one program doing a tail call into the other. The verifier will validate each of the indivial programs just fine. However, in the runtime context the bpf_cg_run_ctx holds an bpf_prog_array_item which contains the BPF program as well as any cgroup local storage flavor the program uses. Helpers such as bpf_get_local_storage() pick this up from the runtime context: ctx = container_of(current->bpf_ctx, struct bpf_cg_run_ctx, run_ctx); storage = ctx->prog_item->cgroup_storage[stype]; if (stype == BPF_CGROUP_STORAGE_SHARED) ptr = &READ_ONCE(storage->buf)->data[0]; else ptr = this_cpu_ptr(storage->percpu_buf); For the second program which was called from the originally attached one, this means bpf_get_local_storage() will pick up the former program's map, not its own. With mismatching sizes, this can result in an unintended out-of-bounds access. To fix this issue, we need to extend bpf_map_owner with an array of storage_cookie[] to match on i) the exact maps from the original program if the second program was using bpf_get_local_storage(), or ii) allow the tail call combination if the second program was not using any of the cgroup local storage maps. Fixes: 7d9c3427894f ("bpf: Make cgroup storages shared between programs on the same cgroup") Reported-by: Lonial Con Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250730234733.530041-4-daniel@iogearbox.net Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

bpf: Move cgroup iterator helpers to bpf.h

2025-09-09T16:58:01Z

[ Upstream commit 9621e60f59eae87eb9ffe88d90f24f391a1ef0f0 ] Move them into bpf.h given we also need them in core code. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250730234733.530041-3-daniel@iogearbox.net Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov Stable-dep-of: abad3d0bad72 ("bpf: Fix oob access in cgroup local storage") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

bpf: Move bpf map owner out of common struct

2025-09-09T16:58:01Z

[ Upstream commit fd1c98f0ef5cbcec842209776505d9e70d8fcd53 ] Given this is only relevant for BPF tail call maps, it is adding up space and penalizing other map types. We also need to extend this with further objects to track / compare to. Therefore, lets move this out into a separate structure and dynamically allocate it only for BPF tail call maps. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250730234733.530041-2-daniel@iogearbox.net Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov Stable-dep-of: abad3d0bad72 ("bpf: Fix oob access in cgroup local storage") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

bpf: Add cookie object to bpf maps

2025-09-09T16:58:01Z

[ Upstream commit 12df58ad294253ac1d8df0c9bb9cf726397a671d ] Add a cookie to BPF maps to uniquely identify BPF maps for the timespan when the node is up. This is different to comparing a pointer or BPF map id which could get rolled over and reused. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250730234733.530041-1-daniel@iogearbox.net Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin