<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>user/sven/linux.git/include/linux, branch v6.5.11</title>
<subtitle>Linux Kernel
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/atom?h=v6.5.11</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/atom?h=v6.5.11'/>
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<updated>2023-11-08T13:09:04Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>PCI: Prevent xHCI driver from claiming AMD VanGogh USB3 DRD device</title>
<updated>2023-11-08T13:09:04Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Vicki Pfau</name>
<email>vi@endrift.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-09-27T20:22:12Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=c99f302ea6799cc52517023d78754483475262a1'/>
<id>urn:sha1:c99f302ea6799cc52517023d78754483475262a1</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 7e6f3b6d2c352b5fde37ce3fed83bdf6172eebd4 upstream.

The AMD VanGogh SoC contains a DesignWare USB3 Dual-Role Device that can be
operated as either a USB Host or a USB Device, similar to on the AMD Nolan
platform.

be6646bfbaec ("PCI: Prevent xHCI driver from claiming AMD Nolan USB3 DRD
device") added a quirk to let the dwc3 driver claim the Nolan device since
it provides more specific support.

Extend that quirk to include the VanGogh SoC USB3 device.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230927202212.2388216-1-vi@endrift.com
Signed-off-by: Vicki Pfau &lt;vi@endrift.com&gt;
[bhelgaas: include be6646bfbaec reference, add stable tag]
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas &lt;bhelgaas@google.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org	# v3.19+
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>power: supply: core: Use blocking_notifier_call_chain to avoid RCU complaint</title>
<updated>2023-11-08T13:09:04Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Kai-Heng Feng</name>
<email>kai.heng.feng@canonical.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-09-13T03:32:33Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=65d457433a083e58a3985e964ff68eb543c9f4af'/>
<id>urn:sha1:65d457433a083e58a3985e964ff68eb543c9f4af</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit bbaa6ffa5b6c9609d3b3c431c389b407eea5441f ]

AMD PMF driver can cause the following warning:
[  196.159546] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[  196.159556] Voluntary context switch within RCU read-side critical section!
[  196.159571] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 9 at kernel/rcu/tree_plugin.h:320 rcu_note_context_switch+0x43d/0x560
[  196.159604] Modules linked in: nvme_fabrics ccm rfcomm snd_hda_scodec_cs35l41_spi cmac algif_hash algif_skcipher af_alg bnep joydev btusb btrtl uvcvideo btintel btbcm videobuf2_vmalloc intel_rapl_msr btmtk videobuf2_memops uvc videobuf2_v4l2 intel_rapl_common binfmt_misc hid_sensor_als snd_sof_amd_vangogh hid_sensor_trigger bluetooth industrialio_triggered_buffer videodev snd_sof_amd_rembrandt hid_sensor_iio_common amdgpu ecdh_generic kfifo_buf videobuf2_common hp_wmi kvm_amd sparse_keymap snd_sof_amd_renoir wmi_bmof industrialio ecc mc nls_iso8859_1 kvm snd_sof_amd_acp irqbypass snd_sof_xtensa_dsp crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul mt7921e snd_sof_pci snd_ctl_led polyval_clmulni mt7921_common polyval_generic snd_sof ghash_clmulni_intel mt792x_lib mt76_connac_lib sha512_ssse3 snd_sof_utils aesni_intel snd_hda_codec_realtek crypto_simd mt76 snd_hda_codec_generic cryptd snd_soc_core snd_hda_codec_hdmi rapl ledtrig_audio input_leds snd_compress i2c_algo_bit drm_ttm_helper mac80211 snd_pci_ps hid_multitouch ttm drm_exec
[  196.159970]  drm_suballoc_helper snd_rpl_pci_acp6x amdxcp drm_buddy snd_hda_intel snd_acp_pci snd_hda_scodec_cs35l41_i2c serio_raw gpu_sched snd_hda_scodec_cs35l41 snd_acp_legacy_common snd_intel_dspcfg snd_hda_cs_dsp_ctls snd_hda_codec libarc4 drm_display_helper snd_pci_acp6x cs_dsp snd_hwdep snd_soc_cs35l41_lib video k10temp snd_pci_acp5x thunderbolt snd_hda_core drm_kms_helper cfg80211 snd_seq snd_rn_pci_acp3x snd_pcm snd_acp_config cec snd_soc_acpi snd_seq_device rc_core ccp snd_pci_acp3x snd_timer snd soundcore wmi amd_pmf platform_profile amd_pmc mac_hid serial_multi_instantiate wireless_hotkey hid_sensor_hub sch_fq_codel msr parport_pc ppdev lp parport efi_pstore ip_tables x_tables autofs4 btrfs blake2b_generic raid10 raid456 async_raid6_recov async_memcpy async_pq async_xor async_tx libcrc32c xor raid6_pq raid1 raid0 multipath linear dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log cdc_ether usbnet r8152 mii hid_generic nvme i2c_hid_acpi i2c_hid nvme_core i2c_piix4 xhci_pci amd_sfh drm xhci_pci_renesas nvme_common hid
[  196.160382] CPU: 0 PID: 9 Comm: kworker/0:1 Not tainted 6.6.0-rc1 #4
[  196.160397] Hardware name: HP HP EliteBook 845 14 inch G10 Notebook PC/8B6E, BIOS V82 Ver. 01.02.00 08/24/2023
[  196.160405] Workqueue: events power_supply_changed_work
[  196.160426] RIP: 0010:rcu_note_context_switch+0x43d/0x560
[  196.160440] Code: 00 48 89 be 40 08 00 00 48 89 86 48 08 00 00 48 89 10 e9 63 fe ff ff 48 c7 c7 10 e7 b0 9e c6 05 e8 d8 20 02 01 e8 13 0f f3 ff &lt;0f&gt; 0b e9 27 fc ff ff a9 ff ff ff 7f 0f 84 cf fc ff ff 65 48 8b 3c
[  196.160450] RSP: 0018:ffffc900001878f0 EFLAGS: 00010046
[  196.160462] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88885e834040 RCX: 0000000000000000
[  196.160470] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
[  196.160476] RBP: ffffc90000187910 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[  196.160482] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000
[  196.160488] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff888100990000 R15: ffff888100990000
[  196.160495] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88885e800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[  196.160504] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  196.160512] CR2: 000055cb053c8246 CR3: 000000013443a000 CR4: 0000000000750ef0
[  196.160520] PKRU: 55555554
[  196.160526] Call Trace:
[  196.160532]  &lt;TASK&gt;
[  196.160548]  ? show_regs+0x72/0x90
[  196.160570]  ? rcu_note_context_switch+0x43d/0x560
[  196.160580]  ? __warn+0x8d/0x160
[  196.160600]  ? rcu_note_context_switch+0x43d/0x560
[  196.160613]  ? report_bug+0x1bb/0x1d0
[  196.160637]  ? handle_bug+0x46/0x90
[  196.160658]  ? exc_invalid_op+0x19/0x80
[  196.160675]  ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1b/0x20
[  196.160709]  ? rcu_note_context_switch+0x43d/0x560
[  196.160727]  __schedule+0xb9/0x15f0
[  196.160746]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0x7f
[  196.160765]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0x7f
[  196.160778]  ? acpi_ns_search_one_scope+0xbe/0x270
[  196.160806]  schedule+0x68/0x110
[  196.160820]  schedule_timeout+0x151/0x160
[  196.160829]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0x7f
[  196.160842]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0x7f
[  196.160855]  ? acpi_ns_lookup+0x3c5/0xa90
[  196.160878]  __down_common+0xff/0x220
[  196.160905]  __down_timeout+0x16/0x30
[  196.160920]  down_timeout+0x64/0x70
[  196.160938]  acpi_os_wait_semaphore+0x85/0x200
[  196.160959]  acpi_ut_acquire_mutex+0x9e/0x280
[  196.160979]  acpi_ex_enter_interpreter+0x2d/0xb0
[  196.160992]  acpi_ns_evaluate+0x2f0/0x5f0
[  196.161005]  acpi_evaluate_object+0x172/0x490
[  196.161018]  ? acpi_os_signal_semaphore+0x8a/0xd0
[  196.161038]  acpi_evaluate_integer+0x52/0xe0
[  196.161055]  ? kfree+0x79/0x120
[  196.161071]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0x7f
[  196.161089]  acpi_ac_get_state.part.0+0x27/0x80
[  196.161110]  get_ac_property+0x5c/0x70
[  196.161127]  ? __pfx___power_supply_is_system_supplied+0x10/0x10
[  196.161146]  __power_supply_is_system_supplied+0x44/0xb0
[  196.161166]  class_for_each_device+0x124/0x160
[  196.161184]  ? acpi_ac_get_state.part.0+0x27/0x80
[  196.161203]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0x7f
[  196.161223]  power_supply_is_system_supplied+0x3c/0x70
[  196.161243]  amd_pmf_get_power_source+0xe/0x20 [amd_pmf]
[  196.161276]  amd_pmf_power_slider_update_event+0x49/0x90 [amd_pmf]
[  196.161310]  amd_pmf_pwr_src_notify_call+0xe7/0x100 [amd_pmf]
[  196.161340]  notifier_call_chain+0x5f/0xe0
[  196.161362]  atomic_notifier_call_chain+0x33/0x60
[  196.161378]  power_supply_changed_work+0x84/0x110
[  196.161394]  process_one_work+0x178/0x360
[  196.161412]  ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
[  196.161424]  worker_thread+0x307/0x430
[  196.161440]  ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
[  196.161451]  kthread+0xf4/0x130
[  196.161467]  ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[  196.161486]  ret_from_fork+0x43/0x70
[  196.161502]  ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[  196.161518]  ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30
[  196.161558]  &lt;/TASK&gt;
[  196.161562] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

Since there's no guarantee that all the callbacks can work in atomic
context, switch to use blocking_notifier_call_chain to relax the
constraint.

Signed-off-by: Kai-Heng Feng &lt;kai.heng.feng@canonical.com&gt;
Reported-by: Allen Zhong &lt;allen@atr.me&gt;
Fixes: 4c71ae414474 ("platform/x86/amd/pmf: Add support SPS PMF feature")
Closes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=217571
Reviewed-by: Mario Limonciello &lt;mario.limonciello@amd.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230913033233.602986-1-kai.heng.feng@canonical.com
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Reichel &lt;sebastian.reichel@collabora.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>kasan: print the original fault addr when access invalid shadow</title>
<updated>2023-11-02T08:36:56Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Haibo Li</name>
<email>haibo.li@mediatek.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-10-09T07:37:48Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=1c43576ac2d13b6b8d3cbfa34ea6424c808af330'/>
<id>urn:sha1:1c43576ac2d13b6b8d3cbfa34ea6424c808af330</id>
<content type='text'>
commit babddbfb7d7d70ae7f10fedd75a45d8ad75fdddf upstream.

when the checked address is illegal,the corresponding shadow address from
kasan_mem_to_shadow may have no mapping in mmu table.  Access such shadow
address causes kernel oops.  Here is a sample about oops on arm64(VA
39bit) with KASAN_SW_TAGS and KASAN_OUTLINE on:

[ffffffb80aaaaaaa] pgd=000000005d3ce003, p4d=000000005d3ce003,
    pud=000000005d3ce003, pmd=0000000000000000
Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000006 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 3 PID: 100 Comm: sh Not tainted 6.6.0-rc1-dirty #43
Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
pstate: 80000005 (Nzcv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : __hwasan_load8_noabort+0x5c/0x90
lr : do_ib_ob+0xf4/0x110
ffffffb80aaaaaaa is the shadow address for efffff80aaaaaaaa.
The problem is reading invalid shadow in kasan_check_range.

The generic kasan also has similar oops.

It only reports the shadow address which causes oops but not
the original address.

Commit 2f004eea0fc8("x86/kasan: Print original address on #GP")
introduce to kasan_non_canonical_hook but limit it to KASAN_INLINE.

This patch extends it to KASAN_OUTLINE mode.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20231009073748.159228-1-haibo.li@mediatek.com
Fixes: 2f004eea0fc8("x86/kasan: Print original address on #GP")
Signed-off-by: Haibo Li &lt;haibo.li@mediatek.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Andrey Konovalov &lt;andreyknvl@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Alexander Potapenko &lt;glider@google.com&gt;
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin &lt;ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: AngeloGioacchino Del Regno &lt;angelogioacchino.delregno@collabora.com&gt;
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Cc: Haibo Li &lt;haibo.li@mediatek.com&gt;
Cc: Matthias Brugger &lt;matthias.bgg@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Vincenzo Frascino &lt;vincenzo.frascino@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>wifi: mac80211: don't drop all unprotected public action frames</title>
<updated>2023-11-02T08:36:54Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Avraham Stern</name>
<email>avraham.stern@intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-10-16T11:52:48Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=8279cd3af8bfc73f2c8305b1ff770ec167f4cadd'/>
<id>urn:sha1:8279cd3af8bfc73f2c8305b1ff770ec167f4cadd</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 91535613b6090fc968c601d11d4e2f16b333713c ]

Not all public action frames have a protected variant. When MFP is
enabled drop only public action frames that have a dual protected
variant.

Fixes: 76a3059cf124 ("wifi: mac80211: drop some unprotected action frames")
Signed-off-by: Avraham Stern &lt;avraham.stern@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Gregory Greenman &lt;gregory.greenman@intel.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231016145213.2973e3c8d3bb.I6198b8d3b04cf4a97b06660d346caec3032f232a@changeid
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg &lt;johannes.berg@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>hugetlbfs: extend hugetlb_vma_lock to private VMAs</title>
<updated>2023-11-02T08:36:48Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Rik van Riel</name>
<email>riel@surriel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-10-06T03:59:07Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=257931b5d8b1dd79035a600b6e2420074fa011bf'/>
<id>urn:sha1:257931b5d8b1dd79035a600b6e2420074fa011bf</id>
<content type='text'>
commit bf4916922c60f43efaa329744b3eef539aa6a2b2 upstream.

Extend the locking scheme used to protect shared hugetlb mappings from
truncate vs page fault races, in order to protect private hugetlb mappings
(with resv_map) against MADV_DONTNEED.

Add a read-write semaphore to the resv_map data structure, and use that
from the hugetlb_vma_(un)lock_* functions, in preparation for closing the
race between MADV_DONTNEED and page faults.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20231006040020.3677377-3-riel@surriel.com
Fixes: 04ada095dcfc ("hugetlb: don't delete vma_lock in hugetlb MADV_DONTNEED processing")
Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel &lt;riel@surriel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Mike Kravetz &lt;mike.kravetz@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) &lt;willy@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Muchun Song &lt;muchun.song@linux.dev&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>perf: Disallow mis-matched inherited group reads</title>
<updated>2023-10-25T10:16:27Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Peter Zijlstra</name>
<email>peterz@infradead.org</email>
</author>
<published>2023-10-18T11:56:54Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=20f925d38e1ecc1d36ee6bf6e325fb514a6f727d'/>
<id>urn:sha1:20f925d38e1ecc1d36ee6bf6e325fb514a6f727d</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 32671e3799ca2e4590773fd0e63aaa4229e50c06 upstream.

Because group consistency is non-atomic between parent (filedesc) and children
(inherited) events, it is possible for PERF_FORMAT_GROUP read() to try and sum
non-matching counter groups -- with non-sensical results.

Add group_generation to distinguish the case where a parent group removes and
adds an event and thus has the same number, but a different configuration of
events as inherited groups.

This became a problem when commit fa8c269353d5 ("perf/core: Invert
perf_read_group() loops") flipped the order of child_list and sibling_list.
Previously it would iterate the group (sibling_list) first, and for each
sibling traverse the child_list. In this order, only the group composition of
the parent is relevant. By flipping the order the group composition of the
child (inherited) events becomes an issue and the mis-match in group
composition becomes evident.

That said; even prior to this commit, while reading of a group that is not
equally inherited was not broken, it still made no sense.

(Ab)use ECHILD as error return to indicate issues with child process group
composition.

Fixes: fa8c269353d5 ("perf/core: Invert perf_read_group() loops")
Reported-by: Budimir Markovic &lt;markovicbudimir@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20231018115654.GK33217@noisy.programming.kicks-ass.net
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mtd: rawnand: Ensure the nand chip supports cached reads</title>
<updated>2023-10-25T10:16:21Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Rouven Czerwinski</name>
<email>r.czerwinski@pengutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2023-09-22T14:17:16Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=13d605fb6b2be4212f3d289360887befd94a6ab6'/>
<id>urn:sha1:13d605fb6b2be4212f3d289360887befd94a6ab6</id>
<content type='text'>
commit f6ca3fb6978f94d95ee79f95085fc22e71ca17cc upstream.

Both the JEDEC and ONFI specification say that read cache sequential
support is an optional command. This means that we not only need to
check whether the individual controller supports the command, we also
need to check the parameter pages for both ONFI and JEDEC NAND flashes
before enabling sequential cache reads.

This fixes support for NAND flashes which don't support enabling cache
reads, i.e. Samsung K9F4G08U0F or Toshiba TC58NVG0S3HTA00.

Sequential cache reads are now only available for ONFI and JEDEC
devices, if individual vendors implement this, it needs to be enabled
per vendor.

Tested on i.MX6Q with a Samsung NAND flash chip that doesn't support
sequential reads.

Fixes: 003fe4b9545b ("mtd: rawnand: Support for sequential cache reads")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Rouven Czerwinski &lt;r.czerwinski@pengutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Miquel Raynal &lt;miquel.raynal@bootlin.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mtd/20230922141717.35977-1-r.czerwinski@pengutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: more strict VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_UDP_L4 validation</title>
<updated>2023-10-25T10:16:16Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Willem de Bruijn</name>
<email>willemb@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-10-11T14:01:14Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=f53e11725233024d02f3f6efeb489cc660788567'/>
<id>urn:sha1:f53e11725233024d02f3f6efeb489cc660788567</id>
<content type='text'>
commit fc8b2a619469378717e7270d2a4e1ef93c585f7a upstream.

Syzbot reported two new paths to hit an internal WARNING using the
new virtio gso type VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_UDP_L4.

    RIP: 0010:skb_checksum_help+0x4a2/0x600 net/core/dev.c:3260
    skb len=64521 gso_size=344
and

    RIP: 0010:skb_warn_bad_offload+0x118/0x240 net/core/dev.c:3262

Older virtio types have historically had loose restrictions, leading
to many entirely impractical fuzzer generated packets causing
problems deep in the kernel stack. Ideally, we would have had strict
validation for all types from the start.

New virtio types can have tighter validation. Limit UDP GSO packets
inserted via virtio to the same limits imposed by the UDP_SEGMENT
socket interface:

1. must use checksum offload
2. checksum offload matches UDP header
3. no more segments than UDP_MAX_SEGMENTS
4. UDP GSO does not take modifier flags, notably SKB_GSO_TCP_ECN

Fixes: 860b7f27b8f7 ("linux/virtio_net.h: Support USO offload in vnet header.")
Reported-by: syzbot+01cdbc31e9c0ae9b33ac@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/0000000000005039270605eb0b7f@google.com/
Reported-by: syzbot+c99d835ff081ca30f986@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/0000000000005426680605eb0b9f@google.com/
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn &lt;willemb@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Jason Wang &lt;jasowang@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>audit,io_uring: io_uring openat triggers audit reference count underflow</title>
<updated>2023-10-25T10:16:11Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Dan Clash</name>
<email>daclash@linux.microsoft.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-10-12T21:55:18Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=6952b951ac9b581eb18cc9dfcbafa6969c015ad0'/>
<id>urn:sha1:6952b951ac9b581eb18cc9dfcbafa6969c015ad0</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 03adc61edad49e1bbecfb53f7ea5d78f398fe368 upstream.

An io_uring openat operation can update an audit reference count
from multiple threads resulting in the call trace below.

A call to io_uring_submit() with a single openat op with a flag of
IOSQE_ASYNC results in the following reference count updates.

These first part of the system call performs two increments that do not race.

do_syscall_64()
  __do_sys_io_uring_enter()
    io_submit_sqes()
      io_openat_prep()
        __io_openat_prep()
          getname()
            getname_flags()       /* update 1 (increment) */
              __audit_getname()   /* update 2 (increment) */

The openat op is queued to an io_uring worker thread which starts the
opportunity for a race.  The system call exit performs one decrement.

do_syscall_64()
  syscall_exit_to_user_mode()
    syscall_exit_to_user_mode_prepare()
      __audit_syscall_exit()
        audit_reset_context()
           putname()              /* update 3 (decrement) */

The io_uring worker thread performs one increment and two decrements.
These updates can race with the system call decrement.

io_wqe_worker()
  io_worker_handle_work()
    io_wq_submit_work()
      io_issue_sqe()
        io_openat()
          io_openat2()
            do_filp_open()
              path_openat()
                __audit_inode()   /* update 4 (increment) */
            putname()             /* update 5 (decrement) */
        __audit_uring_exit()
          audit_reset_context()
            putname()             /* update 6 (decrement) */

The fix is to change the refcnt member of struct audit_names
from int to atomic_t.

kernel BUG at fs/namei.c:262!
Call Trace:
...
 ? putname+0x68/0x70
 audit_reset_context.part.0.constprop.0+0xe1/0x300
 __audit_uring_exit+0xda/0x1c0
 io_issue_sqe+0x1f3/0x450
 ? lock_timer_base+0x3b/0xd0
 io_wq_submit_work+0x8d/0x2b0
 ? __try_to_del_timer_sync+0x67/0xa0
 io_worker_handle_work+0x17c/0x2b0
 io_wqe_worker+0x10a/0x350

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/MW2PR2101MB1033FFF044A258F84AEAA584F1C9A@MW2PR2101MB1033.namprd21.prod.outlook.com/
Fixes: 5bd2182d58e9 ("audit,io_uring,io-wq: add some basic audit support to io_uring")
Signed-off-by: Dan Clash &lt;daclash@linux.microsoft.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231012215518.GA4048@linuxonhyperv3.guj3yctzbm1etfxqx2vob5hsef.xx.internal.cloudapp.net
Reviewed-by: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@kernel.dk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fs: factor out vfs_parse_monolithic_sep() helper</title>
<updated>2023-10-19T21:11:08Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Amir Goldstein</name>
<email>amir73il@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-10-12T12:24:17Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=cd86498418ede1e57961955eb2a1308d1d038d79'/>
<id>urn:sha1:cd86498418ede1e57961955eb2a1308d1d038d79</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit e001d1447cd4585d7f23a44ff668ba2bc624badb ]

Factor out vfs_parse_monolithic_sep() from generic_parse_monolithic(),
so filesystems could use it with a custom option separator callback.

Acked-by: Christian Brauner &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein &lt;amir73il@gmail.com&gt;
Stable-dep-of: c34706acf40b ("ovl: fix regression in parsing of mount options with escaped comma")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
