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<title>user/sven/linux.git/include/net/secure_seq.h, branch v3.10.44</title>
<subtitle>Linux Kernel
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/atom?h=v3.10.44</id>
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<updated>2013-10-13T23:08:30Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>net: net_secret should not depend on TCP</title>
<updated>2013-10-13T23:08:30Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2013-09-24T13:19:57Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:bdf831a681dd237fcde669e07e5202daddfa0c65</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 9a3bab6b05383f1e4c3716b3615500c51285959e ]

A host might need net_secret[] and never open a single socket.

Problem added in commit aebda156a570782
("net: defer net_secret[] initialization")

Based on prior patch from Hannes Frederic Sowa.

Reported-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa &lt;hannes@stressinduktion.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa &lt;hannes@strressinduktion.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: defer net_secret[] initialization</title>
<updated>2013-04-29T19:14:02Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2013-04-29T05:58:52Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:aebda156a570782a86fc4426842152237a19427d</id>
<content type='text'>
Instead of feeding net_secret[] at boot time, defer the init
at the point first socket is created.

This permits some platforms to use better entropy sources than
the ones available at boot time.

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tcp: add const qualifiers where possible</title>
<updated>2011-10-21T09:22:42Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>eric.dumazet@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2011-10-21T09:22:42Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:cf533ea53ebfae41be15b103d78e7ebec30b9969</id>
<content type='text'>
Adding const qualifiers to pointers can ease code review, and spot some
bugs. It might allow compiler to optimize code further.

For example, is it legal to temporary write a null cksum into tcphdr
in tcp_md5_hash_header() ? I am afraid a sniffer could catch the
temporary null value...

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;eric.dumazet@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: Compute protocol sequence numbers and fragment IDs using MD5.</title>
<updated>2011-08-07T01:33:19Z</updated>
<author>
<name>David S. Miller</name>
<email>davem@davemloft.net</email>
</author>
<published>2011-08-04T03:50:44Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:6e5714eaf77d79ae1c8b47e3e040ff5411b717ec</id>
<content type='text'>
Computers have become a lot faster since we compromised on the
partial MD4 hash which we use currently for performance reasons.

MD5 is a much safer choice, and is inline with both RFC1948 and
other ISS generators (OpenBSD, Solaris, etc.)

Furthermore, only having 24-bits of the sequence number be truly
unpredictable is a very serious limitation.  So the periodic
regeneration and 8-bit counter have been removed.  We compute and
use a full 32-bit sequence number.

For ipv6, DCCP was found to use a 32-bit truncated initial sequence
number (it needs 43-bits) and that is fixed here as well.

Reported-by: Dan Kaminsky &lt;dan@doxpara.com&gt;
Tested-by: Willy Tarreau &lt;w@1wt.eu&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
</entry>
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