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<title>user/sven/linux.git/include/net/secure_seq.h, branch v3.2.83</title>
<subtitle>Linux Kernel
</subtitle>
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<updated>2014-09-13T22:41:48Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>inetpeer: get rid of ip_id_count</title>
<updated>2014-09-13T22:41:48Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-06-02T12:26:03Z</published>
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[ Upstream commit 73f156a6e8c1074ac6327e0abd1169e95eb66463 ]

Ideally, we would need to generate IP ID using a per destination IP
generator.

linux kernels used inet_peer cache for this purpose, but this had a huge
cost on servers disabling MTU discovery.

1) each inet_peer struct consumes 192 bytes

2) inetpeer cache uses a binary tree of inet_peer structs,
   with a nominal size of ~66000 elements under load.

3) lookups in this tree are hitting a lot of cache lines, as tree depth
   is about 20.

4) If server deals with many tcp flows, we have a high probability of
   not finding the inet_peer, allocating a fresh one, inserting it in
   the tree with same initial ip_id_count, (cf secure_ip_id())

5) We garbage collect inet_peer aggressively.

IP ID generation do not have to be 'perfect'

Goal is trying to avoid duplicates in a short period of time,
so that reassembly units have a chance to complete reassembly of
fragments belonging to one message before receiving other fragments
with a recycled ID.

We simply use an array of generators, and a Jenkin hash using the dst IP
as a key.

ipv6_select_ident() is put back into net/ipv6/ip6_output.c where it
belongs (it is only used from this file)

secure_ip_id() and secure_ipv6_id() no longer are needed.

Rename ip_select_ident_more() to ip_select_ident_segs() to avoid
unnecessary decrement/increment of the number of segments.

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tcp: add const qualifiers where possible</title>
<updated>2011-10-21T09:22:42Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>eric.dumazet@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2011-10-21T09:22:42Z</published>
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<content type='text'>
Adding const qualifiers to pointers can ease code review, and spot some
bugs. It might allow compiler to optimize code further.

For example, is it legal to temporary write a null cksum into tcphdr
in tcp_md5_hash_header() ? I am afraid a sniffer could catch the
temporary null value...

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;eric.dumazet@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: Compute protocol sequence numbers and fragment IDs using MD5.</title>
<updated>2011-08-07T01:33:19Z</updated>
<author>
<name>David S. Miller</name>
<email>davem@davemloft.net</email>
</author>
<published>2011-08-04T03:50:44Z</published>
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<content type='text'>
Computers have become a lot faster since we compromised on the
partial MD4 hash which we use currently for performance reasons.

MD5 is a much safer choice, and is inline with both RFC1948 and
other ISS generators (OpenBSD, Solaris, etc.)

Furthermore, only having 24-bits of the sequence number be truly
unpredictable is a very serious limitation.  So the periodic
regeneration and 8-bit counter have been removed.  We compute and
use a full 32-bit sequence number.

For ipv6, DCCP was found to use a 32-bit truncated initial sequence
number (it needs 43-bits) and that is fixed here as well.

Reported-by: Dan Kaminsky &lt;dan@doxpara.com&gt;
Tested-by: Willy Tarreau &lt;w@1wt.eu&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
</entry>
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