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<title>user/sven/linux.git/include/net, branch v3.4.48</title>
<subtitle>Linux Kernel
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/atom?h=v3.4.48</id>
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<updated>2013-05-19T17:54:47Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>ipv6: do not clear pinet6 field</title>
<updated>2013-05-19T17:54:47Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2013-05-09T10:28:16Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:7d9577d0b2d7958c821236064d995a995e1c4256</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit f77d602124d865c38705df7fa25c03de9c284ad2 ]

We have seen multiple NULL dereferences in __inet6_lookup_established()

After analysis, I found that inet6_sk() could be NULL while the
check for sk_family == AF_INET6 was true.

Bug was added in linux-2.6.29 when RCU lookups were introduced in UDP
and TCP stacks.

Once an IPv6 socket, using SLAB_DESTROY_BY_RCU is inserted in a hash
table, we no longer can clear pinet6 field.

This patch extends logic used in commit fcbdf09d9652c891
("net: fix nulls list corruptions in sk_prot_alloc")

TCP/UDP/UDPLite IPv6 protocols provide their own .clear_sk() method
to make sure we do not clear pinet6 field.

At socket clone phase, we do not really care, as cloning the parent (non
NULL) pinet6 is not adding a fatal race.

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tcp: force a dst refcount when prequeue packet</title>
<updated>2013-05-19T17:54:43Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2013-04-25T01:34:55Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:8e1546d7e14ef043ff74070cea0aff55ba2f600c</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 093162553c33e9479283e107b4431378271c735d ]

Before escaping RCU protected section and adding packet into
prequeue, make sure the dst is refcounted.

Reported-by: Mike Galbraith &lt;bitbucket@online.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: fix incorrect credentials passing</title>
<updated>2013-05-01T16:41:16Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2013-04-19T15:32:32Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:ca4bf7c6970aee586c4b6b642e011e3847ac5f93</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 83f1b4ba917db5dc5a061a44b3403ddb6e783494 ]

Commit 257b5358b32f ("scm: Capture the full credentials of the scm
sender") changed the credentials passing code to pass in the effective
uid/gid instead of the real uid/gid.

Obviously this doesn't matter most of the time (since normally they are
the same), but it results in differences for suid binaries when the wrong
uid/gid ends up being used.

This just undoes that (presumably unintentional) part of the commit.

Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@amacapital.net&gt;
Cc: Eric W. Biederman &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Cc: Serge E. Hallyn &lt;serge@hallyn.com&gt;
Cc: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>inet: limit length of fragment queue hash table bucket lists</title>
<updated>2013-03-28T19:11:54Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Hannes Frederic Sowa</name>
<email>hannes@stressinduktion.org</email>
</author>
<published>2013-03-15T11:32:30Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:1280938465132080915aef414a1f40f62831bab9</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 5a3da1fe9561828d0ca7eca664b16ec2b9bf0055 ]

This patch introduces a constant limit of the fragment queue hash
table bucket list lengths. Currently the limit 128 is choosen somewhat
arbitrary and just ensures that we can fill up the fragment cache with
empty packets up to the default ip_frag_high_thresh limits. It should
just protect from list iteration eating considerable amounts of cpu.

If we reach the maximum length in one hash bucket a warning is printed.
This is implemented on the caller side of inet_frag_find to distinguish
between the different users of inet_fragment.c.

I dropped the out of memory warning in the ipv4 fragment lookup path,
because we already get a warning by the slab allocator.

Cc: Eric Dumazet &lt;eric.dumazet@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Jesper Dangaard Brouer &lt;jbrouer@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa &lt;hannes@stressinduktion.org&gt;
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ipv4: fix definition of FIB_TABLE_HASHSZ</title>
<updated>2013-03-28T19:11:53Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Denis V. Lunev</name>
<email>den@openvz.org</email>
</author>
<published>2013-03-13T00:24:15Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:6a2d122cdd939e33279baf351c7cbf12c50eaeb5</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 5b9e12dbf92b441b37136ea71dac59f05f2673a9 ]

a long time ago by the commit

  commit 93456b6d7753def8760b423ac6b986eb9d5a4a95
  Author: Denis V. Lunev &lt;den@openvz.org&gt;
  Date:   Thu Jan 10 03:23:38 2008 -0800

    [IPV4]: Unify access to the routing tables.

the defenition of FIB_HASH_TABLE size has obtained wrong dependency:
it should depend upon CONFIG_IP_MULTIPLE_TABLES (as was in the original
code) but it was depended from CONFIG_IP_ROUTE_MULTIPATH

This patch returns the situation to the original state.

The problem was spotted by Tingwei Liu.

Signed-off-by: Denis V. Lunev &lt;den@openvz.org&gt;
CC: Tingwei Liu &lt;tingw.liu@gmail.com&gt;
CC: Alexey Kuznetsov &lt;kuznet@ms2.inr.ac.ru&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ipv6: use a stronger hash for tcp</title>
<updated>2013-02-28T14:59:06Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2013-02-21T12:18:52Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:e5a096aa0aeb1fc8ad8b3d6bd70d322a0d65edc4</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 08dcdbf6a7b9d14c2302c5bd0c5390ddf122f664 ]

It looks like its possible to open thousands of TCP IPv6
sessions on a server, all landing in a single slot of TCP hash
table. Incoming packets have to lookup sockets in a very
long list.

We should hash all bits from foreign IPv6 addresses, using
a salt and hash mix, not a simple XOR.

inet6_ehashfn() can also separately use the ports, instead
of xoring them.

Reported-by: Neal Cardwell &lt;ncardwell@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Cc: Yuchung Cheng &lt;ycheng@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: fix a compile error when SOCK_REFCNT_DEBUG is enabled</title>
<updated>2013-02-28T14:59:06Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Ying Xue</name>
<email>ying.xue@windriver.com</email>
</author>
<published>2013-02-15T22:28:25Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:1e6b5fb5ce92028f6c87864712ed7290446a4c11</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit dec34fb0f5b7873de45132a84a3af29e61084a6b ]

When SOCK_REFCNT_DEBUG is enabled, below build error is met:

kernel/sysctl_binary.o: In function `sk_refcnt_debug_release':
include/net/sock.h:1025: multiple definition of `sk_refcnt_debug_release'
kernel/sysctl.o:include/net/sock.h:1025: first defined here
kernel/audit.o: In function `sk_refcnt_debug_release':
include/net/sock.h:1025: multiple definition of `sk_refcnt_debug_release'
kernel/sysctl.o:include/net/sock.h:1025: first defined here
make[1]: *** [kernel/built-in.o] Error 1
make: *** [kernel] Error 2

So we decide to make sk_refcnt_debug_release static to eliminate
the error.

Signed-off-by: Ying Xue &lt;ying.xue@windriver.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tcp: implement RFC 5961 3.2</title>
<updated>2013-01-11T17:07:14Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-07-17T08:13:05Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:34fb350281ced2a72707a5c0064f69992d440edb</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 282f23c6ee343126156dd41218b22ece96d747e3 ]

Implement the RFC 5691 mitigation against Blind
Reset attack using RST bit.

Idea is to validate incoming RST sequence,
to match RCV.NXT value, instead of previouly accepted
window : (RCV.NXT &lt;= SEG.SEQ &lt; RCV.NXT+RCV.WND)

If sequence is in window but not an exact match, send
a "challenge ACK", so that the other part can resend an
RST with the appropriate sequence.

Add a new sysctl, tcp_challenge_ack_limit, to limit
number of challenge ACK sent per second.

Add a new SNMP counter to count number of challenge acks sent.
(netstat -s | grep TCPChallengeACK)

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Cc: Kiran Kumar Kella &lt;kkiran@broadcom.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>inet: Fix kmemleak in tcp_v4/6_syn_recv_sock and dccp_v4/6_request_recv_sock</title>
<updated>2013-01-11T17:07:14Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Christoph Paasch</name>
<email>christoph.paasch@uclouvain.be</email>
</author>
<published>2012-12-14T04:07:58Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:d46699a94ddf2dd4d83e986a759b64981b37fc5b</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit e337e24d6624e74a558aa69071e112a65f7b5758 ]

If in either of the above functions inet_csk_route_child_sock() or
__inet_inherit_port() fails, the newsk will not be freed:

unreferenced object 0xffff88022e8a92c0 (size 1592):
  comm "softirq", pid 0, jiffies 4294946244 (age 726.160s)
  hex dump (first 32 bytes):
    0a 01 01 01 0a 01 01 02 00 00 00 00 a7 cc 16 00  ................
    02 00 03 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
  backtrace:
    [&lt;ffffffff8153d190&gt;] kmemleak_alloc+0x21/0x3e
    [&lt;ffffffff810ab3e7&gt;] kmem_cache_alloc+0xb5/0xc5
    [&lt;ffffffff8149b65b&gt;] sk_prot_alloc.isra.53+0x2b/0xcd
    [&lt;ffffffff8149b784&gt;] sk_clone_lock+0x16/0x21e
    [&lt;ffffffff814d711a&gt;] inet_csk_clone_lock+0x10/0x7b
    [&lt;ffffffff814ebbc3&gt;] tcp_create_openreq_child+0x21/0x481
    [&lt;ffffffff814e8fa5&gt;] tcp_v4_syn_recv_sock+0x3a/0x23b
    [&lt;ffffffff814ec5ba&gt;] tcp_check_req+0x29f/0x416
    [&lt;ffffffff814e8e10&gt;] tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x161/0x2bc
    [&lt;ffffffff814eb917&gt;] tcp_v4_rcv+0x6c9/0x701
    [&lt;ffffffff814cea9f&gt;] ip_local_deliver_finish+0x70/0xc4
    [&lt;ffffffff814cec20&gt;] ip_local_deliver+0x4e/0x7f
    [&lt;ffffffff814ce9f8&gt;] ip_rcv_finish+0x1fc/0x233
    [&lt;ffffffff814cee68&gt;] ip_rcv+0x217/0x267
    [&lt;ffffffff814a7bbe&gt;] __netif_receive_skb+0x49e/0x553
    [&lt;ffffffff814a7cc3&gt;] netif_receive_skb+0x50/0x82

This happens, because sk_clone_lock initializes sk_refcnt to 2, and thus
a single sock_put() is not enough to free the memory. Additionally, things
like xfrm, memcg, cookie_values,... may have been initialized.
We have to free them properly.

This is fixed by forcing a call to tcp_done(), ending up in
inet_csk_destroy_sock, doing the final sock_put(). tcp_done() is necessary,
because it ends up doing all the cleanup on xfrm, memcg, cookie_values,
xfrm,...

Before calling tcp_done, we have to set the socket to SOCK_DEAD, to
force it entering inet_csk_destroy_sock. To avoid the warning in
inet_csk_destroy_sock, inet_num has to be set to 0.
As inet_csk_destroy_sock does a dec on orphan_count, we first have to
increase it.

Calling tcp_done() allows us to remove the calls to
tcp_clear_xmit_timer() and tcp_cleanup_congestion_control().

A similar approach is taken for dccp by calling dccp_done().

This is in the kernel since 093d282321 (tproxy: fix hash locking issue
when using port redirection in __inet_inherit_port()), thus since
version &gt;= 2.6.37.

Signed-off-by: Christoph Paasch &lt;christoph.paasch@uclouvain.be&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mac80211: verify that skb data is present</title>
<updated>2012-11-17T21:16:11Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Johannes Berg</name>
<email>johannes.berg@intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-10-25T22:36:40Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:4435990b6d456a8c5cac203c025d1f10e0b48a93</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 9b395bc3be1cebf0144a127c7e67d56dbdac0930 upstream.

A number of places in the mesh code don't check that
the frame data is present and in the skb header when
trying to access. Add those checks and the necessary
pskb_may_pull() calls. This prevents accessing data
that doesn't actually exist.

To do this, export ieee80211_get_mesh_hdrlen() to be
able to use it in mac80211.

Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg &lt;johannes.berg@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
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