<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>user/sven/linux.git/include/trace, branch v4.14.299</title>
<subtitle>Linux Kernel
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/atom?h=v4.14.299</id>
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<updated>2022-08-25T09:11:27Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>spmi: trace: fix stack-out-of-bound access in SPMI tracing functions</title>
<updated>2022-08-25T09:11:27Z</updated>
<author>
<name>David Collins</name>
<email>quic_collinsd@quicinc.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-06-27T23:55:12Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:dc6033a7761254e5a5ba7df36b64db787a53313c</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 2af28b241eea816e6f7668d1954f15894b45d7e3 upstream.

trace_spmi_write_begin() and trace_spmi_read_end() both call
memcpy() with a length of "len + 1".  This leads to one extra
byte being read beyond the end of the specified buffer.  Fix
this out-of-bound memory access by using a length of "len"
instead.

Here is a KASAN log showing the issue:

BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in trace_event_raw_event_spmi_read_end+0x1d0/0x234
Read of size 2 at addr ffffffc0265b7540 by task thermal@2.0-ser/1314
...
Call trace:
 dump_backtrace+0x0/0x3e8
 show_stack+0x2c/0x3c
 dump_stack_lvl+0xdc/0x11c
 print_address_description+0x74/0x384
 kasan_report+0x188/0x268
 kasan_check_range+0x270/0x2b0
 memcpy+0x90/0xe8
 trace_event_raw_event_spmi_read_end+0x1d0/0x234
 spmi_read_cmd+0x294/0x3ac
 spmi_ext_register_readl+0x84/0x9c
 regmap_spmi_ext_read+0x144/0x1b0 [regmap_spmi]
 _regmap_raw_read+0x40c/0x754
 regmap_raw_read+0x3a0/0x514
 regmap_bulk_read+0x418/0x494
 adc5_gen3_poll_wait_hs+0xe8/0x1e0 [qcom_spmi_adc5_gen3]
 ...
 __arm64_sys_read+0x4c/0x60
 invoke_syscall+0x80/0x218
 el0_svc_common+0xec/0x1c8
 ...

addr ffffffc0265b7540 is located in stack of task thermal@2.0-ser/1314 at offset 32 in frame:
 adc5_gen3_poll_wait_hs+0x0/0x1e0 [qcom_spmi_adc5_gen3]

this frame has 1 object:
 [32, 33) 'status'

Memory state around the buggy address:
 ffffffc0265b7400: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1
 ffffffc0265b7480: 04 f3 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
&gt;ffffffc0265b7500: 00 00 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 01 f3 f3 f3 00 00 00 00
                                           ^
 ffffffc0265b7580: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
 ffffffc0265b7600: f1 f1 f1 f1 01 f2 07 f2 f2 f2 01 f3 00 00 00 00
==================================================================

Fixes: a9fce374815d ("spmi: add command tracepoints for SPMI")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Stephen Boyd &lt;sboyd@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Collins &lt;quic_collinsd@quicinc.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220627235512.2272783-1-quic_collinsd@quicinc.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: sock: tracing: Fix sock_exceed_buf_limit not to dereference stale pointer</title>
<updated>2022-07-21T18:42:43Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Steven Rostedt (Google)</name>
<email>rostedt@goodmis.org</email>
</author>
<published>2022-07-06T14:50:40Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:98d0dcf81a992722703d6c97930d3d61cb35f6f3</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 820b8963adaea34a87abbecb906d1f54c0aabfb7 upstream.

The trace event sock_exceed_buf_limit saves the prot-&gt;sysctl_mem pointer
and then dereferences it in the TP_printk() portion. This is unsafe as the
TP_printk() portion is executed at the time the buffer is read. That is,
it can be seconds, minutes, days, months, even years later. If the proto
is freed, then this dereference will can also lead to a kernel crash.

Instead, save the sysctl_mem array into the ring buffer and have the
TP_printk() reference that instead. This is the proper and safe way to
read pointers in trace events.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220706052130.16368-12-kuniyu@amazon.com/

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 3847ce32aea9f ("core: add tracepoints for queueing skb to rcvbuf")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Acked-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima &lt;kuniyu@amazon.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ata: libata: add qc-&gt;flags in ata_qc_complete_template tracepoint</title>
<updated>2022-07-02T14:18:08Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Edward Wu</name>
<email>edwardwu@realtek.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-06-17T03:32:20Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:42c75fc81f6d6978faa07c8f58503f59678ee932</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 540a92bfe6dab7310b9df2e488ba247d784d0163 upstream.

Add flags value to check the result of ata completion

Fixes: 255c03d15a29 ("libata: Add tracepoints")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Edward Wu &lt;edwardwu@realtek.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Damien Le Moal &lt;damien.lemoal@opensource.wdc.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>random: remove unused tracepoints</title>
<updated>2022-06-25T09:46:34Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Jason A. Donenfeld</name>
<email>Jason@zx2c4.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-02-10T15:40:44Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:707c01fe19eb2128374d1a71b7b6d1c9ee2d379f</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 14c174633f349cb41ea90c2c0aaddac157012f74 upstream.

These explicit tracepoints aren't really used and show sign of aging.
It's work to keep these up to date, and before I attempted to keep them
up to date, they weren't up to date, which indicates that they're not
really used. These days there are better ways of introspecting anyway.

Cc: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski &lt;linux@dominikbrodowski.net&gt;
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld &lt;Jason@zx2c4.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>random: use hash function for crng_slow_load()</title>
<updated>2022-06-25T09:46:33Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Jason A. Donenfeld</name>
<email>Jason@zx2c4.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-02-08T18:23:17Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:acbf6f4851e3d3815fa8907afffbbcf9140eb3f4</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 66e4c2b9541503d721e936cc3898c9f25f4591ff upstream.

Since we have a hash function that's really fast, and the goal of
crng_slow_load() is reportedly to "touch all of the crng's state", we
can just hash the old state together with the new state and call it a
day. This way we dont need to reason about another LFSR or worry about
various attacks there. This code is only ever used at early boot and
then never again.

Cc: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski &lt;linux@dominikbrodowski.net&gt;
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld &lt;Jason@zx2c4.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>random: simplify entropy debiting</title>
<updated>2022-06-25T09:46:32Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Jason A. Donenfeld</name>
<email>Jason@zx2c4.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-02-02T12:30:03Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:62a2b4bd3ec9e30514466863e06b30f3305b4bb5</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 9c07f57869e90140080cfc282cc628d123e27704 upstream.

Our pool is 256 bits, and we only ever use all of it or don't use it at
all, which is decided by whether or not it has at least 128 bits in it.
So we can drastically simplify the accounting and cmpxchg loop to do
exactly this.  While we're at it, we move the minimum bit size into a
constant so it can be shared between the two places where it matters.

The reason we want any of this is for the case in which an attacker has
compromised the current state, and then bruteforces small amounts of
entropy added to it. By demanding a particular minimum amount of entropy
be present before reseeding, we make that bruteforcing difficult.

Note that this rationale no longer includes anything about /dev/random
blocking at the right moment, since /dev/random no longer blocks (except
for at ~boot), but rather uses the crng. In a former life, /dev/random
was different and therefore required a more nuanced account(), but this
is no longer.

Behaviorally, nothing changes here. This is just a simplification of
the code.

Cc: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski &lt;linux@dominikbrodowski.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld &lt;Jason@zx2c4.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>random: rather than entropy_store abstraction, use global</title>
<updated>2022-06-25T09:46:31Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Jason A. Donenfeld</name>
<email>Jason@zx2c4.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-01-12T16:18:08Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:55349296ba9b060d41129a074fc5d8414d83682f</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 90ed1e67e896cc8040a523f8428fc02f9b164394 upstream.

Originally, the RNG used several pools, so having things abstracted out
over a generic entropy_store object made sense. These days, there's only
one input pool, and then an uneven mix of usage via the abstraction and
usage via &amp;input_pool. Rather than this uneasy mixture, just get rid of
the abstraction entirely and have things always use the global. This
simplifies the code and makes reading it a bit easier.

Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski &lt;linux@dominikbrodowski.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld &lt;Jason@zx2c4.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>random: remove dead code left over from blocking pool</title>
<updated>2022-06-25T09:46:29Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
<email>ebiggers@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-03-22T05:14:00Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:5ab8e04f6da2696ece26579a5159d67a8d8574be</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 118a4417e14348b2e46f5e467da8444ec4757a45 upstream.

Remove some dead code that was left over following commit 90ea1c6436d2
("random: remove the blocking pool").

Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Jann Horn &lt;jannh@google.com&gt;
Cc: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel &lt;ardb@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld &lt;Jason@zx2c4.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>random: only read from /dev/random after its pool has received 128 bits</title>
<updated>2022-06-25T09:46:26Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Theodore Ts'o</name>
<email>tytso@mit.edu</email>
</author>
<published>2019-02-20T21:06:38Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:fd5e41d61e3796f67877ec0b629fb423d8ec13a8</id>
<content type='text'>
commit eb9d1bf079bb438d1a066d72337092935fc770f6 upstream.

Immediately after boot, we allow reads from /dev/random before its
entropy pool has been fully initialized.  Fix this so that we don't
allow this until the blocking pool has received 128 bits.

We do this by repurposing the initialized flag in the entropy pool
struct, and use the initialized flag in the blocking pool to indicate
whether it is safe to pull from the blocking pool.

To do this, we needed to rework when we decide to push entropy from the
input pool to the blocking pool, since the initialized flag for the
input pool was used for this purpose.  To simplify things, we no
longer use the initialized flag for that purpose, nor do we use the
entropy_total field any more.

Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld &lt;Jason@zx2c4.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tracing: incorrect isolate_mote_t cast in mm_vmscan_lru_isolate</title>
<updated>2022-06-14T14:53:47Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Vasily Averin</name>
<email>vvs@openvz.org</email>
</author>
<published>2022-05-11T09:46:53Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:232db3526cdd1d286cf15a5230bcfa51ca8d4774</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 2b132903de7124dd9a758be0c27562e91a510848 ]

Fixes following sparse warnings:

  CHECK   mm/vmscan.c
mm/vmscan.c: note: in included file (through
include/trace/trace_events.h, include/trace/define_trace.h,
include/trace/events/vmscan.h):
./include/trace/events/vmscan.h:281:1: sparse: warning:
 cast to restricted isolate_mode_t
./include/trace/events/vmscan.h:281:1: sparse: warning:
 restricted isolate_mode_t degrades to integer

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/e85d7ff2-fd10-53f8-c24e-ba0458439c1b@openvz.org
Signed-off-by: Vasily Averin &lt;vvs@openvz.org&gt;
Acked-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
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