<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>user/sven/linux.git/include/uapi/linux/audit.h, branch v4.19.32</title>
<subtitle>Linux Kernel
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/atom?h=v4.19.32</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/atom?h=v4.19.32'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/'/>
<updated>2018-08-16T05:54:12Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security</title>
<updated>2018-08-16T05:54:12Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2018-08-16T05:54:12Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=f91e654474d413201ae578820fb63f8a811f6c4e'/>
<id>urn:sha1:f91e654474d413201ae578820fb63f8a811f6c4e</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull integrity updates from James Morris:
 "This adds support for EVM signatures based on larger digests, contains
  a new audit record AUDIT_INTEGRITY_POLICY_RULE to differentiate the
  IMA policy rules from the IMA-audit messages, addresses two deadlocks
  due to either loading or searching for crypto algorithms, and cleans
  up the audit messages"

* 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
  EVM: fix return value check in evm_write_xattrs()
  integrity: prevent deadlock during digsig verification.
  evm: Allow non-SHA1 digital signatures
  evm: Don't deadlock if a crypto algorithm is unavailable
  integrity: silence warning when CONFIG_SECURITYFS is not enabled
  ima: Differentiate auditing policy rules from "audit" actions
  ima: Do not audit if CONFIG_INTEGRITY_AUDIT is not set
  ima: Use audit_log_format() rather than audit_log_string()
  ima: Call audit_log_string() rather than logging it untrusted
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ima: Differentiate auditing policy rules from "audit" actions</title>
<updated>2018-07-18T11:27:22Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Stefan Berger</name>
<email>stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-06-04T20:54:55Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=dba31ee759417ef1a952e929524b0cca1751c036'/>
<id>urn:sha1:dba31ee759417ef1a952e929524b0cca1751c036</id>
<content type='text'>
The AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE is used for auditing IMA policy rules and
the IMA "audit" policy action.  This patch defines
AUDIT_INTEGRITY_POLICY_RULE to reflect the IMA policy rules.

Since we defined a new message type we can now also pass the
audit_context and get an associated SYSCALL record. This now produces
the following records when parsing IMA policy's rules:

type=UNKNOWN[1807] msg=audit(1527888965.738:320): action=audit \
  func=MMAP_CHECK mask=MAY_EXEC res=1
type=UNKNOWN[1807] msg=audit(1527888965.738:320): action=audit \
  func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ res=1
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1527888965.738:320): arch=c000003e syscall=1 \
  success=yes exit=17 a0=1 a1=55bcfcca9030 a2=11 a3=7fcc1b55fb38 \
  items=0 ppid=1567 pid=1601 auid=0 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 \
  fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=tty2 ses=2 comm="echo" \
  exe="/usr/bin/echo" \
  subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 key=(null)

Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger &lt;stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Acked-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>audit: rename FILTER_TYPE to FILTER_EXCLUDE</title>
<updated>2018-06-19T14:39:54Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Richard Guy Briggs</name>
<email>rgb@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-06-05T15:45:07Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=d904ac0320d3c4ff4e9d80e4294ca5dde803696f'/>
<id>urn:sha1:d904ac0320d3c4ff4e9d80e4294ca5dde803696f</id>
<content type='text'>
The AUDIT_FILTER_TYPE name is vague and misleading due to not describing
where or when the filter is applied and obsolete due to its available
filter fields having been expanded.

Userspace has already renamed it from AUDIT_FILTER_TYPE to
AUDIT_FILTER_EXCLUDE without checking if it already exists.  The
userspace maintainer assures that as long as it is set to the same value
it will not be a problem since the userspace code does not treat
compiler warnings as errors.  If this policy changes then checks if it
already exists can be added at the same time.

See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/89

Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs &lt;rgb@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security</title>
<updated>2018-06-07T22:40:37Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2018-06-07T22:40:37Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=00d535a386c071a06e111fd846f6beda445126a5'/>
<id>urn:sha1:00d535a386c071a06e111fd846f6beda445126a5</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull integrity updates from James Morris:
 "From Mimi:

   - add run time support for specifying additional security xattrs
     included in the security.evm HMAC/signature

   - some code clean up and bug fixes"

* 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
  EVM: unlock on error path in evm_read_xattrs()
  EVM: prevent array underflow in evm_write_xattrs()
  EVM: Fix null dereference on xattr when xattr fails to allocate
  EVM: fix memory leak of temporary buffer 'temp'
  IMA: use list_splice_tail_init_rcu() instead of its open coded variant
  ima: use match_string() helper
  ima: fix updating the ima_appraise flag
  ima: based on policy verify firmware signatures (pre-allocated buffer)
  ima: define a new policy condition based on the filesystem name
  EVM: Allow runtime modification of the set of verified xattrs
  EVM: turn evm_config_xattrnames into a list
  integrity: Add an integrity directory in securityfs
  ima: Remove unused variable ima_initialized
  ima: Unify logging
  ima: Reflect correct permissions for policy
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>EVM: Allow runtime modification of the set of verified xattrs</title>
<updated>2018-05-18T19:34:45Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Matthew Garrett</name>
<email>mjg59@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-05-15T17:38:26Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=fa516b66a1bfce1d72f1620c54bdfebc493000d1'/>
<id>urn:sha1:fa516b66a1bfce1d72f1620c54bdfebc493000d1</id>
<content type='text'>
Sites may wish to provide additional metadata alongside files in order
to make more fine-grained security decisions[1]. The security of this is
enhanced if this metadata is protected, something that EVM makes
possible. However, the kernel cannot know about the set of extended
attributes that local admins may wish to protect, and hardcoding this
policy in the kernel makes it difficult to change over time and less
convenient for distributions to enable.

This patch adds a new /sys/kernel/security/integrity/evm/evm_xattrs node,
which can be read to obtain the current set of EVM-protected extended
attributes or written to in order to add new entries. Extending this list
will not change the validity of any existing signatures provided that the
file in question does not have any of the additional extended attributes -
missing xattrs are skipped when calculating the EVM hash.

[1] For instance, a package manager could install information about the
package uploader in an additional extended attribute. Local LSM policy
could then be associated with that extended attribute in order to
restrict the privileges available to packages from less trusted
uploaders.

Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett &lt;mjg59@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: James Morris &lt;james.morris@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>audit: convert sessionid unset to a macro</title>
<updated>2018-05-14T19:56:35Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Richard Guy Briggs</name>
<email>rgb@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-05-13T01:58:19Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=f0b752168d7091f38e7d61a80de2542e8b71d266'/>
<id>urn:sha1:f0b752168d7091f38e7d61a80de2542e8b71d266</id>
<content type='text'>
Use a macro, "AUDIT_SID_UNSET", to replace each instance of
initialization and comparison to an audit session ID.

Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs &lt;rgb@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'audit-pr-20171113' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit</title>
<updated>2017-11-15T21:28:48Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2017-11-15T21:28:48Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=f9bab2677ac77622618686b199073978ba263c12'/>
<id>urn:sha1:f9bab2677ac77622618686b199073978ba263c12</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull audit updates from Paul Moore:
 "Another relatively small pull request for audit, nine patches total.

  The only real new bit of functionality is the patch from Richard which
  adds the ability to filter records based on the filesystem type.

  The remainder are bug fixes and cleanups; the bug fix highlights
  include:

   - ensuring that we properly audit init/PID-1 (me)

   - allowing the audit daemon to shutdown the kernel/auditd connection
     cleanly by setting the audit PID to zero (Steve)"

* tag 'audit-pr-20171113' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit:
  audit: filter PATH records keyed on filesystem magic
  Audit: remove unused audit_log_secctx function
  audit: Allow auditd to set pid to 0 to end auditing
  audit: Add new syscalls to the perm=w filter
  audit: use audit_set_enabled() in audit_enable()
  audit: convert audit_ever_enabled to a boolean
  audit: don't use simple_strtol() anymore
  audit: initialize the audit subsystem as early as possible
  audit: ensure that 'audit=1' actually enables audit for PID 1
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'for_linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jack/linux-fs</title>
<updated>2017-11-14T22:13:11Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2017-11-14T22:13:11Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=f14fc0ccee5521e5b38cdd1df4385d32c6e1805b'/>
<id>urn:sha1:f14fc0ccee5521e5b38cdd1df4385d32c6e1805b</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull quota, ext2, isofs and udf fixes from Jan Kara:

 - two small quota error handling fixes

 - two isofs fixes for architectures with signed char

 - several udf block number overflow and signedness fixes

 - ext2 rework of mount option handling to avoid GFP_KERNEL allocation
   with spinlock held

 - ... it also contains a patch to implement auditing of responses to
   fanotify permission events. That should have been in the fanotify
   pull request but I mistakenly merged that patch into a wrong branch
   and noticed only now at which point I don't think it's worth rebasing
   and redoing.

* 'for_linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jack/linux-fs:
  quota: be aware of error from dquot_initialize
  quota: fix potential infinite loop
  isofs: use unsigned char types consistently
  isofs: fix timestamps beyond 2027
  udf: Fix some sign-conversion warnings
  udf: Fix signed/unsigned format specifiers
  udf: Fix 64-bit sign extension issues affecting blocks &gt; 0x7FFFFFFF
  udf: Remove some outdate references from documentation
  udf: Avoid overflow when session starts at large offset
  ext2: Fix possible sleep in atomic during mount option parsing
  ext2: Parse mount options into a dedicated structure
  audit: Record fanotify access control decisions
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>audit: filter PATH records keyed on filesystem magic</title>
<updated>2017-11-10T21:08:56Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Richard Guy Briggs</name>
<email>rgb@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-08-23T11:03:39Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=42d5e37654e4cdb9fb2e2f3ab30045fee35c42d8'/>
<id>urn:sha1:42d5e37654e4cdb9fb2e2f3ab30045fee35c42d8</id>
<content type='text'>
Tracefs or debugfs were causing hundreds to thousands of PATH records to
be associated with the init_module and finit_module SYSCALL records on a
few modules when the following rule was in place for startup:
	-a always,exit -F arch=x86_64 -S init_module -F key=mod-load

Provide a method to ignore these large number of PATH records from
overwhelming the logs if they are not of interest.  Introduce a new
filter list "AUDIT_FILTER_FS", with a new field type AUDIT_FSTYPE,
which keys off the filesystem 4-octet hexadecimal magic identifier to
filter specific filesystem PATH records.

An example rule would look like:
	-a never,filesystem -F fstype=0x74726163 -F key=ignore_tracefs
	-a never,filesystem -F fstype=0x64626720 -F key=ignore_debugfs

Arguably the better way to address this issue is to disable tracefs and
debugfs on boot from production systems.

See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/16
See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-userspace/issues/8
Test case: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-testsuite/issues/42

Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs &lt;rgb@redhat.com&gt;
[PM: fixed the whitespace damage in kernel/auditsc.c]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>License cleanup: add SPDX license identifier to uapi header files with a license</title>
<updated>2017-11-02T10:20:11Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Greg Kroah-Hartman</name>
<email>gregkh@linuxfoundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2017-11-01T14:09:13Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=e2be04c7f9958dde770eeb8b30e829ca969b37bb'/>
<id>urn:sha1:e2be04c7f9958dde770eeb8b30e829ca969b37bb</id>
<content type='text'>
Many user space API headers have licensing information, which is either
incomplete, badly formatted or just a shorthand for referring to the
license under which the file is supposed to be.  This makes it hard for
compliance tools to determine the correct license.

Update these files with an SPDX license identifier.  The identifier was
chosen based on the license information in the file.

GPL/LGPL licensed headers get the matching GPL/LGPL SPDX license
identifier with the added 'WITH Linux-syscall-note' exception, which is
the officially assigned exception identifier for the kernel syscall
exception:

   NOTE! This copyright does *not* cover user programs that use kernel
   services by normal system calls - this is merely considered normal use
   of the kernel, and does *not* fall under the heading of "derived work".

This exception makes it possible to include GPL headers into non GPL
code, without confusing license compliance tools.

Headers which have either explicit dual licensing or are just licensed
under a non GPL license are updated with the corresponding SPDX
identifier and the GPLv2 with syscall exception identifier.  The format
is:
        ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR SPDX-ID-OF-OTHER-LICENSE)

SPDX license identifiers are a legally binding shorthand, which can be
used instead of the full boiler plate text.  The update does not remove
existing license information as this has to be done on a case by case
basis and the copyright holders might have to be consulted. This will
happen in a separate step.

This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
Philippe Ombredanne.  See the previous patch in this series for the
methodology of how this patch was researched.

Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart &lt;kstewart@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne &lt;pombredanne@nexb.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
