user/sven/linux.git/include, branch v3.0.50

ipvs: fix oops on NAT reply in br_nf context

2012-10-21T16:17:11Z

commit 9e33ce453f8ac8452649802bee1f410319408f4b upstream. IPVS should not reset skb->nf_bridge in FORWARD hook by calling nf_reset for NAT replies. It triggers oops in br_nf_forward_finish. [ 579.781508] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000004 [ 579.781669] IP: [] br_nf_forward_finish+0x58/0x112 [ 579.781792] PGD 218f9067 PUD 0 [ 579.781865] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP [ 579.781945] CPU 0 [ 579.781983] Modules linked in: [ 579.782047] [ 579.782080] [ 579.782114] Pid: 4644, comm: qemu Tainted: G W 3.5.0-rc5-00006-g95e69f9 #282 Hewlett-Packard /30E8 [ 579.782300] RIP: 0010:[] [] br_nf_forward_finish+0x58/0x112 [ 579.782455] RSP: 0018:ffff88007b003a98 EFLAGS: 00010287 [ 579.782541] RAX: 0000000000000008 RBX: ffff8800762ead00 RCX: 000000000001670a [ 579.782653] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000000000000000a RDI: ffff8800762ead00 [ 579.782845] RBP: ffff88007b003ac8 R08: 0000000000016630 R09: ffff88007b003a90 [ 579.782957] R10: ffff88007b0038e8 R11: ffff88002da37540 R12: ffff88002da01a02 [ 579.783066] R13: ffff88002da01a80 R14: ffff88002d83c000 R15: ffff88002d82a000 [ 579.783177] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88007b000000(0063) knlGS:00000000f62d1b70 [ 579.783306] CS: 0010 DS: 002b ES: 002b CR0: 000000008005003b [ 579.783395] CR2: 0000000000000004 CR3: 00000000218fe000 CR4: 00000000000027f0 [ 579.783505] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 579.783684] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 579.783795] Process qemu (pid: 4644, threadinfo ffff880021b20000, task ffff880021aba760) [ 579.783919] Stack: [ 579.783959] ffff88007693cedc ffff8800762ead00 ffff88002da01a02 ffff8800762ead00 [ 579.784110] ffff88002da01a02 ffff88002da01a80 ffff88007b003b18 ffffffff817b26c7 [ 579.784260] ffff880080000000 ffffffff81ef59f0 ffff8800762ead00 ffffffff81ef58b0 [ 579.784477] Call Trace: [ 579.784523] [ 579.784562] [ 579.784603] [] br_nf_forward_ip+0x275/0x2c8 [ 579.784707] [] nf_iterate+0x47/0x7d [ 579.784797] [] ? br_dev_queue_push_xmit+0xae/0xae [ 579.784906] [] nf_hook_slow+0x6d/0x102 [ 579.784995] [] ? br_dev_queue_push_xmit+0xae/0xae [ 579.785175] [] ? _raw_write_unlock_bh+0x19/0x1b [ 579.785179] [] __br_forward+0x97/0xa2 [ 579.785179] [] br_handle_frame_finish+0x1a6/0x257 [ 579.785179] [] br_nf_pre_routing_finish+0x26d/0x2cb [ 579.785179] [] br_nf_pre_routing+0x55d/0x5c1 [ 579.785179] [] nf_iterate+0x47/0x7d [ 579.785179] [] ? br_handle_local_finish+0x44/0x44 [ 579.785179] [] nf_hook_slow+0x6d/0x102 [ 579.785179] [] ? br_handle_local_finish+0x44/0x44 [ 579.785179] [] ? sky2_poll+0xb35/0xb54 [ 579.785179] [] br_handle_frame+0x213/0x229 [ 579.785179] [] ? br_handle_frame_finish+0x257/0x257 [ 579.785179] [] __netif_receive_skb+0x2b4/0x3f1 [ 579.785179] [] process_backlog+0x99/0x1e2 [ 579.785179] [] net_rx_action+0xdf/0x242 [ 579.785179] [] __do_softirq+0xc1/0x1e0 [ 579.785179] [] ? trace_hardirqs_off_thunk+0x3a/0x6c [ 579.785179] [] call_softirq+0x1c/0x30 The steps to reproduce as follow, 1. On Host1, setup brige br0(192.168.1.106) 2. Boot a kvm guest(192.168.1.105) on Host1 and start httpd 3. Start IPVS service on Host1 ipvsadm -A -t 192.168.1.106:80 -s rr ipvsadm -a -t 192.168.1.106:80 -r 192.168.1.105:80 -m 4. Run apache benchmark on Host2(192.168.1.101) ab -n 1000 http://192.168.1.106/ ip_vs_reply4 ip_vs_out handle_response ip_vs_notrack nf_reset() { skb->nf_bridge = NULL; } Actually, IPVS wants in this case just to replace nfct with untracked version. So replace the nf_reset(skb) call in ip_vs_notrack() with a nf_conntrack_put(skb->nfct) call. Signed-off-by: Lin Ming Signed-off-by: Julian Anastasov Signed-off-by: Simon Horman Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso Acked-by: David Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

netfilter: nf_conntrack: fix racy timer handling with reliable events

2012-10-21T16:17:11Z

commit 5b423f6a40a0327f9d40bc8b97ce9be266f74368 upstream. Existing code assumes that del_timer returns true for alive conntrack entries. However, this is not true if reliable events are enabled. In that case, del_timer may return true for entries that were just inserted in the dying list. Note that packets / ctnetlink may hold references to conntrack entries that were just inserted to such list. This patch fixes the issue by adding an independent timer for event delivery. This increases the size of the ecache extension. Still we can revisit this later and use variable size extensions to allocate this area on demand. Tested-by: Oliver Smith Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso Acked-by: David Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

mempolicy: fix a race in shared_policy_replace()

2012-10-12T20:28:14Z

commit b22d127a39ddd10d93deee3d96e643657ad53a49 upstream. shared_policy_replace() use of sp_alloc() is unsafe. 1) sp_node cannot be dereferenced if sp->lock is not held and 2) another thread can modify sp_node between spin_unlock for allocating a new sp node and next spin_lock. The bug was introduced before 2.6.12-rc2. Kosaki's original patch for this problem was to allocate an sp node and policy within shared_policy_replace and initialise it when the lock is reacquired. I was not keen on this approach because it partially duplicates sp_alloc(). As the paths were sp->lock is taken are not that performance critical this patch converts sp->lock to sp->mutex so it can sleep when calling sp_alloc(). [kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com: Original patch] Signed-off-by: Mel Gorman Acked-by: KOSAKI Motohiro Reviewed-by: Christoph Lameter Cc: Josh Boyer Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

xfrm_user: ensure user supplied esn replay window is valid

2012-10-12T20:28:05Z

[ Upstream commit ecd7918745234e423dd87fcc0c077da557909720 ] The current code fails to ensure that the netlink message actually contains as many bytes as the header indicates. If a user creates a new state or updates an existing one but does not supply the bytes for the whole ESN replay window, the kernel copies random heap bytes into the replay bitmap, the ones happen to follow the XFRMA_REPLAY_ESN_VAL netlink attribute. This leads to following issues: 1. The replay window has random bits set confusing the replay handling code later on. 2. A malicious user could use this flaw to leak up to ~3.5kB of heap memory when she has access to the XFRM netlink interface (requires CAP_NET_ADMIN). Known users of the ESN replay window are strongSwan and Steffen's iproute2 patch (). The latter uses the interface with a bitmap supplied while the former does not. strongSwan is therefore prone to run into issue 1. To fix both issues without breaking existing userland allow using the XFRMA_REPLAY_ESN_VAL netlink attribute with either an empty bitmap or a fully specified one. For the former case we initialize the in-kernel bitmap with zero, for the latter we copy the user supplied bitmap. For state updates the full bitmap must be supplied. To prevent overflows in the bitmap length calculation the maximum size of bmp_len is limited to 128 by this patch -- resulting in a maximum replay window of 4096 packets. This should be sufficient for all real life scenarios (RFC 4303 recommends a default replay window size of 64). Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause Cc: Steffen Klassert Cc: Martin Willi Cc: Ben Hutchings Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

xfrm: Workaround incompatibility of ESN and async crypto

2012-10-12T20:28:03Z

[ Upstream commit 3b59df46a449ec9975146d71318c4777ad086744 ] ESN for esp is defined in RFC 4303. This RFC assumes that the sequence number counters are always up to date. However, this is not true if an async crypto algorithm is employed. If the sequence number counters are not up to date on sequence number check, we may incorrectly update the upper 32 bit of the sequence number. This leads to a DOS. We workaround this by comparing the upper sequence number, (used for authentication) with the upper sequence number computed after the async processing. We drop the packet if these numbers are different. To do this, we introduce a recheck function that does this check in the ESN case. Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert Acked-by: Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

serial: set correct baud_base for EXSYS EX-41092 Dual 16950

2012-10-07T15:27:25Z

commit 26e8220adb0aec43b7acafa0f1431760eee28522 upstream. Apparently the same card model has two IDs, so this patch complements the commit 39aced68d664291db3324d0fcf0985ab5626aac2 adding the missing one. Signed-off-by: Flavio Leitner Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

time: Move ktime_t overflow checking into timespec_valid_strict

2012-10-02T16:47:52Z

commit cee58483cf56e0ba355fdd97ff5e8925329aa936 upstream Andreas Bombe reported that the added ktime_t overflow checking added to timespec_valid in commit 4e8b14526ca7 ("time: Improve sanity checking of timekeeping inputs") was causing problems with X.org because it caused timeouts larger then KTIME_T to be invalid. Previously, these large timeouts would be clamped to KTIME_MAX and would never expire, which is valid. This patch splits the ktime_t overflow checking into a new timespec_valid_strict function, and converts the timekeeping codes internal checking to use this more strict function. Reported-and-tested-by: Andreas Bombe Cc: Zhouping Liu Cc: Ingo Molnar Cc: Prarit Bhargava Cc: Thomas Gleixner Signed-off-by: John Stultz Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: John Stultz Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

time: Improve sanity checking of timekeeping inputs

2012-10-02T16:47:44Z

commit 4e8b14526ca7fb046a81c94002c1c43b6fdf0e9b upstream Unexpected behavior could occur if the time is set to a value large enough to overflow a 64bit ktime_t (which is something larger then the year 2262). Also unexpected behavior could occur if large negative offsets are injected via adjtimex. So this patch improves the sanity check timekeeping inputs by improving the timespec_valid() check, and then makes better use of timespec_valid() to make sure we don't set the time to an invalid negative value or one that overflows ktime_t. Note: This does not protect from setting the time close to overflowing ktime_t and then letting natural accumulation cause the overflow. Reported-by: CAI Qian Reported-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: John Stultz Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Prarit Bhargava Cc: Zhouping Liu Cc: Ingo Molnar Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1344454580-17031-1-git-send-email-john.stultz@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Signed-off-by: John Stultz Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

sched: Fix race in task_group()

2012-10-02T16:47:42Z

commit 8323f26ce3425460769605a6aece7a174edaa7d1 upstream. Stefan reported a crash on a kernel before a3e5d1091c1 ("sched: Don't call task_group() too many times in set_task_rq()"), he found the reason to be that the multiple task_group() invocations in set_task_rq() returned different values. Looking at all that I found a lack of serialization and plain wrong comments. The below tries to fix it using an extra pointer which is updated under the appropriate scheduler locks. Its not pretty, but I can't really see another way given how all the cgroup stuff works. Reported-and-tested-by: Stefan Bader Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1340364965.18025.71.camel@twins Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

mutex: Place lock in contended state after fastpath_lock failure

2012-10-02T16:47:39Z

commit 0bce9c46bf3b15f485d82d7e81dabed6ebcc24b1 upstream. ARM recently moved to asm-generic/mutex-xchg.h for its mutex implementation after the previous implementation was found to be missing some crucial memory barriers. However, this has revealed some problems running hackbench on SMP platforms due to the way in which the MUTEX_SPIN_ON_OWNER code operates. The symptoms are that a bunch of hackbench tasks are left waiting on an unlocked mutex and therefore never get woken up to claim it. This boils down to the following sequence of events: Task A Task B Task C Lock value 0 1 1 lock() 0 2 lock() 0 3 spin(A) 0 4 unlock() 1 5 lock() 0 6 cmpxchg(1,0) 0 7 contended() -1 8 lock() 0 9 spin(C) 0 10 unlock() 1 11 cmpxchg(1,0) 0 12 unlock() 1 At this point, the lock is unlocked, but Task B is in an uninterruptible sleep with nobody to wake it up. This patch fixes the problem by ensuring we put the lock into the contended state if we fail to acquire it on the fastpath, ensuring that any blocked waiters are woken up when the mutex is released. Signed-off-by: Will Deacon Cc: Arnd Bergmann Cc: Chris Mason Cc: Ingo Molnar Reviewed-by: Nicolas Pitre Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-6e9lrw2avczr0617fzl5vqb8@git.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman