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<title>user/sven/linux.git/include, branch v3.14.19</title>
<subtitle>Linux Kernel
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/atom?h=v3.14.19</id>
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<updated>2014-09-17T16:19:27Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>vfs: add d_is_dir()</title>
<updated>2014-09-17T16:19:27Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Miklos Szeredi</name>
<email>mszeredi@suse.cz</email>
</author>
<published>2014-04-01T15:08:41Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=db8bf54b17afbc609432464c543597c7e1101358'/>
<id>urn:sha1:db8bf54b17afbc609432464c543597c7e1101358</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 44b1d53043c482225196e8a9cd9f35163a1b3336 upstream.

Add d_is_dir(dentry) helper which is analogous to S_ISDIR().

To avoid confusion, rename d_is_directory() to d_can_lookup().

Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi &lt;mszeredi@suse.cz&gt;
Reviewed-by: J. Bruce Fields &lt;bfields@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>RDMA/uapi: Include socket.h in rdma_user_cm.h</title>
<updated>2014-09-17T16:19:24Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Doug Ledford</name>
<email>dledford@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-08-12T23:20:11Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:274a2532607a785216bb022231f16673bbf72e22</id>
<content type='text'>
commit db1044d458a287c18c4d413adc4ad12e92e253b5 upstream.

added struct sockaddr_storage to rdma_user_cm.h without also adding an
include for linux/socket.h to make sure it is defined.  Systemtap
needs the header files to build standalone and cannot rely on other
files to pre-include other headers, so add linux/socket.h to the list
of includes in this file.

Fixes: ee7aed4528f ("RDMA/ucma: Support querying for AF_IB addresses")
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford &lt;dledford@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier &lt;roland@purestorage.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mnt: Correct permission checks in do_remount</title>
<updated>2014-09-17T16:19:21Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric W. Biederman</name>
<email>ebiederm@xmission.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-07-29T00:26:07Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:92ecaf8784ebb728f2b147f5bfd9af5aa8a35f4e</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 9566d6742852c527bf5af38af5cbb878dad75705 upstream.

While invesgiating the issue where in "mount --bind -oremount,ro ..."
would result in later "mount --bind -oremount,rw" succeeding even if
the mount started off locked I realized that there are several
additional mount flags that should be locked and are not.

In particular MNT_NOSUID, MNT_NODEV, MNT_NOEXEC, and the atime
flags in addition to MNT_READONLY should all be locked.  These
flags are all per superblock, can all be changed with MS_BIND,
and should not be changable if set by a more privileged user.

The following additions to the current logic are added in this patch.
- nosuid may not be clearable by a less privileged user.
- nodev  may not be clearable by a less privielged user.
- noexec may not be clearable by a less privileged user.
- atime flags may not be changeable by a less privileged user.

The logic with atime is that always setting atime on access is a
global policy and backup software and auditing software could break if
atime bits are not updated (when they are configured to be updated),
and serious performance degradation could result (DOS attack) if atime
updates happen when they have been explicitly disabled.  Therefore an
unprivileged user should not be able to mess with the atime bits set
by a more privileged user.

The additional restrictions are implemented with the addition of
MNT_LOCK_NOSUID, MNT_LOCK_NODEV, MNT_LOCK_NOEXEC, and MNT_LOCK_ATIME
mnt flags.

Taken together these changes and the fixes for MNT_LOCK_READONLY
should make it safe for an unprivileged user to create a user
namespace and to call "mount --bind -o remount,... ..." without
the danger of mount flags being changed maliciously.

Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn &lt;serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mnt: Only change user settable mount flags in remount</title>
<updated>2014-09-17T16:19:21Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric W. Biederman</name>
<email>ebiederm@xmission.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-07-28T23:26:53Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:98e68ce8f4a6d3ad72243eecd1022ba120b515d2</id>
<content type='text'>
commit a6138db815df5ee542d848318e5dae681590fccd upstream.

Kenton Varda &lt;kenton@sandstorm.io&gt; discovered that by remounting a
read-only bind mount read-only in a user namespace the
MNT_LOCK_READONLY bit would be cleared, allowing an unprivileged user
to the remount a read-only mount read-write.

Correct this by replacing the mask of mount flags to preserve
with a mask of mount flags that may be changed, and preserve
all others.   This ensures that any future bugs with this mask and
remount will fail in an easy to detect way where new mount flags
simply won't change.

Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn &lt;serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ACPI / scan: not cache _SUN value in struct acpi_device_pnp</title>
<updated>2014-09-17T16:19:20Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Yasuaki Ishimatsu</name>
<email>isimatu.yasuaki@jp.fujitsu.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-09-03T04:39:13Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:089d41d4057ff601e34b701a4d03f06c479900aa</id>
<content type='text'>
commit a383b68d9fe9864c4d3b86f67ad6488f58136435 upstream.

The _SUN device indentification object is not guaranteed to return
the same value every time it is executed, so we should not cache its
return value, but rather execute it every time as needed.  If it is
cached, an incorrect stale value may be used in some situations.

This issue was exposed by commit 202317a573b2 (ACPI / scan: Add
acpi_device objects for all device nodes in the namespace).  Fix it
by avoiding to cache the return value of _SUN.

Fixes: 202317a573b2 (ACPI / scan: Add acpi_device objects for all device nodes in the namespace)
Signed-off-by: Yasuaki Ishimatsu &lt;isimatu.yasuaki@jp.fujitsu.com&gt;
[ rjw: Changelog ]
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki &lt;rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>scsi: do not issue SCSI RSOC command to Promise Vtrak E610f</title>
<updated>2014-09-17T16:19:14Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Janusz Dziemidowicz</name>
<email>rraptorr@nails.eu.org</email>
</author>
<published>2014-07-24T13:48:46Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:aeed424c53c76baac72c10892b10c3bfc5ffb5ee</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 0213436a2cc5e4a5ca2fabfaa4d3877097f3b13f upstream.

Some devices don't like REPORT SUPPORTED OPERATION CODES and will
simply timeout causing sd_mod init to take a very very long time.
Introduce BLIST_NO_RSOC scsi scan flag, that stops RSOC from being
issued. Add it to Promise Vtrak E610f entry in scsi scan
blacklist. Fixes bug #79901 reported at
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=79901

Fixes: 98dcc2946adb ("SCSI: sd: Update WRITE SAME heuristics")

Signed-off-by: Janusz Dziemidowicz &lt;rraptorr@nails.eu.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Martin K. Petersen &lt;martin.petersen@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>scsi: add a blacklist flag which enables VPD page inquiries</title>
<updated>2014-09-17T16:19:13Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Martin K. Petersen</name>
<email>martin.petersen@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-07-15T16:49:17Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:d1988d080f8522b44d08ac38c9e5f6a881968fce</id>
<content type='text'>
commit c1d40a527e885a40bb9ea6c46a1b1145d42b66a0 upstream.

Despite supporting modern SCSI features some storage devices continue to
claim conformance to an older version of the SPC spec. This is done for
compatibility with legacy operating systems.

Linux by default will not attempt to read VPD pages on devices that
claim SPC-2 or older. Introduce a blacklist flag that can be used to
trigger VPD page inquiries on devices that are known to support them.

Reported-by: KY Srinivasan &lt;kys@microsoft.com&gt;
Tested-by: KY Srinivasan &lt;kys@microsoft.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: KY Srinivasan &lt;kys@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen &lt;martin.petersen@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>scsi_scan: Restrict sequential scan to 256 LUNs</title>
<updated>2014-09-17T16:19:13Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Hannes Reinecke</name>
<email>hare@suse.de</email>
</author>
<published>2014-06-03T08:58:53Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:2fc0acc5c14a0fd2973d8af261017df4f6d2fa3f</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 22ffeb48b7584d6cd50f2a595ed6065d86a87459 upstream.

Sequential scan for more than 256 LUNs is very fragile as
LUNs might not be numbered sequentially after that point.

SAM revisions later than SCSI-3 impose a structure on
LUNs larger than 256, making LUN numbers between 256
and 16384 illegal.
SCSI-3, however allows for plain 64-bit numbers with
no internal structure.

So restrict sequential LUN scan to 256 LUNs and add a
new blacklist flag 'BLIST_SCSI3LUN' to scan up to
max_lun devices.

Signed-off-by: Hannes Reinecke &lt;hare@suse.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Ewan Milne &lt;emilne@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>CAPABILITIES: remove undefined caps from all processes</title>
<updated>2014-09-17T16:19:09Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Paris</name>
<email>eparis@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-07-23T19:36:26Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:1ae2c97a0a284ca73754acd2b3be33fe4f2505b2</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 7d8b6c63751cfbbe5eef81a48c22978b3407a3ad upstream.

This is effectively a revert of 7b9a7ec565505699f503b4fcf61500dceb36e744
plus fixing it a different way...

We found, when trying to run an application from an application which
had dropped privs that the kernel does security checks on undefined
capability bits.  This was ESPECIALLY difficult to debug as those
undefined bits are hidden from /proc/$PID/status.

Consider a root application which drops all capabilities from ALL 4
capability sets.  We assume, since the application is going to set
eff/perm/inh from an array that it will clear not only the defined caps
less than CAP_LAST_CAP, but also the higher 28ish bits which are
undefined future capabilities.

The BSET gets cleared differently.  Instead it is cleared one bit at a
time.  The problem here is that in security/commoncap.c::cap_task_prctl()
we actually check the validity of a capability being read.  So any task
which attempts to 'read all things set in bset' followed by 'unset all
things set in bset' will not even attempt to unset the undefined bits
higher than CAP_LAST_CAP.

So the 'parent' will look something like:
CapInh:	0000000000000000
CapPrm:	0000000000000000
CapEff:	0000000000000000
CapBnd:	ffffffc000000000

All of this 'should' be fine.  Given that these are undefined bits that
aren't supposed to have anything to do with permissions.  But they do...

So lets now consider a task which cleared the eff/perm/inh completely
and cleared all of the valid caps in the bset (but not the invalid caps
it couldn't read out of the kernel).  We know that this is exactly what
the libcap-ng library does and what the go capabilities library does.
They both leave you in that above situation if you try to clear all of
you capapabilities from all 4 sets.  If that root task calls execve()
the child task will pick up all caps not blocked by the bset.  The bset
however does not block bits higher than CAP_LAST_CAP.  So now the child
task has bits in eff which are not in the parent.  These are
'meaningless' undefined bits, but still bits which the parent doesn't
have.

The problem is now in cred_cap_issubset() (or any operation which does a
subset test) as the child, while a subset for valid cap bits, is not a
subset for invalid cap bits!  So now we set durring commit creds that
the child is not dumpable.  Given it is 'more priv' than its parent.  It
also means the parent cannot ptrace the child and other stupidity.

The solution here:
1) stop hiding capability bits in status
	This makes debugging easier!

2) stop giving any task undefined capability bits.  it's simple, it you
don't put those invalid bits in CAP_FULL_SET you won't get them in init
and you won't get them in any other task either.
	This fixes the cap_issubset() tests and resulting fallout (which
	made the init task in a docker container untraceable among other
	things)

3) mask out undefined bits when sys_capset() is called as it might use
~0, ~0 to denote 'all capabilities' for backward/forward compatibility.
	This lets 'capsh --caps="all=eip" -- -c /bin/bash' run.

4) mask out undefined bit when we read a file capability off of disk as
again likely all bits are set in the xattr for forward/backward
compatibility.
	This lets 'setcap all+pe /bin/bash; /bin/bash' run

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris &lt;eparis@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Andrew Vagin &lt;avagin@openvz.org&gt;
Cc: Andrew G. Morgan &lt;morgan@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Serge E. Hallyn &lt;serge.hallyn@canonical.com&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Steve Grubb &lt;sgrubb@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Dan Walsh &lt;dwalsh@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;james.l.morris@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tpm: Provide a generic means to override the chip returned timeouts</title>
<updated>2014-09-17T16:19:08Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Jason Gunthorpe</name>
<email>jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-05-22T00:26:44Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:8b5a02ed633c1bfa97359abcd098aac689c1ca9b</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 8e54caf407b98efa05409e1fee0e5381abd2b088 upstream.

Some Atmel TPMs provide completely wrong timeouts from their
TPM_CAP_PROP_TIS_TIMEOUT query. This patch detects that and returns
new correct values via a DID/VID table in the TIS driver.

Tested on ARM using an AT97SC3204T FW version 37.16

[PHuewe: without this fix these 'broken' Atmel TPMs won't function on
older kernels]
Signed-off-by: "Berg, Christopher" &lt;Christopher.Berg@atmel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe &lt;jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

Signed-off-by: Peter Huewe &lt;peterhuewe@gmx.de&gt;

</content>
</entry>
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