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<title>user/sven/linux.git/include, branch v3.14.68</title>
<subtitle>Linux Kernel
</subtitle>
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<updated>2016-05-04T21:51:25Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>include/linux/poison.h: fix LIST_POISON{1,2} offset</title>
<updated>2016-05-04T21:51:25Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Vasily Kulikov</name>
<email>segoon@openwall.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-09-09T22:36:00Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:703d87a503141999a6749263d0a8caf038ce5b75</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 8a5e5e02fc83aaf67053ab53b359af08c6c49aaf upstream.

Poison pointer values should be small enough to find a room in
non-mmap'able/hardly-mmap'able space.  E.g.  on x86 "poison pointer space"
is located starting from 0x0.  Given unprivileged users cannot mmap
anything below mmap_min_addr, it should be safe to use poison pointers
lower than mmap_min_addr.

The current poison pointer values of LIST_POISON{1,2} might be too big for
mmap_min_addr values equal or less than 1 MB (common case, e.g.  Ubuntu
uses only 0x10000).  There is little point to use such a big value given
the "poison pointer space" below 1 MB is not yet exhausted.  Changing it
to a smaller value solves the problem for small mmap_min_addr setups.

The values are suggested by Solar Designer:
http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2015/05/02/6

Signed-off-by: Vasily Kulikov &lt;segoon@openwall.com&gt;
Cc: Solar Designer &lt;solar@openwall.com&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" &lt;kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tracing: Fix trace_printk() to print when not using bprintk()</title>
<updated>2016-04-12T16:12:47Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Steven Rostedt (Red Hat)</name>
<email>rostedt@goodmis.org</email>
</author>
<published>2016-03-22T21:30:58Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:29d5056343389ea5d75677576f30db211001fb58</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 3debb0a9ddb16526de8b456491b7db60114f7b5e upstream.

The trace_printk() code will allocate extra buffers if the compile detects
that a trace_printk() is used. To do this, the format of the trace_printk()
is saved to the __trace_printk_fmt section, and if that section is bigger
than zero, the buffers are allocated (along with a message that this has
happened).

If trace_printk() uses a format that is not a constant, and thus something
not guaranteed to be around when the print happens, the compiler optimizes
the fmt out, as it is not used, and the __trace_printk_fmt section is not
filled. This means the kernel will not allocate the special buffers needed
for the trace_printk() and the trace_printk() will not write anything to the
tracing buffer.

Adding a "__used" to the variable in the __trace_printk_fmt section will
keep it around, even though it is set to NULL. This will keep the string
from being printed in the debugfs/tracing/printk_formats section as it is
not needed.

Reported-by: Vlastimil Babka &lt;vbabka@suse.cz&gt;
Fixes: 07d777fe8c398 "tracing: Add percpu buffers for trace_printk()"
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fs/coredump: prevent fsuid=0 dumps into user-controlled directories</title>
<updated>2016-04-12T16:12:47Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Jann Horn</name>
<email>jann@thejh.net</email>
</author>
<published>2016-03-22T21:25:36Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:37c0427e9c9b6d7c100c5a4e8a4e3935f70e3659</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 378c6520e7d29280f400ef2ceaf155c86f05a71a upstream.

This commit fixes the following security hole affecting systems where
all of the following conditions are fulfilled:

 - The fs.suid_dumpable sysctl is set to 2.
 - The kernel.core_pattern sysctl's value starts with "/". (Systems
   where kernel.core_pattern starts with "|/" are not affected.)
 - Unprivileged user namespace creation is permitted. (This is
   true on Linux &gt;=3.8, but some distributions disallow it by
   default using a distro patch.)

Under these conditions, if a program executes under secure exec rules,
causing it to run with the SUID_DUMP_ROOT flag, then unshares its user
namespace, changes its root directory and crashes, the coredump will be
written using fsuid=0 and a path derived from kernel.core_pattern - but
this path is interpreted relative to the root directory of the process,
allowing the attacker to control where a coredump will be written with
root privileges.

To fix the security issue, always interpret core_pattern for dumps that
are written under SUID_DUMP_ROOT relative to the root directory of init.

Signed-off-by: Jann Horn &lt;jann@thejh.net&gt;
Acked-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>PCI: Disable IO/MEM decoding for devices with non-compliant BARs</title>
<updated>2016-04-12T16:12:39Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Bjorn Helgaas</name>
<email>bhelgaas@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-02-25T20:35:57Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:ead467e8c38b28f705c0ace2f39b1dffede53084</id>
<content type='text'>
commit b84106b4e2290c081cdab521fa832596cdfea246 upstream.

The PCI config header (first 64 bytes of each device's config space) is
defined by the PCI spec so generic software can identify the device and
manage its usage of I/O, memory, and IRQ resources.

Some non-spec-compliant devices put registers other than BARs where the
BARs should be.  When the PCI core sizes these "BARs", the reads and writes
it does may have unwanted side effects, and the "BAR" may appear to
describe non-sensical address space.

Add a flag bit to mark non-compliant devices so we don't touch their BARs.
Turn off IO/MEM decoding to prevent the devices from consuming address
space, since we can't read the BARs to find out what that address space
would be.

Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas &lt;bhelgaas@google.com&gt;
Tested-by: Andi Kleen &lt;ak@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Revert: "crypto: af_alg - Disallow bind/setkey/... after accept(2)"</title>
<updated>2016-03-16T15:42:21Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Greg Kroah-Hartman</name>
<email>gregkh@linuxfoundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2016-03-13T05:30:16Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:c4eb62da6f34bfa9bbcbd005210a90fdfca7e367</id>
<content type='text'>
This reverts commit 06b4194533ff92ed5888840e3a6beaf29a8fe5d4 which is
commit c840ac6af3f8713a71b4d2363419145760bd6044 upstream.

It's been widely reported that this patch breaks existing userspace
applications when backported to the stable kernel releases.  As no fix
seems to be forthcoming, just revert it to let systems work again.

Reported-by: "J. Paul Reed" &lt;preed@sigkill.com&gt;
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Cc: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;


</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>modules: fix longstanding /proc/kallsyms vs module insertion race.</title>
<updated>2016-03-16T15:42:21Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Rusty Russell</name>
<email>rusty@rustcorp.com.au</email>
</author>
<published>2016-02-03T06:25:26Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:952b0e42f8f8c7c316491d0cbf9c0d41ad4d3838</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 8244062ef1e54502ef55f54cced659913f244c3e upstream.

For CONFIG_KALLSYMS, we keep two symbol tables and two string tables.
There's one full copy, marked SHF_ALLOC and laid out at the end of the
module's init section.  There's also a cut-down version that only
contains core symbols and strings, and lives in the module's core
section.

After module init (and before we free the module memory), we switch
the mod-&gt;symtab, mod-&gt;num_symtab and mod-&gt;strtab to point to the core
versions.  We do this under the module_mutex.

However, kallsyms doesn't take the module_mutex: it uses
preempt_disable() and rcu tricks to walk through the modules, because
it's used in the oops path.  It's also used in /proc/kallsyms.
There's nothing atomic about the change of these variables, so we can
get the old (larger!) num_symtab and the new symtab pointer; in fact
this is what I saw when trying to reproduce.

By grouping these variables together, we can use a
carefully-dereferenced pointer to ensure we always get one or the
other (the free of the module init section is already done in an RCU
callback, so that's safe).  We allocate the init one at the end of the
module init section, and keep the core one inside the struct module
itself (it could also have been allocated at the end of the module
core, but that's probably overkill).

[ Rebased for 4.4-stable and older, because the following changes aren't
  in the older trees:
  - e0224418516b4d8a6c2160574bac18447c354ef0: adds arg to is_core_symbol
  - 7523e4dc5057e157212b4741abd6256e03404cf1: module_init/module_core/init_size/core_size
    become init_layout.base/core_layout.base/init_layout.size/core_layout.size.

  Original commit: 8244062ef1e54502ef55f54cced659913f244c3e
]

Reported-by: Weilong Chen &lt;chenweilong@huawei.com&gt;
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=111541
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell &lt;rusty@rustcorp.com.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>efi: Make efivarfs entries immutable by default</title>
<updated>2016-03-16T15:42:21Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Peter Jones</name>
<email>pjones@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-02-08T19:48:15Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:c67d696fa1339567014dc2aa5919ff36a0642697</id>
<content type='text'>
commit ed8b0de5a33d2a2557dce7f9429dca8cb5bc5879 upstream.

"rm -rf" is bricking some peoples' laptops because of variables being
used to store non-reinitializable firmware driver data that's required
to POST the hardware.

These are 100% bugs, and they need to be fixed, but in the mean time it
shouldn't be easy to *accidentally* brick machines.

We have to have delete working, and picking which variables do and don't
work for deletion is quite intractable, so instead make everything
immutable by default (except for a whitelist), and make tools that
aren't quite so broad-spectrum unset the immutable flag.

Signed-off-by: Peter Jones &lt;pjones@redhat.com&gt;
Tested-by: Lee, Chun-Yi &lt;jlee@suse.com&gt;
Acked-by: Matthew Garrett &lt;mjg59@coreos.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming &lt;matt@codeblueprint.co.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>efi: Make our variable validation list include the guid</title>
<updated>2016-03-16T15:42:21Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Peter Jones</name>
<email>pjones@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-02-08T19:48:14Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:a74e2a9e766e214c834f3d2964cfffa1c387b9a0</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 8282f5d9c17fe15a9e658c06e3f343efae1a2a2f upstream.

All the variables in this list so far are defined to be in the global
namespace in the UEFI spec, so this just further ensures we're
validating the variables we think we are.

Including the guid for entries will become more important in future
patches when we decide whether or not to allow deletion of variables
based on presence in this list.

Signed-off-by: Peter Jones &lt;pjones@redhat.com&gt;
Tested-by: Lee, Chun-Yi &lt;jlee@suse.com&gt;
Acked-by: Matthew Garrett &lt;mjg59@coreos.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming &lt;matt@codeblueprint.co.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>efi: Do variable name validation tests in utf8</title>
<updated>2016-03-16T15:42:20Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Peter Jones</name>
<email>pjones@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-02-08T19:48:13Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=3285d6ab25cb597f71ce911a1237ac993c177fc5'/>
<id>urn:sha1:3285d6ab25cb597f71ce911a1237ac993c177fc5</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 3dcb1f55dfc7631695e69df4a0d589ce5274bd07 upstream.

Actually translate from ucs2 to utf8 before doing the test, and then
test against our other utf8 data, instead of fudging it.

Signed-off-by: Peter Jones &lt;pjones@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Matthew Garrett &lt;mjg59@coreos.com&gt;
Tested-by: Lee, Chun-Yi &lt;jlee@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming &lt;matt@codeblueprint.co.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>lib/ucs2_string: Add ucs2 -&gt; utf8 helper functions</title>
<updated>2016-03-16T15:42:20Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Peter Jones</name>
<email>pjones@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-02-08T19:48:11Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:002f14d470825598cca1ab3c3a97d8eb1c026613</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 73500267c930baadadb0d02284909731baf151f7 upstream.

This adds ucs2_utf8size(), which tells us how big our ucs2 string is in
bytes, and ucs2_as_utf8, which translates from ucs2 to utf8..

Signed-off-by: Peter Jones &lt;pjones@redhat.com&gt;
Tested-by: Lee, Chun-Yi &lt;jlee@suse.com&gt;
Acked-by: Matthew Garrett &lt;mjg59@coreos.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming &lt;matt@codeblueprint.co.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
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