<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>user/sven/linux.git/include, branch v3.18.61</title>
<subtitle>Linux Kernel
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/atom?h=v3.18.61</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/atom?h=v3.18.61'/>
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<updated>2017-07-15T08:14:40Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>usb: Fix typo in the definition of Endpoint[out]Request</title>
<updated>2017-07-15T08:14:40Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Benjamin Herrenschmidt</name>
<email>benh@kernel.crashing.org</email>
</author>
<published>2017-06-13T06:01:13Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=e7ce85766bdda03194e33f2e5c2e8a959ed818b9'/>
<id>urn:sha1:e7ce85766bdda03194e33f2e5c2e8a959ed818b9</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 7cf916bd639bd26db7214f2205bccdb4b9306256 upstream.

The current definition is wrong. This breaks my upcoming
Aspeed virtual hub driver.

Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt &lt;benh@kernel.crashing.org&gt;
Acked-by: Alan Stern &lt;stern@rowland.harvard.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xfrm: fix stack access out of bounds with CONFIG_XFRM_SUB_POLICY</title>
<updated>2017-07-05T12:35:14Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Sabrina Dubroca</name>
<email>sd@queasysnail.net</email>
</author>
<published>2017-05-03T14:43:19Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=dd5d0625c56f3d85aad2a613c068a66414bbee72'/>
<id>urn:sha1:dd5d0625c56f3d85aad2a613c068a66414bbee72</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 9b3eb54106cf6acd03f07cf0ab01c13676a226c2 upstream.

When CONFIG_XFRM_SUB_POLICY=y, xfrm_dst stores a copy of the flowi for
that dst. Unfortunately, the code that allocates and fills this copy
doesn't care about what type of flowi (flowi, flowi4, flowi6) gets
passed. In multiple code paths (from raw_sendmsg, from TCP when
replying to a FIN, in vxlan, geneve, and gre), the flowi that gets
passed to xfrm is actually an on-stack flowi4, so we end up reading
stuff from the stack past the end of the flowi4 struct.

Since xfrm_dst-&gt;origin isn't used anywhere following commit
ca116922afa8 ("xfrm: Eliminate "fl" and "pol" args to
xfrm_bundle_ok()."), just get rid of it.  xfrm_dst-&gt;partner isn't used
either, so get rid of that too.

Fixes: 9d6ec938019c ("ipv4: Use flowi4 in public route lookup interfaces.")
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca &lt;sd@queasysnail.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert &lt;steffen.klassert@secunet.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mm: larger stack guard gap, between vmas</title>
<updated>2017-06-26T05:10:54Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Hugh Dickins</name>
<email>hughd@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-06-19T11:03:24Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=d4712eb79b17d85c9e354efa2d3156ce50736128'/>
<id>urn:sha1:d4712eb79b17d85c9e354efa2d3156ce50736128</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 1be7107fbe18eed3e319a6c3e83c78254b693acb upstream.

Stack guard page is a useful feature to reduce a risk of stack smashing
into a different mapping. We have been using a single page gap which
is sufficient to prevent having stack adjacent to a different mapping.
But this seems to be insufficient in the light of the stack usage in
userspace. E.g. glibc uses as large as 64kB alloca() in many commonly
used functions. Others use constructs liks gid_t buffer[NGROUPS_MAX]
which is 256kB or stack strings with MAX_ARG_STRLEN.

This will become especially dangerous for suid binaries and the default
no limit for the stack size limit because those applications can be
tricked to consume a large portion of the stack and a single glibc call
could jump over the guard page. These attacks are not theoretical,
unfortunatelly.

Make those attacks less probable by increasing the stack guard gap
to 1MB (on systems with 4k pages; but make it depend on the page size
because systems with larger base pages might cap stack allocations in
the PAGE_SIZE units) which should cover larger alloca() and VLA stack
allocations. It is obviously not a full fix because the problem is
somehow inherent, but it should reduce attack space a lot.

One could argue that the gap size should be configurable from userspace,
but that can be done later when somebody finds that the new 1MB is wrong
for some special case applications.  For now, add a kernel command line
option (stack_guard_gap) to specify the stack gap size (in page units).

Implementation wise, first delete all the old code for stack guard page:
because although we could get away with accounting one extra page in a
stack vma, accounting a larger gap can break userspace - case in point,
a program run with "ulimit -S -v 20000" failed when the 1MB gap was
counted for RLIMIT_AS; similar problems could come with RLIMIT_MLOCK
and strict non-overcommit mode.

Instead of keeping gap inside the stack vma, maintain the stack guard
gap as a gap between vmas: using vm_start_gap() in place of vm_start
(or vm_end_gap() in place of vm_end if VM_GROWSUP) in just those few
places which need to respect the gap - mainly arch_get_unmapped_area(),
and and the vma tree's subtree_gap support for that.

Original-patch-by: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Original-patch-by: Michal Hocko &lt;mhocko@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins &lt;hughd@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Michal Hocko &lt;mhocko@suse.com&gt;
Tested-by: Helge Deller &lt;deller@gmx.de&gt; # parisc
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
[wt: backport to 4.11: adjust context]
[wt: backport to 4.9: adjust context ; kernel doc was not in admin-guide]
[wt: backport to 4.4: adjust context ; drop ppc hugetlb_radix changes]
[wt: backport to 3.18: adjust context ; no FOLL_POPULATE ;
     s390 uses generic arch_get_unmapped_area()]
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau &lt;w@1wt.eu&gt;
[gkh: minor build fixes for 3.18]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>USB: hub: fix SS max number of ports</title>
<updated>2017-06-26T05:10:51Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Johan Hovold</name>
<email>johan@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2017-05-10T16:18:29Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=097e1d5f532d0c45c3b2b4f73f4d88105337de2e'/>
<id>urn:sha1:097e1d5f532d0c45c3b2b4f73f4d88105337de2e</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 93491ced3c87c94b12220dbac0527e1356702179 upstream.

Add define for the maximum number of ports on a SuperSpeed hub as per
USB 3.1 spec Table 10-5, and use it when verifying the retrieved hub
descriptor.

This specifically avoids benign attempts to update the DeviceRemovable
mask for non-existing ports (should we get that far).

Fixes: dbe79bbe9dcb ("USB 3.0 Hub Changes")
Acked-by: Alan Stern &lt;stern@rowland.harvard.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold &lt;johan@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>log2: make order_base_2() behave correctly on const input value zero</title>
<updated>2017-06-26T05:10:49Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Ard Biesheuvel</name>
<email>ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org</email>
</author>
<published>2017-02-02T18:05:26Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=9fc9f9a8df55a56155cefb7f8a8631eca7ec7a48'/>
<id>urn:sha1:9fc9f9a8df55a56155cefb7f8a8631eca7ec7a48</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 29905b52fad0854351f57bab867647e4982285bf upstream.

The function order_base_2() is defined (according to the comment block)
as returning zero on input zero, but subsequently passes the input into
roundup_pow_of_two(), which is explicitly undefined for input zero.

This has gone unnoticed until now, but optimization passes in GCC 7 may
produce constant folded function instances where a constant value of
zero is passed into order_base_2(), resulting in link errors against the
deliberately undefined '____ilog2_NaN'.

So update order_base_2() to adhere to its own documented interface.

[ See

     http://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&amp;m=147672952517795&amp;w=2

  and follow-up discussion for more background. The gcc "optimization
  pass" is really just broken, but now the GCC trunk problem seems to
  have escaped out of just specially built daily images, so we need to
  work around it in mainline.    - Linus ]

Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel &lt;ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@verizon.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>arm64: hw_breakpoint: fix watchpoint matching for tagged pointers</title>
<updated>2017-06-14T10:54:20Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Kristina Martsenko</name>
<email>kristina.martsenko@arm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-05-03T15:37:46Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=d8f0905a0d4347061291e2ce3fcd75196df5851a'/>
<id>urn:sha1:d8f0905a0d4347061291e2ce3fcd75196df5851a</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 7dcd9dd8cebe9fa626af7e2358d03a37041a70fb upstream.

When we take a watchpoint exception, the address that triggered the
watchpoint is found in FAR_EL1. We compare it to the address of each
configured watchpoint to see which one was hit.

The configured watchpoint addresses are untagged, while the address in
FAR_EL1 will have an address tag if the data access was done using a
tagged address. The tag needs to be removed to compare the address to
the watchpoints.

Currently we don't remove it, and as a result can report the wrong
watchpoint as being hit (specifically, always either the highest TTBR0
watchpoint or lowest TTBR1 watchpoint). This patch removes the tag.

Fixes: d50240a5f6ce ("arm64: mm: permit use of tagged pointers at EL0")
Acked-by: Mark Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt;
Acked-by: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kristina Martsenko &lt;kristina.martsenko@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>drivers: char: random: add get_random_long()</title>
<updated>2017-06-14T10:54:19Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Daniel Cashman</name>
<email>dcashman@android.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-02-26T23:19:34Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=f7533e654b909e728675e23da581f40c98a4c9e0'/>
<id>urn:sha1:f7533e654b909e728675e23da581f40c98a4c9e0</id>
<content type='text'>
commit ec9ee4acd97c0039a61c0ae4f12705767ae62153 upstream.

Commit d07e22597d1d ("mm: mmap: add new /proc tunable for mmap_base
ASLR") added the ability to choose from a range of values to use for
entropy count in generating the random offset to the mmap_base address.

The maximum value on this range was set to 32 bits for 64-bit x86
systems, but this value could be increased further, requiring more than
the 32 bits of randomness provided by get_random_int(), as is already
possible for arm64.  Add a new function: get_random_long() which more
naturally fits with the mmap usage of get_random_int() but operates
exactly the same as get_random_int().

Also, fix the shifting constant in mmap_rnd() to be an unsigned long so
that values greater than 31 bits generate an appropriate mask without
overflow.  This is especially important on x86, as its shift instruction
uses a 5-bit mask for the shift operand, which meant that any value for
mmap_rnd_bits over 31 acts as a no-op and effectively disables mmap_base
randomization.

Finally, replace calls to get_random_int() with get_random_long() where
appropriate.

This patch (of 2):

Add get_random_long().

Signed-off-by: Daniel Cashman &lt;dcashman@android.com&gt;
Acked-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Cc: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Cc: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Ralf Baechle &lt;ralf@linux-mips.org&gt;
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt &lt;benh@kernel.crashing.org&gt;
Cc: Paul Mackerras &lt;paulus@samba.org&gt;
Cc: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
Cc: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: H. Peter Anvin &lt;hpa@zytor.com&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Nick Kralevich &lt;nnk@google.com&gt;
Cc: Jeff Vander Stoep &lt;jeffv@google.com&gt;
Cc: Mark Salyzyn &lt;salyzyn@android.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: ping: do not abuse udp_poll()</title>
<updated>2017-06-14T10:54:17Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-06-03T16:29:25Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=7c7c21ee8b7ac6699ab9d6b7a260f3c11e31ad28'/>
<id>urn:sha1:7c7c21ee8b7ac6699ab9d6b7a260f3c11e31ad28</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 77d4b1d36926a9b8387c6b53eeba42bcaaffcea3 ]

Alexander reported various KASAN messages triggered in recent kernels

The problem is that ping sockets should not use udp_poll() in the first
place, and recent changes in UDP stack finally exposed this old bug.

Fixes: c319b4d76b9e ("net: ipv4: add IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind")
Fixes: 6d0bfe226116 ("net: ipv6: Add IPv6 support to the ping socket.")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Reported-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@verizon.com&gt;
Cc: Solar Designer &lt;solar@openwall.com&gt;
Cc: Vasiliy Kulikov &lt;segoon@openwall.com&gt;
Cc: Lorenzo Colitti &lt;lorenzo@google.com&gt;
Acked-By: Lorenzo Colitti &lt;lorenzo@google.com&gt;
Tested-By: Lorenzo Colitti &lt;lorenzo@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tracing/kprobes: Enforce kprobes teardown after testing</title>
<updated>2017-05-25T12:18:02Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Thomas Gleixner</name>
<email>tglx@linutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2017-05-17T08:19:49Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=9713a7c45a15c568b266bcbc7d5b9cd054d8c1a6'/>
<id>urn:sha1:9713a7c45a15c568b266bcbc7d5b9cd054d8c1a6</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 30e7d894c1478c88d50ce94ddcdbd7f9763d9cdd upstream.

Enabling the tracer selftest triggers occasionally the warning in
text_poke(), which warns when the to be modified page is not marked
reserved.

The reason is that the tracer selftest installs kprobes on functions marked
__init for testing. These probes are removed after the tests, but that
removal schedules the delayed kprobes_optimizer work, which will do the
actual text poke. If the work is executed after the init text is freed,
then the warning triggers. The bug can be reproduced reliably when the work
delay is increased.

Flush the optimizer work and wait for the optimizing/unoptimizing lists to
become empty before returning from the kprobes tracer selftest. That
ensures that all operations which were queued due to the probes removal
have completed.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170516094802.76a468bb@gandalf.local.home

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu &lt;mhiramat@kernel.org&gt;
Fixes: 6274de498 ("kprobes: Support delayed unoptimizing")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>f2fs: sanity check segment count</title>
<updated>2017-05-15T07:19:09Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Jin Qian</name>
<email>jinqian@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-04-25T23:28:48Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=27f411c7ee241d194cd5fd3271d83089d70b2c20'/>
<id>urn:sha1:27f411c7ee241d194cd5fd3271d83089d70b2c20</id>
<content type='text'>
commit b9dd46188edc2f0d1f37328637860bb65a771124 upstream.

F2FS uses 4 bytes to represent block address. As a result, supported
size of disk is 16 TB and it equals to 16 * 1024 * 1024 / 2 segments.

Signed-off-by: Jin Qian &lt;jinqian@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim &lt;jaegeuk@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
</feed>
