user/sven/linux.git/include, branch v4.1.10

net: sched: fix refcount imbalance in actions

2015-09-29T17:26:24Z

[ Upstream commit 28e6b67f0b292f557468c139085303b15f1a678f ] Since commit 55334a5db5cd ("net_sched: act: refuse to remove bound action outside"), we end up with a wrong reference count for a tc action. Test case 1: FOO="1,6 0 0 4294967295," BAR="1,6 0 0 4294967294," tc filter add dev foo parent 1: bpf bytecode "$FOO" flowid 1:1 \ action bpf bytecode "$FOO" tc actions show action bpf action order 0: bpf bytecode '1,6 0 0 4294967295' default-action pipe index 1 ref 1 bind 1 tc actions replace action bpf bytecode "$BAR" index 1 tc actions show action bpf action order 0: bpf bytecode '1,6 0 0 4294967294' default-action pipe index 1 ref 2 bind 1 tc actions replace action bpf bytecode "$FOO" index 1 tc actions show action bpf action order 0: bpf bytecode '1,6 0 0 4294967295' default-action pipe index 1 ref 3 bind 1 Test case 2: FOO="1,6 0 0 4294967295," tc filter add dev foo parent 1: bpf bytecode "$FOO" flowid 1:1 action ok tc actions show action gact action order 0: gact action pass random type none pass val 0 index 1 ref 1 bind 1 tc actions add action drop index 1 RTNETLINK answers: File exists [...] tc actions show action gact action order 0: gact action pass random type none pass val 0 index 1 ref 2 bind 1 tc actions add action drop index 1 RTNETLINK answers: File exists [...] tc actions show action gact action order 0: gact action pass random type none pass val 0 index 1 ref 3 bind 1 What happens is that in tcf_hash_check(), we check tcf_common for a given index and increase tcfc_refcnt and conditionally tcfc_bindcnt when we've found an existing action. Now there are the following cases: 1) We do a late binding of an action. In that case, we leave the tcfc_refcnt/tcfc_bindcnt increased and are done with the ->init() handler. This is correctly handeled. 2) We replace the given action, or we try to add one without replacing and find out that the action at a specific index already exists (thus, we go out with error in that case). In case of 2), we have to undo the reference count increase from tcf_hash_check() in the tcf_hash_check() function. Currently, we fail to do so because of the 'tcfc_bindcnt > 0' check which bails out early with an -EPERM error. Now, while commit 55334a5db5cd prevents 'tc actions del action ...' on an already classifier-bound action to drop the reference count (which could then become negative, wrap around etc), this restriction only accounts for invocations outside a specific action's ->init() handler. One possible solution would be to add a flag thus we possibly trigger the -EPERM ony in situations where it is indeed relevant. After the patch, above test cases have correct reference count again. Fixes: 55334a5db5cd ("net_sched: act: refuse to remove bound action outside") Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann Reviewed-by: Cong Wang Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

ipv6: lock socket in ip6_datagram_connect()

2015-09-29T17:26:22Z

[ Upstream commit 03645a11a570d52e70631838cb786eb4253eb463 ] ip6_datagram_connect() is doing a lot of socket changes without socket being locked. This looks wrong, at least for udp_lib_rehash() which could corrupt lists because of concurrent udp_sk(sk)->udp_portaddr_hash accesses. Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Acked-by: Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

jbd2: avoid infinite loop when destroying aborted journal

2015-09-29T17:26:19Z

commit 841df7df196237ea63233f0f9eaa41db53afd70f upstream. Commit 6f6a6fda2945 "jbd2: fix ocfs2 corrupt when updating journal superblock fails" changed jbd2_cleanup_journal_tail() to return EIO when the journal is aborted. That makes logic in jbd2_log_do_checkpoint() bail out which is fine, except that jbd2_journal_destroy() expects jbd2_log_do_checkpoint() to always make a progress in cleaning the journal. Without it jbd2_journal_destroy() just loops in an infinite loop. Fix jbd2_journal_destroy() to cleanup journal checkpoint lists of jbd2_log_do_checkpoint() fails with error. Reported-by: Eryu Guan Tested-by: Eryu Guan Fixes: 6f6a6fda294506dfe0e3e0a253bb2d2923f28f0a Signed-off-by: Jan Kara Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

iommu/tegra-smmu: Parameterize number of TLB lines

2015-09-29T17:26:14Z

commit 11cec15bf3fb498206ef63b1fa26c27689e02d0e upstream. The number of TLB lines was increased from 16 on Tegra30 to 32 on Tegra114 and later. Parameterize the value so that the initial default can be set accordingly. On Tegra30, initializing the value to 32 would effectively disable the TLB and hence cause massive latencies for memory accesses translated through the SMMU. This is especially noticeable for isochronuous clients such as display, whose FIFOs would continuously underrun. Fixes: 891846516317 ("memory: Add NVIDIA Tegra memory controller support") Signed-off-by: Thierry Reding Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

SUNRPC: Ensure that we wait for connections to complete before retrying

2015-09-29T17:26:10Z

commit 0fdea1e8a2853f79d39b8555cc9de16a7e0ab26f upstream. Commit 718ba5b87343, moved the responsibility for unlocking the socket to xs_tcp_setup_socket, meaning that the socket will be unlocked before we know that it has finished trying to connect. The following patch is based on an initial patch by Russell King to ensure that we delay clearing the XPRT_CONNECTING flag until we either know that we failed to initiate a connection attempt, or the connection attempt itself failed. Fixes: 718ba5b87343 ("SUNRPC: Add helpers to prevent socket create from racing") Reported-by: Russell King Reported-by: Russell King Tested-by: Russell King Tested-by: Benjamin Coddington Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

net: sunrpc: fix tracepoint Warning: unknown op '->'

2015-09-29T17:26:10Z

commit 051ac3848a94f21cfdec899cc9c65ce7f9f116fa upstream. `perf stat -e sunrpc:svc_xprt_do_enqueue true` results in Warning: unknown op '->' Warning: [sunrpc:svc_xprt_do_enqueue] unknown op '->' Similar warning for svc_handle_xprt as well. Actually TP_printk() should never dereference an address saved in the ring buffer that points somewhere in the kernel. There's no guarantee that that object still exists (with the exception of static strings). Therefore change all the arguments for TP_printk(), so that it references values existing in the ring buffer only. While doing that, also fix another possible bug when argument xprt could be NULL and TP_fast_assign() tries to access it's elements. Signed-off-by: Pratyush Anand Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton Acked-by: Steven Rostedt Fixes: 83a712e0afef "sunrpc: add some tracepoints around ..." Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

mm: make page pfmemalloc check more robust

2015-09-29T17:26:06Z

commit 2f064f3485cd29633ad1b3cfb00cc519509a3d72 upstream. Commit c48a11c7ad26 ("netvm: propagate page->pfmemalloc to skb") added checks for page->pfmemalloc to __skb_fill_page_desc(): if (page->pfmemalloc && !page->mapping) skb->pfmemalloc = true; It assumes page->mapping == NULL implies that page->pfmemalloc can be trusted. However, __delete_from_page_cache() can set set page->mapping to NULL and leave page->index value alone. Due to being in union, a non-zero page->index will be interpreted as true page->pfmemalloc. So the assumption is invalid if the networking code can see such a page. And it seems it can. We have encountered this with a NFS over loopback setup when such a page is attached to a new skbuf. There is no copying going on in this case so the page confuses __skb_fill_page_desc which interprets the index as pfmemalloc flag and the network stack drops packets that have been allocated using the reserves unless they are to be queued on sockets handling the swapping which is the case here and that leads to hangs when the nfs client waits for a response from the server which has been dropped and thus never arrive. The struct page is already heavily packed so rather than finding another hole to put it in, let's do a trick instead. We can reuse the index again but define it to an impossible value (-1UL). This is the page index so it should never see the value that large. Replace all direct users of page->pfmemalloc by page_is_pfmemalloc which will hide this nastiness from unspoiled eyes. The information will get lost if somebody wants to use page->index obviously but that was the case before and the original code expected that the information should be persisted somewhere else if that is really needed (e.g. what SLAB and SLUB do). [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix blooper in slub] Fixes: c48a11c7ad26 ("netvm: propagate page->pfmemalloc to skb") Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko Debugged-by: Vlastimil Babka Debugged-by: Jiri Bohac Cc: Eric Dumazet Cc: David Miller Acked-by: Mel Gorman Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

fs: create and use seq_show_option for escaping

2015-09-21T17:05:45Z

commit a068acf2ee77693e0bf39d6e07139ba704f461c3 upstream. Many file systems that implement the show_options hook fail to correctly escape their output which could lead to unescaped characters (e.g. new lines) leaking into /proc/mounts and /proc/[pid]/mountinfo files. This could lead to confusion, spoofed entries (resulting in things like systemd issuing false d-bus "mount" notifications), and who knows what else. This looks like it would only be the root user stepping on themselves, but it's possible weird things could happen in containers or in other situations with delegated mount privileges. Here's an example using overlay with setuid fusermount trusting the contents of /proc/mounts (via the /etc/mtab symlink). Imagine the use of "sudo" is something more sneaky: $ BASE="ovl" $ MNT="$BASE/mnt" $ LOW="$BASE/lower" $ UP="$BASE/upper" $ WORK="$BASE/work/ 0 0 none /proc fuse.pwn user_id=1000" $ mkdir -p "$LOW" "$UP" "$WORK" $ sudo mount -t overlay -o "lowerdir=$LOW,upperdir=$UP,workdir=$WORK" none /mnt $ cat /proc/mounts none /root/ovl/mnt overlay rw,relatime,lowerdir=ovl/lower,upperdir=ovl/upper,workdir=ovl/work/ 0 0 none /proc fuse.pwn user_id=1000 0 0 $ fusermount -u /proc $ cat /proc/mounts cat: /proc/mounts: No such file or directory This fixes the problem by adding new seq_show_option and seq_show_option_n helpers, and updating the vulnerable show_option handlers to use them as needed. Some, like SELinux, need to be open coded due to unusual existing escape mechanisms. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: add lost chunk, per Kees] [keescook@chromium.org: seq_show_option should be using const parameters] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook Acked-by: Serge Hallyn Acked-by: Jan Kara Acked-by: Paul Moore Cc: J. R. Okajima Signed-off-by: Kees Cook Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

ACPI, PCI: Penalize legacy IRQ used by ACPI SCI

2015-09-21T17:05:44Z

commit 5d0ddfebb93069061880fc57ee4ba7246bd1e1ee upstream. Nick Meier reported a regression with HyperV that " After rebooting the VM, the following messages are logged in syslog when trying to load the tulip driver: tulip: Linux Tulip drivers version 1.1.15 (Feb 27, 2007) tulip: 0000:00:0a.0: PCI INT A: failed to register GSI tulip: Cannot enable tulip board #0, aborting tulip: probe of 0000:00:0a.0 failed with error -16 Errors occur in 3.19.0 kernel Works in 3.17 kernel. " According to the ACPI dump file posted by Nick at https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/linux/+bug/1440072 The ACPI MADT table includes an interrupt source overridden entry for ACPI SCI: [236h 0566 1] Subtable Type : 02 [237h 0567 1] Length : 0A [238h 0568 1] Bus : 00 [239h 0569 1] Source : 09 [23Ah 0570 4] Interrupt : 00000009 [23Eh 0574 2] Flags (decoded below) : 000D Polarity : 1 Trigger Mode : 3 And in DSDT table, we have _PRT method to define PCI interrupts, which eventually goes to: Name (PRSA, ResourceTemplate () { IRQ (Level, ActiveLow, Shared, ) {3,4,5,7,9,10,11,12,14,15} }) Name (PRSB, ResourceTemplate () { IRQ (Level, ActiveLow, Shared, ) {3,4,5,7,9,10,11,12,14,15} }) Name (PRSC, ResourceTemplate () { IRQ (Level, ActiveLow, Shared, ) {3,4,5,7,9,10,11,12,14,15} }) Name (PRSD, ResourceTemplate () { IRQ (Level, ActiveLow, Shared, ) {3,4,5,7,9,10,11,12,14,15} }) According to the MADT and DSDT tables, IRQ 9 may be used for: 1) ACPI SCI in level, high mode 2) PCI legacy IRQ in level, low mode So there's a conflict in polarity setting for IRQ 9. Prior to commit cd68f6bd53cf ("x86, irq, acpi: Get rid of special handling of GSI for ACPI SCI"), ACPI SCI is handled specially and there's no check for conflicts between ACPI SCI and PCI legagy IRQ. And it seems that the HyperV hypervisor doesn't make use of the polarity configuration in IOAPIC entry, so it just works. Commit cd68f6bd53cf gets rid of the specially handling of ACPI SCI, and then the pin attribute checking code discloses the conflicts between ACPI SCI and PCI legacy IRQ on HyperV virtual machine, and rejects the request to assign IRQ9 to PCI devices. So penalize legacy IRQ used by ACPI SCI and mark it unusable if ACPI SCI attributes conflict with PCI IRQ attributes. Please refer to following links for more information: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=101301 https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/linux/+bug/1440072 Fixes: cd68f6bd53cf ("x86, irq, acpi: Get rid of special handling of GSI for ACPI SCI") Reported-and-tested-by: Nick Meier Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner Signed-off-by: Jiang Liu Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

PCI: Add dev_flags bit to access VPD through function 0

2015-09-21T17:05:33Z

commit 932c435caba8a2ce473a91753bad0173269ef334 upstream. Add a dev_flags bit, PCI_DEV_FLAGS_VPD_REF_F0, to access VPD through function 0 to provide VPD access on other functions. This is for hardware devices that provide copies of the same VPD capability registers in multiple functions. Because the kernel expects that each function has its own registers, both the locking and the state tracking are affected by VPD accesses to different functions. On such devices for example, if a VPD write is performed on function 0, *any* later attempt to read VPD from any other function of that device will hang. This has to do with how the kernel tracks the expected value of the F bit per function. Concurrent accesses to different functions of the same device can not only hang but also corrupt both read and write VPD data. When hangs occur, typically the error message: vpd r/w failed. This is likely a firmware bug on this device. will be seen. Never set this bit on function 0 or there will be an infinite recursion. Signed-off-by: Mark Rustad Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas Acked-by: Alexander Duyck Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman