<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>user/sven/linux.git/include, branch v4.14.170</title>
<subtitle>Linux Kernel
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/atom?h=v4.14.170</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/atom?h=v4.14.170'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/'/>
<updated>2020-02-05T14:18:21Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>cfg80211: Fix radar event during another phy CAC</title>
<updated>2020-02-05T14:18:21Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Orr Mazor</name>
<email>orr.mazor@tandemg.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-12-22T14:55:31Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=2dbb6faebb94d6d5ae87e5ea6be9280c366393e1'/>
<id>urn:sha1:2dbb6faebb94d6d5ae87e5ea6be9280c366393e1</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 26ec17a1dc5ecdd8d91aba63ead6f8b5ad5dea0d ]

In case a radar event of CAC_FINISHED or RADAR_DETECTED
happens during another phy is during CAC we might need
to cancel that CAC.

If we got a radar in a channel that another phy is now
doing CAC on then the CAC should be canceled there.

If, for example, 2 phys doing CAC on the same channels,
or on comptable channels, once on of them will finish his
CAC the other might need to cancel his CAC, since it is no
longer relevant.

To fix that the commit adds an callback and implement it in
mac80211 to end CAC.
This commit also adds a call to said callback if after a radar
event we see the CAC is no longer relevant

Signed-off-by: Orr Mazor &lt;Orr.Mazor@tandemg.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Sergey Matyukevich &lt;sergey.matyukevich.os@quantenna.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191222145449.15792-1-Orr.Mazor@tandemg.com
[slightly reformat/reword commit message]
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg &lt;johannes.berg@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>USB: serial: ir-usb: fix link-speed handling</title>
<updated>2020-02-05T14:17:59Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Johan Hovold</name>
<email>johan@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2020-01-22T10:15:27Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=dc7692a8975be3e97a5e0df02ab619430eb3ead8'/>
<id>urn:sha1:dc7692a8975be3e97a5e0df02ab619430eb3ead8</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 17a0184ca17e288decdca8b2841531e34d49285f upstream.

Commit e0d795e4f36c ("usb: irda: cleanup on ir-usb module") added a USB
IrDA header with common defines, but mistakingly switched to using the
class-descriptor baud-rate bitmask values for the outbound header.

This broke link-speed handling for rates above 9600 baud, but a device
would also be able to operate at the default 9600 baud until a
link-speed request was issued (e.g. using the TCGETS ioctl).

Fixes: e0d795e4f36c ("usb: irda: cleanup on ir-usb module")
Cc: stable &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;     # 2.6.27
Cc: Felipe Balbi &lt;balbi@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold &lt;johan@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>netfilter: ipset: use bitmap infrastructure completely</title>
<updated>2020-01-29T14:02:39Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Kadlecsik József</name>
<email>kadlec@blackhole.kfki.hu</email>
</author>
<published>2020-01-19T21:06:49Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=f3439dd7ee8662c4f8558b5f41676e15c31776c2'/>
<id>urn:sha1:f3439dd7ee8662c4f8558b5f41676e15c31776c2</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 32c72165dbd0e246e69d16a3ad348a4851afd415 upstream.

The bitmap allocation did not use full unsigned long sizes
when calculating the required size and that was triggered by KASAN
as slab-out-of-bounds read in several places. The patch fixes all
of them.

Reported-by: syzbot+fabca5cbf5e54f3fe2de@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+827ced406c9a1d9570ed@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+190d63957b22ef673ea5@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+dfccdb2bdb4a12ad425e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+df0d0f5895ef1f41a65b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+b08bd19bb37513357fd4@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+53cdd0ec0bbabd53370a@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jozsef Kadlecsik &lt;kadlec@netfilter.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso &lt;pablo@netfilter.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bitmap: Add bitmap_alloc(), bitmap_zalloc() and bitmap_free()</title>
<updated>2020-01-29T14:02:39Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Andy Shevchenko</name>
<email>andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-08-01T22:42:56Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=8f715caa52eae8a31704cb398a2d9fe5250a37bf'/>
<id>urn:sha1:8f715caa52eae8a31704cb398a2d9fe5250a37bf</id>
<content type='text'>
commit c42b65e363ce97a828f81b59033c3558f8fa7f70 upstream.

A lot of code become ugly because of open coding allocations for bitmaps.

Introduce three helpers to allow users be more clear of intention
and keep their code neat.

Note, due to multiple circular dependencies we may not provide
the helpers as inliners. For now we keep them exported and, perhaps,
at some point in the future we will sort out header inclusion and
inheritance.

Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko &lt;andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov &lt;dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tracing: xen: Ordered comparison of function pointers</title>
<updated>2020-01-29T14:02:38Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Changbin Du</name>
<email>changbin.du@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-01-12T03:42:31Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=09efdaaca8c613bf7c23ec48dc014906b6b6d296'/>
<id>urn:sha1:09efdaaca8c613bf7c23ec48dc014906b6b6d296</id>
<content type='text'>
commit d0695e2351102affd8efae83989056bc4b275917 upstream.

Just as commit 0566e40ce7 ("tracing: initcall: Ordered comparison of
function pointers"), this patch fixes another remaining one in xen.h
found by clang-9.

In file included from arch/x86/xen/trace.c:21:
In file included from ./include/trace/events/xen.h:475:
In file included from ./include/trace/define_trace.h:102:
In file included from ./include/trace/trace_events.h:473:
./include/trace/events/xen.h:69:7: warning: ordered comparison of function \
pointers ('xen_mc_callback_fn_t' (aka 'void (*)(void *)') and 'xen_mc_callback_fn_t') [-Wordered-compare-function-pointers]
                    __field(xen_mc_callback_fn_t, fn)
                    ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
./include/trace/trace_events.h:421:29: note: expanded from macro '__field'
                                ^
./include/trace/trace_events.h:407:6: note: expanded from macro '__field_ext'
                                 is_signed_type(type), filter_type);    \
                                 ^
./include/linux/trace_events.h:554:44: note: expanded from macro 'is_signed_type'
                                              ^

Fixes: c796f213a6934 ("xen/trace: add multicall tracing")
Signed-off-by: Changbin Du &lt;changbin.du@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: rtnetlink: validate IFLA_MTU attribute in rtnl_create_link()</title>
<updated>2020-01-29T14:02:36Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-01-22T06:47:29Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=e841252840c48e9a0e5add9d82796b1d55c0f653'/>
<id>urn:sha1:e841252840c48e9a0e5add9d82796b1d55c0f653</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit d836f5c69d87473ff65c06a6123e5b2cf5e56f5b ]

rtnl_create_link() needs to apply dev-&gt;min_mtu and dev-&gt;max_mtu
checks that we apply in do_setlink()

Otherwise malicious users can crash the kernel, for example after
an integer overflow :

BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in memset include/linux/string.h:365 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __alloc_skb+0x37b/0x5e0 net/core/skbuff.c:238
Write of size 32 at addr ffff88819f20b9c0 by task swapper/0/0

CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.5.0-rc1-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
 &lt;IRQ&gt;
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
 dump_stack+0x197/0x210 lib/dump_stack.c:118
 print_address_description.constprop.0.cold+0xd4/0x30b mm/kasan/report.c:374
 __kasan_report.cold+0x1b/0x41 mm/kasan/report.c:506
 kasan_report+0x12/0x20 mm/kasan/common.c:639
 check_memory_region_inline mm/kasan/generic.c:185 [inline]
 check_memory_region+0x134/0x1a0 mm/kasan/generic.c:192
 memset+0x24/0x40 mm/kasan/common.c:108
 memset include/linux/string.h:365 [inline]
 __alloc_skb+0x37b/0x5e0 net/core/skbuff.c:238
 alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:1049 [inline]
 alloc_skb_with_frags+0x93/0x590 net/core/skbuff.c:5664
 sock_alloc_send_pskb+0x7ad/0x920 net/core/sock.c:2242
 sock_alloc_send_skb+0x32/0x40 net/core/sock.c:2259
 mld_newpack+0x1d7/0x7f0 net/ipv6/mcast.c:1609
 add_grhead.isra.0+0x299/0x370 net/ipv6/mcast.c:1713
 add_grec+0x7db/0x10b0 net/ipv6/mcast.c:1844
 mld_send_cr net/ipv6/mcast.c:1970 [inline]
 mld_ifc_timer_expire+0x3d3/0x950 net/ipv6/mcast.c:2477
 call_timer_fn+0x1ac/0x780 kernel/time/timer.c:1404
 expire_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1449 [inline]
 __run_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1773 [inline]
 __run_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1740 [inline]
 run_timer_softirq+0x6c3/0x1790 kernel/time/timer.c:1786
 __do_softirq+0x262/0x98c kernel/softirq.c:292
 invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:373 [inline]
 irq_exit+0x19b/0x1e0 kernel/softirq.c:413
 exiting_irq arch/x86/include/asm/apic.h:536 [inline]
 smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x1a3/0x610 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1137
 apic_timer_interrupt+0xf/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:829
 &lt;/IRQ&gt;
RIP: 0010:native_safe_halt+0xe/0x10 arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:61
Code: 98 6b ea f9 eb 8a cc cc cc cc cc cc e9 07 00 00 00 0f 00 2d 44 1c 60 00 f4 c3 66 90 e9 07 00 00 00 0f 00 2d 34 1c 60 00 fb f4 &lt;c3&gt; cc 55 48 89 e5 41 57 41 56 41 55 41 54 53 e8 4e 5d 9a f9 e8 79
RSP: 0018:ffffffff89807ce8 EFLAGS: 00000286 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffff13
RAX: 1ffffffff13266ae RBX: ffffffff8987a1c0 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: dffffc0000000000 RSI: 0000000000000006 RDI: ffffffff8987aa54
RBP: ffffffff89807d18 R08: ffffffff8987a1c0 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: dffffc0000000000
R13: ffffffff8a799980 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
 arch_cpu_idle+0xa/0x10 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:690
 default_idle_call+0x84/0xb0 kernel/sched/idle.c:94
 cpuidle_idle_call kernel/sched/idle.c:154 [inline]
 do_idle+0x3c8/0x6e0 kernel/sched/idle.c:269
 cpu_startup_entry+0x1b/0x20 kernel/sched/idle.c:361
 rest_init+0x23b/0x371 init/main.c:451
 arch_call_rest_init+0xe/0x1b
 start_kernel+0x904/0x943 init/main.c:784
 x86_64_start_reservations+0x29/0x2b arch/x86/kernel/head64.c:490
 x86_64_start_kernel+0x77/0x7b arch/x86/kernel/head64.c:471
 secondary_startup_64+0xa4/0xb0 arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S:242

The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:ffffea00067c82c0 refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0
raw: 057ffe0000000000 ffffea00067c82c8 ffffea00067c82c8 0000000000000000
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

Memory state around the buggy address:
 ffff88819f20b880: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
 ffff88819f20b900: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
&gt;ffff88819f20b980: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
                                           ^
 ffff88819f20ba00: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
 ffff88819f20ba80: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff

Fixes: 61e84623ace3 ("net: centralize net_device min/max MTU checking")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Reported-by: syzbot &lt;syzkaller@googlegroups.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mmc: sdio: fix wl1251 vendor id</title>
<updated>2020-01-27T13:46:52Z</updated>
<author>
<name>H. Nikolaus Schaller</name>
<email>hns@goldelico.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-11-07T10:30:42Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=7effc7cf857317e78fdaa9111243ee9d24a8e80f'/>
<id>urn:sha1:7effc7cf857317e78fdaa9111243ee9d24a8e80f</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit e5db673e7fe2f971ec82039a28dc0811c2100e87 ]

v4.11-rc1 did introduce a patch series that rearranged the
sdio quirks into a header file. Unfortunately this did forget
to handle SDIO_VENDOR_ID_TI differently between wl1251 and
wl1271 with the result that although the wl1251 was found on
the sdio bus, the firmware did not load any more and there was
no interface registration.

This patch defines separate constants to be used by sdio quirks
and drivers.

Fixes: 884f38607897 ("mmc: core: move some sdio IDs out of quirks file")
Signed-off-by: H. Nikolaus Schaller &lt;hns@goldelico.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt; # v4.11+
Signed-off-by: Ulf Hansson &lt;ulf.hansson@linaro.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>dmaengine: imx-sdma: fix size check for sdma script_number</title>
<updated>2020-01-27T13:46:50Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Robin Gong</name>
<email>yibin.gong@nxp.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-09-24T09:49:18Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=1ca124f27e5083048bb9d8c5a87deca63b1a027e'/>
<id>urn:sha1:1ca124f27e5083048bb9d8c5a87deca63b1a027e</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit bd73dfabdda280fc5f05bdec79b6721b4b2f035f ]

Illegal memory will be touch if SDMA_SCRIPT_ADDRS_ARRAY_SIZE_V3
(41) exceed the size of structure sdma_script_start_addrs(40),
thus cause memory corrupt such as slob block header so that kernel
trap into while() loop forever in slob_free(). Please refer to below
code piece in imx-sdma.c:
for (i = 0; i &lt; sdma-&gt;script_number; i++)
	if (addr_arr[i] &gt; 0)
		saddr_arr[i] = addr_arr[i]; /* memory corrupt here */
That issue was brought by commit a572460be9cf ("dmaengine: imx-sdma: Add
support for version 3 firmware") because SDMA_SCRIPT_ADDRS_ARRAY_SIZE_V3
(38-&gt;41 3 scripts added) not align with script number added in
sdma_script_start_addrs(2 scripts).

Fixes: a572460be9cf ("dmaengine: imx-sdma: Add support for version 3 firmware")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel
Link: https://www.spinics.net/lists/arm-kernel/msg754895.html
Signed-off-by: Robin Gong &lt;yibin.gong@nxp.com&gt;
Reported-by: Jurgen Lambrecht &lt;J.Lambrecht@TELEVIC.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1569347584-3478-1-git-send-email-yibin.gong@nxp.com
[vkoul: update the patch title]
Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul &lt;vkoul@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tcp: annotate lockless access to tcp_memory_pressure</title>
<updated>2020-01-27T13:46:50Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-10-09T22:10:15Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=a8e920b22026c4717daee0e16ecee828aecfcb84'/>
<id>urn:sha1:a8e920b22026c4717daee0e16ecee828aecfcb84</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 1f142c17d19a5618d5a633195a46f2c8be9bf232 ]

tcp_memory_pressure is read without holding any lock,
and its value could be changed on other cpus.

Use READ_ONCE() to annotate these lockless reads.

The write side is already using atomic ops.

Fixes: b8da51ebb1aa ("tcp: introduce tcp_under_memory_pressure()")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;jakub.kicinski@netronome.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: add {READ|WRITE}_ONCE() annotations on -&gt;rskq_accept_head</title>
<updated>2020-01-27T13:46:50Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-10-09T21:51:20Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=681c8c92c4b78e80e0853f8e18861e93069d68e6'/>
<id>urn:sha1:681c8c92c4b78e80e0853f8e18861e93069d68e6</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 60b173ca3d1cd1782bd0096dc17298ec242f6fb1 ]

reqsk_queue_empty() is called from inet_csk_listen_poll() while
other cpus might write -&gt;rskq_accept_head value.

Use {READ|WRITE}_ONCE() to avoid compiler tricks
and potential KCSAN splats.

Fixes: fff1f3001cc5 ("tcp: add a spinlock to protect struct request_sock_queue")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;jakub.kicinski@netronome.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
