<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>user/sven/linux.git/include, branch v4.14.19</title>
<subtitle>Linux Kernel
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/atom?h=v4.14.19</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/atom?h=v4.14.19'/>
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<updated>2018-02-07T19:12:25Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>x86/retpoline: Avoid retpolines for built-in __init functions</title>
<updated>2018-02-07T19:12:25Z</updated>
<author>
<name>David Woodhouse</name>
<email>dwmw@amazon.co.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2018-02-01T11:27:20Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=838dbae0acd06da5fb0d0173dfddc72ca5650eb0'/>
<id>urn:sha1:838dbae0acd06da5fb0d0173dfddc72ca5650eb0</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 66f793099a636862a71c59d4a6ba91387b155e0c

There's no point in building init code with retpolines, since it runs before
any potentially hostile userspace does. And before the retpoline is actually
ALTERNATIVEd into place, for much of it.

Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse &lt;dwmw@amazon.co.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: karahmed@amazon.de
Cc: peterz@infradead.org
Cc: bp@alien8.de
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1517484441-1420-2-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;


</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>vfs, fdtable: Prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution</title>
<updated>2018-02-07T19:12:23Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Dan Williams</name>
<email>dan.j.williams@intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-01-30T01:03:05Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:98116c32d3b4b60bc1add46a81ed4f991ef02a7d</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 56c30ba7b348b90484969054d561f711ba196507

'fd' is a user controlled value that is used as a data dependency to
read from the 'fdt-&gt;fd' array.  In order to avoid potential leaks of
kernel memory values, block speculative execution of the instruction
stream that could issue reads based on an invalid 'file *' returned from
__fcheck_files.

Co-developed-by: Elena Reshetova &lt;elena.reshetova@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams &lt;dan.j.williams@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org
Cc: alan@linux.intel.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/151727418500.33451.17392199002892248656.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;


</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>array_index_nospec: Sanitize speculative array de-references</title>
<updated>2018-02-07T19:12:22Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Dan Williams</name>
<email>dan.j.williams@intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-01-30T01:02:22Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:478742cf80b732f6c3227c572184e18b6e8bcb05</id>
<content type='text'>
commit f3804203306e098dae9ca51540fcd5eb700d7f40

array_index_nospec() is proposed as a generic mechanism to mitigate
against Spectre-variant-1 attacks, i.e. an attack that bypasses boundary
checks via speculative execution. The array_index_nospec()
implementation is expected to be safe for current generation CPUs across
multiple architectures (ARM, x86).

Based on an original implementation by Linus Torvalds, tweaked to remove
speculative flows by Alexei Starovoitov, and tweaked again by Linus to
introduce an x86 assembly implementation for the mask generation.

Co-developed-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Co-developed-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Suggested-by: Cyril Novikov &lt;cnovikov@lynx.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams &lt;dan.j.williams@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Russell King &lt;linux@armlinux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org
Cc: alan@linux.intel.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/151727414229.33451.18411580953862676575.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;


</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>module/retpoline: Warn about missing retpoline in module</title>
<updated>2018-02-07T19:12:18Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Andi Kleen</name>
<email>ak@linux.intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-01-25T23:50:28Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:86b5b1eb18aa49eedff2c9a9087fc48d03099844</id>
<content type='text'>
commit caf7501a1b4ec964190f31f9c3f163de252273b8

There's a risk that a kernel which has full retpoline mitigations becomes
vulnerable when a module gets loaded that hasn't been compiled with the
right compiler or the right option.

To enable detection of that mismatch at module load time, add a module info
string "retpoline" at build time when the module was compiled with
retpoline support. This only covers compiled C source, but assembler source
or prebuilt object files are not checked.

If a retpoline enabled kernel detects a non retpoline protected module at
load time, print a warning and report it in the sysfs vulnerability file.

[ tglx: Massaged changelog ]

Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen &lt;ak@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: David Woodhouse &lt;dwmw2@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org
Cc: jeyu@kernel.org
Cc: arjan@linux.intel.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180125235028.31211-1-andi@firstfloor.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tty: fix data race between tty_init_dev and flush of buf</title>
<updated>2018-02-03T16:39:19Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Gaurav Kohli</name>
<email>gkohli@codeaurora.org</email>
</author>
<published>2018-01-23T07:46:34Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:3c538ad935465d7ba4bf0b5747fadcfdf05311c9</id>
<content type='text'>
commit b027e2298bd588d6fa36ed2eda97447fb3eac078 upstream.

There can be a race, if receive_buf call comes before
tty initialization completes in n_tty_open and tty-&gt;disc_data
may be NULL.

CPU0					CPU1
----					----
 000|n_tty_receive_buf_common()   	n_tty_open()
-001|n_tty_receive_buf2()		tty_ldisc_open.isra.3()
-002|tty_ldisc_receive_buf(inline)	tty_ldisc_setup()

Using ldisc semaphore lock in tty_init_dev till disc_data
initializes completely.

Signed-off-by: Gaurav Kohli &lt;gkohli@codeaurora.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Alan Cox &lt;alan@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KVM: Let KVM_SET_SIGNAL_MASK work as advertised</title>
<updated>2018-02-03T16:39:06Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Jan H. Schönherr</name>
<email>jschoenh@amazon.de</email>
</author>
<published>2017-11-24T21:39:01Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:40ba283e2602d319d00d4f6539b5113eb8d25d24</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 20b7035c66bacc909ae3ffe92c1a1ea7db99fe4f ]

KVM API says for the signal mask you set via KVM_SET_SIGNAL_MASK, that
"any unblocked signal received [...] will cause KVM_RUN to return with
-EINTR" and that "the signal will only be delivered if not blocked by
the original signal mask".

This, however, is only true, when the calling task has a signal handler
registered for a signal. If not, signal evaluation is short-circuited for
SIG_IGN and SIG_DFL, and the signal is either ignored without KVM_RUN
returning or the whole process is terminated.

Make KVM_SET_SIGNAL_MASK behave as advertised by utilizing logic similar
to that in do_sigtimedwait() to avoid short-circuiting of signals.

Signed-off-by: Jan H. SchÃ¶nherr &lt;jschoenh@amazon.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@verizon.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mac80211: use QoS NDP for AP probing</title>
<updated>2018-02-03T16:39:03Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Johannes Berg</name>
<email>johannes.berg@intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-11-21T13:46:08Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:e23090a7d8f05f03cf564148472130286f5ca9bf</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 7b6ddeaf27eca72795ceeae2f0f347db1b5f9a30 ]

When connected to a QoS/WMM AP, mac80211 should use a QoS NDP
for probing it, instead of a regular non-QoS one, fix this.

Change all the drivers to *not* allow QoS NDP for now, even
though it looks like most of them should be OK with that.

Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg &lt;johannes.berg@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@verizon.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>uapi: fix linux/kfd_ioctl.h userspace compilation errors</title>
<updated>2018-02-03T16:39:02Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Dmitry V. Levin</name>
<email>ldv@altlinux.org</email>
</author>
<published>2017-11-13T00:35:27Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:120c41af36df87401576f09498abf5696fb3d474</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit b4d085201d86af69cbda2214c6dafc0be240ef9f ]

Consistently use types provided by &lt;linux/types.h&gt; via &lt;drm/drm.h&gt;
to fix the following linux/kfd_ioctl.h userspace compilation errors:

/usr/include/linux/kfd_ioctl.h:236:2: error: unknown type name 'uint64_t'
  uint64_t va_addr; /* to KFD */
/usr/include/linux/kfd_ioctl.h:237:2: error: unknown type name 'uint32_t'
  uint32_t gpu_id; /* to KFD */
/usr/include/linux/kfd_ioctl.h:238:2: error: unknown type name 'uint32_t'
  uint32_t pad;
/usr/include/linux/kfd_ioctl.h:243:2: error: unknown type name 'uint64_t'
  uint64_t tile_config_ptr;
/usr/include/linux/kfd_ioctl.h:245:2: error: unknown type name 'uint64_t'
  uint64_t macro_tile_config_ptr;
/usr/include/linux/kfd_ioctl.h:249:2: error: unknown type name 'uint32_t'
  uint32_t num_tile_configs;
/usr/include/linux/kfd_ioctl.h:253:2: error: unknown type name 'uint32_t'
  uint32_t num_macro_tile_configs;
/usr/include/linux/kfd_ioctl.h:255:2: error: unknown type name 'uint32_t'
  uint32_t gpu_id;  /* to KFD */
/usr/include/linux/kfd_ioctl.h:256:2: error: unknown type name 'uint32_t'
  uint32_t gb_addr_config; /* from KFD */
/usr/include/linux/kfd_ioctl.h:257:2: error: unknown type name 'uint32_t'
  uint32_t num_banks;  /* from KFD */
/usr/include/linux/kfd_ioctl.h:258:2: error: unknown type name 'uint32_t'
  uint32_t num_ranks;  /* from KFD */

Fixes: 6a1c9510694fe ("drm/amdkfd: Adding new IOCTL for scratch memory v2")
Fixes: 5d71dbc3a5886 ("drm/amdkfd: Implement image tiling mode support v2")
Signed-off-by: Dmitry V. Levin &lt;ldv@altlinux.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Oded Gabbay &lt;oded.gabbay@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@verizon.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>rxrpc: Fix service endpoint expiry</title>
<updated>2018-02-03T16:39:01Z</updated>
<author>
<name>David Howells</name>
<email>dhowells@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-11-24T10:18:42Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=1392633bafde919b3d78449b8a1a1c9f50f2b72e'/>
<id>urn:sha1:1392633bafde919b3d78449b8a1a1c9f50f2b72e</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit f859ab61875978eeaa539740ff7f7d91f5d60006 ]

RxRPC service endpoints expire like they're supposed to by the following
means:

 (1) Mark dead rxrpc_net structs (with -&gt;live) rather than twiddling the
     global service conn timeout, otherwise the first rxrpc_net struct to
     die will cause connections on all others to expire immediately from
     then on.

 (2) Mark local service endpoints for which the socket has been closed
     (-&gt;service_closed) so that the expiration timeout can be much
     shortened for service and client connections going through that
     endpoint.

 (3) rxrpc_put_service_conn() needs to schedule the reaper when the usage
     count reaches 1, not 0, as idle conns have a 1 count.

 (4) The accumulator for the earliest time we might want to schedule for
     should be initialised to jiffies + MAX_JIFFY_OFFSET, not ULONG_MAX as
     the comparison functions use signed arithmetic.

 (5) Simplify the expiration handling, adding the expiration value to the
     idle timestamp each time rather than keeping track of the time in the
     past before which the idle timestamp must go to be expired.  This is
     much easier to read.

 (6) Ignore the timeouts if the net namespace is dead.

 (7) Restart the service reaper work item rather the client reaper.

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@verizon.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: gcm - add GCM IV size constant</title>
<updated>2018-02-03T16:38:49Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Corentin LABBE</name>
<email>clabbe.montjoie@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-08-22T08:08:08Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:cffaf2b6b179227b31f8e21d7f65b68630fc6606</id>
<content type='text'>
commit ef780324592dd639e4bfbc5b9bf8934b234b7c99 upstream.

Many GCM users use directly GCM IV size instead of using some constant.

This patch add all IV size constant used by GCM.

Signed-off-by: Corentin Labbe &lt;clabbe.montjoie@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
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