<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>user/sven/linux.git/include, branch v4.14.211</title>
<subtitle>Linux Kernel
</subtitle>
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<updated>2020-12-08T09:17:33Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>bonding: wait for sysfs kobject destruction before freeing struct slave</title>
<updated>2020-12-08T09:17:33Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Jamie Iles</name>
<email>jamie@nuviainc.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-11-20T14:28:27Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=1426584e3b4149afe0e4124fc6476e888a0eb0ed'/>
<id>urn:sha1:1426584e3b4149afe0e4124fc6476e888a0eb0ed</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit b9ad3e9f5a7a760ab068e33e1f18d240ba32ce92 ]

syzkaller found that with CONFIG_DEBUG_KOBJECT_RELEASE=y, releasing a
struct slave device could result in the following splat:

  kobject: 'bonding_slave' (00000000cecdd4fe): kobject_release, parent 0000000074ceb2b2 (delayed 1000)
  bond0 (unregistering): (slave bond_slave_1): Releasing backup interface
  ------------[ cut here ]------------
  ODEBUG: free active (active state 0) object type: timer_list hint: workqueue_select_cpu_near kernel/workqueue.c:1549 [inline]
  ODEBUG: free active (active state 0) object type: timer_list hint: delayed_work_timer_fn+0x0/0x98 kernel/workqueue.c:1600
  WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 842 at lib/debugobjects.c:485 debug_print_object+0x180/0x240 lib/debugobjects.c:485
  Kernel panic - not syncing: panic_on_warn set ...
  CPU: 1 PID: 842 Comm: kworker/u4:4 Tainted: G S                5.9.0-rc8+ #96
  Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
  Workqueue: netns cleanup_net
  Call trace:
   dump_backtrace+0x0/0x4d8 include/linux/bitmap.h:239
   show_stack+0x34/0x48 arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c:142
   __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
   dump_stack+0x174/0x1f8 lib/dump_stack.c:118
   panic+0x360/0x7a0 kernel/panic.c:231
   __warn+0x244/0x2ec kernel/panic.c:600
   report_bug+0x240/0x398 lib/bug.c:198
   bug_handler+0x50/0xc0 arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c:974
   call_break_hook+0x160/0x1d8 arch/arm64/kernel/debug-monitors.c:322
   brk_handler+0x30/0xc0 arch/arm64/kernel/debug-monitors.c:329
   do_debug_exception+0x184/0x340 arch/arm64/mm/fault.c:864
   el1_dbg+0x48/0xb0 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:65
   el1_sync_handler+0x170/0x1c8 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:93
   el1_sync+0x80/0x100 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:594
   debug_print_object+0x180/0x240 lib/debugobjects.c:485
   __debug_check_no_obj_freed lib/debugobjects.c:967 [inline]
   debug_check_no_obj_freed+0x200/0x430 lib/debugobjects.c:998
   slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1536 [inline]
   slab_free_freelist_hook+0x190/0x210 mm/slub.c:1577
   slab_free mm/slub.c:3138 [inline]
   kfree+0x13c/0x460 mm/slub.c:4119
   bond_free_slave+0x8c/0xf8 drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c:1492
   __bond_release_one+0xe0c/0xec8 drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c:2190
   bond_slave_netdev_event drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c:3309 [inline]
   bond_netdev_event+0x8f0/0xa70 drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c:3420
   notifier_call_chain+0xf0/0x200 kernel/notifier.c:83
   __raw_notifier_call_chain kernel/notifier.c:361 [inline]
   raw_notifier_call_chain+0x44/0x58 kernel/notifier.c:368
   call_netdevice_notifiers_info+0xbc/0x150 net/core/dev.c:2033
   call_netdevice_notifiers_extack net/core/dev.c:2045 [inline]
   call_netdevice_notifiers net/core/dev.c:2059 [inline]
   rollback_registered_many+0x6a4/0xec0 net/core/dev.c:9347
   unregister_netdevice_many.part.0+0x2c/0x1c0 net/core/dev.c:10509
   unregister_netdevice_many net/core/dev.c:10508 [inline]
   default_device_exit_batch+0x294/0x338 net/core/dev.c:10992
   ops_exit_list.isra.0+0xec/0x150 net/core/net_namespace.c:189
   cleanup_net+0x44c/0x888 net/core/net_namespace.c:603
   process_one_work+0x96c/0x18c0 kernel/workqueue.c:2269
   worker_thread+0x3f0/0xc30 kernel/workqueue.c:2415
   kthread+0x390/0x498 kernel/kthread.c:292
   ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:925

This is a potential use-after-free if the sysfs nodes are being accessed
whilst removing the struct slave, so wait for the object destruction to
complete before freeing the struct slave itself.

Fixes: 07699f9a7c8d ("bonding: add sysfs /slave dir for bond slave devices.")
Fixes: a068aab42258 ("bonding: Fix reference count leak in bond_sysfs_slave_add.")
Cc: Qiushi Wu &lt;wu000273@umn.edu&gt;
Cc: Jay Vosburgh &lt;j.vosburgh@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Veaceslav Falico &lt;vfalico@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Andy Gospodarek &lt;andy@greyhouse.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jamie Iles &lt;jamie@nuviainc.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201120142827.879226-1-jamie@nuviainc.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>USB: core: add endpoint-blacklist quirk</title>
<updated>2020-12-02T07:34:45Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Johan Hovold</name>
<email>johan@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2020-02-03T15:38:28Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:5a77c5050ee4f93e3c0696e6b2d7e8683e63cc95</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 73f8bda9b5dc1c69df2bc55c0cbb24461a6391a9 upstream

Add a new device quirk that can be used to blacklist endpoints.

Since commit 3e4f8e21c4f2 ("USB: core: fix check for duplicate
endpoints") USB core ignores any duplicate endpoints found during
descriptor parsing.

In order to handle devices where the first interfaces with duplicate
endpoints are the ones that should have their endpoints ignored, we need
to add a blacklist.

Tested-by: edes &lt;edes@gmx.net&gt;
Cc: stable &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold &lt;johan@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200203153830.26394-2-johan@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
[sudip: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Sudip Mukherjee &lt;sudipm.mukherjee@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>scsi: libiscsi: Fix NOP race condition</title>
<updated>2020-12-02T07:34:42Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Lee Duncan</name>
<email>lduncan@suse.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-11-06T19:33:17Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=3d68717efdc5a12cc71991acd02b73f295c99581'/>
<id>urn:sha1:3d68717efdc5a12cc71991acd02b73f295c99581</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit fe0a8a95e7134d0b44cd407bc0085b9ba8d8fe31 ]

iSCSI NOPs are sometimes "lost", mistakenly sent to the user-land iscsid
daemon instead of handled in the kernel, as they should be, resulting in a
message from the daemon like:

  iscsid: Got nop in, but kernel supports nop handling.

This can occur because of the new forward- and back-locks, and the fact
that an iSCSI NOP response can occur before processing of the NOP send is
complete. This can result in "conn-&gt;ping_task" being NULL in
iscsi_nop_out_rsp(), when the pointer is actually in the process of being
set.

To work around this, we add a new state to the "ping_task" pointer. In
addition to NULL (not assigned) and a pointer (assigned), we add the state
"being set", which is signaled with an INVALID pointer (using "-1").

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201106193317.16993-1-leeman.duncan@gmail.com
Reviewed-by: Mike Christie &lt;michael.christie@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Lee Duncan &lt;lduncan@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen &lt;martin.petersen@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>wireless: Use linux/stddef.h instead of stddef.h</title>
<updated>2020-12-02T07:34:39Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Hauke Mehrtens</name>
<email>hauke@hauke-m.de</email>
</author>
<published>2020-05-21T20:14:22Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=c6ff4318467b9636c3fde55150504d1899902568'/>
<id>urn:sha1:c6ff4318467b9636c3fde55150504d1899902568</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 1b9ae0c92925ac40489be526d67d0010d0724ce0 upstream.

When compiling inside the kernel include linux/stddef.h instead of
stddef.h. When I compile this header file in backports for power PC I
run into a conflict with ptrdiff_t. I was unable to reproduce this in
mainline kernel. I still would like to fix this problem in the kernel.

Fixes: 6989310f5d43 ("wireless: Use offsetof instead of custom macro.")
Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens &lt;hauke@hauke-m.de&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200521201422.16493-1-hauke@hauke-m.de
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg &lt;johannes.berg@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xen/events: add a new "late EOI" evtchn framework</title>
<updated>2020-11-18T17:28:01Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Juergen Gross</name>
<email>jgross@suse.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-11-03T14:29:02Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=b454e8e950fc9acfa9dfb435660b38b42a113cf8'/>
<id>urn:sha1:b454e8e950fc9acfa9dfb435660b38b42a113cf8</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 54c9de89895e0a36047fcc4ae754ea5b8655fb9d upstream.

In order to avoid tight event channel related IRQ loops add a new
framework of "late EOI" handling: the IRQ the event channel is bound
to will be masked until the event has been handled and the related
driver is capable to handle another event. The driver is responsible
for unmasking the event channel via the new function xen_irq_lateeoi().

This is similar to binding an event channel to a threaded IRQ, but
without having to structure the driver accordingly.

In order to support a future special handling in case a rogue guest
is sending lots of unsolicited events, add a flag to xen_irq_lateeoi()
which can be set by the caller to indicate the event was a spurious
one.

This is part of XSA-332.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Julien Grall &lt;julien@xen.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich &lt;jbeulich@suse.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini &lt;sstabellini@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu &lt;wl@xen.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>perf/core: Fix bad use of igrab()</title>
<updated>2020-11-18T17:28:00Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Song Liu</name>
<email>songliubraving@fb.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-04-18T06:29:07Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=3cd62032ff7d99509286e3594df93e95248ff037'/>
<id>urn:sha1:3cd62032ff7d99509286e3594df93e95248ff037</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 9511bce9fe8e5e6c0f923c09243a713eba560141 upstream

As Miklos reported and suggested:

 "This pattern repeats two times in trace_uprobe.c and in
  kernel/events/core.c as well:

      ret = kern_path(filename, LOOKUP_FOLLOW, &amp;path);
      if (ret)
          goto fail_address_parse;

      inode = igrab(d_inode(path.dentry));
      path_put(&amp;path);

  And it's wrong.  You can only hold a reference to the inode if you
  have an active ref to the superblock as well (which is normally
  through path.mnt) or holding s_umount.

  This way unmounting the containing filesystem while the tracepoint is
  active will give you the "VFS: Busy inodes after unmount..." message
  and a crash when the inode is finally put.

  Solution: store path instead of inode."

This patch fixes the issue in kernel/event/core.c.

Reviewed-and-tested-by: Alexander Shishkin &lt;alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com&gt;
Reported-by: Miklos Szeredi &lt;miklos@szeredi.hu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Song Liu &lt;songliubraving@fb.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: &lt;kernel-team@fb.com&gt;
Cc: Alexander Shishkin &lt;alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo &lt;acme@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Jiri Olsa &lt;jolsa@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Stephane Eranian &lt;eranian@google.com&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Vince Weaver &lt;vincent.weaver@maine.edu&gt;
Fixes: 375637bc5249 ("perf/core: Introduce address range filtering")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180418062907.3210386-2-songliubraving@fb.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sudip Mukherjee &lt;sudipm.mukherjee@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>random32: make prandom_u32() output unpredictable</title>
<updated>2020-11-18T17:28:00Z</updated>
<author>
<name>George Spelvin</name>
<email>lkml@sdf.org</email>
</author>
<published>2020-08-09T06:57:44Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=a16f026330fee92e434267dc35c21bceaa7fd573'/>
<id>urn:sha1:a16f026330fee92e434267dc35c21bceaa7fd573</id>
<content type='text'>
commit c51f8f88d705e06bd696d7510aff22b33eb8e638 upstream.

Non-cryptographic PRNGs may have great statistical properties, but
are usually trivially predictable to someone who knows the algorithm,
given a small sample of their output.  An LFSR like prandom_u32() is
particularly simple, even if the sample is widely scattered bits.

It turns out the network stack uses prandom_u32() for some things like
random port numbers which it would prefer are *not* trivially predictable.
Predictability led to a practical DNS spoofing attack.  Oops.

This patch replaces the LFSR with a homebrew cryptographic PRNG based
on the SipHash round function, which is in turn seeded with 128 bits
of strong random key.  (The authors of SipHash have *not* been consulted
about this abuse of their algorithm.)  Speed is prioritized over security;
attacks are rare, while performance is always wanted.

Replacing all callers of prandom_u32() is the quick fix.
Whether to reinstate a weaker PRNG for uses which can tolerate it
is an open question.

Commit f227e3ec3b5c ("random32: update the net random state on interrupt
and activity") was an earlier attempt at a solution.  This patch replaces
it.

Reported-by: Amit Klein &lt;aksecurity@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Willy Tarreau &lt;w@1wt.eu&gt;
Cc: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" &lt;Jason@zx2c4.com&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: tytso@mit.edu
Cc: Florian Westphal &lt;fw@strlen.de&gt;
Cc: Marc Plumb &lt;lkml.mplumb@gmail.com&gt;
Fixes: f227e3ec3b5c ("random32: update the net random state on interrupt and activity")
Signed-off-by: George Spelvin &lt;lkml@sdf.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20200808152628.GA27941@SDF.ORG/
[ willy: partial reversal of f227e3ec3b5c; moved SIPROUND definitions
  to prandom.h for later use; merged George's prandom_seed() proposal;
  inlined siprand_u32(); replaced the net_rand_state[] array with 4
  members to fix a build issue; cosmetic cleanups to make checkpatch
  happy; fixed RANDOM32_SELFTEST build ]
[wt: backported to 4.14 -- various context adjustments; timer API change]
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau &lt;w@1wt.eu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>can: can_create_echo_skb(): fix echo skb generation: always use skb_clone()</title>
<updated>2020-11-18T17:27:54Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Oleksij Rempel</name>
<email>o.rempel@pengutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2019-12-18T08:39:02Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=6df51ca5977cab16b7093b4290a87970d5ea11e1'/>
<id>urn:sha1:6df51ca5977cab16b7093b4290a87970d5ea11e1</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 286228d382ba6320f04fa2e7c6fc8d4d92e428f4 ]

All user space generated SKBs are owned by a socket (unless injected into the
key via AF_PACKET). If a socket is closed, all associated skbs will be cleaned
up.

This leads to a problem when a CAN driver calls can_put_echo_skb() on a
unshared SKB. If the socket is closed prior to the TX complete handler,
can_get_echo_skb() and the subsequent delivering of the echo SKB to all
registered callbacks, a SKB with a refcount of 0 is delivered.

To avoid the problem, in can_get_echo_skb() the original SKB is now always
cloned, regardless of shared SKB or not. If the process exists it can now
safely discard its SKBs, without disturbing the delivery of the echo SKB.

The problem shows up in the j1939 stack, when it clones the incoming skb, which
detects the already 0 refcount.

We can easily reproduce this with following example:

testj1939 -B -r can0: &amp;
cansend can0 1823ff40#0123

WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 293 at lib/refcount.c:25 refcount_warn_saturate+0x108/0x174
refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free.
Modules linked in: coda_vpu imx_vdoa videobuf2_vmalloc dw_hdmi_ahb_audio vcan
CPU: 0 PID: 293 Comm: cansend Not tainted 5.5.0-rc6-00376-g9e20dcb7040d #1
Hardware name: Freescale i.MX6 Quad/DualLite (Device Tree)
Backtrace:
[&lt;c010f570&gt;] (dump_backtrace) from [&lt;c010f90c&gt;] (show_stack+0x20/0x24)
[&lt;c010f8ec&gt;] (show_stack) from [&lt;c0c3e1a4&gt;] (dump_stack+0x8c/0xa0)
[&lt;c0c3e118&gt;] (dump_stack) from [&lt;c0127fec&gt;] (__warn+0xe0/0x108)
[&lt;c0127f0c&gt;] (__warn) from [&lt;c01283c8&gt;] (warn_slowpath_fmt+0xa8/0xcc)
[&lt;c0128324&gt;] (warn_slowpath_fmt) from [&lt;c0539c0c&gt;] (refcount_warn_saturate+0x108/0x174)
[&lt;c0539b04&gt;] (refcount_warn_saturate) from [&lt;c0ad2cac&gt;] (j1939_can_recv+0x20c/0x210)
[&lt;c0ad2aa0&gt;] (j1939_can_recv) from [&lt;c0ac9dc8&gt;] (can_rcv_filter+0xb4/0x268)
[&lt;c0ac9d14&gt;] (can_rcv_filter) from [&lt;c0aca2cc&gt;] (can_receive+0xb0/0xe4)
[&lt;c0aca21c&gt;] (can_receive) from [&lt;c0aca348&gt;] (can_rcv+0x48/0x98)
[&lt;c0aca300&gt;] (can_rcv) from [&lt;c09b1fdc&gt;] (__netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x64/0x88)
[&lt;c09b1f78&gt;] (__netif_receive_skb_one_core) from [&lt;c09b2070&gt;] (__netif_receive_skb+0x38/0x94)
[&lt;c09b2038&gt;] (__netif_receive_skb) from [&lt;c09b2130&gt;] (netif_receive_skb_internal+0x64/0xf8)
[&lt;c09b20cc&gt;] (netif_receive_skb_internal) from [&lt;c09b21f8&gt;] (netif_receive_skb+0x34/0x19c)
[&lt;c09b21c4&gt;] (netif_receive_skb) from [&lt;c0791278&gt;] (can_rx_offload_napi_poll+0x58/0xb4)

Fixes: 0ae89beb283a ("can: add destructor for self generated skbs")
Signed-off-by: Oleksij Rempel &lt;o.rempel@pengutronix.de&gt;
Link: http://lore.kernel.org/r/20200124132656.22156-1-o.rempel@pengutronix.de
Acked-by: Oliver Hartkopp &lt;socketcan@hartkopp.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde &lt;mkl@pengutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>time: Prevent undefined behaviour in timespec64_to_ns()</title>
<updated>2020-11-18T17:27:52Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Zeng Tao</name>
<email>prime.zeng@hisilicon.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-09-01T09:30:13Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=1b0c077318aa0ba8b0341d6de4f3da58dd0e56f4'/>
<id>urn:sha1:1b0c077318aa0ba8b0341d6de4f3da58dd0e56f4</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit cb47755725da7b90fecbb2aa82ac3b24a7adb89b ]

UBSAN reports:

Undefined behaviour in ./include/linux/time64.h:127:27
signed integer overflow:
17179869187 * 1000000000 cannot be represented in type 'long long int'
Call Trace:
 timespec64_to_ns include/linux/time64.h:127 [inline]
 set_cpu_itimer+0x65c/0x880 kernel/time/itimer.c:180
 do_setitimer+0x8e/0x740 kernel/time/itimer.c:245
 __x64_sys_setitimer+0x14c/0x2c0 kernel/time/itimer.c:336
 do_syscall_64+0xa1/0x540 arch/x86/entry/common.c:295

Commit bd40a175769d ("y2038: itimer: change implementation to timespec64")
replaced the original conversion which handled time clamping correctly with
timespec64_to_ns() which has no overflow protection.

Fix it in timespec64_to_ns() as this is not necessarily limited to the
usage in itimers.

[ tglx: Added comment and adjusted the fixes tag ]

Fixes: 361a3bf00582 ("time64: Add time64.h header and define struct timespec64")
Signed-off-by: Zeng Tao &lt;prime.zeng@hisilicon.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1598952616-6416-1-git-send-email-prime.zeng@hisilicon.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mm: always have io_remap_pfn_range() set pgprot_decrypted()</title>
<updated>2020-11-10T09:29:04Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Jason Gunthorpe</name>
<email>jgg@nvidia.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-11-02T01:08:00Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=f9f46d6c621665eedf3197dc83c0600f8b90c965'/>
<id>urn:sha1:f9f46d6c621665eedf3197dc83c0600f8b90c965</id>
<content type='text'>
commit f8f6ae5d077a9bdaf5cbf2ac960a5d1a04b47482 upstream.

The purpose of io_remap_pfn_range() is to map IO memory, such as a
memory mapped IO exposed through a PCI BAR.  IO devices do not
understand encryption, so this memory must always be decrypted.
Automatically call pgprot_decrypted() as part of the generic
implementation.

This fixes a bug where enabling AMD SME causes subsystems, such as RDMA,
using io_remap_pfn_range() to expose BAR pages to user space to fail.
The CPU will encrypt access to those BAR pages instead of passing
unencrypted IO directly to the device.

Places not mapping IO should use remap_pfn_range().

Fixes: aca20d546214 ("x86/mm: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption")
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe &lt;jgg@nvidia.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Cc: Tom Lendacky &lt;thomas.lendacky@amd.com&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin &lt;aryabinin@virtuozzo.com&gt;
Cc: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Cc: Brijesh Singh &lt;brijesh.singh@amd.com&gt;
Cc: Jonathan Corbet &lt;corbet@lwn.net&gt;
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Cc: "Dave Young" &lt;dyoung@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Alexander Potapenko &lt;glider@google.com&gt;
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk &lt;konrad.wilk@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Larry Woodman &lt;lwoodman@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Matt Fleming &lt;matt@codeblueprint.co.uk&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" &lt;mst@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Rik van Riel &lt;riel@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Toshimitsu Kani &lt;toshi.kani@hpe.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/0-v1-025d64bdf6c4+e-amd_sme_fix_jgg@nvidia.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
</feed>
