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<title>user/sven/linux.git/include, branch v4.14.39</title>
<subtitle>Linux Kernel
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/atom?h=v4.14.39</id>
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<updated>2018-05-01T19:58:27Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>arm/arm64: KVM: Add PSCI version selection API</title>
<updated>2018-05-01T19:58:27Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Marc Zyngier</name>
<email>marc.zyngier@arm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-01-21T16:42:56Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:e5a290c4ff77c9fb3fcb1dee7cfb356969daeee2</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 85bd0ba1ff9875798fad94218b627ea9f768f3c3 upstream.

Although we've implemented PSCI 0.1, 0.2 and 1.0, we expose either 0.1
or 1.0 to a guest, defaulting to the latest version of the PSCI
implementation that is compatible with the requested version. This is
no different from doing a firmware upgrade on KVM.

But in order to give a chance to hypothetical badly implemented guests
that would have a fit by discovering something other than PSCI 0.2,
let's provide a new API that allows userspace to pick one particular
version of the API.

This is implemented as a new class of "firmware" registers, where
we expose the PSCI version. This allows the PSCI version to be
save/restored as part of a guest migration, and also set to
any supported version if the guest requires it.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org #4.16
Reviewed-by: Christoffer Dall &lt;cdall@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier &lt;marc.zyngier@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>earlycon: Use a pointer table to fix __earlycon_table stride</title>
<updated>2018-05-01T19:58:24Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Daniel Kurtz</name>
<email>djkurtz@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2018-04-06T23:21:53Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:3a5465d0b61d91d9185570be027cf5e166af3d59</id>
<content type='text'>
commit dd709e72cb934eefd44de8d9969097173fbf45dc upstream.

Commit 99492c39f39f ("earlycon: Fix __earlycon_table stride") tried to fix
__earlycon_table stride by forcing the earlycon_id struct alignment to 32
and asking the linker to 32-byte align the __earlycon_table symbol.  This
fix was based on commit 07fca0e57fca92 ("tracing: Properly align linker
defined symbols") which tried a similar fix for the tracing subsystem.

However, this fix doesn't quite work because there is no guarantee that
gcc will place structures packed into an array format.  In fact, gcc 4.9
chooses to 64-byte align these structs by inserting additional padding
between the entries because it has no clue that they are supposed to be in
an array.  If we are unlucky, the linker will assign symbol
"__earlycon_table" to a 32-byte aligned address which does not correspond
to the 64-byte aligned contents of section "__earlycon_table".

To address this same problem, the fix to the tracing system was
subsequently re-implemented using a more robust table of pointers approach
by commits:
 3d56e331b653 ("tracing: Replace syscall_meta_data struct array with pointer array")
 654986462939 ("tracepoints: Fix section alignment using pointer array")
 e4a9ea5ee7c8 ("tracing: Replace trace_event struct array with pointer array")

Let's use this same "array of pointers to structs" approach for
EARLYCON_TABLE.

Fixes: 99492c39f39f ("earlycon: Fix __earlycon_table stride")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Kurtz &lt;djkurtz@chromium.org&gt;
Suggested-by: Aaron Durbin &lt;adurbin@chromium.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Rob Herring &lt;robh@kernel.org&gt;
Tested-by: Guenter Roeck &lt;groeck@chromium.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Guenter Roeck &lt;groeck@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: stable &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mtd: cfi: cmdset_0001: Do not allow read/write to suspend erase block.</title>
<updated>2018-05-01T19:58:18Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Joakim Tjernlund</name>
<email>joakim.tjernlund@transmode.se</email>
</author>
<published>2018-03-01T13:39:39Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:1de1ad0c2c4262a9eafcbede4e662aa503f71f6c</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 6510bbc88e3258631831ade49033537081950605 upstream.

Currently it is possible to read and/or write to suspend EB's.
Writing /dev/mtdX or /dev/mtdblockX from several processes may
break the flash state machine.

Signed-off-by: Joakim Tjernlund &lt;joakim.tjernlund@infinera.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Richard Weinberger &lt;richard@nod.at&gt;
Signed-off-by: Boris Brezillon &lt;boris.brezillon@bootlin.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ALSA: control: Hardening for potential Spectre v1</title>
<updated>2018-05-01T19:58:16Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Takashi Iwai</name>
<email>tiwai@suse.de</email>
</author>
<published>2018-04-24T05:45:56Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:6ab1a94d17dbf959f5910f56edda84889f5ddd39</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 088e861edffb84879cf0c0d1b02eda078c3a0ffe upstream.

As recently Smatch suggested, a few places in ALSA control core codes
may expand the array directly from the user-space value with
speculation:

  sound/core/control.c:1003 snd_ctl_elem_lock() warn: potential spectre issue 'kctl-&gt;vd'
  sound/core/control.c:1031 snd_ctl_elem_unlock() warn: potential spectre issue 'kctl-&gt;vd'
  sound/core/control.c:844 snd_ctl_elem_info() warn: potential spectre issue 'kctl-&gt;vd'
  sound/core/control.c:891 snd_ctl_elem_read() warn: potential spectre issue 'kctl-&gt;vd'
  sound/core/control.c:939 snd_ctl_elem_write() warn: potential spectre issue 'kctl-&gt;vd'

Although all these seem doing only the first load without further
reference, we may want to stay in a safer side, so hardening with
array_index_nospec() would still make sense.

In this patch, we put array_index_nospec() to the common
snd_ctl_get_ioff*() helpers instead of each caller.  These helpers are
also referred from some drivers, too, and basically all usages are to
calculate the array index from the user-space value, hence it's better
to cover there.

BugLink: https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&amp;m=152411496503418&amp;w=2
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter &lt;dan.carpenter@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai &lt;tiwai@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tty: Don't call panic() at tty_ldisc_init()</title>
<updated>2018-05-01T19:58:13Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Tetsuo Handa</name>
<email>penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp</email>
</author>
<published>2018-04-05T10:40:16Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:4854b9665c8193291199e7b3d53c63a14a19a802</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 903f9db10f18f735e62ba447147b6c434b6af003 upstream.

syzbot is reporting kernel panic [1] triggered by memory allocation failure
at tty_ldisc_get() from tty_ldisc_init(). But since both tty_ldisc_get()
and caller of tty_ldisc_init() can cleanly handle errors, tty_ldisc_init()
does not need to call panic() when tty_ldisc_get() failed.

[1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=883431818e036ae6a9981156a64b821110f39187

Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa &lt;penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp&gt;
Reported-by: syzbot &lt;syzkaller@googlegroups.com&gt;
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Cc: Jiri Slaby &lt;jslaby@suse.com&gt;
Cc: stable &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>virtio: add ability to iterate over vqs</title>
<updated>2018-05-01T19:58:11Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Michael S. Tsirkin</name>
<email>mst@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-04-20T17:22:40Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:7ae93ff136a00eccc0027d9a01c95680a9e8d756</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 24a7e4d20783c0514850f24a5c41ede46ab058f0 upstream.

For cleanup it's helpful to be able to simply scan all vqs and discard
all data. Add an iterator to do that.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin &lt;mst@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fsnotify: Fix fsnotify_mark_connector race</title>
<updated>2018-04-29T09:33:16Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Robert Kolchmeyer</name>
<email>rkolchmeyer@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-04-19T17:44:33Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:75b98294e09a9a027eecaff448b4c59f521b6b56</id>
<content type='text'>
commit d90a10e2444ba5a351fa695917258ff4c5709fa5 upstream.

fsnotify() acquires a reference to a fsnotify_mark_connector through
the SRCU-protected pointer to_tell-&gt;i_fsnotify_marks. However, it
appears that no precautions are taken in fsnotify_put_mark() to
ensure that fsnotify() drops its reference to this
fsnotify_mark_connector before assigning a value to its 'destroy_next'
field. This can result in fsnotify_put_mark() assigning a value
to a connector's 'destroy_next' field right before fsnotify() tries to
traverse the linked list referenced by the connector's 'list' field.
Since these two fields are members of the same union, this behavior
results in a kernel panic.

This issue is resolved by moving the connector's 'destroy_next' field
into the object pointer union. This should work since the object pointer
access is protected by both a spinlock and the value of the 'flags'
field, and the 'flags' field is cleared while holding the spinlock in
fsnotify_put_mark() before 'destroy_next' is updated. It shouldn't be
possible for another thread to accidentally read from the object pointer
after the 'destroy_next' field is updated.

The offending behavior here is extremely unlikely; since
fsnotify_put_mark() removes references to a connector (specifically,
it ensures that the connector is unreachable from the inode it was
formerly attached to) before updating its 'destroy_next' field, a
sizeable chunk of code in fsnotify_put_mark() has to execute in the
short window between when fsnotify() acquires the connector reference
and saves the value of its 'list' field. On the HEAD kernel, I've only
been able to reproduce this by inserting a udelay(1) in fsnotify().
However, I've been able to reproduce this issue without inserting a
udelay(1) anywhere on older unmodified release kernels, so I believe
it's worth fixing at HEAD.

References: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199437
Fixes: 08991e83b7286635167bab40927665a90fb00d81
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Robert Kolchmeyer &lt;rkolchmeyer@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Revert "mm/hmm: fix header file if/else/endif maze"</title>
<updated>2018-04-29T09:33:16Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Greg Kroah-Hartman</name>
<email>gregkh@linuxfoundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2018-04-27T11:49:00Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:540e7b5be492df4aab0ebbd13f658cc096149575</id>
<content type='text'>
This reverts commit 25df8b83e867dcfb660123e9589ebf6f094fcdd3 which is
commit b28b08de436a638c82d0cf3dcdbdbad055baf1fc upstream.

There are still build errors with this patch applied, and the upstream
patches do not seem to apply anymore, so reverting this patch seems like
the best thing to do at this point in time.

Reported-by: Randy Dunlap &lt;rdunlap@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Cc: Михаил Носов &lt;drdeimosnn@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Jérôme Glisse &lt;jglisse@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Balbir Singh &lt;bsingharora@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Ralph Campbell &lt;rcampbell@nvidia.com&gt;
Cc: John Hubbard &lt;jhubbard@nvidia.com&gt;
Cc: Evgeny Baskakov &lt;ebaskakov@nvidia.com&gt;
Cc: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KVM: s390: wire up bpb feature</title>
<updated>2018-04-29T09:33:14Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Christian Borntraeger</name>
<email>borntraeger@de.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-04-27T05:36:27Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:ea5566fecd035bc5d84d8bd341b655238134deb8</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 35b3fde6203b932b2b1a5b53b3d8808abc9c4f60 ]

The new firmware interfaces for branch prediction behaviour changes
are transparently available for the guest. Nevertheless, there is
new state attached that should be migrated and properly resetted.
Provide a mechanism for handling reset, migration and VSIE.

Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger &lt;borntraeger@de.ibm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand &lt;david@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck &lt;cohuck@redhat.com&gt;
[Changed capability number to 152. - Radim]
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář &lt;rkrcmar@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky &lt;schwidefsky@de.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: sched: ife: handle malformed tlv length</title>
<updated>2018-04-29T09:33:13Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Alexander Aring</name>
<email>aring@mojatatu.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-04-20T19:15:04Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:388f3d9708fcc96cea44fe343ffe055e58ba6e6b</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit cc74eddd0ff325d57373cea99f642b787d7f76f5 ]

There is currently no handling to check on a invalid tlv length. This
patch adds such handling to avoid killing the kernel with a malformed
ife packet.

Signed-off-by: Alexander Aring &lt;aring@mojatatu.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Yotam Gigi &lt;yotam.gi@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Jamal Hadi Salim &lt;jhs@mojatatu.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
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