user/sven/linux.git/include, branch v4.19.103

x86/apic/msi: Plug non-maskable MSI affinity race

2020-02-11T12:34:18Z

commit 6f1a4891a5928a5969c87fa5a584844c983ec823 upstream. Evan tracked down a subtle race between the update of the MSI message and the device raising an interrupt internally on PCI devices which do not support MSI masking. The update of the MSI message is non-atomic and consists of either 2 or 3 sequential 32bit wide writes to the PCI config space. - Write address low 32bits - Write address high 32bits (If supported by device) - Write data When an interrupt is migrated then both address and data might change, so the kernel attempts to mask the MSI interrupt first. But for MSI masking is optional, so there exist devices which do not provide it. That means that if the device raises an interrupt internally between the writes then a MSI message is sent built from half updated state. On x86 this can lead to spurious interrupts on the wrong interrupt vector when the affinity setting changes both address and data. As a consequence the device interrupt can be lost causing the device to become stuck or malfunctioning. Evan tried to handle that by disabling MSI accross an MSI message update. That's not feasible because disabling MSI has issues on its own: If MSI is disabled the PCI device is routing an interrupt to the legacy INTx mechanism. The INTx delivery can be disabled, but the disablement is not working on all devices. Some devices lose interrupts when both MSI and INTx delivery are disabled. Another way to solve this would be to enforce the allocation of the same vector on all CPUs in the system for this kind of screwed devices. That could be done, but it would bring back the vector space exhaustion problems which got solved a few years ago. Fortunately the high address (if supported by the device) is only relevant when X2APIC is enabled which implies interrupt remapping. In the interrupt remapping case the affinity setting is happening at the interrupt remapping unit and the PCI MSI message is programmed only once when the PCI device is initialized. That makes it possible to solve it with a two step update: 1) Target the MSI msg to the new vector on the current target CPU 2) Target the MSI msg to the new vector on the new target CPU In both cases writing the MSI message is only changing a single 32bit word which prevents the issue of inconsistency. After writing the final destination it is necessary to check whether the device issued an interrupt while the intermediate state #1 (new vector, current CPU) was in effect. This is possible because the affinity change is always happening on the current target CPU. The code runs with interrupts disabled, so the interrupt can be detected by checking the IRR of the local APIC. If the vector is pending in the IRR then the interrupt is retriggered on the new target CPU by sending an IPI for the associated vector on the target CPU. This can cause spurious interrupts on both the local and the new target CPU. 1) If the new vector is not in use on the local CPU and the device affected by the affinity change raised an interrupt during the transitional state (step #1 above) then interrupt entry code will ignore that spurious interrupt. The vector is marked so that the 'No irq handler for vector' warning is supressed once. 2) If the new vector is in use already on the local CPU then the IRR check might see an pending interrupt from the device which is using this vector. The IPI to the new target CPU will then invoke the handler of the device, which got the affinity change, even if that device did not issue an interrupt 3) If the new vector is in use already on the local CPU and the device affected by the affinity change raised an interrupt during the transitional state (step #1 above) then the handler of the device which uses that vector on the local CPU will be invoked. expose issues in device driver interrupt handlers which are not prepared to handle a spurious interrupt correctly. This not a regression, it's just exposing something which was already broken as spurious interrupts can happen for a lot of reasons and all driver handlers need to be able to deal with them. Reported-by: Evan Green Debugged-by: Evan Green Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Tested-by: Evan Green Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/87imkr4s7n.fsf@nanos.tec.linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

mm: zero remaining unavailable struct pages

2020-02-11T12:34:18Z

[ Upstream commit 907ec5fca3dc38d37737de826f06f25b063aa08e ] Patch series "mm: Fix for movable_node boot option", v3. This patch series contains a fix for the movable_node boot option issue which was introduced by commit 124049decbb1 ("x86/e820: put !E820_TYPE_RAM regions into memblock.reserved"). The commit breaks the option because it changed the memory gap range to reserved memblock. So, the node is marked as Normal zone even if the SRAT has Hot pluggable affinity. First and second patch fix the original issue which the commit tried to fix, then revert the commit. This patch (of 3): There is a kernel panic that is triggered when reading /proc/kpageflags on the kernel booted with kernel parameter 'memmap=nn[KMG]!ss[KMG]': BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at fffffffffffffffe PGD 9b20e067 P4D 9b20e067 PUD 9b210067 PMD 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI CPU: 2 PID: 1728 Comm: page-types Not tainted 4.17.0-rc6-mm1-v4.17-rc6-180605-0816-00236-g2dfb086ef02c+ #160 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.11.0-2.fc28 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:stable_page_flags+0x27/0x3c0 Code: 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 85 ff 0f 84 a0 03 00 00 41 54 55 49 89 fc 53 48 8b 57 08 48 8b 2f 48 8d 42 ff 83 e2 01 48 0f 44 c7 <48> 8b 00 f6 c4 01 0f 84 10 03 00 00 31 db 49 8b 54 24 08 4c 89 e7 RSP: 0018:ffffbbd44111fde0 EFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: fffffffffffffffe RBX: 00007fffffffeff9 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000202 RDI: ffffed1182fff5c0 RBP: ffffffffffffffff R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000001 R10: ffffbbd44111fed8 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffed1182fff5c0 R13: 00000000000bffd7 R14: 0000000002fff5c0 R15: ffffbbd44111ff10 FS: 00007efc4335a500(0000) GS:ffff93a5bfc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: fffffffffffffffe CR3: 00000000b2a58000 CR4: 00000000001406e0 Call Trace: kpageflags_read+0xc7/0x120 proc_reg_read+0x3c/0x60 __vfs_read+0x36/0x170 vfs_read+0x89/0x130 ksys_pread64+0x71/0x90 do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x160 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 RIP: 0033:0x7efc42e75e23 Code: 09 00 ba 9f 01 00 00 e8 ab 81 f4 ff 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 83 3d 29 0a 2d 00 00 75 13 49 89 ca b8 11 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 34 c3 48 83 ec 08 e8 db d3 01 00 48 89 04 24 According to kernel bisection, this problem became visible due to commit f7f99100d8d9 which changes how struct pages are initialized. Memblock layout affects the pfn ranges covered by node/zone. Consider that we have a VM with 2 NUMA nodes and each node has 4GB memory, and the default (no memmap= given) memblock layout is like below: MEMBLOCK configuration: memory size = 0x00000001fff75c00 reserved size = 0x000000000300c000 memory.cnt = 0x4 memory[0x0] [0x0000000000001000-0x000000000009efff], 0x000000000009e000 bytes on node 0 flags: 0x0 memory[0x1] [0x0000000000100000-0x00000000bffd6fff], 0x00000000bfed7000 bytes on node 0 flags: 0x0 memory[0x2] [0x0000000100000000-0x000000013fffffff], 0x0000000040000000 bytes on node 0 flags: 0x0 memory[0x3] [0x0000000140000000-0x000000023fffffff], 0x0000000100000000 bytes on node 1 flags: 0x0 ... If you give memmap=1G!4G (so it just covers memory[0x2]), the range [0x100000000-0x13fffffff] is gone: MEMBLOCK configuration: memory size = 0x00000001bff75c00 reserved size = 0x000000000300c000 memory.cnt = 0x3 memory[0x0] [0x0000000000001000-0x000000000009efff], 0x000000000009e000 bytes on node 0 flags: 0x0 memory[0x1] [0x0000000000100000-0x00000000bffd6fff], 0x00000000bfed7000 bytes on node 0 flags: 0x0 memory[0x2] [0x0000000140000000-0x000000023fffffff], 0x0000000100000000 bytes on node 1 flags: 0x0 ... This causes shrinking node 0's pfn range because it is calculated by the address range of memblock.memory. So some of struct pages in the gap range are left uninitialized. We have a function zero_resv_unavail() which does zeroing the struct pages outside memblock.memory, but currently it covers only the reserved unavailable range (i.e. memblock.memory && !memblock.reserved). This patch extends it to cover all unavailable range, which fixes the reported issue. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181002143821.5112-2-msys.mizuma@gmail.com Fixes: f7f99100d8d9 ("mm: stop zeroing memory during allocation in vmemmap") Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi Signed-off-by-by: Masayoshi Mizuma Tested-by: Oscar Salvador Tested-by: Masayoshi Mizuma Reviewed-by: Pavel Tatashin Cc: Ingo Molnar Cc: Michal Hocko Cc: Thomas Gleixner Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

KVM: Use vcpu-specific gva->hva translation when querying host page size

2020-02-11T12:34:17Z

[ Upstream commit f9b84e19221efc5f493156ee0329df3142085f28 ] Use kvm_vcpu_gfn_to_hva() when retrieving the host page size so that the correct set of memslots is used when handling x86 page faults in SMM. Fixes: 54bf36aac520 ("KVM: x86: use vcpu-specific functions to read/write/translate GFNs") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

KVM: x86: Use gpa_t for cr2/gpa to fix TDP support on 32-bit KVM

2020-02-11T12:34:17Z

[ Upstream commit 736c291c9f36b07f8889c61764c28edce20e715d ] Convert a plethora of parameters and variables in the MMU and page fault flows from type gva_t to gpa_t to properly handle TDP on 32-bit KVM. Thanks to PSE and PAE paging, 32-bit kernels can access 64-bit physical addresses. When TDP is enabled, the fault address is a guest physical address and thus can be a 64-bit value, even when both KVM and its guest are using 32-bit virtual addressing, e.g. VMX's VMCS.GUEST_PHYSICAL is a 64-bit field, not a natural width field. Using a gva_t for the fault address means KVM will incorrectly drop the upper 32-bits of the GPA. Ditto for gva_to_gpa() when it is used to translate L2 GPAs to L1 GPAs. Opportunistically rename variables and parameters to better reflect the dual address modes, e.g. use "cr2_or_gpa" for fault addresses and plain "addr" instead of "vaddr" when the address may be either a GVA or an L2 GPA. Similarly, use "gpa" in the nonpaging_page_fault() flows to avoid a confusing "gpa_t gva" declaration; this also sets the stage for a future patch to combing nonpaging_page_fault() and tdp_page_fault() with minimal churn. Sprinkle in a few comments to document flows where an address is known to be a GVA and thus can be safely truncated to a 32-bit value. Add WARNs in kvm_handle_page_fault() and FNAME(gva_to_gpa_nested)() to help document such cases and detect bugs. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

bonding/alb: properly access headers in bond_alb_xmit()

2020-02-11T12:34:14Z

[ Upstream commit 38f88c45404293bbc027b956def6c10cbd45c616 ] syzbot managed to send an IPX packet through bond_alb_xmit() and af_packet and triggered a use-after-free. First, bond_alb_xmit() was using ipx_hdr() helper to reach the IPX header, but ipx_hdr() was using the transport offset instead of the network offset. In the particular syzbot report transport offset was 0xFFFF This patch removes ipx_hdr() since it was only (mis)used from bonding. Then we need to make sure IPv4/IPv6/IPX headers are pulled in skb->head before dereferencing anything. BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in bond_alb_xmit+0x153a/0x1590 drivers/net/bonding/bond_alb.c:1452 Read of size 2 at addr ffff8801ce56dfff by task syz-executor.2/18108 (if (ipx_hdr(skb)->ipx_checksum != IPX_NO_CHECKSUM) ...) Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: [] __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline] [] dump_stack+0x14d/0x20b lib/dump_stack.c:53 [] print_address_description+0x6f/0x20b mm/kasan/report.c:282 [] kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:380 [inline] [] kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:438 [inline] [] kasan_report.cold+0x8c/0x2a0 mm/kasan/report.c:422 [] __asan_report_load_n_noabort+0xf/0x20 mm/kasan/report.c:469 [] bond_alb_xmit+0x153a/0x1590 drivers/net/bonding/bond_alb.c:1452 [] __bond_start_xmit drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c:4199 [inline] [] bond_start_xmit+0x4f4/0x1570 drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c:4224 [] __netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4525 [inline] [] netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4539 [inline] [] xmit_one net/core/dev.c:3611 [inline] [] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x168/0x910 net/core/dev.c:3627 [] __dev_queue_xmit+0x1f55/0x33b0 net/core/dev.c:4238 [] dev_queue_xmit+0x18/0x20 net/core/dev.c:4278 [] packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:3226 [inline] [] packet_sendmsg+0x4919/0x70b0 net/packet/af_packet.c:3252 [] sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:673 [inline] [] sock_sendmsg+0x12c/0x160 net/socket.c:684 [] __sys_sendto+0x262/0x380 net/socket.c:1996 [] SYSC_sendto net/socket.c:2008 [inline] [] SyS_sendto+0x40/0x60 net/socket.c:2004 Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Reported-by: syzbot Cc: Jay Vosburgh Cc: Veaceslav Falico Cc: Andy Gospodarek Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

percpu: Separate decrypted varaibles anytime encryption can be enabled

2020-02-11T12:34:11Z

commit 264b0d2bee148073c117e7bbbde5be7125a53be1 upstream. CONFIG_VIRTUALIZATION may not be enabled for memory encrypted guests. If disabled, decrypted per-CPU variables may end up sharing the same page with variables that should be left encrypted. Always separate per-CPU variables that should be decrypted into their own page anytime memory encryption can be enabled in the guest rather than rely on any other config option that may not be enabled. Fixes: ac26963a1175 ("percpu: Introduce DEFINE_PER_CPU_DECRYPTED") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.15+ Signed-off-by: Erdem Aktas Signed-off-by: David Rientjes Signed-off-by: Dennis Zhou Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

eventfd: track eventfd_signal() recursion depth

2020-02-11T12:34:08Z

commit b5e683d5cab8cd433b06ae178621f083cabd4f63 upstream. eventfd use cases from aio and io_uring can deadlock due to circular or resursive calling, when eventfd_signal() tries to grab the waitqueue lock. On top of that, it's also possible to construct notification chains that are deep enough that we could blow the stack. Add a percpu counter that tracks the percpu recursion depth, warn if we exceed it. The counter is also exposed so that users of eventfd_signal() can do the right thing if it's non-zero in the context where it is called. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.19+ Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

media: v4l2-rect.h: fix v4l2_rect_map_inside() top/left adjustments

2020-02-11T12:33:57Z

commit f51e50db4c20d46930b33be3f208851265694f3e upstream. boundary->width and boundary->height are sizes relative to boundary->left and boundary->top coordinates, but they were not being taken into consideration to adjust r->left and r->top, leading to the following error: Consider the follow as initial values for boundary and r: struct v4l2_rect boundary = { .left = 100, .top = 100, .width = 800, .height = 600, } struct v4l2_rect r = { .left = 0, .top = 0, .width = 1920, .height = 960, } calling v4l2_rect_map_inside(&r, &boundary) was modifying r to: r = { .left = 0, .top = 0, .width = 800, .height = 600, } Which is wrongly outside the boundary rectangle, because: v4l2_rect_set_max_size(r, boundary); // r->width = 800, r->height = 600 ... if (r->left + r->width > boundary->width) // true r->left = boundary->width - r->width; // r->left = 800 - 800 if (r->top + r->height > boundary->height) // true r->top = boundary->height - r->height; // r->height = 600 - 600 Fix this by considering top/left coordinates from boundary. Fixes: ac49de8c49d7 ("[media] v4l2-rect.h: new header with struct v4l2_rect helper functions") Signed-off-by: Helen Koike Cc: # for v4.7 and up Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

cfg80211: Fix radar event during another phy CAC

2020-02-05T14:43:46Z

[ Upstream commit 26ec17a1dc5ecdd8d91aba63ead6f8b5ad5dea0d ] In case a radar event of CAC_FINISHED or RADAR_DETECTED happens during another phy is during CAC we might need to cancel that CAC. If we got a radar in a channel that another phy is now doing CAC on then the CAC should be canceled there. If, for example, 2 phys doing CAC on the same channels, or on comptable channels, once on of them will finish his CAC the other might need to cancel his CAC, since it is no longer relevant. To fix that the commit adds an callback and implement it in mac80211 to end CAC. This commit also adds a call to said callback if after a radar event we see the CAC is no longer relevant Signed-off-by: Orr Mazor Reviewed-by: Sergey Matyukevich Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191222145449.15792-1-Orr.Mazor@tandemg.com [slightly reformat/reword commit message] Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

rseq: Unregister rseq for clone CLONE_VM

2020-02-05T14:43:42Z

[ Upstream commit 463f550fb47bede3a5d7d5177f363a6c3b45d50b ] It has been reported by Google that rseq is not behaving properly with respect to clone when CLONE_VM is used without CLONE_THREAD. It keeps the prior thread's rseq TLS registered when the TLS of the thread has moved, so the kernel can corrupt the TLS of the parent. The approach of clearing the per task-struct rseq registration on clone with CLONE_THREAD flag is incomplete. It does not cover the use-case of clone with CLONE_VM set, but without CLONE_THREAD. Here is the rationale for unregistering rseq on clone with CLONE_VM flag set: 1) CLONE_THREAD requires CLONE_SIGHAND, which requires CLONE_VM to be set. Therefore, just checking for CLONE_VM covers all CLONE_THREAD uses. There is no point in checking for both CLONE_THREAD and CLONE_VM, 2) There is the possibility of an unlikely scenario where CLONE_SETTLS is used without CLONE_VM. In order to be an issue, it would require that the rseq TLS is in a shared memory area. I do not plan on adding CLONE_SETTLS to the set of clone flags which unregister RSEQ, because it would require that we also unregister RSEQ on set_thread_area(2) and arch_prctl(2) ARCH_SET_FS for completeness. So rather than doing a partial solution, it appears better to let user-space explicitly perform rseq unregistration across clone if needed in scenarios where CLONE_VM is not set. Signed-off-by: Mathieu Desnoyers Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Thomas Gleixner Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191211161713.4490-3-mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin